LTTE takes beating, but long way to go

  • Troops recapture Muhamalai and break siege of Jaffna
  • But serious questions about LTTE strategy with its air and sea wings
  • Maj. Gen. Lawrence Fernando placed in overall charge of security of Colombo and suburbs

It began soon after they finished a breakfast of rice, dhal and dried fish bedun last Friday morning.

Czech-built T-55 Main Battle Tanks cut through the sandy terrain at Muhamalai, south of the Jaffna peninsula, where the bitterest battles of ongoing Eelam War IV have been fought in the past weeks. Russian-built BMP troop carriers followed with soldiers. Just behind, columns of heavily armed infantry troops treaded cautiously.

Troops near Russian built armoured troop carriers at the Muhamalai defences.

For the troops, the memories of pitched close quarter battles just days earlier were very much alive. They were ready for another close quarter battle to retake what was once the bustling entry-exit point at Muhamalai. They had fallen back some 800 metres during a tactical withdrawal and wanted to return to their original positions.

At first they met with only surprise. There was no enemy to halt their onslaught. Later, both artillery and mortar fire began to rain on them. The troops were prepared for it and dodged it in large measure. Confirmation that the guerrillas will not engage them directly came during radio intercepts. They had chosen not to take on the troops but only resort to indirect fire. Instead, the guerrillas were busy repairing the damage caused to their defence lines during earlier battles.

A Czech built T-55 Main Battle Tank on the defence lines at Muhamalai.

Yet, the troops had to face a major obstacle. Before moving away from what was once a string of makeshift structures at the Muhamalai entry-exit point, the guerrillas had heavily mined the area. They had also placed booby trapped devices. Clearing them lasted more than two hours but the troops took complete control of the area. As this went on, Air Force Kfir ground attack aircraft continued to pound guerrilla positions across the Muhamalai defences.

Troops completed their mission by Friday forenoon. Two officers were killed when improvised explosive devices exploded. One officer and 22 soldiers were injured, nine of them after stepping on what is called batta or improvised anti-personnel mines. The tracks of three T-55 Main Battle Tanks were damaged when they rolled over land mines and improvised explosive devices. They were later repaired. The troops were consolidating their gains. As they continued to remove mines yesterday, a soldier pulled the branch of a tree that lay on the ground. An IED (Improvised Explosive Device) exploded. Secondary explosions followed. Nine soldiers were killed and 11 were wounded.

Another significant move in the Muhamalai sector came yesterday morning. Troops ousted Tiger guerrillas from positions they were holding at Eluthumaduval, north east of the Muhamalai defences. Here again the troops had made a tactical withdrawal after repulsing guerrilla attempts to cut across the thin isthmus that links the Jaffna peninsula to the mainland. If that attempt was successful, troops in Muhamalai would have been trapped. But they bravely resisted repeated guerrilla attempts and inflicted casualties on them.

Yesterday two soldiers were wounded.

By capturing areas in and around Muhamalai, troops have gone back to their original positions that existed after the ceasefire in February 2002. In Eluthumaduwal they have evicted the guerrillas from some ten bunkers and surrounding areas. Thus they have denied the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) any claims that they drove the troops out in some areas of the Jaffna peninsula.

The fact that the troops are back in their original positions in the Jaffna peninsula from this week is significant. This clearly means that despite some of the heaviest battles since 5.45 p.m. on August 11, the guerrillas were not successful in infiltrating the peninsula by breaking through security forces defences. Troops have steadfastly withstood such attempts. Thus they prevented cadres who had remained within the peninsula from activating themselves after linking with those who have infiltrated.

Whilst the ground troops have returned to status quo ante, the Air Force, playing a very key role in the current fighting, has begun to respond to LTTE attempts since August 11 to prevent flights from landing at Palaly airstrip. Almost daily the guerrillas have directed 130 mm artillery fire at the runway and other locations coming within the Air Force base there.

This week the Air Force landed An-32 transport planes at Palaly. This is whilst a reconnaissance aircraft was airborne looking out for locations from which guerrilla artillery fire could emanate. It will be a while before they revert to their normal schedule. Only such a move would pave the way for the resumption of commercial flights.

