LTTE
takes beating, but long way to go
- Troops recapture Muhamalai and break siege
of Jaffna
- But serious questions about LTTE strategy
with its air and sea wings
- Maj. Gen. Lawrence Fernando placed in overall
charge of security of Colombo and suburbs
It began soon after they finished a breakfast of
rice, dhal and dried fish bedun last Friday morning.
Czech-built T-55 Main Battle Tanks cut through
the sandy terrain at Muhamalai, south of the Jaffna peninsula, where
the bitterest battles of ongoing Eelam War IV have been fought in
the past weeks. Russian-built BMP troop carriers followed with soldiers.
Just behind, columns of heavily armed infantry troops treaded cautiously.
|
Troops near Russian built armoured troop carriers
at the Muhamalai defences. |
For the troops, the memories of pitched close
quarter battles just days earlier were very much alive. They were
ready for another close quarter battle to retake what was once the
bustling entry-exit point at Muhamalai. They had fallen back some
800 metres during a tactical withdrawal and wanted to return to
their original positions.
At first they met with only surprise. There was
no enemy to halt their onslaught. Later, both artillery and mortar
fire began to rain on them. The troops were prepared for it and
dodged it in large measure. Confirmation that the guerrillas will
not engage them directly came during radio intercepts. They had
chosen not to take on the troops but only resort to indirect fire.
Instead, the guerrillas were busy repairing the damage caused to
their defence lines during earlier battles.
|
A Czech built T-55 Main Battle Tank on the
defence lines at Muhamalai. |
Yet, the troops had to face a major obstacle.
Before moving away from what was once a string of makeshift structures
at the Muhamalai entry-exit point, the guerrillas had heavily mined
the area. They had also placed booby trapped devices. Clearing them
lasted more than two hours but the troops took complete control
of the area. As this went on, Air Force Kfir ground attack aircraft
continued to pound guerrilla positions across the Muhamalai defences.
Troops completed their mission by Friday forenoon.
Two officers were killed when improvised explosive devices exploded.
One officer and 22 soldiers were injured, nine of them after stepping
on what is called batta or improvised anti-personnel mines. The
tracks of three T-55 Main Battle Tanks were damaged when they rolled
over land mines and improvised explosive devices. They were later
repaired. The troops were consolidating their gains. As they continued
to remove mines yesterday, a soldier pulled the branch of a tree
that lay on the ground. An IED (Improvised Explosive Device) exploded.
Secondary explosions followed. Nine soldiers were killed and 11
were wounded.
Another significant move in the Muhamalai sector
came yesterday morning. Troops ousted Tiger guerrillas from positions
they were holding at Eluthumaduval, north east of the Muhamalai
defences. Here again the troops had made a tactical withdrawal after
repulsing guerrilla attempts to cut across the thin isthmus that
links the Jaffna peninsula to the mainland. If that attempt was
successful, troops in Muhamalai would have been trapped. But they
bravely resisted repeated guerrilla attempts and inflicted casualties
on them.
Yesterday two soldiers were wounded.
By capturing areas in and around Muhamalai, troops
have gone back to their original positions that existed after the
ceasefire in February 2002. In Eluthumaduwal they have evicted the
guerrillas from some ten bunkers and surrounding areas. Thus they
have denied the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) any claims
that they drove the troops out in some areas of the Jaffna peninsula.
The fact that the troops are back in their original
positions in the Jaffna peninsula from this week is significant.
This clearly means that despite some of the heaviest battles since
5.45 p.m. on August 11, the guerrillas were not successful in infiltrating
the peninsula by breaking through security forces defences. Troops
have steadfastly withstood such attempts. Thus they prevented cadres
who had remained within the peninsula from activating themselves
after linking with those who have infiltrated.
