Situation Report

9-hour sea battle: What was the Sea Tigers' agenda?

Sri Lanka Navy's "Charlie Patrol" - a fleet of four Dvora fast attack craft (FAC) - was scouring the seas off the Jaffna peninsula last Friday evening.

They were some three nautical miles from the coast when men on board one of the FACs spotted Sea Tiger boats approaching. It was around 7.30 p.m. and there were more than 20 boats. They radioed the Northern Naval Area headquarters in Kankesanthurai to say the boats, in three clusters, were moving. They sailed past the shores of Championpattu, Kudarappu and Nagerkovil.

The Navy FACs moved in and gun battles erupted off the coast of Point Pedro. One cluster of boats headed northwards. Another veered westwards and came to the waters off Kankesanthurai. More naval craft moved in from KKS and the battle intensified. Eleven FACs were now engaging the Sea Tiger flotilla. A few hours later, nine more FACs from the Eastern Naval Area headquarters Trincomalee moved in.

Army personnel and residents in the coastal areas of Point Pedro said flashes in the sky as the fighting raged resembled a massive fireworks display. Loud explosions were heard inland. It was past 3 a.m. when the fighting began to recede and Sea Tiger cadres began to withdraw in stages. Before the crack of dawn the battles were over.

The Navy said they had damaged seven Sea Tiger boats and sunk five more. Before they went down, a Navy official said, there were loud explosions. This suggested that these boats were explosive laden and were used by suicide cadres. He claimed that the target was the Northern Naval Area headquarters located in the Kankesanthurai harbour and declared that over 80 guerrillas were killed.

Independent verification of the casualty figures is not possible. Two naval craft were also damaged and three sailors were wounded. There is no gainsaying the navy personnel bravely resisted several guerrilla attempts to fire at their vessels.

The reasoning behind the claim that the KKS harbour was the target is because of ongoing security forces operations to secure Sampur. The Navy official argued that soon, with the recapture, the Eastern Naval Area headquarters in Trincomalee would be free of artillery attacks. Thus, the LTTE had planned to disrupt KKS, he argued. Whether the target was indeed the major navy base in the north remains a critical question. It is highly unlikely that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) would have mustered a cluster of some 20 or more Sea Tiger boats to launch an attack on what is easily the largest naval base in the north. Such a full frontal attack, with limited personnel and firepower, would have spelt disaster for the guerrillas. The Navy, with their superior strength and firepower, would have pulverized them.

Quite apart from what the aim of the Sea Tiger thrust on Friday night was, there is a significant reality that has come to light. Substantially the Sea Tiger resources remain intact. This is despite the ongoing Eelam War IV where the LTTE suffered substantial losses to its cadres and damage to its bases due to bombings by the Air Force. The aim of the latter's exercise has been to destroy, if not weaken, the LTTE infrastructure.

As the Navy says, it inflicted heavy damage and casualties to the Sea Tigers. Yet, the latter sustained the sea battles for some nine hours before backing out. In the light of the Sea Tigers thus retaining most of their resources and capability, there is no doubt; the defence establishment has to look beyond the possibility of the KKS harbour being the main target. There are a number of other important questions that arise. Among them:

= Were the Sea Tigers planning an attack on major naval or shipping movements? Did they miss out on such a target? It is no secret that both civilian and military supplies from Trincomalee are transported via the northeastern seas to the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE, at any cost, wants to interrupt this activity which is the life blood for some 40,000 troops and policemen in the peninsula.

Proof of this came this week when the LTTE said that it was ready to allow food and medicine to the people of Jaffna to be transported along the A-9 highway. The LTTE conveyed its consent to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). They claimed that sea routes were being used by the military to re-supply. In offering to open its side of A-9 highway so, the LTTE is also keen to re-open its entry-exit points that have remained a major source of revenue to it. In fact the Omanthai side was open for civilians and food convoys on Friday.

= Whether the Friday night's thrust by the Sea Tiger flotilla was a diversion? Were the rebels carrying out a mid sea transfer of any weaponry and did they want to keep the Navy patrols engaged? A sizeable number of naval craft were involved in battles with the Sea Tiger clusters.

= Were the movements of the three clusters of Sea Tiger boats part of an exercise to test the strength and responses of the Navy?

= Was the cluster of Sea Tiger boats planning to reach the shores somewhere in the peninsula to land its cadres for an attack or sabotage mission?

Other than Friday night's incident, the Jaffna peninsula remained relatively calm except for occasional barrages of guerrilla mortar fire. They were directed at security forces positions.

However, in the east the security forces operation to regain control of Sampur continues. Troops are moving cautiously since the area is heavily mined. Most of the fighting has been through indirect fire. It is only the recapture of Sampur and its environs that will remove the threat facing the port of Trincomalee, including the Navy's largest base. The ongoing operation will end only with the recapture. Thereafter, the security forces and even the police will have to dominate an area of some 180 square kilometres to make sure the Trincomalee port is safe.

Commandant of the Police Special Task Force (STF) Nimal Lewke, Deput Inspector General of Police at ceremonies in memory of fallen heroes held on Friday at their training school in Kalutara.

