Equal status for Sea Tigers
SLMM proposals undermine Lanka’s sovereignty and territorial integrity

Navy Chief Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri - a firm no to SLMM proposals

Fourteen months into a Ceasefire Agreement, the United National Front (UNF) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are yet to discuss core issues that would end the long drawn ethnic conflict.

The furthest they have gone at the March talks in Hakone, (Japan), was set out in an official statement from the Royal Norwegian Government. It declared "the parties re-iterated their commitment to develop a federal system based on self-determination within a united Sri Lanka."

Even before the official positions of the two sides were so defined, UNF leaders have qualified their own stance on the issue. A federal system they envisage, they have continued to assert, will protect the nation's territorial integrity, sovereignty and have one Army, one Navy, one Air Force and one Police force.

Sea Tigers show their strength at sea

At least officially, the LTTE is yet to stake their claim for a separate or parallel security arms "under a federal system based on self-determination" - a declaration they have become party to. There is no doubt they will make a strong case when the issue does come up. That will be very much after the two sides are successful enough to reach accord on the final format for a federal system. That will also be very much after they are successful in agreeing on the definitions of what constitutes a federal system based on self-determination.

These are no easy task. To say the least, they are time consuming and arduous. If and when such accords are reached, then the UNF will have to seek Parliamentary approval and the endorsement of the people of Sri Lanka. This again is a time consuming and arduous process where many obstacles have to be overcome. Such are the gigantic challenges that lay ahead for a Government which even though has successfully stilled gunfire in the north-eastern battlefields but finds that its one time adversary is growing in strength and stature.

Against this backdrop, plagued with uncertainties and a waning euphoria over an immediate settlement, comes far reaching, if not shocking, proposals from retired Norwegian Major General Tryggve Tellefsen, Head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). If accepted at the political level they will give nationhood status to the LTTE. That is not all. It seeks to equate the LTTE as a sovereign entity with the Government of Sri Lanka. That is before discussions on core issues, leave alone a settlement, is reached.

These proposals are listed in an "Initial Discussion Paper" Maj. Gen. Tellefsen has given the Government and the LTTE on 'MEASURES TO BE CONSIDERED FOR PREVENTING INCIDENTS BETWEEN THE SLN (Sri Lanka Navy) AND LTTE AT SEA." (See full text on this page) Here are some of the highlights:

* In the spirit of the CFA (Ceasefire Agreement) the GOSL (Government of Sri Lanka), and especially the SLN (Sri Lanka Navy) should recognize the LTTE Sea Tigers as a de facto naval unit….

The acceptance of this proposal by the UNF Government would amount to recognition of the LTTE (and not the Tamil people) as a sovereign nation with a separate naval arm. It will see the emergence of a new Navy in the Indian Ocean region even before a permanent peace accord is reached.

* For mutual trust and understanding and as a confidence building exercise, the SLN and the LTTE Sea Tigers should permit observers from the other Party onboard their vessels while conducting exercises and training. Notification of such naval exercises should also be implemented as a normal procedure.

Since the beginning of the separatist war, both the Sri Lanka Navy and Sea Tigers, the LTTE's sea going arm, have been training and preparing themselves to confront each other. Now, even before a permanent peace accord is reached, the proposal envisages the positioning of each other's representatives on board vessels belonging to them. This again subordinates the sovereignty of Sri Lanka to a militant cum political organisation that has been conferred nationhood status by Gen. Tellefson, head of the SLMM through his proposals.

* To prevent misunderstanding and to exchange crucial information when needed, both Parties' vessels, when at sea, are to monitor channel 16 in accordance with international laws at Sea.

This is the international frequency used by those engaged in maritime shipping. In asking that the Sri Lanka Navy, which is the security arm of a sovereign state to constantly remain in touch with the LTTE on an international shipping frequency, is to compromise its role in protecting the shores of Sri Lanka. How will the Sri Lanka Navy engage in measures to counter attempts at smuggling military hardware into Sri Lanka? Channel 16 was not designed for communications between combatants.

* Neither SLN nor LTTE Sea Tigers will conduct offensive or aggressive operations and movements at sea. The minimum distance between the Parties' vessels should be kept to one (1) NM (nautical mile). In emergencies or when situations require so shorter distance between the vessels may be agreed on.

This will mean the Navy will forfeit its legal and sovereign right to conduct any offensive or aggressive operations if and when the LTTE is engaged in smuggling in military hardware. It will also prevent the freedom of access to the nation's sovereign waters, which is the sole prerogative and the undisputed entitlement of the nation's Navy.