Whilst the ground troops have returned to status
quo ante, the Air Force, playing a very key role in the current
fighting, has begun to respond to LTTE attempts since August 11
to prevent flights from landing at Palaly airstrip. Almost daily
the guerrillas have directed 130 mm artillery fire at the runway
and other locations coming within the Air Force base there.
This week the Air Force landed An-32 transport
planes at Palaly. This is whilst a reconnaissance aircraft was airborne
looking out for locations from which guerrilla artillery fire could
emanate. It will be a while before they revert to their normal schedule.
Only such a move would pave the way for the resumption of commercial
flights.
The guerrillas also directed artillery fire on
the Dockyard in Trincomalee, home for the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters.
This was from across the seas from the village of Sampur which they
occupy. The Government's concern over this was highlighted last
Monday. President Mahinda Rajapaksa told envoys of the Donor Co-chairs
- United States, Japan, European Union and Norway - that he sought
an explicit commitment from the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran
to ensure that "Sampur area does not pose a military threat
to the Trincomalee harbour and its environs emanating from the LTTE
presence in that area in violation of the ceasefire agreement."
This was whilst insisting that Mr. Prabhakaran should also give
the Government an explicit commitment to a "comprehensive and
verifiable cessation of hostilities."
Serious external constraints prevent me from making
a fuller appreciation of the recent developments and what they portend.
Thus readers may, to a considerable degree, be
handicapped in understanding the important realities. I regret my
inability to express myself freely in the light of these constraints
and the resultant restraints imposed.
There is no doubt the LTTE has received a severe
beating in the recent fighting with security forces, both in the
north and in the east. But they are not yet beaten. The worst blow
came for them in their continued attempts to lay siege on the Jaffna
peninsula.
Guerrilla held areas in Wanni has been plunged
into chaos and confusion. Hardly a day has passed without a number
of funerals, according to reports reaching Colombo. Hospitals in
Kilinochchi, Dharmapuram, Nedunkerni and Vattakachchi are reported
to be full with injured guerrilla cadres. Reports also said several
houses in the Wanni have been turned into wards where the injured
are being cared for. Guerrilla leaders were reported to have launched
a manhunt for civilians in the area who are being suspected as informants
to the security forces. Some have been rounded up and "imprisoned."
This is particularly after the series of air raids
by the Sri Lanka Air Force. They have been bombing Sea Tiger bases,
ammunition dumps, guerrilla camps and even boat movements at sea.
A high ranking military source who spoke on grounds of anonymity
said the aim was to destroy the LTTE military infrastructure so
"they will not have the muscle to carry out repeated attacks
on us."
But the intelligence hierarchy in Colombo as well
as foreign intelligence establishments is baffled by a number of
questions. Among them is why the LTTE did not use some of the resources
it has acquired during the ceasefire. Among a few of the areas which
remain unclear are:
= The LTTE, as exclusively revealed
by The Sunday Times on many occasions in the past years constructed
a 1.4 kilometre long airstrip near the Iranamadu irrigation tank.
A foreign intelligence source confirmed to the Government that the
LTTE possessed five light aircraft. There were fears in the Air
Force that they could be used as "suicide bombs" in the
sky. But they were not put to use.
= The LTTE is known to be in
possession of Russian built SA 7 surface-to-air missiles. This was
used to down Air Force passenger planes in April 1995 after the
outbreak of Eelam War III. It is known that these SAMs have a limited
shelf life. Have they outlived their life span? During this week's
United States Federal Bureau of Investigation bust of an LTTE ring,
one of the suspects Thani admitted the LTTE possessed SA-7s. He
told FBI they are not effective in hitting aircraft and it took
two to three missiles to down one of them.
