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Attack
on Tiger ship - a job well done
A week after scouring the north-eastern deep seas, Captain Ruwan Dias, Commanding Officer of SLNS Sayura, radioed Eastern Naval Area Headquarters in Trincomalee to make a port call last Sunday, March 9. There were some routine chores to attend to before resuming their two-week long assignment to track down weapons smuggling or other illegal activity. But the Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri had other plans for him, his 135 officers and men on board. In Colombo, the Navy Chief had received reliable information once again that Tiger guerrillas were planning to smuggle a shipload of military hardware. If previous attempts to intercept them had failed, almost at the eleventh hour, Vice Admiral Sandagiri had worked out a top-secret operation with his men. This time he wanted to ensure nothing went wrong. At the centre of this task were his Director General of Naval Operations (DNO), Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera, Commander, Eastern Naval Area (COMEAST), Rear Admiral Vasantha Karannagoda and Commander, Northern Naval Area (COMNORTH), Rear Admiral Nandana Tuduwewatte. Whilst ordering Captain Dias to change course and proceed to the location where the ship was said to be hovering around, reportedly until trawlers arrived for mid-sea transfer of cargo, they put into effect a series of other measures. The intelligence information was also conveyed promptly to the Indian Navy through diplomatic channels. SLNS Sayura, the former Indian Naval ship INS Saryu, was on its maiden long haul voyage since acquisition three years ago when it was ordered to alter course. This Advanced Offshore Patrol Vessel (AOPV), the largest in the Navy's fleet, was to have been the platform for the Navy's Air Wing - a project that was scrapped and revived only last week. Whilst SLNS Sayura cut through the mildly choppy seas, Fast Attack Craft (FACs) and Gun Boats were rushed from the COMEAST and COMNORTH headquarters in Trincomalee and Kankesanthurai respectively. Operation Waruna Kirana, the permanent naval blockade in the north-east, introduced on May 25 2001 and now extending from the shores off Delft in the North to Vakarai in the East was strengthened. On Monday (March 10), men on board SLNS Sayura had finished a breakfast of pol rotti, lunumiris and canned fish. Then came the good news. At 7.45 a.m. SLNS Sayura radioed COMEAST to report the sighting of the suspicious vessel. The location they gave was - 11 degrees 17 minutes north, 83 degrees 23 minutes east. Men at the Command Room then switched to Channel 16 - the International Maritime Communications Channel and called upon the suspect vessel to identify themselves. After a long pause, a shaky voice replied "we are motor tanker Warlos." A source on board said later "though he tried to imitate a westerner, the accent gave the show away. Our suspicions grew…" More questions were fired from the SLNS Sayura radio but there was no response. By then SLNS Udara, SLNS Prathapa, Fast Attack Craft (FAC)P 474 and P 494 had arrived in the area. Dornier aircraft from the Indian Navy's fleet air arm were flying sorties over the sky. Pointing out there was radio silence from the vessel, after some obscene language was used against them, SLNS Sayura that had moved closer, radioed details to COMEAST. The suspicious vessel was a tanker. It had its funnel painted in black with the marking "SN." The hull was white and the super structure green. It was approximately 70 metres long with an estimated 500-ton deadweight. There was no flag of owner, port of registry or any other identification marks displayed. Navy Headquarters who were kept informed by COMEAST sent orders to SLNS Sayura through the same channel. They were directed to strictly adhere to Rules of Engagement (RoE) issued after the Ceasefire Agreement. In terms of this, the Navy is "entitled to apprehend any vessel/boat on the high seas," if found engaged in, inter alia, "manoeuvring of a vessel/boat in order to rendezvous with suspect log boats/any other/boats with a clear intention of transferring/smuggling in warlike materials;" It also entitles the Sri Lanka Navy to "exercise the right of hot pursuit into high seas, when it has good reason to believe that a suspect vessel/boat has violated the laws and regulations of Sri Lanka. (See box story) In accordance
with the RoE, Navy Headquarters sent directions to SLNS
Sayura through COMEAST. They were ordered to fire
across the bow, the bridge and the radio/radar mast to stop the
tanker, if it defied orders and attempted to move. Navy men opened
fire across the bows to warn them. Tiger guerrillas retaliated with
medium calibre gunfire. An officer and two sailors sustained injuries.
