Trincomalee port: new wave of security measures
APolice Constable, one among a group assigned to establish a Police
Post between Parayanakulam and Chettikulam (on the newly established Vavuniya-Mannar
road) met with his untimely death early this week.
He was toying around with a grenade. It exploded disembowelling him and injuring 15 of his colleagues, a few of them seriously.
The men were part of a large group now being deployed by the Inspector General of Police, W.B. Rajaguru, in order to relieve more troops required for the upcoming military offensive to link Vavuniya with Kilinochchi - an exercise which has become the main pre-occupation of the defence establishment.
The incident was a minor set back. Many other Policemen who were at the scene or heard of it made a hasty retreat. A group literally "hi-jacked" a civilian bus that arrived in Chettikulam and made their way to Medawachchiya. They will undoubtedly receive their Vacation of Post notices.
But that notwithstanding, a series of top level discussions are taking place to re-structure security force deployment to sectorise the operation area to inter-service/police areas of responsibility.
Last month, Navy Commander, Vice Admiral C.I. Tissera, set up a North Central Command (NCC) - first in the Navy history where an installation is being located in a non-coastal area and deep inland on a land based role. This is obviously aimed on the one hand to relieve the Army of second line duties for them to concentrate on increased operational front line duties. On the other, this measure also gives the Navy a land operational role which could be perhaps developed in due course to a "marine" type operations in support of both Navy and land related tasks.
In hindsight, some of the operational failures in establishing bridge-heads with Naval support for further exploitation by the Army, as was seen in Kattaiparichchan years ago and more recently in Mullaitivu it may be a sound idea to develop a small force with intimate knowledge of both Navy and Army operations.
Commander S.R. Samaratunga, has been named as Commander of NCC (Comnorcen).
Army Headquarters named Military Secretary, Brigadier Nihal Marambe, as Deputy General Officer Commanding the Army's newly raised 55 Division. Brigadier Shantha Kottegoda, one of the Army's top infantry officers, has already taken over as GOC of this new division.
A new Military Secretary has not been named. There was speculation that Brigadier Marambe may return to this post after the impending operation is over.
LTTE publications have already given wide reportage to the fact that the Government was massing troops in Vavuniya for a major assault on them in the Vanni. In its front paged main news story in the April issue, Viduthalai Pulikal, not only reports on the troop build-up but also comments extensively on the recent accord reached between President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and Opposition Leader, Ranil Wickremasinghe, to adopt a bi-partisan approach on the ethnic issue.
The LTTE's own position in this regard is clearly set out. It says that the only way in which President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga is trying to find a solution to the ethnic problem "even now" is through military means.
These developments are reflecting themselves clearly in Trincomalee, the north eastern port City which the LTTE wants to declare as its capital of the so - called state of Eelam. Following intelligence warnings, security forces officials are planning a string of counter measures to thwart any major strike by the LTTE in this district in a bid to divert the defence establishment's attention from the Vanni.
Two weeks ago, near the tenth mile post at Pulmoddai, some 56 kilo metres north of Trincomalee, Tiger guerrillas ambushed an Army route clearing party. Twenty two soldiers were killed and four were wounded.
The district's Military Co-ordinating Officer, (also Commanding Officer of Army 22 Brigade) Brigadier Nihal Jayakody, launched "Operation Ran Hela" in the area. The two-phased operation ended this week but there was clear evidence that the Tiger cadres had moved out of the area.
Past weeks have seen a movement of Tiger cadres from this district towards the north. But the security forces are taking no chances. Intense security measures have been put into effect, particularly to protect the port and other vital areas. It was in the Trincomalee Port that the Tigers drew first blood on April 19, 1995, thus signalling the end of 100 days of peace talks and the beginning of the third phase of the separatist war.
A night in the inner harbour is enough proof of what has gone into effect. The glaring searchlights on the coast illuminate the shore-line. The moonlight reflect on the waters creating a flood-lit effect. The Navy patrol craft at a distance silhouette the backdrop. Only a gentle breeze causes ripples in an otherwise calm night. The scenario is somewhat reminiscent of a Hollywood war movie.