= The Sunday Times (Situation
Reports) last year exclusively revealed suspicions by the Air Force
that the guerrillas have acquired air defence systems to protect
their airstrip. This was after three different helicopter flights
had their counter missile systems activated when they flew past
the LTTE airstrip at Iranamadu. Even if such a mechanism activated
when Kfir jets bombed the airstrip, the LTTE does not have the capability
to fire back at this Israeli ground attack aircraft. By LTTE's own
admission, it is fast moving and cannot be hit by an SA 7 surface
to air missile. This is why the LTTE was trying to get Russian built
SA-18 surface-to-air missiles in the United States, as revealed
by the FBI this week. They were also seeking various types of equipment
for use in the airstrip. Here again, the question is like their
aircraft, why the airstrip was not put to use.
= The Sea Tigers, the sea going
arm of the LTTE. Recent fighting has not seen the induction of large
groups of Sea Tigers either on a sea borne operation or in coastal
areas. Is this the result of Air Force bombing of Sea Tiger bases
or a deliberate move to keep them away for the time being?
= Many recent detections (including
the attempt on the Colombo Port, the detection by the Karandeniya
Police of a lorry laden with weapons, the Borella Police find of
a claymore mine) showed LTTE preparations to trigger off attacks
in Colombo. Has the LTTE failed in successive attempts due to greater
public awareness? There is still a worry prompted by fears that
some of the explosives or weaponry would have come in undetected.
President Rajapaksa has ordered that high priority
be given to the security in the City of Colombo and immediate suburbs.
The Ministry of Defence on August 18 appointed an experienced Army
officer as Overall Operations Commander (OOC) for Colombo.
Major General Lawrence Fernando, now number four
officer in the Army's hierarchy is the former Director General of
General Staff (DGGS) at Joint Operations Headquarters. He has been
hand picked by President Rajapaksa.
His areas of responsibility will be to exercise
command over the personnel of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Police
and STF (Special Task Force) allocated/deployed for operational
duties within Colombo and suburbs. He will also co-ordinate all
intelligence activities, deal with matters pertaining to civil/commercial
security and civil defence organizations.
All Army, Navy, Air Force, STF Detachment, Police
areas including Police Stations, intelligence agencies, Civil Defence
Organisations, Civil/Commercial Security Organisations within the
metropolitan area of Colombo and suburbs including Wattala, Ragama,
Sapugaskanda, Peliyagoda, Kelaniya, Wellampitiya, Mulleriyawa, Welikada,
Thalangama, Mirihana, Kohuwala, Dehiwala and Mount Lavinia have
been placed under Major General Fernando for operational purposes.
He will operate under Air Chief Marshal Donald Perera, Chief of
Defence Staff for "functional aspects of maintaining law and
order and security in Colombo and suburbs."
In another development, President Rajapaksa has
appointed a two-member Commission of Inquiry to probe the assassination
of Batticaloa district parliamentarian Joseph Pararajasingham on
December 25, 2005. The Commission comprises two former judges -Mahanama
Tillekeratne and S.V.P. Munidasa.
The task of the Commission will be to "inquire
into and obtain information in respect of the circumstances relating
to the assassination of the late Joseph Pararajasingham at Batticaloa
on or about 25th December, 2005 and the person or persons directly
or indirectly responsible for such assassination."
The Commission has also been called upon to probe
"whether the manner in which the investigations were carried
out by the Police and other security personnel assisting was adequate
and impartial having due regard to the proceedings established by
law."
The Commission has been empowered to hold sittings
in camera if it so determines.
These developments come as the security forces
and the police have stepped up their counter offensives against
the guerrillas. In marked contrast to previous occasions, the LTTE
propaganda machine has been relatively slow in speaking about developments
in the battlefield.
The recent beating guerrilla cadres received,
particularly after they have chosen and executed the areas of attack
in the north and east (like Mutur and its environs, Jaffna peninsula)
could be attributed to a number of reasons. Main among them is the
fact that the LTTE has not been able to retain its military capability
at peak levels with the exit of its eastern leader Vinayagamoorthy
Muralitharan alias Karuna. This was clearly shown during battles
in the east and thereafter at Muhamalai. The Karuna cadres formed
the bulwark of LTTE's military machine when troops launched Operation
Jaya Sikurui in 1997 to link Vavuniya with the Jaffna peninsula.