Two "wind shields" (on the port side of the bridge) were
shattered. Navy men were angered at the hostile action, which in
their view, constituted an attack. They decided to exercise provisions
in the RoE that allowed them "the use of force in extraordinary
situations, which may pose an imminent threat to the national security
and defence of Sri Lanka." It was exactly 10.15 a.m. when SLNS Sayura positioned itself closer and opened out with volleys of 40 mm Bofors gun, the most powerful gun on board with a range of some 6,000 metres. The two FACs, P 474 and P 494 also moved in and began firing at the tanker. Within moments, it was engulfed in a huge ball of fire. Thick black clouds billowed sky high. The deep blue waters of the sea shined as the fire became intense. By 10.30 a.m. the tanker began listing from the starboard side. By 11.30 a.m. it began to sink. SLNS Sayura gave COMEAST the location - 11 degrees 17 minutes north, 083 degrees 23 minutes east or 185 miles north east of Mullaitivu. At exactly 1509 hours (3.09 p.m.), SLNS Sayura reported to COMEAST that the sea had swallowed the tanker. It had gone down some four kilometres ending a deep-sea drama that came as a major achievement for Vice Admiral Sandagiri and his men. Indeed it marked a major milestone in Sri Lanka Navy's history. Whilst the Navy and Tiger guerrillas were exchanging fire in the deep seas last Monday morning, LTTE Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham, reached the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) office in Colombo on a telephone from Wanni. He lodged a strong protest over what he called an unprovoked attack on their cargo ship on "innocent passage in international waters." The same night, Political Wing leader, S.P. Tamilselvan, wrote to Defence Minister, Tilak Marpana, calling the incident a "grave violation of the Ceasefire Agreement" and warned that it "will have far reaching implications for the peace process." The next day, Mr. Marapana refuted the allegations and defended the Navy's action. Both the UNF and PA leaders lauded the Navy. Minister Milinda Moragoda, a member of the Government's peace negotiating team, told Vice Admiral Sandagiri it was a job well done. President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumartunga, who left Colombo on Friday on a visit to a European country, also congratulated Vice Admiral Sandagiri for the brave action of his men. A debrief of the Navy men involved in the operation and the video footage from Israeli built MSIS (Multi Sensor Integrated System) on board the Navy vessels have led to more startling revelations. The Sunday Times learnt that the LTTE cargo vessel sunk by the Navy was none other than "MV Koimar"- the tanker that avoided a joint Sri Lanka-India Navy search in December, last year. (Situation Report - December 22, 2002 "LTTE'S MV KOIMAR WAS LOADED WITH AMMUNITION AND FUEL"). This report, which spoke of how the Navy missed apprehending the vessel, noted: "There is incontrovertible evidence that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was responsible. They used a large tanker to bring in not only assorted ammunition and other warlike items to Sri Lanka but also large quantities of fuel. This has been further confirmed by the Indian Navy that had trailed the suspicious vessel since it was spotted in the Bay of Bengal waters, far east of the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu or some 110 nautical miles north east of Mullaitivu. "That is not all. Besides confirming that the suspicious vessel in question was the 75 metres long "MV Koimar", the Indian Navy, The Sunday Times learnt, has made available to their Sri Lankan counterparts colour photographs of the vessel moving in the high seas. Earlier, responding to radio calls, those on board the vessel had identified themselves as members of the LTTE"… Eyewitness accounts have now revealed that the sunken tanker bore the marking "MV Koei" - a modification of the name "MV Koimar." Changing names of their cargo vessels at mid sea to avoid detection has been a standard tactic of the LTTE. On January 16, 1993, when the Indian Coast Guard opened fire on an LTTE vessel killing its then Jaffna Commander Sathasivam Krishnakumar alias Kittu, it bore the name "MV Ahat." The original name of the vessel "MV Emerald" had undergone name changes from "MV Ahata," "MV Yahat" to "MV Ahat." Similarly another vessel, "MV Ilyana," was changed to "MV Francis," "MV Sunbird" and "MV Omros." Copies of the MSIS video have been given to at least two countries for analysis by their specialised agencies. Besides the name change, the colour, appearance and other particulars of the tanker "MV Koimar" and "MV Koei" have been found to be identical thus confirming they are one and the same. What formed the cargo in the sunken tanker? The Sunday Times has learnt from authoritative sources that it included large quantities of ammunition, both for small arms and heavy weapons. However, last Wednesday the Government received a list of items from a foreign source that spoke of the cargo containing ten 130 mm artillery guns among other items. Within hours, Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, ensured the information was leaked to the media. Both the electronic and print made gave wide exposure to this list. It is only after it became public knowledge did some UNF leaders realise the information should have been first verified. If this information received was not altogether correct, needless to say that would anger the LTTE and make them believe the Government had made up a concocted list. But there