The Situation Report

4th October 1998

Kilinochchi calamity: worst debacle in 17 years war

By Iqbal Athas

Shattering close-up view of the battlefront

The final briefings to launch the latest phase of "Operation Jaya Sikurui" (Victory Assured) were in place by the end of last week.

When Sunday, September 27, dawned, both officers and men were equally conscious they should rest as much as they could. Some 24 hours later, they were to step into the battlefield once again for a renewed thrust to re-capture Mankulam.

But further north, beyond the rugged, open terrain they had to fight their way through to their final destination, Kilinochchi, the LTTE had made other plans.

Soon after 2 a.m. on Sunday, mortars began to rain on the Paranthan defences and the Kilinochchi defence complex – the southern most among the string of military establishments beginning with the Security Forces Headquarters in Jaffna.

At Kilinochchi, home for Sri Lanka Army's 54 Division and the 543 Brigade, the mortar barrages were intense. When troops who were hit fell down, subsequent rounds took a toll of those who went to their rescue. They fell on their injured colleagues or nearby. At times, as much as six rounds of mortars fell in one place. It seemed the guerrillas who had infiltrated radioed details of exact locations to other cadres outside to range their mortar launchers on exact targets.

By the time senior officials at the Security Force Headquarters in Jaffna learnt of the attack, it became clear that the assault on Paranthan, though fierce, was a deception. The main concentration was on Kilinochchi. They began hurried preparations to rush re-inforcements. Troops deployed in the peninsula were to be clinically thinned out. Trucks and buses were to be lined up for their immediate transport to Kilinochchi via Elephant Pass and Paranthan.

Wave after wave of male and female LTTE cadres, taking advantage of the raining mortars, charged forward to defensive positions spraying bullets from their automatic weapons. They concentrated on seven specific locations around the Kilinochchi defence complex. They came under fierce attack. Grenades were hurled. Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) were fired.

General Officer Commanding 54 Division, CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED and Brigade Commander, 543 Brigade, CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED were inside the complex. They went into action.

Attacks on three locations were repulsed with more troops moving in and engaging the Tiger guerrillas with counter fire. But the attackers over-powered troops at the other four locations and broke into the defence complex. Later, one of the three strongly defended positions was also breached. All hell broke lose.

By Sunday morning, pitched gun battles were going on. As one soldier in a Colombo hospital, whom I will not identify for obvious reasons, explained, it was an extremely gory scene. "Those hit by the mortars were writhing in pain," CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED he said in a voice choking with emotion. It was also an exposition in bravery and valour. "I saw some of my colleagues take cover and fire at the enemy. Some of the attackers dropped dead. But soon they were outnumbered. They paid with their own lives," he added.

As Sunday grew, the troops at the Kilinochchi defence complex came under intense pressure. Hordes of LTTE men and women cadres were swarming the area and they were compelled to shift positions to take on the enemy. The move meant tactical withdrawal from some areas. At one point, shrinking under heavy pressure confined the troops to a narrow 400 metre by 1500 metre stretch. Here again they were pinned down by mortar fire. Many held on while the others fell dead after being hit by enemy fire. It was easily the longest day for those who survived. Monday, (September 28) had dawned.

Smoke billowed skywards from buildings in the defence complex. The exchange of heavy fire continued. The surviving troops were holding their positions as their colleagues lay dead or wounded.

The re-inforcements who had arrived the previous day had met with resistance. On Monday, they came under heavy mortar fire as they tried to advance to help the besieged troops in the defence complex. The largely open terrain, with scrub vegetation, made them easy targets for the falling mortars. Then it turned out that the men whom they were to rescue were some four kilometres away. Tiger guerrillas had cut a gap through the contiguous defence line from Jaffna through Elephant Pass and Paranthan to Kilinochchi.