An occasional Navy patrol craft with roaring engines would cut through the waters leaving behind a quickly receding foamy trail. Its akin to a scene where there is a build up of suspense. Then comes a loud explosion.
The tumbler atop the glass top table in front of my chair bumps creating a loud clink, one that would unnerve the unfamiliar. But that was no cause for alarm.
That has become a way of life in Trincomalee after what has come to be known as Eelam War Three. To avoid a repetition of what happened in April, 1995, Navy authorities have introduced early warning systems and other precautions. But with all this, they are not taking any chances.
Every now and then, under-water charges are set off. Navy officials have nick-named it "scare charges." In their official lexicon, it is more appropriately called "depth charges."
A military official told me "they (the Navy) explode anything between 50 to 500 grams of explosives under water at various locations. This continues throughout the night at varied intervals."
He said "the under-water explosions can be hazardous to Tiger divers who may infiltrate the harbour. It will not only burst their ear drums but eyes too."
If the "scare charges" threaten to make any Tiger intruder deaf and blind, that is not the only effect the explosions have had. It has scared away the abundant marine life. Soon after explosions occur, dead fish float in the area.
The military official said that smaller quantities had an effect only in a limited area. However, a 500 gram explosion was effective within a one mile radius. This action appeared to poke fun at a well known Latin American adage about guerrilla warfare - the fish (the guerrilla) need the sea (the civilian population) to survive. Here the euphemistic fish and their real life ones are being scared away by explosions.
The Government's preparations for the thrust in the Vanni are evident on the road from Habarana to Trincomalee. Rows of huge trailers with battle tanks move slowly along the road. They are covered by huge tarpaulins. Soldiers in fatigues sit atop pointing their guns in different directions. Machine gun mounted trucks lead from front and the rear of this unusual procession.
Compared to several months earlier, there is unusual calm in Trincomalee. Non militant Tamil groups supporting the Government are very active though they are not the most adored by the Tamil populace or those transiting to Jaffna in boats. 'If there is uneasiness, they are the first birds to fly away," says a military official. Holiday makers, largely locals, are present in hotels and guest houses. One club resort has received full bookings for the forthcoming Vesak holidays. But the past has shown that it takes only an incident to disturb this calm.
In addition to the LTTE publicity to the anticipated military operations, the local media too have given much publicity to the impending possibility of a thrust to open the Vavuniya-Kilinochchi MSR or establish an alternate MSR on the Mannar-Pooneryn axis.
This is logically to be expected as it will not only give a political advantage by linking up the peninsula with the mainland Vavuniya, but will also improve the military position both strategically and tactically by dividing the Vanni into two - that is if the Kilinochchi axis is a selected option.
In the western coast option to Pooneryn, though the immediate operation may be easier, it would not confer the military the advantage of dividing the LTTE controlled Vanni. By this operation, denying the western coast to the LTTE will not set them back in Sea Tiger maritime role as the western coast from Viduthaltheevu to Pooneryn has been of little use to the LTTE to establish lines of communication both within the country or with India.
The east coast from Valvettiturai to Mullaitivu has always been the preferred sea route for the LTTE operations.
The shift of operational focus to establish a line of communication to the Vanni has demanded a military build up in that area both by the military as well as by the LTTE. They have done so at the expense of troop strengths in the eastern province.
Though in doing so, both the security forces and the LTTE have depleted their numbers, it should be remembered that in the balance of strengths in a guerrilla war, the guerrilla can retain his initiative with less numbers. And in doing so, the guerrillas can have more successes quite disproportionate to relative strength between the two forces.
This, therefore, keeps open the vulnerability of the eastern province for further destabilisation and political dissatisfaction in a province which is populated in equal proportions by the three major communities.
Thus, whereas the security forces could with its conventional superiority over power the LTTE in establishing an MSR through the Vanni, maintaining it and the peninsula as a viable security zone can prove not only expensive but also enable the LTTE to maintain destabilising operations in the east and in the "border" areas.
Whether the impending Vanni operations will give the Government a political and military advantage depends on whether the LTTE can be politically and militarily marginalised. But to do so with the eastern province open ended is doubtful proposition.
Finally it will boil down to a continuation of the war of attrition on the equation whether the Government can afford the war or the LTTE afford the human resources to continue a viable war.
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