* When an incident at sea occurs, the Parties should refrain from escalating the situation by reinforcing the maritime presence at the scene. Hence, the Parties ROE (Rules of Engagement) at sea should be revised to meet the new requirements.

The proposal debars the Navy from maintaining its operational role by restricting the deployment of the armed resources of the State. A serious question also arises on the legality or power of the head of the SLMM to even propose that the Navy revise its Rules of Engagement but also restrict the rights of a sovereign nation- a prerogative of the sovereign state of Sri Lanka.

* SLN and Sea Tigers should have specific marked exercise and training areas at sea, designed for navigation training and for live firing exercises as well. LTTE vessels when at sea outside exercise areas should not carry weapons or explosives onboard.

After seeking to legitimise the existence of Sea Tigers by asking the Government to recognise it, the SLMM wants to ensure through this proposal that specific areas at sea in the sovereign waters of Sri Lanka are demarcated for use by the SLMM promoted "state of a militant/political group" that these monitors recognise as an "independent nation." Furthermore, ridiculous as it may seem, this proposal further attempts to restrict the sovereign rights of the Government of Sri Lanka from exercising its rights in its own territorial waters.

This will confer on the Sea Tigers the liberty of not only naval training and exercising an illegal right over the nation's sovereign waters but also the freedom of smuggling military hardware. They have been conducting this illegal exercise regularly under cover of the Ceasefire Agreement. The question is why such training and live firing exercises if the declared aim of the LTTE is for peace. To fight whom? Is it not the Sri Lanka Navy and the Government? Isn't it also an indication that the LTTE are not sincere in their pledges for a peaceful settlement to the ethnic issue? Does this also not mean that the SLMM are not assisting and abetting the LTTE in achieving their goal of Eelam?

* The Parties should discuss the possibility of creating safe and legal maritime supply lines within TW (territorial waters) for transporting of personnel and non-military goods.

The proposal will pave the way for a secure passage for LTTE in the seas and deprive the Navy's right to check if it is only used for transporting of personnel and non-military goods as suggested. It also impinges on prevailing Excise and Customs laws and, as a result, widening the illegal administrative infrastructure of the LTTE.

The official response of the UNF Government to these SLMM proposals will be known only when Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, leads the Government delegation for talks on this matter on Thursday (April 24) at the Omanthai crossing point. Representatives of the LTTE will also attend the meeting convened by the Royal Norwegian Government under the aegis of the SLMM. However there were indications last night that this meeting may be put off.

Even if the Government rejects the proposals in toto, which is likely the case, the question still remains whether the SLMM Chief has exceeded his brief. In such an event, many more questions arise. They include the most important question whether the Royal Norwegian Government endorses Maj.Gen. (retd) Teleffsen's proposals and whether such a position does not impinge on their commitment to neutrality as facilitators. If they do not, then there is the all important question of Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen's continuing role as Head of SLMM. Here again, like in the case of the Maj.

Gen. (retd.) Teleffsen's determiniation over the Chinese fishing trawler issue, whether the Government will adopt a supinely passive approach remains another key issue.
Thursday's meeting follows a decision made at the Hakone peace talks to "strengthen the mandate and capacity of the SLMM to undertake preventive measures to avoid serious incidents at sea or on land."

According to the statement issued by the Royal Norwegian Government after the Hakone talks, "the parties have agreed to convene senior naval and political representatives from both sides within three weeks to work out effective arrangements for the operation of naval units in keeping with existing treaty obligations."

The Sunday Times learns that Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, has reacted angrily to these SLMM proposals. He is learnt to have sent a strong response to the Ministry of Defence after the proposals were forwarded to him for study and report. This was after a full discussion with his senior officials.

Though his fuller response is not known, according to one Navy source, Vice Admiral Sandagiri has quite rightly rejected the idea of recognition for the Sea Tigers. He has said that when the Ceasefire Agreement was signed, it was acknowledged that the Navy was in total control of the sea and the sole legitimate force. Even if a federal solution is arrived at, the Navy Chief is learnt to have said that there will be only one Navy and that would be the Sri Lanka Navy.

Vice Admiral Sandagiri is also learnt to have contended that the Sea Tigers is not a legal entity or force to be permitted to carry weapons at sea in accordance with international or local laws.

Even before the current set of proposals were forwarded to the Government (and the LTTE) in an "Initial Discussion Paper" it was the same Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen who declared in a determination on the Chinese trawler incident that outside "armed elements" were responsible. (Situation Report - April 6).

The move drew a strong response from President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. On April 6, she wrote to Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Sandagiri, expressing shock at the finding and directing him to appoint a Court of Inquiry to probe the matter. She asked that a report be handed over to her within two weeks.

