Challenging task for govt. after signing of historic agreement 

A Bell 412 helicopter touched down in an open area in Kilinochchi triggering off a cloud of dust. 

Disembarking to shake hands with Tiger guerrilla cadres was Jon Westborg, Norway's Ambassador in Sri Lanka. 

The pilot kept the engines running until he disembarked and then took off. He landed at the SLAF base in Vavuniya. 

Mr. Westborg was escorted by guerrilla cadres to a secret location. 

There Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran signed a letter as television cameras rolled. Political Wing leader Thamil Chelvam handed over page by page of copies of this letter for Mr. Prabhakaran to place his signature. 

The signing is said to have taken place at a location in Mullaitivu. The signed documents as well as video footage of the event had been rushed to Kilinochchi and handed over to Mr. Westborg.

Mr. Westborg had earlier wanted to travel to Mullaitivu for a psossible meeting with Mr. Prabhakaran. However, security considerations prevented the Air Force from flying to that area.

This is what the letter Mr. Prabhakaran signed said: "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam hereby notifies the Royal Norwegian Government that it consents to being bound by the enclosed Agreement." 

Exactly an hour later, as previously arranged, the helicopter arrived and Mr. Westborg was whisked off to Colombo. 

That was how Mr. Prabhakaran placed his signature to the Norwegian brokered ceasefire agreement. LTTE's Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham had late night on Wednesday approved the document in London. 

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe placed his signature on a letter exactly similar to the one signed by Mr. Prabhakaran. He handed it over to Mr. Westborg at a ceremony at the Kachcheri in Vavuniya. 

At 3 p.m. on Friday, Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Peterson made an official announcement in Oslo. 

He declared: "As from 00.00 hours on 23 February 2002, a ceasefire agreement enters into force between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE). The ceasefire document, signed by Sri Lanka Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, has been deposited with the Norwegian Government, and we have been asked to make the agreement public….." 

Hours after signing the agreement, Premier Wickremesinghe has taken the bold step of explaining details to troops deployed in the north and east. This is whilst President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga expressed "surprise and concern." 

She complained she had been told of contents of the agreement only after it had been signed by Mr. Prabhakaran and charged that procedures followed in concluding the ceasefire agreement ignored constitutional provisions to obtain her approval. She also charged that the Cabinet and Parliament had not been told. 

The seven page Ceasefire Agreement is the first major step in the Norwegian facilitated moves for peace talks between the UNF Government and the LTTE. 

Premier Wickremesinghe himself warned there may be "shortcomings" and there may be "problems." 

He said the ceasefire agreement is aimed at creating a "peaceful atmosphere" for talks but cautioned "the war will not end" because of the ceasefire. 

In the coming weeks, the ceasefire agreement will come in for close scrutiny by all sections of society including the political and military establishment. 

A close study of some of the salient provisions throws light not only on the implications that flow but also the various questions that arise. A more detailed account of the provisions together with observations appear elsewhere in The Sunday Times. 

Here are a few significant examples: 

"1.3 The Sri Lankan armed forces shall continue to perform their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE." 

This brings to the fore the question of the LTTE effecting mid-sea transfers of supplies including war like items – a subject which has drawn considerable attention after last Thursday's deep sea battles. 

(See box story on this page)

Can the Sri Lanka Navy intercept the movement of such supplies ? "No" says a senior Government official associated with the negotiating process. 

"That would amount to an offensive operation which is debarred under the ceasefire agreement," he points out. 

His assertion would mean that the legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka would exclude the LTTE. 

However, Premier Wickremesinghe told Editors of national newspapers on Friday night the Government hoped "to make a statement" asserting its right to intercept LTTE weapons shipments. He said such interceptions cannot be considered a violation of the ceasefire agreement. 

Since the ceasefire agreement has already been signed, whether such a position would be accepted by the LTTE remains a big question. 

"1.8 Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL, by D-day + 30 at the latest. 

The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province." 

The move will effectively shut out other armed groups – the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). 

Some of these groups are now paid and deployed by the Army in counter terrorism work. That would mean the only armed group to hold sway in the Northern and Eastern provinces would be the LTTE. 

In the context of the Jaffna peninsula, it is very significant since there would be a vacuum in some of the islands around Jaffna, particularly Delft, where the EPDP is now in total control. 

In the troubled east too, the LTTE would be the only armed group that will remain as against last's weeks scenario where there were other groups helping the security forces. 

In the coming weeks, the ceasefire agreement will come under more detailed scrutiny. 

With Opposition parties poised to oppose some of the provisions, it is becoming clear that the United National Front will have to go it alone talking peace with the LTTE. It is indeed a challenging task. 
 

