Situation Report

How ‘Eelam War 4’ was averted

A soldier during combat training in the north

It came barely 24 hours after the first anniversary of the Ceasefire Agreement, observed in the south with much publicised religious ceremonies and in the former battle areas of the north and east with hartals. A stand off between the Navy and Tiger

guerrillas nearly sparked off what may have been the beginning of Eelam War Four.
Both the military and the LTTE made hectic preparations by mustering hundreds of men and long-range weapons to go to war. A tense count down was stalled almost near flashpoint thanks to the intervention of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), a Scandinavian team of 47 men and women with their local counterparts, who are finding it increasingly difficult to enforce a ceasefire and ensure peace talks do not end in peril.

The near confrontation was over an incident some four kilometres from Kuchchaveli town, north of Trincomalee, on February 23 (Sunday). Around 1.30 p.m. a bus load of pilgrims were on their way to Girihanduseya Temple at Tiriyaya. Seven Tiger guerrillas, three of them armed with T-56 automatic rifles and another with a T-81 assault rifle, all Chinese built, ambushed them. Another guerrilla carried a communications set. They boarded the bus and began checking the panic stricken passengers. Some 500 metres away, a group of guerrillas were standing by. It was indisputably in a Government controlled area.

The news reached Sri Lanka Navy's Walagamba detachment located in Kuchchaveli. A team rushed to the scene, surrounded the guerrilla group and ordered them to surrender. They refused, threatened to bite the cyanide capsules chained to their necks and commit suicide. The men radioed the detachment headquarters. Navy officers informed the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters at the Dockyard in Trincomalee and the SLMM office. Eight officers and 80 sailors from a special operations unit rushed to the scene. So did sailors from special platoons.

An Army Rapid Deployment team during training

The Navy's Contingent Commander based in Nilaweli, Commander K.K.J. Silva rushed to the scene accompanied by SLMM monitors. Negotiations began with the leader of the seven guerrillas, Vijaya Kanthan. He refused to surrender weapons. Navy men radioed that the group that stood some 500 metres away were taking up position and were pointing their weapons at locations where Navy personnel were deployed.
More Navy re-inforcements rushed to the scene. This included five officers and 60 sailors from Eastern Naval Area headquarters, an officer and 16 men from a special operations platoon and a crack team of commandos from the Special Boat Squadron (SBS). As negotiations continued, a tense situation was developing.

That Sunday morning, unaware that a crisis situation was to develop later, the Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri had accompanied his two colleagues - Army Commander Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle and Air Force Commander Air Marshal Donald Perera - on a flight to Jaffna. They were part of an official entourage of Minister Milinda Moragoda who was on an official visit to the peninsula. Others included Defence Secretary Austin Fernando, Netherlands Ambassador in Sri Lanka,
Ms Susan Blankhart and Ashley de Vos, an archaeological consultant who is an expert on old forts in Sri Lanka.

After arriving at the Palaly airport, Minister Moragoda and party were entertained to a buffet breakfast by the Northern Naval Area Commander, Rear Admiral Nandana Tuduwewatte at the Officer's Mess at his headquarters in Kankesanthurai. Whilst Army Commander Lt. Gen. Balagalle drove to address troops in Muhamalai and later at Palaly, Mr. Moragoda and party travelled by road to the Naval base at Karainagar and took a boat to Fort Hammonheil.

The Navy uses this old Dutch Fort as a detention centre to house deserters and others to whom punishment is meted out on disciplinary grounds. All of them were moved out that day. After a tour of the area, the Minister and party boarded a Navy Dvora fast attack craft (FAC) for a voyage to Delft islands. When a visit to the Police Station and other places of interest ended, they boarded a Sri Lanka Air Force helicopter to arrive at the Northern Naval Area Headquarters for a late lunch, a sumptuous buffet which included various varieties of rice, stuffed cuttle fish, three different type of fish preparations, prawns and fruit platters. Lt. Gen. Balagalle joined in the entourage.

The luncheon session was barely over when Vice Admiral Sandagiri received a telephone call from Commodore S.R. Samaratunga, acting Eastern Naval Area Commander from his headquarters in Trincomalee. COMEAST, Rear Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, was away on leave in Colombo.

