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The recent announcement by the Government that it intends to abolish the entitlements of former Presidents and the pensions of Members of Parliament should rightfully ignite an informed and rigorous public debate: What should politicians get once they are elected, and what should they retain after they leave office? But all indications are that these may not be examined from the perspective of enhancing the quality of democratic governance but rather from a purely populist perspective.  

The public mood on this issue is complex. On one hand, there is widespread frustration about perceived excesses in political perks, especially in a time of economic strain. On the other, there is the equally valid concern that stripping away too much could weaken the dignity of high office, deter qualified and dedicated individuals from entering politics, and even encourage corruption.

This is a conversation worth having without personalising it around individuals who may be affected by such moves. Rather than focusing on the individuals who currently hold or have held office, the real question is about the principles and long-term implications behind such changes.

The case of former presidents’ entitlements

At present, probably only three or four former presidents— may be availing themselves of entitlements provided under the law. These benefits, enshrined in legislation, were originally designed to honour the office of the Head of State, not the personal performance of the individual who held it.

This distinction matters. Public opinion about whether a former president “did a good job” is inevitably subjective and shaped often by political affiliation. If benefits are withdrawn on the basis of perceived failure, one risks politicising the very idea of constitutional entitlements. It would be akin to punishing someone retrospectively for what a segment of the population deems poor performance—without due process or consistent standards.

That is not to say the current system is beyond question. Entitlements can and should be reviewed in the light of national finances, fairness, and changing societal expectations. But such a review should be done with respect and consultation, particularly with those affected. A unilateral cut not only risks appearing vindictive but also undermines the stability of constitutional guarantees.

From a fiscal point of view, the savings to the Treasury from ending these benefits will be minimal. The real effect will be symbolic—a signal to the public that politicians are “sharing the pain.” While symbolism has its place, it is better to be honest about what is achieved and what is not. Symbolic measures without structural reform often generate more heat than light.

Besides if the office of the Executive Presidency is abolished as the NPP government and the rest of the polity is committed to ensure there will be no future Presidents who will receive such payments.

The question of MPs’ pensions

The proposal to abolish pensions for MPs raises even more nuanced issues. Many parliamentarians—especially those who served in earlier decades—are now in the twilight of their lives and may depend on these pensions for essential expenses, including medical care. Removing them overnight could push some into hardship.

A more prudent approach would be to apply such changes prospectively, affecting only those elected after the new law takes effect. This avoids the moral and legal problem of changing the terms of service retroactively while allowing for reform going forward.

Are MPs adequately paid?

This brings us to a larger and more important national question: Are our Members of Parliament adequately compensated?

Public anger over MPs’ perks often obscures the fact that Sri Lankan legislators’ basic salary is currently around Rs. 54,285 per month but supplemented with allowances

—such as fuel and travel—, which are mostly intended to cover actual work-related expenses rather than living expenses. When compared to the complexity of their role—drafting and scrutinising laws, representing constituents, and overseeing national governance—the remuneration is arguably low.

Underpaying legislators carries two major risks:

1. Narrowing the pool of candidates to those who are independently wealthy or politically sponsored, excluding capable individuals from modest backgrounds.

2. Increasing susceptibility to corruption, as MPs may seek “alternative” sources of income to maintain a certain standard of living or meet political costs.

The long-term national interest is better served by ensuring MPs are paid enough to live with dignity, work full-time on parliamentary duties, and resist undue financial temptations. Countries that have invested in fair parliamentary pay—alongside strong transparency and accountability mechanisms—have often seen better governance outcomes.

Party control over MPs’ income

According to media reports, MPs of the National People’s Power (NPP) remit their salaries to the party, which then provides them with a fixed allowance for personal expenses. While the NPP has not officially confirmed this arrangement, it is widely believed to be the case.

If true, this practice raises questions about parliamentary independence. An MP whose livelihood is directly dependent on party approval may be less inclined to vote according to conscience or constituency needs, especially when these conflict with party directives. While party discipline is necessary for coherent governance, complete financial control risks undermining the representative’s constitutional role as an individual legislator.

In several countries, parliamentary remuneration is determined not by politicians themselves but by independent bodies insulated from political pressure. The United Kingdom, for instance, has the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA), which reviews MPs’ salaries and allowances based on objective criteria such as cost of living, workload, and public sector pay trends.

Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have similar mechanisms. These systems aim to balance fair pay with accountability, ensuring that adjustments are transparent and justifiable to the public. Crucially, they take such decisions out of the hands of those who directly benefit from them, reducing the perception of self-interest. Such decisions should be made and completed within the first two years of the life of a Parliament and take effect and apply only to those elected to the next Parliament.

Sri Lanka could benefit from a comparable model. An Independent Parliamentary Remuneration Commission could: Assess the real demands of parliamentary work. Compare salaries with those in other professions requiring similar skills and responsibilities. Ensure benefits and pensions are fair, sustainable, and transparent. Review entitlements for former Presidents and senior officials in a principled, non-partisan way.

Ultimately, the debate about political pay and entitlements cannot be separated from questions of performance and trust. Higher salaries and dignified pensions are easier to justify when politicians demonstrate integrity, competence, and genuine service. Conversely, poor governance and corruption will always erode public tolerance for benefits—no matter how objectively fair they are.

Reform in this area should be part of a broader package which include : Stronger conflict-of-interest rules to prevent outside business from influencing decisions. Clear retirement benefits tied to length and quality of service, rather than blanket entitlements. Public disclosure of any supplementary income from party or private sources.

The question of what elected leaders should receive—while in office and after they leave—is not just about money. It is about respect for democratic institutions, fairness to the taxpayer, and creating conditions where good governance can flourish.

Removing entitlements from former Presidents without consultation risks eroding institutional respect and sets a precedent for politically motivated reversals of established guarantees. Slashing MPs’ pensions overnight could create genuine hardship and undermine trust in the fairness of the system.

The better path lies in independent, principle-based reform that ensures our political representatives are neither over-indulged nor under-valued. Pay and emoluments should be set high enough to attract talent and prevent corruption, but structured transparently and reviewed regularly by a non-partisan body.

Only by striking this balance can we move beyond symbolic gestures to reforms that strengthen—not weaken—the democratic fabric of Sri Lanka (javidyusuf@gmail.com)