Another factor appears to be the LTTE under estimation of the capability
of the security forces. Like in the late 1999, they perceived an
en masse withdrawal when the defences were attacked. That did not
happen.
Since August 11 until August 18, 14 officers and
141 soldiers were killed in the Jaffna peninsula, according to the
Army. A further two officers and 21 soldiers are reported missing.
During this period 43 officers and 685 soldiers were wounded, most
of them being described as "walking wounded." The military
offensive in the east to capture Mavil Aru anicut led to the deaths
of 12 officers and 28 soldiers.
Since July 26 until yesterday 278 security forces
personnel have been killed. They are made up of Army 246, Navy 9,
Air Force 2, Police 14 and Home Guards 7.
Army sources say both in the east and in recent
fighting in the Jaffna peninsula over 800 guerrilla cadres were
killed and a further 1,000 wounded. However, independent verification
of these figures is not possible. The LTTE has also played down
its casualty counts.
The performance of the security forces including
the police as well as their Special Task Force (STF) commandos has
led to national euphoria. Quite rightly so. But for those militarily
engaging the guerrillas, there is a clear message. They need to
remain vigilant and have a long way to go.
One is reminded of the various phases of Operation
Riviresa to capture the Jaffna peninsula. On December 5, 1995 the
recapture was celebrated in Colombo with a glittering nationally
televised ceremony. The events led to the belief that the LTTE had
been defeated.
That was because of a number of reasons. The LTTE
held territory in the Jaffna peninsula and ran a virtual parallel
administration. The money for it came from the Government. They
had a recruitment base there. They had recourse to electricity to
manufacture improvised explosive devices. The sea lanes to India
were closer. They had a population to "govern."
All this was lost when the LTTE was pushed to
the Wanni jungles. Some said from Wann it was a case sweeping them
out to the Indian ocean. But eight months after the recapture of
Jaffna, on July 4, 1996 the LTTE returned. On that day Minister
Nimal Siripala de Silva escaped death from a suicide bomber. But
Brigadier Ananda Hamangoda, Brigade Commander for Jaffna town, SSP
Carlyle Dias, Superintendent of Police Jaffna were among 21 killed.
Just two weeks later, on July 18 1996 the guerrillas carried out
a conventional style attack on the Mullaitivu military base. Over
a thousand soldiers were killed and millions worth of military hardware
was lost. The ongoing offensives on Tiger guerrillas will no doubt
lead to considerable damage and some curtailment of their military
capability. But there is a formidable challenge for the Government.
It would have to beat them not only in the battlefield but on several
other fronts. Main among them is the vast financial resources the
LTTE has amassed in Switzerland and other off shore banks. The revelations
by the FBI on the LTTE's financial capabilities worldwide this week
comes as an eye opener. To crack down on such activity, the Government
will need international support and co-operation. Otherwise the
oxygen for the guerrillas to survive will remain.
Hence prolonged military action will not end the
ongoing problem. More war will only mean more damage to the economy
and heaping of further hardships on the people. An example - in
one battle area for just a week 6500 artillery rounds were fired.
A round cost US $ 285 (or Rs 28,500).
I am reminded of the words of then Commander of
the Army, Lt. Gen. Gerry de Silva, soon after Jaffna was re-captured.
Amidst the nationwide euphoria that prevailed, I asked him then
whether the LTTE has now been defeated. "They are down but
not out," was his reply.
