12th November 2000

Sitrep page for CPJ invitation

Peace talks-rectifying wrong signals and confusion

Sitrep page for CPJ invitation

The prestigious New York based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) which helps promote press freedom world-wide by defending the people who report the news hold an annual Award Day every year. The tenth such annual award this year will take place on Tuesday, November 21 at the Grand Ballroom of The Waldorf Astoria in New York. The invitation card for this year's event is the Situation Report in The Sunday Times of May 21, 2000 where the word CENSORED runs across the page. It also carries our artist Nalin Balasuriya's portrait of a citizen with the Emergency Regulations stuck in his mouth – a symbol which was regularly used to denote deletions made by the Censor.

Peace talks-rectifying wrong signals and confusion

It is not always that those in the intelligence community get rewarded or commended for their contributions. Of the many forecasts they make, after assessment of intelligence received, some turn out to be correct whilst others do not.

Like an incident in the Trincomalee district in September, this year showed, there are also occasions when misinformation transmitted as intelligence prompts security forces into wrong courses of action. An Army truck loaded with heavily armed troops was moving along the Trincomalee- Morawewa Road. At Kanniyai, Tiger guerrillas ambushed and attacked them. An officer and 22 soldiers were killed. The guerrillas seized their weapons.

The troops were on their way to Vilgamvehera, to launch an operation against the guerrillas. It had been hurriedly planned after Military Intelligence received reports of a strong LTTE presence in the Vilgamvehera area, the outer fringe of a jungle north of Trincomalee. Now, there are fears that the reports may be a deliberate plan by the enemy to lure the troops into a trap.

On the night of November 4 (Saturday). a Military Intelligence official received information from a credible source. Black Sea Tiger suicide cadres in explosive laden boats were to stage another attack outside the Trincomalee harbour within the next few hours. The Directorate of Military Intelligence promptly tipped off the Sri Lanka Navy. The attack was thwarted with a Navy patrol destroying an explosive laden Sea Tiger boat. Now, the Military Intelligence officer concerned is to be rewarded and his timely action commended by Army Headquarters.

When a brief front page report of this incident appeared in The Sunday

Times last week, a leading news agency contacted the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence, to obtain confirmation. Officials there were surprised at the Sunday morning inquiry. They said no incident had occurred at the Trincomalee harbour or its environs since October 23. It took another hour or more for the officials to learn that there was in fact an incident the previous night.

Military Intelligence warning to the Navy spoke of two explosive laden LTTE boats, with suicide cadres, were heading for an attack, either in or outside the harbour, headquarters of the Navy's Eastern Naval Area. Two Dvora fast attack craft were just outside the harbour, off the coastal village of Gangi. One of the FACs had spotted a single LTTE boat, off Norway Point, near Foul Point.

The boat was fast approaching towards the stern of the Dvora. The Naval vessel opened fire when the boat was just 20 metres away. It was engulfed in a ball of flame and exploded. Naval patrols scoured the area for the second boat. There were no signs. They heard a radio intercept where Sea Tiger boats in the vicinity were ordered not to move.

Later radio intercepts spoke of the deaths of "Lt. Col. Ganesh alias Murugesh" and "Major Sivarasa alias Sudharmani." If the usual complement for an attack by suicide cadres in boats were three, there were only two in this instance.

An elated acting Commander of the Navy, Rear Admiral Daya Sandagiri, commended his men for the action and later reported the success to Defence Secretary Chandrananda de Silva.

Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera, was away in India on a week long visit and returned to Colombo only on Thursday. He held wide ranging talks with his Indian counterpart, Admiral Sushil Kumar, on increased co-operation between the navies of the two countries. India is selling Sri Lanka a 101 metre long Sukhanya class Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV). The birth of the Navy's air arm will be on this vessel. In an unrelated development, Air Force Commander, Air Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody, left on Friday for Pakistan on a four day official visit.

The LTTE move on November 4 to attack a Naval target near the Trincomalee harbour had greater significance than other previous attacks on Naval targets in the recent months. It was the first major attack LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran had wanted carried out after he met Norway's peace negotiator, Eric Solheim in the Wanni.

Highly placed intelligence sources believe that was a reminder to his own cadres and even the security forces that the LTTE was not slowing down its military campaign because of Mr. Solheim's talks in the Wanni. The sources say it is for the same reason that the LTTE issued a statement from its "International Secretariat" in London, soon after talks with Mr. Solheim. "They wanted to send a clear signal of their stance before Mr. Solheim returned to Colombo," the sources added.

The LTTE statement made clear its leader wanted a cessation of armed hostilities, "the removal of military aggression and occupation, the withdrawal of the economic embargo and the creation of conditions of normalcy in the Tamil homeland". These were described by Mr. Prabhakaran as essential pre-requisites to resume political negotiations.

However, Mr. Solheim, who addressed a news conference upon his return to Colombo, was emphatic Mr. Prabhakaran had placed "no pre-conditions" but explained how the LTTE felt the peace process could be started. He declared that the LTTE was serious about peace talks but made it clear there were no quick fixes.

The conflicting reports were to cause confusion in the security establishment. Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle, highly placed Army sources said, was at the receiving end of a string of telephone calls from his field commanders in the operational areas seeking clarification on the future of military operations. Among the callers, these sources said, was Major General Anton Wijendra, Commander, Security Forces, Jaffna, under whose command area five different military operations have been conducted against Tiger guerrillas since September this year.