Commodore Samaratunga broke the news about the developing situation in the Kuchchaveli area. Minister Moragoda, Defence Secretary Fernando, Rear Admiral Tuduwewatte and the service chiefs shifted to the nearby Security Force Headquarters (Jaffna) located in Palaly. They sat in the SF Commander's room. There SF Commander (Jaffna), Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka and Vice Admiral Sandagiri kept them briefed on developments in Kuchchaveli.

Soon, communication links between Palaly and Trincomalee were busy. Up to the minute briefs were reaching Minister Moragoda. He telephoned Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe in Colombo to apprise him of the situation. Vice Admiral Sandagiri was directing his senior men on the ground about negotiations, after consulting Defence Secretary Fernando. The Navy officers in Kuchchaveli reported that the guerrillas were not allowing the Navy to get near them and were threatening to commit suicide.

Just then, a disturbing message arrived. A state security arm had intercepted a radio message. More than five hundred guerrillas were being readied to storm Naval positions and rescue the seven now trapped by the Navy. Or so the intercept said. Defence Secretary Fernando and the three service chiefs felt they should not take a chance. Emergency preparations got under way.

Air Force Commander Air Marshal Donald Perera ordered two Bell 212 helicopters to be airborne from the SLAF base at Hingurakgoda. They began airlifting men from a commando squadron based in Poonanai in Batticaloa. Army Commander Lt. Gen. Balagalle had also issued other instructions. The fifth battalion of the Gemunu Watch Regiment began moving by road from Weli Oya to Trincomalee. Two more Commando Squadrons from Trincomalee were also moved by road. Heavy Artillery guns were also towed out from Trincomalee to be taken to locations near Kuchchaveli. Full war preparations had begun.

It was dusk when news arrived at the SFHQ in Palaly that SLMM monitors had made their first determination - for two guerrilla cadres to surrender with the weapons to the Navy and the rest to the SLMM. Defence Secretary Fernando, who was personally directing the operations from Palaly, asked for a second determination and tense moments passed before a response came.

In the second determination, the proposal was for the Navy to release the seven Tiger guerrillas in exchange for a soldier and policemen in LTTE custody. The parties (the Navy and LTTE) to immediately revert to their routine deployment. The soldier, Nihal Kumara has been in LTTE custody for over two months. Reserve Police Constable Ananda Gunasekera, who was in uniform inside a bus that arrived at the LTTE checkpoint in Muhamalai, was arrested on February 21. He was travelling to the Army check-point in the area from his quarters in the controlled area. The bus usually drove first to the LTTE area before returning to the Army controlled sector. Action against the two have been instituted in "LTTE Court" and their cases have been listed as "pending."

Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, agreed to the second determination of the SLMM. Vice Admiral Sandagiri immediately conveyed this decision to his officers. At 1935 hours (7.35 pm) the negotiations ended. The SLMM monitors took custody of the seven - Vijaya Kanthan (group leader), Royal, Rangamanathan, Amaran, Karulayan, Rogan and Sivraj. They were released at a point some 500 metres from the Kuchchaveli town. The military stood down.

But there was no news in the days that followed about the soldier and the policemen, much to the chagrin of the SLMM. They wrote a strong letter to the LTTE. And last Friday, Defence Secretary Fernando raised issue with LTTE's "Eastern Commander, Colonel" Karuna, with whom he held talks in Batticaloa. He has been told that a release would be made soon after the Government releases six other guerrilla cadres arrested in Trincomalee on November 1. The six were on board a boat that carried 35 claymore mines in the seas off Trincomalee in violation of the Ceasefire Agreement. (Situation Report - November 10).

Losing their major bargaining chip - the release of the seven guerrillas rounded up with weapons in a Government controlled area in direct violation of the Ceasefire Agreement - has not only embarrassed the UNF Government but also placed it in a very difficult position. Firstly, for more than two long months, it has not been able to secure the release of a single soldier who has been languishing in an LTTE jail since he walked into guerrilla-controlled territory from his camp Weli Oya. And now, added to that is a police constable who travelled in uniform in a bus to LTTE controlled Muhamalai.
How do they seek their release now?

This is not the first time the LTTE has succeeded in securing its members who have fallen into Security Forces hands. There have been many instances the latest being the release of two guerrilla cadres in Trincomalee. That was barely two weeks before the Kuchchaveli incident.

