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The National People’s Power (NPP) Government assumed office under exceptionally difficult circumstances. It inherited an economy that had been driven to collapse by the policies and mismanagement of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) administration that assumed office in 2019.  

 Stabilising public finances, restoring confidence, and rebuilding institutional credibility were already formidable challenges. Yet scarcely had this process begun when the country was struck by the unexpected and devastating natural disaster in the form of Cyclone Ditwah. The scale of destruction caused by the cyclone – through floods, landslides, and widespread displacement – has added a new and urgent layer to the national recovery agenda.

In the immediate aftermath, the government responded with a degree of effectiveness made possible by an unusual fiscal circumstance. Surplus funds were available in the Treasury, largely generated through revenue from vehicle imports, enabling the state to make cash transfers to affected families. These transfers provided short-term relief and signalled an effort to ensure that the most vulnerable were not left without assistance. Alongside this official response, Sri Lankan society once again demonstrated its resilience and solidarity.

Spontaneous voluntary action by citizens, civil society groups, religious institutions, and local organisations together with the armed forces and the Police played a critical role in rescue, relief, and early recovery efforts, helping to mitigate the human cost of floods and landslides.

However, emergency relief – however necessary – is only the first step. The real challenge lies ahead. Rebuilding after Cyclone Ditwah will require careful planning, sustained implementation, and substantial financial resources over many months, if not years. Current assessments suggest that the scale of destruction, affecting nearly two million people, far exceeds what can be managed through domestic resources alone.

While there has been encouraging support from the international community, including expressions of solidarity from bilateral partners and multilateral agencies, preliminary estimates indicate that such assistance will fall well short of what is required for comprehensive reconstruction.

It is in this context that the call made by the Leader of the Opposition, Sajith Premadasa, assumes particular importance. Very early in the post-Ditwah period, he urged the government to convene an International Donor Conference to mobilise global resources for the rebuilding effort. This proposal reflects both political pragmatism and historical precedent. Sri Lanka has, in the past, successfully mobilised international assistance through donor conferences following major crises.

Reports now suggest that the government is moving in this direction, awaiting the completion of formal needs assessments before issuing invitations to the international community. This is a necessary and technically sound approach, as credible data is essential to secure effective donor commitments.

Yet, the success of such a donor conference will depend not only on technical preparation but also on political signalling. Donors do not merely fund projects; they invest in governance arrangements, institutional credibility, and national consensus. In this regard, Sri Lanka has an opportunity – indeed an obligation – to present a united national front that transcends partisan divisions.

A “whole-of-Sri-Lanka” approach, bringing together government and opposition in a structured and visible partnership, would significantly enhance confidence among development partners and ensure more effective outcomes on the ground.

A joint effort between the government and the opposition offers several concrete advantages. First, it signals political stability and national unity at a time of crisis. For donors, unity reduces concerns about policy reversals, politicisation of aid, or implementation paralysis. Second, structured consultation between government and opposition can improve decision-making quality. Diverse perspectives can help identify risks, refine priorities, and ensure that rebuilding strategies are inclusive and socially responsive. Third, shared responsibility helps distribute the political and administrative burden of reconstruction, allowing the government to draw on the experience, networks, and expertise available across the political spectrum.

Importantly, such cooperation need not be improvised or informal. Sri Lanka already possesses a statutory mechanism designed precisely for this purpose: the Disaster Management Council established under the Disaster Management Act No. 13 of 2005. The Act which was enacted in the aftermath of the Tsunami of 2004 provides a comprehensive legal framework for disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. It envisages disaster governance not as an ad hoc executive function but as a coordinated, multi-actor process anchored in law.

Under the Act, the Disaster Management Council is chaired by the President and includes the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, specified Cabinet Ministers, and nominees of the Leader of the Opposition. This composition reflects a deliberate design choice: disaster management is to be treated as a national, rather than partisan, responsibility. The Council is mandated to provide policy direction, coordinate institutional responses, and ensure coherence across ministries and agencies. Crucially, the law requires the Council to meet at least once every three months, underscoring the importance Parliament attached to continuity and preparedness.

Despite this clear legal mandate, the Council remained dormant for an extended period. For nearly seven years it reportedly did not meet, even though Sri Lanka experienced multiple disasters during that time. This institutional neglect weakened coordination, eroded preparedness, and deprived the country of a vital platform for inclusive decision-making. It was only in August 2025, under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, that the Council was convened again, marking an important step toward restoring lawful disaster governance.

What remains unclear, however, is whether the Disaster Management Council has met following Cyclone Ditwah. If the Council has not yet been convened in the post-Ditwah period, the government would do well to do so urgently – ideally before convening any international donor conference. Establishing the Council as the apex coordinating body for recovery would demonstrate institutional seriousness and respect for the rule of law.

Reactivating the Disaster Management Council can serve several critical purposes in the current context.

First, it can function as the central forum for reviewing Needs Assessments and agreeing on national rebuilding priorities. This would ensure that data collection, sectoral plans, and funding proposals are subjected to collective scrutiny.

Second, it provides a legitimate mechanism for incorporating opposition input in a structured and transparent manner, reducing the risk of parallel or competing initiatives.

Third, it can act as the governance backbone for donor engagement, offering a clear institutional counterpart for international partners.

Moreover, the Council can help frame rebuilding not merely as physical reconstruction but as an opportunity for resilience-building. Post-Ditwah recovery must integrate disaster risk reduction, climate adaptation, land-use planning, and social protection. Landslides and floods are not isolated events; they are increasingly frequent manifestations of climate vulnerability compounded by unplanned development.

A bipartisan council is better placed to support long-term policy reforms that may be politically sensitive but nationally necessary.

A united approach also carries symbolic weight domestically. For nearly two million affected citizens, confidence in the recovery process depends on trust – trust that assistance will be fair, timely, and free from partisan bias. When government and opposition stand together, it reassures communities that rebuilding is a national priority rather than a political contest. It also encourages continued civic engagement and voluntary action, which have already played such a commendable role in the immediate aftermath of the disaster.

The opposition, for its part, has a constructive role to play beyond critique. By participating actively in the Disaster Management Council and related mechanisms, it can contribute ideas, monitor implementation, and share responsibility for outcomes. This does not dilute its role as a watchdog; rather, it strengthens democratic accountability by embedding oversight within formal governance structures. In moments of national crisis, responsible opposition enhances, rather than weakens, democracy.

For the government, embracing such cooperation would demonstrate political maturity and confidence. It would also help counter perceptions that rebuilding is being handled in a narrow or centralised manner. By institutionalising collaboration through the mechanisms already provided in law, the government can ensure that unity is not rhetorical but operational.

As the country prepares for an international donor conference, the signal it sends matters greatly. A united front—government and opposition working together through the Disaster Management Council—would not only strengthen Sri Lanka’s case for global support but also lay the foundation for a more resilient, accountable, and cohesive recovery process. In the aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah, rebuilding the nation must be a collective endeavour, carried forward not by one political camp, but by Sri Lanka as a whole.

(javidyusuf@gmail.com)