Lt. Gen. Balagalle had assured his field commanders there was no Government directive to slow down or halt the military campaign against Tiger guerrillas. He told them that the matter should be clearly explained to the officers and men on the ground. Despite all the efforts, some confusion did remain, particularly in the minds of the soldiers. Reports in some sections of the media had been the cause.

President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga is learnt to have briefed all three service commanders on the Wanni visit of Mr. Solheim. She is also learnt to have obtained their views this was well ahead of the visit.

The Solheim visit was the direct outcome of a meeting Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, had with the Norwegian special envoy in Oslo, last month. Taking advantage of an occasion that marked the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Sri Lanka and Norway, Mr. Kadirgamar visited Oslo to make it clear the Government has not shut the door to peace talks. He also told them that the LTTE was intransigent.

The subsequent weeks saw the Norwegians making contacts with the LTTE to arrange a meeting with Mr. Prabhakaran, in the Wanni. Foreign Minister Kadirgamar learnt of the move only when he was in London for a meeting with Home Secretary, Jack Straw. He was told that the meeting with the LTTE leader had been fixed for November 1.

Mr. Kadirgamar who wanted to be on hand in Colombo when Mr. Solheim went to the Wanni, made an appeal for a postponement of the date. But the LTTE was adamant it would be November 1. It seemed Mr. Prabhakaran, a firm believer in numerology who chose numerologically suitable dates for major attacks and assassinations, was not willing to change the date.

Mr. Solheim and his entourage spent the night of October 31 at an LTTE run "guest house" and were later driven to a newly built "conference hall" where they were received by the LTTE leader. During the talks, Mr. Prabhakaran, is learnt to have dwelled at length on what he called an "economic embargo" the Government had imposed on people in the "Tamil homeland." Sornalingam alias Shanker, a one time Air Canada employee, who later became a personal body-guard of Prabhakaran was the translator. He translated into English what Mr. Prabhakaran said in Tamil.

With the meeting over, Mr. Shanker was to play the role of a tour guide taking the Norwegian peace brokers to civilian areas. They were allowed to talk to people, including shop owners, and ascertain how the "embargo" was having a crippling effect on the civilian population. They were also allowed to meet various civilian organisations functioning under the aegis of the LTTE.

Mr. Solheim was to underscore his findings in the Wanni at the Colombo press conference. He said "The LTTE wanted us to see the living conditions there as harsh and difficult. There was a lack of medicine and shortage of many items. We all know it is due to the war situation…"

Mr. Solheim is learnt to have raised issue over this matter during talks with President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. She is learnt to have explained that there is no discrimination in the movement of medical or other supplies to uncontrolled areas. However, she had explained she was not averse to Norwegians coming up with specific instances so she may take remedial action. A report from the Norwegian special envoy is now being awaited by the Government in this regard.

But the confusion over the military campaign and peace talks was cleared further when President Kumaratunga presented her Government's policy statement after the ceremonial opening of Parliament on Thursday. It was a two track policy – a military campaign against terrorism and a political solution to the ethnic conflict.

President Kumaratunga declared "On this occasion we wish to mention about the efforts being made with the good offices of the Government of Norway to arrive at a political solution of this problem through the process of discussion. From the outset we have made efforts to prevent the destruction caused by war and solve this problem through peaceful means. Within a few days of our election in 1994 we launched our peace initiatives. However, we did not receive a favourable response from the LTTE. Even while the war continued we did not reject the various efforts that were made towards peace.

"The Government of Norway is now acting as facilitator in this matter. They have informed us that there are certain conditions that to be met before the beginning of discussions. However, there is no decision yet on what these conditions are. I expect that all Honourable Members of this House would agree with me that prior to taking any decisions about talks with the LTTE, we should take into consideration the previous practices and attitudes of the LTTE.

"We should give the most serious consideration as to whether they are trying to fool us too in the same way as they have fooled different governments through a period of fifteen years. However, once the Government of Norway through their facilitation informs us what these conditions are, we expect to come to the final decision having discussed the matter with all concerned parties. Until then we will in no way change our policy of replying to terrorism through military action".

Those remarks would lay to rest most of the confusion over the peace talks.

But there is a moral in the sequence of events that followed Mr. Solheim's visit to the Wanni and the subsequent reports of peace talks.

The LTTE which agreed to talk to Mr. Solheim on November 1 lost no time in making its stance known world-wide. It came in the form of the official statement released from its "International Secretariat" in London setting out the pre-requisites for such talks. That is not all. It also sought to send a clear signal through military action – the abortive attempt to hit a Naval target on November 4.

What of the Government? The very news of peace talks, which became public as a result of the LTTE's statement from London, sent the wrong signals. An entire military establishment, re-equipped with billions of rupees worth of military hardware and tasked to step up their campaign against the LTTE, was confused. They had to ask their leaders whether there was change in policy.

Once more, a clear indication of a serious vacuum in the command and control structure, both political and military, that is running the war effort. That too, at a time when the Government has placed the nation on a "war footing" after the debilitating military reversals at Elephant Pass and the Jaffna peninsula, this year.

The Fifth Column

Editorial/ Opinion Contents