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Battle
over CBK's military powers The
United National Front Gov ernment this week armed itself with draft
laws in the form of a Joint Chiefs of Staff Act to effect drastic
defence reforms.
They
seek to strip some of the powers and responsibilities now exercised
by the President, who is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces,
and vest them in the Minister of Defence. The Legal Draftsman's
Department formulated these draft laws on a priority basis after
Cabinet approved the recommendations on Higher Defence Control made
in the first report of the Committee on Defence Reforms. Ironic enough, the Cabinet approval and a subsequent draft law, have come even before the Service Chiefs have made their own observations. Defence Secretary Austin Fernando, who was Chairman of the Committee, had called upon them to do so before Thursday October 31. That apart, the fact that the Committee's first report was hurried and did not receive broader public or military consultation is now too well known. Even the only
serving military member responsible for the recommendations, a one
time Army Commander Lt. Gen. (retired) Denis Perera, conceded this
fact when he told The Sunday Times that written public representations
would be received for the Committee's subsequent reports (Situation
Report - October
6). This was after the recommendations in the first report
appeared exclusively in The Sunday Times (Situation
Report - September
29). The reasons for the hurry are no longer inexplicable. The draft Joint
Chiefs of Staff Act (see box story on this page
for details) seeks to establish a Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee (JCSC). If the Defence Reforms Committee had recommended
that the Minister of Defence should appoint such a Committee, the
draft law seeks to place that responsibility in the President. However,
such powers of appointment are restricted since the draft law makes
it clear it would have to be carried out on the advice of the Cabinet
of Ministers. Furthermore,
the draft law says "... the Cabinet of Ministers may, if
it appears to be in the national interest, appoint an officer serving
as Commander of one of the armed forces or an officer above the
required age." (Note: Some sections of the draft contain spelling
and factual errors. It is not clear what the "required age"means).Every
appointment made by the Cabinet is required to be approved by a
Resolution of Parliament. It also requires
the President, "on the advice of the Cabinet of Ministers"
to remove the Chairman from office. In other words
the President has to merely endorse the cabinet's decision to either
appoint or to remove the chairman of the JCSC. The fact that this
provision, or for that matter the entirety of the draft law, has
been prompted largely by political compulsions than the need for
any previously identified defence reforms that are badly required,
is very clear. This specific
provision itself, empowering the Cabinet and requiring a Parliamentary
resolution, assumes greater relevance in view of President Chandrika
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga's decision to extend the tenure of office
of the Commander of the Army, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle, until December
31, next year. The UNF Government now wants to appoint him as acting
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a post that has remained vacant for
the past five months. Later, when the laws are passed, the UNF wants
to name him as the first Chairman of the JCSC. President Kumaratunga,
The Sunday Times has learnt, however, is insistent she will not
change her decision on the extended term. Hence, she will not make
an acting CDS appointment. Therefore, the stage is set for another
round of political confrontation amidst cries for co-habitation. Evidently the
UNF Government believes a change of law will help overcome the deadlock
with the President over the control of the military. The draft law
restricts the age of the Chairman of the JCSC to be below 60 years
and hold office for three years. The Chairman, who will hold the
rank of a General, Admiral or Air Marshal, is to outrank all other
officers of the armed forces but will not exercise "military
command over the Committee or any of the armed forces." In essence,
the draft laws clearly duplicate most of the current functions and
responsibilities of the National Security Council, chaired by the
President, who is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Besides
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee itself, the Assignment of missions
to joint or specific commands, set out in the draft law, is further
illustration of this. This is what it says: "The Commanders
of the armed forces shall assign any joint or specific combat command
established within their respective jurisdiction, the carrying out
of any specific mission. The assignment of such missions shall be
done in accordance with directions which the Minister may issue
in that behalf and be consistent with the prescribed force structure
of each combat command. "The Chairman
of the Committee shall be responsible for ensuring that the activities
of the commands are carried out in accordance with such directions
as are issued in that behalf. "If the
Committee so determines, the Chairman of the Committee shall be
entrusted with the task of controlling and supervising the operations
carried out by any joint or specific combat command. In such an
instance the Chairman shall be responsible to the Minister. "The Commander
of a combat command shall be responsible for the discharge of functions
assigned to his command and shall also be responsible to the Minister
for the overall performance of the missions assigned to his command." The draft law
also makes provision for the appointment of a Comptroller in the
Ministry of Defence to assist the Secretary in organisational and
administrative matters. The UNF Government,
The Sunday Times learns, wants to give priority for the bill to
set up a Joint Chief of Staff Act in Parliament. That is despite
the upcoming budget and the Parliamentary debate that will follow
through December. It is almost certain that the opposition People's
Alliance will go to the Supreme Court to challenge the proposed
law on the grounds that it violates provisions of the Constitution,
much the same way it did over the 19th Amendment. A controlling authority to command, control and co-ordinate the joint operational functioning of the Armed Services is in itself a desirable measure. The experience of nearly two decades of conflict have exposed many shortcomings and deficiencies, both in national defence planning and in the command, logistics and administration of the armed forces per se, as well as in the planning and control of joint operations. These shortcomings
certainly need to be corrected. Logically, therefore, any defence
re-structuring necessarily should be planned, with that view, as
well as to provide for future strategic needs. This is where the
rub is with the proposed JCSC. It is public knowledge that the Defence
Reforms Committee has only researched by interview a very limited
number of those with any knowledge of defence. Worse still, the
Government has accepted the first report of the Committee and rushed
into legislation without considering the views of the Service Chiefs
whose reports on the subject are only due by October 31. The question then is whether the report and recommendations of the Committee is adequately researched for legislation to be enacted. It does not appear to be so. For that reason alone therefore, this soundness of legislation come under question. During the nearly
20 years of war, successive Governments tinkered with different
types of joint command and control mechanisms, none too effectively.
The period of the last PA Government saw the direct control of operations
by the Deputy Minister of Defence, General Anuruddha Ratwatte, even
though a Joint Operations Headquarters existed, with disastrous
results. It is essential that the Government examine the successes
and failures of those command structures before introducing new
command systems. Whether an elaborate joint command structure is
in fact necessary is questionable. The priority
requirement is to consolidate the armed forces, as existing and
to improve their preparedness and readiness to meet any immediate
military contingencies. More so in the atmosphere of a ceasefire
where Tiger guerrillas are doing exactly that. To do so, the defects
and failures of the past have to be put right. These include not
only command and operations but also logistics and procurement.
They have attracted wide scale corruption and have not only been
a major cause for operational failures but also for lowering of
morale. It is no secret that wheeler dealing in even limited procurements
that are now being made have come to the fore. The correction
of existing defects does not require a new command structure, merely
better supervision, honesty and commitment by the Ministry of Defence
and the commands of the armed forces as existing. It goes without
saying that such a need has to be accompanied by infusion of professionally
qualified men at the helm, not incompetent mediocrities, who are
making a mockery of the system. The reforming
and re-structuring of the armed forces should be a studied process
to correct existing defects and future strategic requirements rather
than an ad hoc measure to meet political contingencies. It should
not be rushed. To do so would be to court disaster. |
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