Thus, the ongoing military operations seem to have one larger objective - to thwart a guerrilla siege on Jaffna and the Trincomalee port. In Jaffna, it is by directing artillery fire on the airbase halting regular military and civilian flights. In Trincomalee, it was directing artillery fire at the Dockyard where the Navy base is located thus threatening maritime movements from there. There were suspicions yesterday that the guerrillas may have moved their artillery guns away from Sampur in view of ongoing military operations.

Whilst overcoming these tasks, they will have to ensure there is calm in other areas including the City of Colombo and suburbs. The guerrillas who are regrouping and re-training pose formidable challenges.

Big LTTE bribes for purported State Dept. officials

It was April 2004. The nation was pre-occupied in a campaign for parliamentary general elections. In the north, the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was otherwise busy.

He was planning a major assault across the Verugal River against cadres loyal to renegade eastern leader, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan. This river is the divide between the districts of Trincomalee and Batticaloa.

That assault was executed within days after the election forcing Karuna loyalists to back out. Some were killed and others wounded. But before withdrawing, they destroyed their heavy weaponry.

It now comes to light that whilst directing that onslaught on the Karuna faction, Mr. Prabhakaran was also masterminding another major operation. That was a covert plan to get the United States to lift the ban placed on the LTTE as a terrorist organization. This was by using the same FBI informant, a Sri Lankan Tamil, who posed off as a contact man for influence buying and procurement of weapons.

Last week The Sunday Times disclosed fuller details of the sting by US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in busting an arms procurement ring with the help of this informant. This week's account is about how the FBI, with the help of the same informant, a one time convict for drug trafficking, paroled later and now working for FBI, helped bust the LTTE operation to remove the US ban on it.

In April 2004, Mr. Prabhakaran dispatched an unnamed defendant from India to New York. His mission was to have the LTTE removed from the State Department's terrorist list. Since his name is being kept a secret, The Sunday Times will refer to him as the "LTTE envoy" for easy reference by readers. The FBI's 35-page indictment in this case before the US District Court Eastern District of New York traces the origins of the LTTE's covert operation. But references to the man's identity have been blacked out.

Chandru (Vijayashanthar Patpanathan) helped to facilitate "LTTE envoy's" trip. He explained to the FBI informant (officially identified only as CI-1) that the LTTE "leader" (Velupillai Prabhakaran) had sent the "LTTE envoy" to the US to try to get the ban removed, and that he would be meeting with the leader again next month, May 2004. The conversation in Tamil was recorded.

The "LTTE envoy" returned to the US in June 2004. On or about June 25, 2004, the FBI informant, Chandru and Nachimuthu Socrates met the "envoy" at Newark International Airport in Newark, New Jersey. Three days later, the FBI informant picked up the "envoy" at the Port Authority bus terminal in Manhattan, and the two drove to the informant's residence in Staten Island.

During the drive, the "envoy" explained to the informant how he recently returned from a meeting in LTTE controlled territory in Sri Lanka with the "leader," as well as Pottu Amman, (Shanmuganathan Shivashankar, head of Intelligence and Operations Wing). At the informant's apartment the duo discussed the possibility of bribing the informant's US government sources to persuade them to remove the LTTE from the terrorist list.

The "LTTE envoy" told the FBI informant that he was serious about having the ban on the LTTE lifted, and instructed him to talk to his Government sources. The informant said the main issue with his sources would be money. The "envoy" identified potential financial contributors and arranged a meeting with a prospective contributor.

Between September 2004 and April 2005, Socrates met with an FBI undercover law enforcement officer. He posed off as a State Department official (officially identified only as UC-1). He met him five times at the informant's apartment in Staten Island. The "envoy" accompanied Socrates to the meetings. They discussed in detail financial terms and conditions of the bribe to remove the US ban on the LTTE. The undercover agent made it clear that the LTTE would have to pay him millions of dollars to get the ban lifted. During some of these meetings, the agent and Socrates also discussed the sale of classified United States intelligence information to the LTTE.

Socrates made interim bribery payments to the undercover agent. After a meeting in December 2004, Socrates gave the undercover agent a cheque for US $ 500. At a meeting in April 2005, Socrates gave the agent US $ 5,000 in cash "to prove that we are not empty handed every time."

In July 2005, the LTTE again sent its "envoy" to New York to meet with the purported State Department official and the undercover FBI agent. A second under cover agent (only identified as UC - 2) posing off as a senior State Department official joined in. On July 7, 2005 the two agents and Socrates met with the informant at his Staten Island apartment.

Prior to the meeting, the "LTTE envoy" told Socrates and the FBI informant that he did not want the two State Department officials to know that he was an LTTE representative; he wanted to characterize his involvement in terms of political support. During the meeting, the parties discussed financial terms of the bribery, including a one million US dollar up-front payment. Socrates also inquired from the two purported State Department officials whether they could stop the United States Government from sending arms to Sri Lanka, and whether they could provide intelligence about this issue.