How
FBI trapped the Tiger arms buyers |
A confidential informant
identified by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
as CI-1 received a telephone call from Nadarasa Yogarasa (Yoga)
one day in his apartment in Staten Island, New York, late
last month.
|
This photo of a man identified as "Suresh"
at a firing range was in one of Suresh Sriskandarajah's
galleries linked to his website. |
Yoga did not know that the man, whom The Sunday Times learnt
was a Tamil, was working for the FBI. He believed that he
had a relationship with a black market arms dealer in the
United States. In reality CI-1 (or the FBI informant) was
a convict for drug trafficking in 1994. Since 1999 he had
been working for the US Government. In exchange for his co-operation
he had received parole documents enabling him to stay in the
US. He also received financial assistance. FBI says he has
provided "extremely credible information that has been
corroborated by consensual recordings, e-mails, financial
documents and review of public records."
The conversation between the two, in Tamil, was recorded.
It revealed that Yoga wanted the FBI informant to meet with
someone about a potential arms deal. The duo agreed to discuss
the deal the next day at a location in Queens, New York. There
Yoga and Sathjhan Sarachandran (Satha), who had arrived from
Canada, met the FBI informant. Satha said he was acting on
the instructions of Pottu Amman who handled "outside
purchasing" of arms for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE).
Pottu Amman is the nom de guerre of Shanmuganathan Shivasankar,
head of the LTTE intelligence and operations wing.
Satha told the FBI informant that they needed "the
ones up to the Kfir." The reference was to the Israeli
Aircraft Industries (IAI) built Kfir (Lion Cub in Hebrew)
ground attack aircraft that have been wreaking havoc on Tiger
guerrilla targets in the North and East since April, this
year.
Satha, a Canadian citizen of Sri Lankan origin told the
FBI informant that a "big guy" in Canada was Pottu
Amman's direct contact and was going "there" - (a
reference to LTTE controlled territory in Sri Lanka) to get
a list of items they wanted to purchase. The FBI informant
asked Satha whether he had ever met with "Thalaivar,"
(leader in Tamil), a common reference to Mr. Prabhakaran.
Satha said he had done so three years ago.
At the end of the meeting, Yoga gave Satha's e-mail address
to the FBI informant. The latter sent a message "Thanks
for meeting. I will contact my guy to see what he has. If
it is ok do you want me to send you pictures of the merchandise?
If you need to contact me you can respond to this e-mail or
my cell…." Earlier this month, Satha replied "Thanks
for the quick e-mail. I am waiting for your merchandise pictures."
The next day FBI sent another e-mail from their informant's
account to Satha. It said "here are photos of what my
guy has available. SA 18 Russian made shoulder fired. Let
me know if your guys are interested. Give me a list of what
they want and I'll ask him what he can get." Attached
to the e-mail were two photographs of an SA 18 surface-to-air
missile.
On or around August 7, 2006, the FBI informant and Yoga
met in Queens, New York. They again discussed various weapons
that the LTTE wanted to purchase, including AK 47s and truck-mounted
missile systems. The informant and Yoga called Satha in Canada
on his mobile telephone. Satha confirmed he had received FBI
informant's e-mail and had forwarded it "over there"
(to the LTTE leadership in Sri Lanka). On or about August
8, 2006, Satha sent an e-mail to his LTTE contact in Sri Lanka
who works for Pottu Amman. Both e-mails were obtained by the
FBI after court authorized search warrants.
The e-mail quoted prices for Russian SAMs "SA18 US
$ 75,000 (about Rs 750,000) 1 reusable" and "1 needle
US $ 50,000 (about Rs 50,000)." The word "needle"
was a coded reference to the Russian built anti-aircraft missile.
Satha attached to the e-mail the two photographs of the missile
that the informant had e-mailed to him.
On or around August 11, 2006, the FBI informant and Satha
spoke on the telephone. Satha told the informant that "we
have shown it to 'Periyappa' over there," and he was
very interested. ('Periyappa," in Tamil meant father's
older brother). This was a reference to Mr. Prabhakaran. The
FBI informant asked whether "uncle" had seen the
pictures and Satha replied "even people above him have
seen it." The FBI informant said "the only person
above him is 'Thalaivar' himself." (i.e. Mr. Prabhakaran)
"Who else," asked Satha.
