Editorial

President A.K. Dissanayake’s visit to Japan this week came against the background of a continuing public debate triggered by his own government on the distinction between what is an ‘official’ visit and what is a ‘private’ visit of a Head of State and Government. It has generated further discussion on what its critics argue is a distinction without a difference.

There was much confusion regarding the Japan visit, which oscillated between being publicly referred to in Sri Lanka as a ‘State visit’ and then subsequently an ‘official visit’.

Some years ago, a Sri Lankan prime minister decided he would go on a ‘private’ visit to Japan, though for an official purpose. The Japanese embassy provided him with a mere ‘visit visa’, and on arrival at the Tokyo airport, he was subjected to the usual fingerprinting and delays afforded to everyday tourists. For this indiscretion by the PM, for reasons best known to him, the Sri Lankan ambassador was made the scapegoat and recalled for no fault of his.

The question, however, is that the very issue this Government has raised has rebounded on it, with questions being asked about his meetings with the ‘Sri Lankan community’ in Japan (and earlier in New York and Germany on the sidelines of his visit to the UN General Assembly) are official or indeed ‘private’. Their own argument is being thrown back at them: are these meetings—seemingly organised by the local branches of the ruling JVP/NPP and not by the respective Sri Lankan embassies in those places, with invitations by these party branches (to their select invitees from the community)—the proper thing to be done by a president on an ‘official’ visit’?

At least optics-wise, these foreign visits seem very much like political meetings of the ruling party, more than of bilateral importance. Some would say that these meetings are with an eye on future voters as the Government prepares to explore ways and means of providing the vote for overseas Sri Lankans. This is apart from any fundraising activity and if such collections go to the party coffers rather than the General Treasury. Enfranchising the diaspora is a separate issue.

Playing out local politics among diaspora communities in foreign lands during ‘official’ visits is likely to have repercussions in socio-security ecosystems overseas.

The visit itself, or the official part, seems to have gone on track, with the Japanese making their points very clear. Their prime minister referred to the speech by President J.R. Jayewardene at the post-World War II peace conference in 1951 in San Francisco, seeking clemency for Japan, asking that it be accepted again into the international community without conditions, and winding up quoting from the Buddha. President Dissanayake graciously acknowledged President Jayewardene’s historic speech despite politically condemning him at home. It was churlish of his media division to edit these references in their local version of the two speeches. That speech, so many years ago, at a time when Japan was at its weakest, is in the institutional memory of the Japanese Establishment and is graciously acknowledged by Japanese VVIPs at almost all high-level occasions and has been very much a reason for the ‘most favoured nation’ status afforded by Japan to Sri Lanka.

On the substantive side, it was revealing that contemporary bilateral relations were framed by Prime Minister Ishiba, who stated that ‘peace and stability in Sri Lanka is indispensible for the peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, and that it is important to strengthen security cooperation with Sri Lanka’.

Reflecting heightened concerns around its deteriorating security environment, inter alia, due to growing Chinese economic and military influence, in late 2022, Japan revised its National Security Strategy (NSS). Located at the intersection of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, maintaining a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) as a growth engine for the global economy is vital for Japan. Its recent Overseas Security Assistance (OSA) and the amendment of the Development Cooperation Charter mark a significant shift in Japanese foreign-assistance policies through their emphasis on defence and economic security. This is set against mounting tensions in the region and Japan’s concerns regarding current geopolitical realities—the growing assertiveness of China as well as the recently demonstrated ambivalent USA policy towards Quad partners, including Japan, an ally which is protected under the USA nuclear ‘umbrella’.

Many of the areas of cooperation announced in the Joint Statement recognise Sri Lanka’s strategic ocean role in a FOIP context—maritime security as well as ensuring secure trade routes and supply chains. On the broader security front, including in the context of the ever-present nuclear threat in the Korean peninsula, the Joint Statement also refers to Sri Lanka’s support of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the recent ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT – Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty).

An important new proposal from the Japanese side—the Conceptual Roadmap on “Building an Export-Oriented Industrial Corridor”—has not received much public attention here so far.

On the investment front, Sri Lanka appreciated Japan coming back into supporting investments. But the Japanese also vented their hurt and frustration at the way they have been treated recently, not least by the cancellations of mega-projects in Sri Lanka like the Greater Colombo monorail project and the airport extension project by parties chasing behind financial gain at the expense of the common good of the people of Sri Lanka—and good relations with Japan. The Japanese expressed these concerns candidly by putting into the joint statement the following line: “Both sides noted the significant opportunity that lies in the area of trade and investment and confirmed the importance of further improving the business environment in Sri Lanka, including transparency, predictability, and non-discriminatory treatment.” That would say it all—from the Japanese side.

One year after the Government came in, its ambassador in Japan (like many others elsewhere) has yet to present credentials and therefore can play no official role. In this comatose state, how Sri Lanka can play an effective role abroad in such semi-paralysed circumstances is a point to ponder.