The besieged troops and their General Officer Commanding were, fortunately in radio contact with neighbouring Elephant Pass Military Base and the Jaffna SF Headquarters. By late Monday afternoon, they decided that the remaining troops at Kilinochchi should make a tactical withdrawal to Paranthan. The pull-out leaving behind even their personal belongings also saw some bitter encounters between troops and Tiger guerrillas in which more soldiers were killed or wounded.

As CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED the remaining troops from Kilinochchi reached Paranthan by Monday evening, what is now easily the worst debacle in the 17-year-long separatist war had happened. They linked up at Paranthan. At least for now, the chain of defence lines would end there.

An extent of seven kilometres of the A9 highway (the main Jaffna-Kandy Road) which encompassed the Kilinochchi defence complex was now in LTTE hands. One of the first tasks of Tiger guerrillas was to extend the contiguity of the captured area further southwards. A part of the southern defences of Kilinochchi was captured by the LTTE in an attack that co-incided with the February 4 Independence Celebrations this year – an occasion which marked the 50th anniversary of Sri Lanka's independence from British rule.

As dawn broke on Monday, troops deployed in "Operation Jaya Sikurui" moved out of their defences to advance in two flanks of the A9 highway. Their immediate task was to surround and re-capture the strategic Mankulam junction, the town and its environs. Battles raged throughout day and night on Monday. At exactly 9.23 a.m. on Tuesday (September 29) troops walked into Mankulam, much to the glee of the hierarchy in the defence establishment. For them, if what happened at Kilinochchi was bad news, the entry into Mankulam was not only good but most welcome news.

The wounded at Kilinochchi filled City hospitals almost beyond capacity and the evacuation of those wounded in "Operation Jaya Sikurui" began to pose an accommodation problem. Health authorities had to move casualties arriving at Ratmalana to suburban hospitals, some far off from Colombo.

The most unfortunate outcome of all these developments is the staggering death toll – a very touchy subject both for the Government and the Army Censor. Ever since the latest censorship, both for local and foreign media, was introduced on June 5, this year, the Army Censor has made a concerted effort to keep casualty figures low. This censorship came after the previous resumption of "Operation Jaya Sikurui" on May 28, this year, led to heavy casualties.

Army Headquaters is still busy compiling a list of military hardware, stores and supplies lost.

How many died during the attack on the Kilinochchi defence complex and the Paranthan defences ? How many died after "Operation Jaya Sikurui" resumed on September 28 ? How many died after admission to the hospital ? Even if the whole world knew the answers, most Sri Lankans did not. The censorship ensured that.

The Government claimed that 663 died. This is how the figure was made up: The OP Hq of MOD announcement on Tuesday night that the death toll had risen to 200, subsequent announcement that 63 soldiers had died during the ongoing operations and the acceptance of 400 (out of 600 bodies) handed over by the ICRC. There was no official word on the total number of casualties.

But the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) confirmed officially that it took charge of the bodies of 600 soldiers at Mallavi. They were carried in 25 lorries through Wanni roads and later handed over to the Army at Poovarasankulam on the Vavuniya – Mannar Road. A further 74 bodies were handed over on Thursday. Thus, the total number of bodies handed over by the LTTE to the ICRC and later returned to the Army was 674.

According to authoritative military sources, a total of CENSORED troops were killed in the resumed "Operation Jaya Sikurui" whilst CENSORED soldiers had died in hospitals. The amount totals CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED CENSORED. Added to the figure of 300 (which the MOD Press Release of Tuesday night said), the total number dead works out to CENSORED. The same source said that over CENSORED soldiers have been declared Missing In Action. Three days after the incident, some 40 of those declared MIA returned to Paranthan. In the Sri Lankan context, the word MIA has become an euphemism for those feared dead.

Taking even less than a third of this number, say CENSORED as feared dead, the total would work out to CENSORED – a figure that exceeds those killed in the worst debacle until Kilinochchi – the LTTE attack on the Mullaitivu Military Base. Over CENSORED soldiers were killed in this incident and more than Rs 260 million worth of military hardware was lost. After the attack which occurred on July 18, 1996, the vast majority of those feared dead are still classed in Army records as Missing In Action.

