31st October 1999

Foray after foray towards Periyamadu

The onset of monsoons and an early Presidential poll notwithstanding, security forces continued their thrust against the LTTE in the Wanni this week.

On Thursday, troops of the 55 Division resumed Phase Two of "Operation Watershed." In what seemed to be a limited operation, troops manning the defence lines on the Olumadu-Odusuddan axis (along Mankulam – Mullaitivu highway) were advancing northwards. They were to encompass the Muthaiyankaddu tank and link up with troops north east of Ampakamam, areas captured during the first phase of "Operation Watershed" from October 14 to 17.

Like in the launch of the first phase of the operation, the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence cautiously left out any reference to the second phase in a news release issued on Thursday. The news release said:

"During early hours of 28 October 1999 Security Forces in Wanni who had been continuing clearing operations ahead of newly captured areas in Ampakamam East stepped up their operations with the troops of 53 and 55 Divisions……."

In another news release on Friday, the Op Hq added: "at 1800 hrs on 28 October 1999 on clearing operations in Ampakamam East, ground troops confirm 42 terrorists have been killed and have recovered 27 terrorist bodies along with 18 T-56 weapons, 01 LMG (Light Machine Gun), 01 communication radio set and a belt order. Total number of Security Force casualties are 05 killed and 35 injured including minor casualties."

Like during the first phase, the daily Observer of Friday (October 29), however, disclosed what the Op Hq press release had chosen to cautiously avoid. In its main story headlined 'SECURITY FORCES RELAUNCH OPERATION WATERSHED' the Observer said "security forces launched the Phase II of Operation Watershed at Ampakamam area last afternoon…."

When the first phase of the operation was launched, the Op Hq claimed in a press release on October 14 that "terrorists launched an attack on to the forward defence line.." However, the Observer of October 15 disclosed that "Operation Watershed" had been launched. And now, the Op Hq claims of "clearing opertions in Ampakamam east," the Observer has revealed, was in fact the resumption of phase two.

That is not all. The Sitrep, or the daily situation report circulated to security forces top brass, officials of the defence establishment and selected Government leaders also declared that phase two of "Operation Watershed" was launched on October 28.

In what seemed a retaliatory strike to the launch of phase two of "Operation Watershed", Tiger guerrillas fired an artillery and mortar barrage on the Elephant Pass defences. But most of them hit the Army's Field Hospital located near the 544 Brigade area. A Male Nurse and a soldier were killed and 21 other soldiers were injured.

The incident occurred shortly after 6.30 p.m. on October 28. A group of young officers were going through their routine physical training exercises. Soldiers from the camps closer to the Field Hospital had availed themselves of the evening turn to meet the only doctor on duty. The morning turns have been assigned to those in camps which are distant from the hospital.

The falling artillery and mortar had ripped the roof of the hospital. One had fallen a few feet away from the Doctors' quarters. Acting General Officer Commanding the 54 Division, Brigadier K.B. Egodawala, had arranged for two SLAF helicopters to land in the area within an hour to airlift the injured to the Palaly Military Hospital. Later, he also cleared a team from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit the scene, interview eye witnesses and take photographs of the damage caused.

Army officials are infuriated that the LTTE had chosen the Field Hospital as a target. Both, the Army and Tiger guerrillas, usually avoid hospitals and civilian concentrations under their respective control during confrontations. Army officials were also equally infuriated that efforts to shift the Field Hospital, which they were all along aware was vulnerable to artillery/mortar attacks to a safe location had failed.

Major General Sarath Munasinghe, GOC of the 54 Division, they said, had written to the Engineering Services division at Army Headquarters asking for cement and zinc sheets to establish a Field Hospital in a safe location. It has been turned down on the grounds that funds were not available. Thereafter, Maj. Gen. Munasinghe is reported to have shifted part of the Field Hospital utilising resources available within his command. It was the remaining part of the hospital that was hit.

Army officials said that the artillery/mortars fired were a mixture of 120 mm and 140 mm ones. They are puzzled that the 140 mm artillery, now obsolete and not used by militaries in any part of the world, were still in vogue with the LTTE.

As reported in these columns (Situation Report – October 24) troops had planned to encompass Muthaiyankaddu during the first phase of "Operation Watershed." However, continued Tiger guerrilla resistance put paid to these efforts. The ferocity of the confrontation can be gauged from the Army's use of artillery fire. Nearly 20,000 rounds have been fired during the three day long operation, a very expensive exercise taking into consideration the human and material losses that led to the gain of some 12 square kilometres.

However, the offensive east of Ampakamam appeared diversionary and tended to overshadow another major military thrust launched on Friday night. It is not immediately clear whether this is also part of the second phase of "Operation Watershed" but the aim of this offensive was to encircle or re-capture the village of Periyamadu – a task that failed during the infamous "Operation Rana Gosa 5." As revealed in these columns, the last phase of Rana Gosa ended in a fiasco with troops who broke out from their defences from two broad fronts being forced to return to their original positions within hours.

On Friday night, troops from the Air Mobile Brigade attacked guerrilla defences and paved the way for troops from the Army's 53 Division to advance by yesterday morning. Details of how the operation was proceeding cannot be divulged since troops were engaged in heavy fighting in terrain that has become very soggy due to heavy rains.

But senior officials of the security establishment were embarrassed that news of the latest operation towards Periyamadu had leaked out before its launch. The widely accessed website Tamilnet, in a report headlined "Imminent offensive 'will triger catastrophe' on October 27, a day before the operation, gave the following account:

"An imminent offensive by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) in the Vanni will cause a "massive displacement of tens of thousands of people with no shelter provisions whatever in the adjoining areas, triggering a major catastrophe,' said the London based Tamil Information Centre in a press release today.