These developments come in the backdrop of several significant developments that highlight the belligerent stance of the LTTE. First it was the string of protests initiated in the north and east over the incidents in Delft and Manipay challenging the writ of the Government in areas under its control in the north and east, the belligerency is further underscored by other events.

Among them is one of much significance - a radio communication intercept between two LTTE bases (Base 32 and 28) in the on February 22 - by a security arm of the Government. This is what it says: Base 32: Paduman here. I tried to speak to you after you returned from peace talks. Only today I got an opportunity. I am ready to go up (to the North) in the next few days. That's why I spoke to you. I heard that the meeting with government officials due for 27 and 28 has been postponed.

That may be correct. Base 28: I am Karuna speaking here. It's bad that the meeting was postponed. When we were having the peace talks I told Thamilselvan to get you. I will speak to Thamilselvan by phone and inform you. You had a problem the other day while travelling by bike. Do not take notice of these small incidents.

Base 32: The round hat crowd (Muslims) created a problem. We badly assaulted them. Thereafter there won't be any more problems. The problem occurred in the Nilaweli area. How are the peace talks going? Base 28: Talks at the negotiating table going on well. But still there have been no development activities in our area. They are not genuine. Last time they spoke about recruiting under aged children to our organisation. During the war they killed our children and adults without any difference and now why do they worry about the Tamils.

At the negotiations we spoke about the incidents in Trincomalee as well. We brought up the incidents in Nedunthivu and Manipay. We said that if two of our members arrested in Trinco are held there would be problems. They wanted us to release the army soldier as well. We told them do not speak about it. I have three other telephone numbers. Speak to me on them. Under the current circumstances we are not sure about the situation. It is only dragging time. How are Illekkiyan's activities (regarding recruitment and training).

Base 32: Illenkiyan is carrying on with his work without problems. Recently about 100-armed soldiers had come into the Thoppigala area and gone back. That is because there is a temple at that place. Now we have deployed our men around that area. Next time if they come there they won't be released.

Base 28: Last time's peace talks were pointless. The people understand this. Last time they discussed the issue about recruiting children. "Amma" (President) is telling different things. The government does not have the power. Seems that "Amma" (President) wants to dissolve parliament and go for fresh elections in two to three months. All are having problems. They cannot take a definite decision. Through politics they are speaking to foreign countries. We have made use of this opportunity and explained our position to these countries and therefore we will not have a problem.

Base 32: I too feel that. I am ready for anything at this end.

Base 28: I will give you three code numbers.

Base 32: I will call you now.

Base 28: Clear.

Base 32: We cannot work with the Bulldozers. Kuhaneshan had not brought them. We have asked for a machine to dig up a river.

Base 28: (Karuna) That's good. Kishore is in Chenkalady. He does good welding work. I told Prema to make a place. Activate that programme. That is the location we want to make the LTTE village. Make a good toilet there. Work 24 hours at that point. Near Savithri's place make up the ground. I told Thattha' to put up a check- point in front. He has not done it. It is from there that they had come. Do not allow them to come. "Amma" has said that the government forces should be allowed to enter into our areas. Do not allow that to happen.

I spoke to Prabha. According to him he can get a 12 per cent income. You may be able to get 25 per cent if you do that. Your machine will be replaced and you will get one of those 200. Tell Thurai to act on that. In our area there was a clash after the army attempted to cut the black bands. There can be a clash. If it had happened to our members the situation could have been serious. Do not allow the army to do anything to your members. In that event we will retaliate.

These events added to the previous flagrant violations of the Ceasefire Agreement and the laws of the country confirm that the peace process to the LTTE is a diplomatic ploy to gain their political objectives - the creation of an independent "Eelam." The LTTE threat to resort to offensive action in the Kuchchaveli incident also confirms their Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham's position regarding the need for a LTTE military to back up their brazen violations of the Ceasefire Agreement.

The supine approach of the Government to acquiesce LTTE threats and demands in the belief that it will induce them to accept peace and national unity has again been proved to be a wrong assessment. To a public kept in the dark of the intricacies and detail of negotiations is all the more confusing and does not contribute in building up public support.

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