Already Vice Admiral Sandagiri has appointed a three member Court of Inquiry. It is headed by Captain Susith Weerasekera, Commandant of Naval and Maritime Academy and comprises Commander S.S. Ranasinghe, Commanding Officer of the Fast Attack Craft Squadron and Commander H.U.D. Hettiaratchchi, Base Stores Officer of the Naval Dockyard in Trincomalee. The Court has commenced sittings and its report is to be forwarded to President Kumaratunga within the deadline she has set.

In the wake of the euphoria of the Ceasefire Agreement, one of the immediate responses of the UNF Government was that its military readiness should be responsive to the expectations of a peace dividend. There were ambitious plans to down size the military and find placements for personnel in United Nations peacekeeping forces. But the recent weeks have seen a marked change. Security Forces are being told to prepare themselves for any eventuality and stock up requirements at least for three months. Funds that were restricted are now being released for essential procurements.

The Government now appears to have reviewed the initial euphoric response to downgrade military preparedness and readiness. This is visibly manifest in their current response to revamp military capability and to release funding for essential procurements, which were not given priority since the ceasefire. In hindsight it is all too obvious that the initial lack of a studied approach to the military aspect of the ceasefire has had a devastating setback. In marked contrast, the LTTE on the other hand has used the opportunity of the ceasefire to revamp, re-train and re-arm their military capability. In fact the Government should have woken to the realities of the military situation when LTTE Chief Negotiator, Anton Balasingham, declared in Dusseldorf that they will not disarm and that the Black Tigers have paved the way for the current strength of the Tiger guerrillas to carry out the current political phase of their overall strategy.

Training of troops in the Army had been badly affected due to the non-import of ammunition. Lack of spares have depleted the Navy's fleet and hampered its capability to effectively protect the nation's shores and prevent smuggling in of military hardware. The operational efficiency of the Air Force had reached pathetic levels. I will not delve into disturbing details for it will affect national security considerations and public morale.

However, two instances will speak for the problems of the Air Force. On one occasion, troops had to be rushed from Minneriya to quell violence in Thopur in the Trincomalee district this week. None of the Air Force Mi-17 troop transport helicopters capable of carrying 30 persons, were air worthy. Hence, Bell 212 helicopters which could carry only ten persons were used. In late 1999, when Tiger guerrilla artillery and mortar attacks on the Palaly airfield forced its shut down leading to fears of the fall of Jaffna peninsula, Mi-17 helicopters were used frequently to transport troops and thus ward off a national calamity.

On another occasion, during the Sinhala and Hindu New Year, more than 1500 troops coming on leave to the south were stuck in the Jaffna peninsula. Only two of the Air Force fleet of AN 32 transport planes were operational. Airmen made a third airworthy with difficulty but it developed trouble again. The help of a private airline operator was used to clear the backlog. The flights continued until dawn of New Year.

The woes of the Air Force, sad enough, like the Army and the Navy, are for no fault of their leadership. They have repeatedly warned the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, Austin Fernando. But it has continued to fall on deaf ears of the bureaucracy there. The fact that the Ministry of Defence has not been focused on the three services is no secret though it has now become customary to witch-hunt those who point them out. That is instead of rectifying the defects.

The lack of military preparedness at the moment is a direct result of the lack of professionalism in the Ministry of Defence and the negative approach of the political leadership. In any situation that bears on national security, military hierarchy under the leadership of the political establishment, has to frequently make contingency plans to meet expected threats. In this instance, without delving into details, it is evident that military preparedness and strategic assessments have been subordinated to the expectation of a comprehensive peace settlement.

It is fundamental that any assessment of threat be based on the assessment of the opponent's actions. In this case, the LTTE have unwaveringly maintained their demand for Eelam and regularly re-iterated that it is their military capability that brought them to the political phase of their strategy. They have backed their words by improving on their military muscle and re-vamping their military hardware with smuggled state of the art equipment. For reasons best known to the military establishment of the UNF Government, they appear to have chosen to ignore the developing threat of increasing LTTE military capability. So much so that any rational comment on these military discrepancies and the increasing threat posed by the LTTE have been regarded by the UNF as the views of extremists who are against the peace process.

Regretfully the UNF Government, blinded by political ambition, appears to disregard the fact that the entire country, are all for peace. But what many disagree is that the process, as seen by the public, is heavily loaded in favour of the LTTE and the probable creation of a one group dominated federated state of the north and east provinces.

The public cannot be held at fault for forming such an impression, as the Government has been slow if not hesitant in keeping them informed. In the circumstances the public are prone to see a worse case scenario situation.
Making this assessment is not an expression of anti peace but of the public concern for an undivided Sri Lanka.

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