The guerrillas also directed artillery fire on the Dockyard in Trincomalee, home for the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters. This was from across the seas from the village of Sampur which they occupy. The Government's concern over this was highlighted last Monday. President Mahinda Rajapaksa told envoys of the Donor Co-chairs - United States, Japan, European Union and Norway - that he sought an explicit commitment from the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran to ensure that "Sampur area does not pose a military threat to the Trincomalee harbour and its environs emanating from the LTTE presence in that area in violation of the ceasefire agreement." This was whilst insisting that Mr. Prabhakaran should also give the Government an explicit commitment to a "comprehensive and verifiable cessation of hostilities."

Serious external constraints prevent me from making a fuller appreciation of the recent developments and what they portend.

Thus readers may, to a considerable degree, be handicapped in understanding the important realities. I regret my inability to express myself freely in the light of these constraints and the resultant restraints imposed.

There is no doubt the LTTE has received a severe beating in the recent fighting with security forces, both in the north and in the east. But they are not yet beaten. The worst blow came for them in their continued attempts to lay siege on the Jaffna peninsula.

Guerrilla held areas in Wanni has been plunged into chaos and confusion. Hardly a day has passed without a number of funerals, according to reports reaching Colombo. Hospitals in Kilinochchi, Dharmapuram, Nedunkerni and Vattakachchi are reported to be full with injured guerrilla cadres. Reports also said several houses in the Wanni have been turned into wards where the injured are being cared for. Guerrilla leaders were reported to have launched a manhunt for civilians in the area who are being suspected as informants to the security forces. Some have been rounded up and "imprisoned."

This is particularly after the series of air raids by the Sri Lanka Air Force. They have been bombing Sea Tiger bases, ammunition dumps, guerrilla camps and even boat movements at sea. A high ranking military source who spoke on grounds of anonymity said the aim was to destroy the LTTE military infrastructure so "they will not have the muscle to carry out repeated attacks on us."

But the intelligence hierarchy in Colombo as well as foreign intelligence establishments is baffled by a number of questions. Among them is why the LTTE did not use some of the resources it has acquired during the ceasefire. Among a few of the areas which remain unclear are:

= The LTTE, as exclusively revealed by The Sunday Times on many occasions in the past years constructed a 1.4 kilometre long airstrip near the Iranamadu irrigation tank. A foreign intelligence source confirmed to the Government that the LTTE possessed five light aircraft. There were fears in the Air Force that they could be used as "suicide bombs" in the sky. But they were not put to use.

= The LTTE is known to be in possession of Russian built SA 7 surface-to-air missiles. This was used to down Air Force passenger planes in April 1995 after the outbreak of Eelam War III. It is known that these SAMs have a limited shelf life. Have they outlived their life span? During this week's United States Federal Bureau of Investigation bust of an LTTE ring, one of the suspects Thani admitted the LTTE possessed SA-7s. He told FBI they are not effective in hitting aircraft and it took two to three missiles to down one of them.

= The Sunday Times (Situation Reports) last year exclusively revealed suspicions by the Air Force that the guerrillas have acquired air defence systems to protect their airstrip. This was after three different helicopter flights had their counter missile systems activated when they flew past the LTTE airstrip at Iranamadu. Even if such a mechanism activated when Kfir jets bombed the airstrip, the LTTE does not have the capability to fire back at this Israeli ground attack aircraft. By LTTE's own admission, it is fast moving and cannot be hit by an SA 7 surface to air missile. This is why the LTTE was trying to get Russian built SA-18 surface-to-air missiles in the United States, as revealed by the FBI this week. They were also seeking various types of equipment for use in the airstrip. Here again, the question is like their aircraft, why the airstrip was not put to use.

= The Sea Tigers, the sea going arm of the LTTE. Recent fighting has not seen the induction of large groups of Sea Tigers either on a sea borne operation or in coastal areas. Is this the result of Air Force bombing of Sea Tiger bases or a deliberate move to keep them away for the time being?

= Many recent detections (including the attempt on the Colombo Port, the detection by the Karandeniya Police of a lorry laden with weapons, the Borella Police find of a claymore mine) showed LTTE preparations to trigger off attacks in Colombo. Has the LTTE failed in successive attempts due to greater public awareness? There is still a worry prompted by fears that some of the explosives or weaponry would have come in undetected.

President Rajapaksa has ordered that high priority be given to the security in the City of Colombo and immediate suburbs. The Ministry of Defence on August 18 appointed an experienced Army officer as Overall Operations Commander (OOC) for Colombo.