"The TIC learns that the Sri Lanka government Army is planning a major offensive in the Vanni, an area where over 457,000 people live under miserable conditions, 90 % of whom are displaced people, including women, elderly and children," the statement said.

"The TIC further learns that thousands of Sri Lankan troops are being moved into the remote areas of Palampiddy, Keerisuddan and Iranai Iluppaikulam with heavy military equipment and armaments," it said.

"A major military operation is imminent, which according to social workers will result in a serious crisis and the lives of refugees are at risk, the TIC added……..'

"The proposed offensive by the military will only contribute to hardening of attitudes and activities that will not help in creating an environment conducive for peace talks," Tamilnet added quoting the TIC statement.

How did Tamil Information Centre in London know about an "imminent offensive" by the Sri Lanka Army ?

One possible cause emerged from the battle areas of the Wanni yesterday. For several days last week, hectic preparations for Friday's offensive have been under way. Artillery guns that were being moved to designated locations got bogged down in the muddy terrain caused by heavy rains. In one instance, it took nearly two days to pull out trailers with guns stuck in the mud. Cranes and recovery vehicles had to be used. The loud din caused by the cranes and other movement would have given LTTE spotters indications of a possible build up for an offensive.

The launching of phase two of "Operation Watershed" confirms that the Army has changed its strategy in the Wanni since abandoning the grandiose and expensive "Operation Jaya Sikurui" (Victory Assured) to link Vavuniya with Jaffna in a one shot operation. The new strategy commencing with "Operation Rivi Bala" and thereafter the series of operations "Rana Gosa,' and now Watershed have less ambitious aims.

Spread over a wider front than the narrow single axis of Jaya Sikuru, the new series of operations inch into LTTE controlled areas as opposed to juggernaut style conventional advance, which proved to be frustrating in the guerrilla scenario. The new strategy is logistically easier, especially in the monsoon conditions, and enables the Army to operate within its resources.

The broad front approach also compels the LTTE to deploy in a wider area in defence and so restrict their initiative by denying them the freedom to concentrate their limited power. This is a big advantage, both militarily and politically.

Whilst the new strategy seems to be a militarily a more sensible approach, it lacks lustre to be built up for political panache. On the other hand, it will not be in the interests of the governing Alliance to blow up the military side of politics in the run up to the presidential elections.

This would be counter-productive to that part of the political campaign, which seeks a vote to end the prolonged separatist war through political negotiation. Military victories may influence the support of the Sinhala electorate in as much as operational losses would have the opposite effect.

However, whereas the vote base of the Sinhala electorate is more or less traditional, its military side of governance in as much as the Tamil vote would be on the question of militarism. And that is the vote that which can influence the outcome of the elections.

All aspects considered, it is unlikely that the next few months will see any significant increase in the momentum of military operations. Both political and monsoon conditions determine so. With general elections to follow next year, the pattern of military operations is unlikely to alter. The requirement for communal amity to make political gains will over ride military realities.

That, however superficial is the reality of politics. Whatever be the calculations on this side, the equation also depends on the responses of the LTTE. In this, the Indian factor is indispensable. The re-appointment of George Fernandes as Minister of Defence and the re-emergence of Muthuvel Karunanidhi in Tamil Nadu, together with their significant influence at the centre, must be adrenaline to LTTE hopes.

With the increasing stature of India, both in the region and more in the world scene, it is unlikely that Premier Vajpayee and the centre would permit irrationalities such as to provide support for the LTTE. Yet, India's political rationale will depend on the ability of the governing alliance to remain monolithic. In addition, that the wash back of Eelam militancy could destabilise the security and politics in Tamil Nadu is of concern to India.

This is the last thing that India would want with divisive insurgencies already on hand in its north, east and west boundaries. These uncertainties must create doubts in the LTTE mind of whether they can hope for the type of support they received in the period following July, 1983.

In this situation, any action by the LTTE to disturb the elections either directly or by indirect pressures is most unlikely to be favoured by western democracies. Hence, all aspects considered, it would seem that it will be both militarily and politically practical for LTTE to adopt a watch and see strategy in the run up months to both the Presidential and General elections.

As to the situation that would emerge after the elections is the million dollar question. But, as repeatedly pointed out in these columns peace can only come about if both the politician and the voter will regard the country and nation as being above the pettiness of parochial politics.

Japan alerts about missing cargo vessel

Japan yesterday sought Sri Lanka's assistance to track down a cargo vessel with a 17 member crew reported missing in the Indian Ocean region since October 22.

Following the request, Sri Lanka Navy has directed its vessels deployed in the seas to look out for this vessel, 7760 ton MV Alondra Rainbow.

The vessel carrying over 7,000 tons of aluminium ingots was last known to have departed from the Indonesian port of Kuala Tanjung. It was headed for the port of Miike in Japan. The cargo vessel flying the Panamanian flag and built in a Japanese shipyard in 1998 it is said to be 113 metres long. and have a draught of seven metres. The crew is made up of two Japanese and 15 Filippions. The cargo is said to be consigned to a private firm in Japan.

Navy Headquarters sources said it was extremely unlikely that the vessel was hijacked. "It's too big a ship and could be spotted at a distance of seven to eight kilometres. But fears of a possible attack by pirates or a terrorist group is a reasonable suspicion," a senior official said. "Our patrol crafts have been advised to look out for the vessel," he added.

The Japanese Government had also made requests for assistance from Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar (Burma).

Inquiries so far has failed to produce any evidence about the whereabouts of the vessel. Diplomatic sources said no distress signals, if any, had been picked up by authorities in the region. Nor has there been any communications from the ship since October 22.

The Fifth Column

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