On or around August 14, 2006, an undercover law enforcement
officer posing as the black market arms dealer (identified
as UC 1) called Satha on the telephone. In a recorded conversation,
Satha told him that he had heard a lot about him and added
"we have to meet fast…" He said one of his
partners had arrived from a foreign country and wanted to
meet the "arms dealer" about "how we can proceed
with business."
On or around August 15, 2006, Satha telephoned the FBI informant.
He said he had arrived. The reference was to the "big
guy" in Canada who had travelled to Sri Lanka to obtain
a list of weapons that the LTTE wanted to acquire. He said
four of them planned to arrive in New York on Friday (August
18) evening and they wanted to meet with the "arms dealer"
on Saturday morning (August 19). They wanted to purchase 50
to 100 "needles" (missiles) and to inform the "arms
dealer" they wanted this higher quantity. Satha told
the FBI informant "sometimes getting five or ten needles
is not worth it. It has to be obtained in bulk. At our rate
if we fire ten at least two will hit."
Satha and the FBI informant had additional telephone conversations.
Satha said the missiles would have to be delivered to Sri
Lanka. When asked about payment, Satha replied, "the
guy who is coming is aware of that." He added ,"If
he (the "arms dealer") could ship it to our destination
we will arrange to get it cleared at the other side."
On Friday, August 18, Satha and three others drove across
the border from Canada to New York. They were questioned by
a US Customs official. They replied they were going to Buffalo,
New York, for a bachelor party. The Customs official ran their
names through a government database and discovered that one
of them had a criminal record. He was not permitted to enter
United States. Others were allowed in.
The FBI informant met Satha and his two associates at a
location in Long Island. An undercover agent (UC 4) drove
to the location. Later the FBI informant, Satha and the duo
travelled in the FBI informant's car. The undercover agent
followed in his car. A second undercover law enforcement officer
(UC 2), who posed as a technical expert in military weaponry,
joined the others for a meeting at another location.
At the meeting the "arms dealer" asked Satha and
his associates what they wanted to purchase. It was Thani
(one of the associates) who replied. He said "We need
something for Kfir. He said they also needed some weaponry
to destroy boats.
The "arms dealer" stressed the importance of having
the financial terms and manner of payment in place. Thani
said the money could be made available by Monday or Tuesday
(August 21 or 22, 2006). Satha and another associate Sahil
repeatedly attempted to place a call on a cellular telephone
to their contact about specifics of funds transfer. They discussed
using bank accounts in Switzerland, St. Croix or other off
shore locations. Sahil, who was identified as the "financial
guy," explained that the accounts they used would have
to be active accounts.
Sahil said "if there is no activity in the account
and you throw in a million dollars that is going to raise
a red flag. They will freeze the account on both sides."
The parties discussed depositing the money into an account
that the FBI informant controlled and, after the "arms
dealer" executed the transfer of weapons, the money to
be transferred to him.
Thani said they wanted delivery to occur ship-to-ship in
the Indian Ocean. Training of LTTE fighters in Sri Lanka on
operating the missiles was also discussed. The "arms
dealer" said they could either be trained by video or
that he could provide the training himself. Thani and Sahil
said they wanted him to travel to Sri Lanka to train the ultimate
users. They assured the FBI informant that the "arms
dealer" would be kept safe.
The "arms dealer" asked whether "you guys"
currently have the Russian made SA 18 surface-to-air missiles.
Thani said no, that they currently have the "7s,"
a reference to the Russian made SA 7. He said they were not
effective in hitting aircraft. He said currently it took two
to three missiles to hit an aircraft.
Thani also said they wanted to purchase AK 47 assault rifles.
He said the Chinese equivalents they use now were "garbage."
He specifically asked for American or Russian made weapons.
