CC:Is it the answer to all our ills?

The on-going clamour for the early appointment of the Constitutional Council (CC) may tend to overshadow the delay, indirectly and inadvertently, by sublimation. Perhaps there may have been a faster response, if recourse was had to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, having regard to the proactive and progressive attitude of the Court to public interest litigation.

Be that as it may, the purpose of this letter is to draw attention to the question whether the mere appointment of the CC could cure all the ills faced in its absence. Past experience has shown that policies and procedures followed by the CC are equally important, if not more, to the achievement of the ambitions of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution.

At the time the first CC was appointed, I was a member of the PSC having served only a part of my term. The CC called for nominations through MPs as a preliminary step to the selection of members to the respective commissions. Members of our commission were aware of the heavy rush to politicians for nominations but all of us, bar one, refused to tread the line. Consequently, we were all replaced by others who complied with the new rules.

Thus commissions that were supposed to be a-political were themselves generated through a political process! The pressures that this selection process would have exerted on the independence of the appointees need no emphasis. It did not take long for problems to erupt in the new commissions. One appointee resigned shortly apparently dissatisfied with the working environment. Another commissioner left in the midst of an allegation of favouritism. Yet another declined to accept office due to a clash of interests.

Later on, a vacancy arose in the post of a Chairman but none among those nominated by politicians had the basic qualifications for the post. Consequently, our Chairman who left with us declining to seek nomination, had to be persuaded to accept that appointment.

It is also not clear why the CC had to seek nominations and create 'appointees by proxy'. Surely the persons who deserve to be appointed to these bodies have to be heads and shoulders above others with their qualifications and achievements. The CC, if it is properly constituted, should have the knowledge and wisdom to hand-pick these nationally conspicuous persons without seeking nominations from men of the hour.

Moreover the CC cannot wash its hands off after nomination. They have a moral responsibility to oversee their appointees and ensure that they are on course. Does the system contain a body of knowledge for the CC to evaluate and supervise their appointees?

What is strange is that the above kind of situation never arose among appointments made earlier by the chief executive, without 'constitutional' advice. Nor did the new commissions stand out from their forerunners by way of composition or performance.

It is for the new CC, if and when appointed, to learn from past experience and devise policies and procedures with circumspection and insight so that the bodies they create could live up to the lofty expectations of the 17th Amendment.

By Somapala Gunadheera