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Since 2019, Sri Lanka has confronted three major national crises of unprecedented scale: the Easter Sunday terrorist attacks, the Covid-19 pandemic, and now Cyclone Ditwah. Each of these events posed distinct challenges—security, public health, and disaster management—yet all shared a common institutional feature: they unfolded under the framework of the executive presidency. A close examination of how these crises were handled reveals a recurring structural weakness.  

The executive presidency, by concentrating power and responsibility in a single individual, lacks the operational capacity to effectively manage tragedies of such magnitude. This is not a reflection of the capacities of individual presidents, but rather of a system of governance that overburdens one office at the expense of institutional autonomy, professionalism, and collective decision-making.

One of the most troubling features evident in the lead-up to the Easter Sunday attacks was the absence of operational autonomy within the state apparatus. Information subsequently placed in the public domain showed that intelligence regarding the planned attacks existed across multiple arms of government. Yet, despite this abundance of warning, no decisive preventive action was taken. The reason was not a lack of capability or legal authority within these institutions, but a deeply ingrained culture of dependency on hierarchical approval.

Over time, the executive presidency has fostered a system where initiative is discouraged and responsibility is deferred upwards. Officials, even when in possession of credible intelligence, hesitate to act independently, fearing political repercussions or accusations of overstepping authority. This stands in stark contrast to the functioning of lower-level law enforcement in ordinary circumstances.

A Police Officer-in-Charge who receives credible information of an impending crime within his jurisdiction does not await instructions from above; he acts immediately. Ironically, while the law empowers senior officials to act decisively in matters of national security, the governance culture created by excessive centralisation renders them inert.

The Easter Sunday tragedy demonstrated that no individual, however powerful, can process, evaluate, and act upon complex, time-sensitive intelligence flowing from multiple agencies. Effective counterterrorism requires decentralised initiative, horizontal coordination, and professional trust—qualities incompatible with a governance model overly reliant on one executive authority.

The Covid-19 pandemic offers a contrasting but equally instructive case. Sri Lanka’s relative success in navigating the public health dimensions of the crisis was not due to strong executive leadership but rather to the resilience and professionalism of the country’s public health system. Medical officers, epidemiologists, and public health inspectors functioned with clarity of purpose, scientific discipline, and operational autonomy. They implemented testing, tracing, quarantine, and vaccination strategies largely insulated from political interference.

Significantly, the head of state at the time was widely perceived as inexperienced and, at times, out of his depth in governance. Yet this did not prove fatal to pandemic management precisely because the executive Presidency was not central to operational decision-making. The crisis was effectively managed from below and across institutions rather than from above.

However, the pandemic also exposed the limits of professional autonomy under an executive-dominated system. The promotion of pseudo-scientific remedies such as “Dhammika Pani” and symbolic acts like pouring pots of water into rivers illustrated how political intrusion could undermine rational governance. That these actions did not derail the overall pandemic response is a testament to the medical fraternity’s professionalism. The most glaring failure and the black mark in the government’s response—the forcible cremation of Covid 19 victims—highlighted the ultimate vulnerability of institutions under executive power. Despite local and global expert consensus including the World Health Organisation endorsing burials, health professionals were
unable to override political directives. This episode underscores how, under an executive presidency, even expert-driven systems can be overruled by
centralized authority.

Cyclone Ditwah further reinforces the argument that the executive presidency is structurally ill-equipped to handle large-scale disasters. As government and opposition exchange accusations over accountability, the central issue remains the failure to pre-empt and mitigate the disaster’s impact. Early warning systems, disaster preparedness, evacuation planning, and inter-agency coordination require constant attention and decentralised decision-making. These functions cannot be effectively managed by a single individual regardless of his competence ( if he is overburdened by responsibility over several ministries as is the case under the executive presidency ).

The current president, like his predecessors, holds multiple ministerial portfolios in addition to the sweeping powers of the executive presidency. Finance and economic recovery following the catastrophic crash of 2022 are each formidable responsibilities by themselves. Expecting one individual to meaningfully supervise these areas in addition to Disaster Management as well as several other portfolios is unrealistic. Even a leader of exceptional ability would struggle under such a burden. Governance, unlike heroism, cannot depend on superhuman capacity.

The problem lies not in the individual occupying the office but in a system that conflates authority with omniscience. Disaster Management is inherently multidisciplinary, requiring coordination between meteorological services, local authorities, military units, health services, and community organisations. A Cabinet-based system, where authority and responsibility are distributed
among accountable ministers and professional agencies, is far better
suited to such complexity.

Modern governance and global experience overwhelmingly support collective decision-making in managing complex crises. Cabinet systems encourage deliberation, distribute responsibility, and reduce the risk of catastrophic failure arising from individual misjudgment or overload. They also empower institutions to act within clearly defined mandates without awaiting personal approval from a singular executive authority.

Under a Cabinet form of government, ministers are politically accountable for their respective domains, while professional bureaucracies can better exercise operational autonomy. This structure not only enhances efficiency but also builds institutional memory and resilience. Failures can be identified, corrected, and learned from without destabilising the entire system.

In contrast, the executive presidency concentrates blame as well as power. When crises occur, accountability becomes blurred, as responsibility is simultaneously centralised and diffused. Institutions hesitate to act independently, yet the executive cannot realistically manage every operational detail. This paradox has repeatedly cost Sri Lanka dearly.

The experiences of the Easter Sunday attacks, the Covid-19 pandemic, and Cyclone Ditwah collectively demonstrate that the executive presidency lacks the structural capacity to manage national tragedies of great magnitude. The system imposes an unsustainable burden on one individual while stifling institutional initiative and professional autonomy. Where Sri Lanka has succeeded, it has done so despite executive dominance, not because of it. Where it has failed, the roots of failure can often be traced to excessive centralisation and delayed decision-making.

Reforming governance is not about weakening leadership; it is about strengthening institutions. A shift toward collective governance, grounded in a robust Cabinet system, offers a more realistic, democratic, and effective framework for managing crises in a complex modern state. Sri Lanka’s recent history makes one conclusion unavoidable: no single office, however powerful, can substitute for a well-functioning system of shared responsibility and professional autonomy.

(javidyusuf@gmail.com)