Major General Lawrence Fernando, now number four officer in the Army's hierarchy is the former Director General of General Staff (DGGS) at Joint Operations Headquarters. He has been hand picked by President Rajapaksa.

His areas of responsibility will be to exercise command over the personnel of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Police and STF (Special Task Force) allocated/deployed for operational duties within Colombo and suburbs. He will also co-ordinate all intelligence activities, deal with matters pertaining to civil/commercial security and civil defence organizations.

All Army, Navy, Air Force, STF Detachment, Police areas including Police Stations, intelligence agencies, Civil Defence Organisations, Civil/Commercial Security Organisations within the metropolitan area of Colombo and suburbs including Wattala, Ragama, Sapugaskanda, Peliyagoda, Kelaniya, Wellampitiya, Mulleriyawa, Welikada, Thalangama, Mirihana, Kohuwala, Dehiwala and Mount Lavinia have been placed under Major General Fernando for operational purposes. He will operate under Air Chief Marshal Donald Perera, Chief of Defence Staff for "functional aspects of maintaining law and order and security in Colombo and suburbs."

In another development, President Rajapaksa has appointed a two-member Commission of Inquiry to probe the assassination of Batticaloa district parliamentarian Joseph Pararajasingham on December 25, 2005. The Commission comprises two former judges -Mahanama Tillekeratne and S.V.P. Munidasa.

The task of the Commission will be to "inquire into and obtain information in respect of the circumstances relating to the assassination of the late Joseph Pararajasingham at Batticaloa on or about 25th December, 2005 and the person or persons directly or indirectly responsible for such assassination."

The Commission has also been called upon to probe "whether the manner in which the investigations were carried out by the Police and other security personnel assisting was adequate and impartial having due regard to the proceedings established by law."

The Commission has been empowered to hold sittings in camera if it so determines.

These developments come as the security forces and the police have stepped up their counter offensives against the guerrillas. In marked contrast to previous occasions, the LTTE propaganda machine has been relatively slow in speaking about developments in the battlefield.

The recent beating guerrilla cadres received, particularly after they have chosen and executed the areas of attack in the north and east (like Mutur and its environs, Jaffna peninsula) could be attributed to a number of reasons. Main among them is the fact that the LTTE has not been able to retain its military capability at peak levels with the exit of its eastern leader Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna. This was clearly shown during battles in the east and thereafter at Muhamalai. The Karuna cadres formed the bulwark of LTTE's military machine when troops launched Operation Jaya Sikurui in 1997 to link Vavuniya with the Jaffna peninsula. Another factor appears to be the LTTE under estimation of the capability of the security forces. Like in the late 1999, they perceived an en masse withdrawal when the defences were attacked. That did not happen.

Since August 11 until August 18, 14 officers and 141 soldiers were killed in the Jaffna peninsula, according to the Army. A further two officers and 21 soldiers are reported missing. During this period 43 officers and 685 soldiers were wounded, most of them being described as "walking wounded." The military offensive in the east to capture Mavil Aru anicut led to the deaths of 12 officers and 28 soldiers.

Since July 26 until yesterday 278 security forces personnel have been killed. They are made up of Army 246, Navy 9, Air Force 2, Police 14 and Home Guards 7.

Army sources say both in the east and in recent fighting in the Jaffna peninsula over 800 guerrilla cadres were killed and a further 1,000 wounded. However, independent verification of these figures is not possible. The LTTE has also played down its casualty counts.

The performance of the security forces including the police as well as their Special Task Force (STF) commandos has led to national euphoria. Quite rightly so. But for those militarily engaging the guerrillas, there is a clear message. They need to remain vigilant and have a long way to go.

One is reminded of the various phases of Operation Riviresa to capture the Jaffna peninsula. On December 5, 1995 the recapture was celebrated in Colombo with a glittering nationally televised ceremony. The events led to the belief that the LTTE had been defeated.

That was because of a number of reasons. The LTTE held territory in the Jaffna peninsula and ran a virtual parallel administration. The money for it came from the Government. They had a recruitment base there. They had recourse to electricity to manufacture improvised explosive devices. The sea lanes to India were closer. They had a population to "govern."

