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No
sense in allowing politicians to depoliticise selections for important
posts
The lecture was delivered last week and focused mainly on two important areas; the composition and powers of the Constitutional Council (CC), and the composition of the Elections Commission and the responsibility of conducting a free and fair election. Drawing inspiration from the Soulbury Commission Report and H.L De Silva's article, he argued that it was a contradiction to have politicians and nominees of parliamentarians in a CC that is expected to depoliticise appointments to high office. His contention was that the CC should not have any politicians or nominees of politicians. The alternative he proposed was developed logically from first principles, and took the form of automatic induction into the CC of retiring judges of the SC for a single term of 3 years. He proposed that the CC should be invested with the full power to make all appointments envisaged in the 17th Amendment and granted immunity from FR jurisdiction of the SC. After explaining the weaknesses of the aborted 18th Amendment he made a convincing statement of justification for the granting of immunity to the modified new CC. In regard to the Elections Commission his submission was that it was the 'odd man out' among those listed in the 17th Amendment, in that election work was irregular and occasional unlike the work of, say, the PSC which flowed regularly on a daily basis and required bi-weekly meetings of the Commission. Thus, there was a mismatch between the functions to be performed in election work and the choice of organizational structure. It was a mistake for the framers of the 17th Amendment to assume that one organizational structure could serve all Commissions, he noted. He advocated the Indian model wherein a single Chief Elections Commissioner (with the assistance of subordinates) conducted the election. |
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