The debate on body counts apart, the disaster at Kilinochchi raises a number of other crucial questions. Like the Mullaitivu disaster, it occurred whilst a censorship was in force. However, there was one differencce. The earlier censorship applied to only the local media whilst the existing one covers both local and foreign.

The futility of a censorship could not be better highlighted than by the Kilinochchi incident. International news agencies and satellite television networks ran detailed stories, often highlighting the claims made by the LTTE. These claims were contained in press releases issued from LTTE's "International Secretariat" in London.

One press release that gives an insight into LTTE's aggressive propaganda drive this week over the Kilinochchi incident is shown below:

"LTTE forces have handed over about 600 bodies of Sri Lankan soldiers which they so far recovered from the captured 15 kilometre stretch of Sri Lankan military complexes in Kilinochchi. The bodies were handed over by Thamil Chelvan, leader of LTTE's political section, to the ICRC in Mallavi (Vanni). Further arrangements are being made to hand over another set of bodies later.

"There are still many more bodies of Sri Lankan soldiers which lie abandoned among the more remote parts of the huge army base in Kilinochchi and in scrub jungles. LTTE forces are combing the area to collect the bodies to return to their families in the South of the Island.

"Badly mutiliated or highly decomposed bodies of Sri Lanka soldiers which the Sinhala government would not accept are being cremated by the LTTE with full military honours.

"The capture by the LTTE of the army – held Kilinochchi is a remarkable feat. The highly sophisticated Sri Lankan military fortifications that comprise a 15 kilometre stretch form the nodal Tamil town is now under Tamil Tiger's control. LTTE's battle for the taking over of the military-occupied Tamil area started at midnight on September 26 and ended in the capture on the evening of the 29th.

"LTTE forces captured huge quantities of arms and ammunitions from the Sri Lankan armed forces."

Like in most other instances, the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence, has only been reacting to LTTE claims. Even in respect of the latest LTTE press release, all that the Op Hq did was to simply dismiss the LTTE claim locally. The news releases issued clearly focused only on the casualties in an obvious attempt to keep the figures low. Leave alone the outside world, the move did not appear to be effective even in Sri Lanka.

The state owned Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC), one of the leading propaganda arms of the state, found itself in a highly embarrassing position. In view of a written agreement, the SLBC is committed to broadcast BBC's Sandheshaya (Sinhala Service) news bulletins live. That takes place immediately after the broadcast of SLBC's own news bulletin.

In what appears to be a paradoxical situation, Sri Lankans who first listen to the SLBC later hear another version from the Sandheshaya broadcast. Needless to say what is said in the first bulletin is entirely different from what is said in the second. The first is contradictory of the second one. That is not all. The latter complements the reportage in the international media. In short, it is a case of some Sri Lankans being fooled some of the time. Not all of them.

If that is the futility of the ongoing censorship, let us look at the much publicised reason for its imposition. The claim is being made that the media provides sensitive military information to the enemy. If that be the case, no charge has been levelled against any section of the media for indulging in this activity. If one is to accept the argument that the Censors have in fact prevented sensitive information, or in other words intelligence going out to the enemy, there is another question that arises.

Have not the Government's own intelligence agencies failed to receive any advanced warning about the impending attack on Kilinochchi ? Was this not the case when the Mullaitivu Military Base was attacked ?

Late this week, Brigadier Sunil Tennekoon, Director of Military Intelligence (and official Military Spokesman) said in a confidential report to the Ministry of Defence that none other than LTTE Leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran led the attack on the Kilinochchi Defence Complex. It was code named Oyatha Alaikal II (Unceasing Waves Two). The first operation Oyatha Alaikal was on the Mullaitivu Military Base.

If he was able to say with confidence that Prabhakaran carried out the attack, why could not the Directorate of Military Intelligence forestall disaster by reporting on an impending attack. Obviously they were unaware.

Fifth Column

Editorial/Opinion Contents