were also other important reasons why it should have been verified first. Whether the need for such a measure occurred to Sri Lanka's Defence Secretary is another matter. The all-knowing Defence Secretary, Mr Fernando may unabashedly swear on four sheets of A-4 paper that it is a "figment of imagination" but it is still very true. It would have been impossible for Tiger guerrillas to smuggle 130 mm artillery guns in a tanker, transfer it mid sea to trawlers and bring them ashore. The barrel of this piece of artillery alone weighs over six tons and is long. When the Sri Lanka Army acquired 130 mm guns during the tenure of the People's Alliance, they faced a serious difficulty on how to unload them from ships. The cranes at the Kankesanthurai (the most convenient location since they were for use in the Jaffna peninsula) and Trincomalee ports were not suitable. Former Defence Secretary Chandrananda de Silva, a man who scrupulously maintained the dignity and decorum of his office though he became the centre of many a controversy, issued a gazette notification under Emergency Regulations temporarily requisitioning the cranes at the jetty of the Prima Flour Milling complex in Trincomalee. They were unloaded there. The Sri Lanka Navy's LCM (Landing Craft Mechanised) were able to transport only one piece of 130 mm artillery at a time. Although the sunken tanker is known to have had a crane capable of lifting ten tons of cargo, it could not have carried these artillery pieces in an improvised tanker. Assuming they were on board for purposes of argument, they could still not have been transferred at mid sea to small trawlers. The Sea Tigers are not known to have trawlers that could carry more than six tons of cargo. Moreover, anyone conversant with merchant marine activity would explain that unloading such a tonnage from a cargo vessel at sea would have to be done only when the roll (or the shake of the vessel at sea) does not exceed three degrees. Otherwise, the moorings of the crane may be wrenched off or the cargo ship may topple. Even if one lived in "dream-land" and believed nothing they did not know ever takes place, a basic knowledge of fundamentals is very essential. The tanker incident not only underscores this reality but also highlights how much damage such colossal ignorance, not to mention gross mediocrity, can cause to a nation and its national security interests. That such comical situations occur in rapid sequence is certainly no credit to the UNF Government. Must one say anything more about accountability? At the opening of the "Tamil Eelam Appeal Courts complex," in Kilinochchi (note: how the so-called Eelam legal network is expanding since the ceasefire), guerrilla Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham made the proud boast that the tanker was a "LTTE registered merchant vessel engaged in commercial activity." That indeed is a declaration that any self-respecting sovereign Government should not meekly allow to pass. At least at the upcoming Hakkone (Japan) peace talks, the Sri Lanka delegation should ask him or other LTTE members to answer a few fundamental questions. Or would that amount to offending them? Here are a few among the many questions that beg answers:
What was the Cargo Manifest of this "legally registered merchant vessel?" From which port did it depart last and where was it headed for? Whose cargo was it carrying? To anyone with a modicum of knowledge in the elements of commerce these are basic questions. The location where the incident occurred, the Sri Lanka Navy has no doubt, is an area within the country's national jurisdiction. Sri Lanka's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (as promulgated by Presidential Proclamation of January 15 1977 under the Maritime Zones Law No. 22 of 1976) extends up to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the coast. The sovereignty and enforcement jurisdiction of a State is limited to 12-mile territorial waters and a further distance of 12 miles, up to the outer limit of the 24 mile contiguous zone. However, in the 200-mile EEZ, the coastal states exercise exclusive jurisdiction in respect of resources. Accordingly the Law of the Sea Convention recognises the right of hot pursuit of the coastal state in respect of violations in the Exclusive Economic Zone. Thus, the waters within 200 miles constitute an area under national jurisdiction, although freedom of navigation exists, as in the high seas, for vessels of third states. It is important to note in this regard, that the Law of the Sea Convention stipulates that vessels of third states have the freedom of navigation and other international lawful uses of the sea, in the 200 miles EEZ. Last Monday's tanker incident is again conclusive proof that the Tiger guerrillas have continued to smuggle in military hardware. This is whilst recruiting new cadres and conducting training for them, all preparations to enhance their military might. What of the Security Forces? Since the Ceasefire Agreement, there have been much-publicised moves only to down size the military and grandiose plans to find placements for them in United Nations Peace Keeping Force. This is at the expense of totally ignoring military preparedness. To say so, is not to advocate a return to war. Only a strong military that is in a full state of preparedness will add muscle to the Government's negotiating stance. Pointing this out should not be construed to mean anti peace - now fast becoming a whipping game for those who resent or dislike the realities being projected.
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