The parties discussed the quantity and price of SA 18s and
AK-47s. The parties agreed that an initial shipment would
consist of 10 SA 18 missiles and 500 AK-47s. The "arms
dealer" agreed to provide technical training on the use
of missiles. The package for missiles, guns and training was
to be between US $ 900,000 and US $ 937,500.
The "arms dealer" wanted to know if the LTTE trio
wanted to see an SA 18 and the AK-47s they were discussing.
Thani said yes. The first undercover agent with assistance
brought in a long wooden crate containing an SA 18 missile.
Sahil was to remark that it looked like a "casket."
The "arms dealer," a witty one, laughed and declared
it could put a few people in caskets. Another undercover officer
then brought in a large cardboard box containing two AK 47
assault rifles.
When the missile was unpacked, Thani picked up the tube
and placed it in his shoulder, in the same manner as it would
be used to shoot down a plane. He and his associates raised
questions about how far ahead the target should be and the
speed. Satha, Sahil and Thani each then held the Ak-47 in
firing position.
Sahil and Thani also asked about various other weapons and
military items. For example, Thani discussed with the first
undercover law enforcement officer posing off as the technical
expert in military weaponry, the use and availability of anti-tank
missiles, "fire finders" that would enable the LTTE
to track the location from which enemy fire had come, and
surface-to-surface missiles that could be used for attacking
targets such as ships. Sahil also asked for the availability
of other weaponry, including American and French made surface-to-air
missiles, and a "forty-forty," which, based on the
conversation, appears to have been a reference to a multiple
rocket launch system that can fire multiple surface-to-surface
rockets simultaneously.
The "arms dealer" also asked if the trio were
interested in night vision equipment, and Thani said they
were. When the agent took out the night vision goggles and
handed them to Thani, he indicated that the goggles were "Generation
2," and that they wanted "Generation 3."
The most shocking moment came just then. The under cover
agent posing off as the technical expert on military weapons
gave a signal. The trio with LTTE connections were arrested.
The details leading to their arrest are contained in a 21-page
indictment filed before the Eastern District Court of New
York on August 21. A copy of this, together with a 35-page
indictment of five others, was obtained by The Sunday Times.
That first is in respect of Sathajhan Sarachandran (Satha),
Sahilal Sabaratnam (also known as Sahil and Shakil), Thiruthanikan
Thanigasalam (Thani) and Nadarasa Yogarasa (Yoga). The four
of them were charged with multiple crimes including conspiracy
to provide material support and resources to the LTTE.
Earlier, a five-page statement from the US Department of
Justice gave brief details about the outcome of exhaustive
investigations by the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)
together with their Field Offices. The FBI investigations
had started in 1999. Following a visit to the United States
by Foreign Minister, Mangala Samaraweera, the US Government
sent an FBI team to Colombo. That team also unearthed data
that have been incorporated in the two indictments.
The second FBI indictment also is on four others - Thirukumaran
Sinnathamby (also known as Thirukumaran Sivasubramaniam),
Murugesu Vinayagamoorthy (also known as Dr. Moorthy and Vinayagamoorthy
Murugesu) and Nachimuthu Socrates in the same Courts. This
is for providing material support to the LTTE that included
the procurement of military equipment, dual use technology,
fund raising, money laundering through "front" charitable
organizations and United States bank accounts.
The latter also includes charges that they attempted to
obtain classified information and conspired to bribe US public
officials in an effort to remove the LTTE from the State Department's
list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations and dealt in financial
transactions with the LTTE. Later, the FBI updated this indictment
with the inclusion of the name of Ramanan Mylvaganam.
The four indicted in this case, the FBI investigations have
revealed, were engaged in a far-reaching conspiracy to provide
material support to the LTTE. It consisted of procurement
of military equipment, communication devices, other technology,
fund raising, money laundering through front charitable organizations
and a myriad of other criminal activities. It included conspiracy
to bribe public officials, attempting to obtain classified
information, dealing in financial transactions and money laundering
among others. |
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