All this was lost when the LTTE was pushed to the Wanni jungles. Some said from Wann it was a case sweeping them out to the Indian ocean. But eight months after the recapture of Jaffna, on July 4, 1996 the LTTE returned. On that day Minister Nimal Siripala de Silva escaped death from a suicide bomber. But Brigadier Ananda Hamangoda, Brigade Commander for Jaffna town, SSP Carlyle Dias, Superintendent of Police Jaffna were among 21 killed. Just two weeks later, on July 18 1996 the guerrillas carried out a conventional style attack on the Mullaitivu military base. Over a thousand soldiers were killed and millions worth of military hardware was lost. The ongoing offensives on Tiger guerrillas will no doubt lead to considerable damage and some curtailment of their military capability. But there is a formidable challenge for the Government. It would have to beat them not only in the battlefield but on several other fronts. Main among them is the vast financial resources the LTTE has amassed in Switzerland and other off shore banks. The revelations by the FBI on the LTTE's financial capabilities worldwide this week comes as an eye opener. To crack down on such activity, the Government will need international support and co-operation. Otherwise the oxygen for the guerrillas to survive will remain.

Hence prolonged military action will not end the ongoing problem. More war will only mean more damage to the economy and heaping of further hardships on the people. An example - in one battle area for just a week 6500 artillery rounds were fired. A round cost US $ 285 (or Rs 28,500).

I am reminded of the words of then Commander of the Army, Lt. Gen. Gerry de Silva, soon after Jaffna was re-captured. Amidst the nationwide euphoria that prevailed, I asked him then whether the LTTE has now been defeated. "They are down but not out," was his reply.

How FBI trapped the Tiger arms buyers

A confidential informant identified by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as CI-1 received a telephone call from Nadarasa Yogarasa (Yoga) one day in his apartment in Staten Island, New York, late last month.

This photo of a man identified as "Suresh" at a firing range was in one of Suresh Sriskandarajah's galleries linked to his website.

Yoga did not know that the man, whom The Sunday Times learnt was a Tamil, was working for the FBI. He believed that he had a relationship with a black market arms dealer in the United States. In reality CI-1 (or the FBI informant) was a convict for drug trafficking in 1994. Since 1999 he had been working for the US Government. In exchange for his co-operation he had received parole documents enabling him to stay in the US. He also received financial assistance. FBI says he has provided "extremely credible information that has been corroborated by consensual recordings, e-mails, financial documents and review of public records."

The conversation between the two, in Tamil, was recorded. It revealed that Yoga wanted the FBI informant to meet with someone about a potential arms deal. The duo agreed to discuss the deal the next day at a location in Queens, New York. There Yoga and Sathjhan Sarachandran (Satha), who had arrived from Canada, met the FBI informant. Satha said he was acting on the instructions of Pottu Amman who handled "outside purchasing" of arms for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Pottu Amman is the nom de guerre of Shanmuganathan Shivasankar, head of the LTTE intelligence and operations wing.

Satha told the FBI informant that they needed "the ones up to the Kfir." The reference was to the Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) built Kfir (Lion Cub in Hebrew) ground attack aircraft that have been wreaking havoc on Tiger guerrilla targets in the North and East since April, this year.

Satha, a Canadian citizen of Sri Lankan origin told the FBI informant that a "big guy" in Canada was Pottu Amman's direct contact and was going "there" - (a reference to LTTE controlled territory in Sri Lanka) to get a list of items they wanted to purchase. The FBI informant asked Satha whether he had ever met with "Thalaivar," (leader in Tamil), a common reference to Mr. Prabhakaran. Satha said he had done so three years ago.

At the end of the meeting, Yoga gave Satha's e-mail address to the FBI informant. The latter sent a message "Thanks for meeting. I will contact my guy to see what he has. If it is ok do you want me to send you pictures of the merchandise? If you need to contact me you can respond to this e-mail or my cell…." Earlier this month, Satha replied "Thanks for the quick e-mail. I am waiting for your merchandise pictures."

The next day FBI sent another e-mail from their informant's account to Satha. It said "here are photos of what my guy has available. SA 18 Russian made shoulder fired. Let me know if your guys are interested. Give me a list of what they want and I'll ask him what he can get." Attached to the e-mail were two photographs of an SA 18 surface-to-air missile.