That logistics run on the eve of the ceasefire Defence Secretary Austin Fernando was at a conference with the service chiefs last Thursday morning when the news arrived – fighting had erupted between Sea Tiger guerrillas and the Navy in the deep seas off Mullaitivu.  Details were then sketchy. Reports said an officer had died and the radar of Navy's P 441 patrol boat was damaged. The conference which focused on logistics for a major event – an agreement for an open ended ceasefire between the Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – shifted to logistics of a different kind – Sea Tiger cadres were escorting a mid-sea transfer of supplies to the shore. That was how the fighting had broken out.  Fears mounted whether the gun battles would escalate wrecking the ceasefire agreement, to be concluded only hours later, and signal the end of the latest peace process. On the other hand, even if the nation was unaware, Defence Secretary Fernando and the service chiefs were well aware Tiger guerrillas had been engaging in logistics runs ever since they declared a cessation of hostilities and the Government responded to it. At least four such logistics moves had come to the attention of the Government. This was the fifth one. It was felt a prompt response was necessary to make it clear the Government was not taking things lying down.  The Commander of the Sri Lanka Air Force, Air Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody was directed by Defence Secretary Fernando, to conduct air raids on the Sea Tiger flotilla. Four Israeli built Kfir interceptor jets scrambled into the air from the Air Force base at Katunayake. They were followed by Mi-24 helicopter gunships. When they flew over the scene of the battle, at least ten Sea Tiger boats had beached on the shores of Chalai, north of Mullaitivu. That was the location of a major Sea Tiger base. The jets did bomb some targets but the results are not known.  With that over, attention focused again on the ceasefire agreement. Government officials sought renewed assurances from Norway's Ambassador in Sri Lanka, Jon Westborg, after the deep sea encounter. It did not take much time for Mr. Westborg to allay fears. Within hours the episode was a forgotten chapter.  How did Thursday's deep sea encounter between Sea Tigers and the Navy occur ?  Late on Wednesday night, senior defence officials and security forces top brass were aware guerrillas were making preparations for a logistics run the next morning. This was after reports arrived that a flotilla of Sea Tiger boats had put to sea that night and were heading towards deeper waters.  By Thursday morning, at least 15 Naval craft were at sea, some 25 nautical miles north east of Mullaitivu. It was then that they observed on radar the movement of at least ten Sea Tiger boats heading towards the shore. The guerrillas were on another logistics run. When P 441 moved closer, it came under fire. Sub Lieutenant Wettasinghe, the deputy commanding officer fell dead. Later, heavy gunfire took the lives of two more sailors and injured three others.  One senior Navy official, who did not wish to be identified, told The Sunday Times "the Navy boats were poorly equipped. That is not to say we are incapable of thwarting an enemy supply run. We could have easily managed with available resources but something went wrong. We may never know…." The Naval craft stood in the area for a while and withdrew as the Air Force took over.  Navy Commander Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri offered an altogether different explanation to the nation. Speaking on the Independent Television Network (ITN) on Friday night, he said the enemy had more powerful guns than that of the Navy. Hence, with less powerful guns, the Naval craft could not get closer to engage the guerrillas. The response, coming from the Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy, was certainly an unprecedented public testimonial to the LTTE. That seemed to suggest that the guerrillas were better equipped than the Navy. Would that be a correct position ? Going by public statements, even senior UNF leaders appear to have accepted that position.  But, in reality the previous People's Alliance Government had poured billions of rupees to strengthen the Navy, after acknowledging, though belatedly, that they were the first line of the nation's defence. During the seven year PA tenure, the Navy, for the first time enhanced its deep water capability with the acquisition of more Fast Attack Craft (FACs) from Israel and Gun Boats from China. They also embarked on a programme to develop a blue water capability. This was after acquiring from India an Advanced Offshore Patrol Vessel (AOPV) and three Fast Missile Vessels from Israel.  It is no secret that some of the Navy's resources are now being diverted to non-priority ventures. In this context, it is still not late for the UNF Government or the Ministry of Defence to commission a study to ascertain why the Navy's preparedness for battle has weakened or slowed down. Like the Navy, other security arms of the state and even the Police have received a vast volume of financial allocations by successive Governments when peace talks failed and a war became inevitable. It is well known that some of the Navy's acquisitions for which millions of dollars or billions of rupees were paid are now lying idle. One example is the million pound worth Hovercraft purchased from a British supplier. Another is the purchase of a large stock of guns for Naval boats. They are said to be lying in a warehouse. The catalogue is long winding.  In these columns last week, I reported how the guerrillas smuggled in supplies from the international waters to the north east coast whilst the Navy was pre-occupied with a parade at their Eastern Naval Area Headquarters in the Dockyard at Trincomalee.  The report was to cause some embarrassment at the highest levels. Even if it was publicly dismissed as a rumour, in private the matter was to cause serious concern at the highest levels.  The matter figured first at the weekly meeting of security forces and Police top brass chaired by Chief of Defence Staff, General Rohan de S. Daluwatte, at the Joint Operations Headquarters on February 18. Gen. Daluwatte was to ask Navy Commander Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri why his men were unable to intercept the guerrilla logistics run on the night of Friday, February 15. He explained that he had pruned down the number of patrol craft operating in the area in view of the cessation of hostilities and the upcoming peace talks.  The subject was raised again at a brief meeting of the National Security Council on February 19. President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, who chaired the meeting asked Vice Admiral Sandagiri what could have been the supplies guerrillas had smuggled that Friday night. He said it was fuel and possibly other war like items.  A service chief interjected to say he had heard the guerrillas were bringing in long range artillery for 130 mm guns. Defence Minister Tilak Marapana was to ask whether these were guns that were seized from the security forces. He replied that not a single 130 mm artillery weapon has been lost by the security forces.  So, like the artillery shells, did the guerrillas also smuggle in the large and heavy 130 mm guns ? The question lingers on in the minds of those who attended that meeting.