Moorthy (Murugesu Vinayagamoorthy also known as Dr. Moorthy) also got involved at this stage. On or about August 9, 2005 Moorthy sent an e-mail to the "LTTE envoy" explaining that "the person who helped us to get the man to come. He says he has some thing (sic) important needing to be discussed with Ty….. He probably plans to do this while I am there." The reference is to the "LTTE envoy," and "the man to come from A" is a reference to an individual who travelled to Sri Lanka from "A" - i.e. "America."

In September 2005, Moorthy and the "LTTE envoy" travelled to Sri Lanka and met with the LTTE leadership. In late September 2005, the LTTE sent Moorthy to the United States to meet with the purported State Department officials. On or about September 29, 2005, Moorthy, Socrates, the two undercover agents and the FBI informant met at the latter's Staten Island apartment. Moorthy made it clear he had travelled to the United States for the meeting on behalf of senior LTTE leadership in Sri Lanka, and that the LTTE "leader" (Mr. Prabhakaran) - would make the ultimate decision as to how much the LTTE was willing to bribe the State Department officials to remove the LTTE from the terrorist list.

Moorthy: I 'am not going to talk to the leader myself, straight. There's no phone communication. So it has to be passed to somebody else, and that person will pass over to him. And the decision will be between these three.

The second agent acting as Senior State Department official: Well, who, who would you go to that has enough weight to talk to the leader?

Moorthy: It is my weight transmitted to him. Nobody else has.

Agent: So you and in conjunction with the leader, are essentially making the decision.

Moorthy: I am not making the decision, I am passing the information to him and he makes the decision. I don't really make any decision at all and if he says, 'okay we have a million dollars we can agree.'

Agent: Well how do you know, just from your own personal assessment, how do you feel about the idea?

Moorthy:I'll tell you a few things….Are they financially that muscular? I don't think they are that. So they may not agree to the magnitude…..They are very strict businessmen…..

Agent: I understand that's good business that makes good sense….I won't make a move until the money is available.

The purported State Department officials repeatedly emphasized to Moorthy that in order for the LTTE to be removed from the list of foreign terrorist organizations, and, more importantly remain off the list, the LTTE would have to renounce suicide bombings and the use of children as soldiers. Moorthy tried to justify the LTTE's tactics and explained that if war broke out again, suicide bombings were inevitable: as far a suicide bombing was concerned there was no option…. Even the people who are sending them there or the people who are going, is not because they just want to go and destruct something……..

After the meeting, Moorthy, Socrates and the first undercover agent discussed next steps. Moorthy said that the most that Prabhakaran would agree to was US$ 1 million, and that it would have to be a cash payment - no banks involved. Moorthy said he would go back to London and communicate to LTTE leadership in Sri Lanka through his "channel." Moorthy also explained that in his experience with the LTTE leadership, "when you present something, you get thousand questions. Otherwise, if he (Prabhakaran) considers this an important thing, he will say "varalam" ("can come"). He will ask me if I could go and then I will have to go in one day and meet him."

Upon returning to London, Moorthy promptly contacted, via e-mail, his "channel." On or about October 4, 2005, Moorthy sent the "channel" an e-mail including various payment alternatives for a bribery scheme. Over the next few weeks, Moorthy and the "channel" had several additional e-mail communications about the scheme. On or about November 2, 2005, Moorthy sent another e-mail to the "channel" saying "Sivaperuman (Prabhakaran) has informed that the plan related to the visit I did is to be dropped for the moment.

The LTTE front men were determined to maintain and expand their illicit relationship with the purported State Department officials. On or about December 2, 2005, Socrates met with the FBI informant and the "junior State Department" official concerning the purchase of a purported classified intelligence document about the LTTE. Socrates and the informant gave this "official" US $ 1,000 in cash, and he permitted Socrates to view and take notes from the document.

There were references to a joint investigation by the US and a foreign government into Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), a suspected LTTE fund raising organization. The documents said the US and foreign government authorities interviewed four TRO officers, and learned that TRO had transmitted a large sum of money from London to Sri Lanka. The document further states that the US authorities concluded that this information did not warrant continued investigation of the TRO in the United States, and that the investigation had ceased.

The next morning Socrates called "the envoy" to inform him about the meeting and the document. They discussed offering the "junior" State Department official a US $ 50,000 annual salary to provide additional information going forward. Later "the envoy" and Socrates called Moorthy to relay to him the information contained in the document.

Socrates, concerned about the secrecy and their phones being tapped, asked Moorthy whether he was in a "good place" and talking on a "random number." Moorthy told Socrates and the "envoy" to talk "in a hidden way." The "LTTE envoy" then explained the contents of the document to Moorthy. The "envoy" and Socrates also bribed the purported junior State Department official to give them a purportedly classified document. On February 18, 2006, Socrates gave the official an envelope containing US $ 1,000 cash. But, by August this year, they had all fallen into the FBI trap.

According to the FBI, the "LTTE envoy" is a principal LTTE procurement officer. He has used several US based e-mail accounts to purchase and/or inquire about, among other items, military arms, unmanned aerial vehicles for 'jamming of radio and radar,' submarine design, flight lessons, cell towers, radio controller equipment, global positioning system equipment, short wavelength radio equipment, radio and satellite equipment, air traffic equipment, cameras, computers and engineering publications.

Back to Columns