On or around August 7, 2006, the FBI informant and Yoga met in Queens, New York. They again discussed various weapons that the LTTE wanted to purchase, including AK 47s and truck-mounted missile systems. The informant and Yoga called Satha in Canada on his mobile telephone. Satha confirmed he had received FBI informant's e-mail and had forwarded it "over there" (to the LTTE leadership in Sri Lanka). On or about August 8, 2006, Satha sent an e-mail to his LTTE contact in Sri Lanka who works for Pottu Amman. Both e-mails were obtained by the FBI after court authorized search warrants.

The e-mail quoted prices for Russian SAMs "SA18 US $ 75,000 (about Rs 750,000) 1 reusable" and "1 needle US $ 50,000 (about Rs 50,000)." The word "needle" was a coded reference to the Russian built anti-aircraft missile. Satha attached to the e-mail the two photographs of the missile that the informant had e-mailed to him.

On or around August 11, 2006, the FBI informant and Satha spoke on the telephone. Satha told the informant that "we have shown it to 'Periyappa' over there," and he was very interested. ('Periyappa," in Tamil meant father's older brother). This was a reference to Mr. Prabhakaran. The FBI informant asked whether "uncle" had seen the pictures and Satha replied "even people above him have seen it." The FBI informant said "the only person above him is 'Thalaivar' himself." (i.e. Mr. Prabhakaran) "Who else," asked Satha.

On or around August 14, 2006, an undercover law enforcement officer posing as the black market arms dealer (identified as UC 1) called Satha on the telephone. In a recorded conversation, Satha told him that he had heard a lot about him and added "we have to meet fast…" He said one of his partners had arrived from a foreign country and wanted to meet the "arms dealer" about "how we can proceed with business."

On or around August 15, 2006, Satha telephoned the FBI informant. He said he had arrived. The reference was to the "big guy" in Canada who had travelled to Sri Lanka to obtain a list of weapons that the LTTE wanted to acquire. He said four of them planned to arrive in New York on Friday (August 18) evening and they wanted to meet with the "arms dealer" on Saturday morning (August 19). They wanted to purchase 50 to 100 "needles" (missiles) and to inform the "arms dealer" they wanted this higher quantity. Satha told the FBI informant "sometimes getting five or ten needles is not worth it. It has to be obtained in bulk. At our rate if we fire ten at least two will hit."

Satha and the FBI informant had additional telephone conversations. Satha said the missiles would have to be delivered to Sri Lanka. When asked about payment, Satha replied, "the guy who is coming is aware of that." He added ,"If he (the "arms dealer") could ship it to our destination we will arrange to get it cleared at the other side."

On Friday, August 18, Satha and three others drove across the border from Canada to New York. They were questioned by a US Customs official. They replied they were going to Buffalo, New York, for a bachelor party. The Customs official ran their names through a government database and discovered that one of them had a criminal record. He was not permitted to enter United States. Others were allowed in.

The FBI informant met Satha and his two associates at a location in Long Island. An undercover agent (UC 4) drove to the location. Later the FBI informant, Satha and the duo travelled in the FBI informant's car. The undercover agent followed in his car. A second undercover law enforcement officer (UC 2), who posed as a technical expert in military weaponry, joined the others for a meeting at another location.

At the meeting the "arms dealer" asked Satha and his associates what they wanted to purchase. It was Thani (one of the associates) who replied. He said "We need something for Kfir. He said they also needed some weaponry to destroy boats.

The "arms dealer" stressed the importance of having the financial terms and manner of payment in place. Thani said the money could be made available by Monday or Tuesday (August 21 or 22, 2006). Satha and another associate Sahil repeatedly attempted to place a call on a cellular telephone to their contact about specifics of funds transfer. They discussed using bank accounts in Switzerland, St. Croix or other off shore locations. Sahil, who was identified as the "financial guy," explained that the accounts they used would have to be active accounts.

Sahil said "if there is no activity in the account and you throw in a million dollars that is going to raise a red flag. They will freeze the account on both sides." The parties discussed depositing the money into an account that the FBI informant controlled and, after the "arms dealer" executed the transfer of weapons, the money to be transferred to him.

Thani said they wanted delivery to occur ship-to-ship in the Indian Ocean. Training of LTTE fighters in Sri Lanka on operating the missiles was also discussed. The "arms dealer" said they could either be trained by video or that he could provide the training himself. Thani and Sahil said they wanted him to travel to Sri Lanka to train the ultimate users. They assured the FBI informant that the "arms dealer" would be kept safe.

The "arms dealer" asked whether "you guys" currently have the Russian made SA 18 surface-to-air missiles. Thani said no, that they currently have the "7s," a reference to the Russian made SA 7. He said they were not effective in hitting aircraft. He said currently it took two to three missiles to hit an aircraft.

Thani also said they wanted to purchase AK 47 assault rifles. He said the Chinese equivalents they use now were "garbage." He specifically asked for American or Russian made weapons. The parties discussed the quantity and price of SA 18s and AK-47s. The parties agreed that an initial shipment would consist of 10 SA 18 missiles and 500 AK-47s. The "arms dealer" agreed to provide technical training on the use of missiles. The package for missiles, guns and training was to be between US $ 900,000 and US $ 937,500.

The "arms dealer" wanted to know if the LTTE trio wanted to see an SA 18 and the AK-47s they were discussing. Thani said yes. The first undercover agent with assistance brought in a long wooden crate containing an SA 18 missile. Sahil was to remark that it looked like a "casket." The "arms dealer," a witty one, laughed and declared it could put a few people in caskets. Another undercover officer then brought in a large cardboard box containing two AK 47 assault rifles.

When the missile was unpacked, Thani picked up the tube and placed it in his shoulder, in the same manner as it would be used to shoot down a plane. He and his associates raised questions about how far ahead the target should be and the speed. Satha, Sahil and Thani each then held the Ak-47 in firing position.

Sahil and Thani also asked about various other weapons and military items. For example, Thani discussed with the first undercover law enforcement officer posing off as the technical expert in military weaponry, the use and availability of anti-tank missiles, "fire finders" that would enable the LTTE to track the location from which enemy fire had come, and surface-to-surface missiles that could be used for attacking targets such as ships. Sahil also asked for the availability of other weaponry, including American and French made surface-to-air missiles, and a "forty-forty," which, based on the conversation, appears to have been a reference to a multiple rocket launch system that can fire multiple surface-to-surface rockets simultaneously.

The "arms dealer" also asked if the trio were interested in night vision equipment, and Thani said they were. When the agent took out the night vision goggles and handed them to Thani, he indicated that the goggles were "Generation 2," and that they wanted "Generation 3."

The most shocking moment came just then. The under cover agent posing off as the technical expert on military weapons gave a signal. The trio with LTTE connections were arrested.

The details leading to their arrest are contained in a 21-page indictment filed before the Eastern District Court of New York on August 21. A copy of this, together with a 35-page indictment of five others, was obtained by The Sunday Times. That first is in respect of Sathajhan Sarachandran (Satha), Sahilal Sabaratnam (also known as Sahil and Shakil), Thiruthanikan Thanigasalam (Thani) and Nadarasa Yogarasa (Yoga). The four of them were charged with multiple crimes including conspiracy to provide material support and resources to the LTTE.

Earlier, a five-page statement from the US Department of Justice gave brief details about the outcome of exhaustive investigations by the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) together with their Field Offices. The FBI investigations had started in 1999. Following a visit to the United States by Foreign Minister, Mangala Samaraweera, the US Government sent an FBI team to Colombo. That team also unearthed data that have been incorporated in the two indictments.

The second FBI indictment also is on four others - Thirukumaran Sinnathamby (also known as Thirukumaran Sivasubramaniam), Murugesu Vinayagamoorthy (also known as Dr. Moorthy and Vinayagamoorthy Murugesu) and Nachimuthu Socrates in the same Courts. This is for providing material support to the LTTE that included the procurement of military equipment, dual use technology, fund raising, money laundering through "front" charitable organizations and United States bank accounts.

The latter also includes charges that they attempted to obtain classified information and conspired to bribe US public officials in an effort to remove the LTTE from the State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations and dealt in financial transactions with the LTTE. Later, the FBI updated this indictment with the inclusion of the name of Ramanan Mylvaganam.

The four indicted in this case, the FBI investigations have revealed, were engaged in a far-reaching conspiracy to provide material support to the LTTE. It consisted of procurement of military equipment, communication devices, other technology, fund raising, money laundering through front charitable organizations and a myriad of other criminal activities. It included conspiracy to bribe public officials, attempting to obtain classified information, dealing in financial transactions and money laundering among others.


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