Since the completion of operations Riviresa, the Eelam war has ground itself to a stalemate. Confrontation between the two forces is limited to widespread skirmishes in the north, eastern provinces and on the border of the communal divide. Nevertheless these brushfire confrontations are taking a heavy toll of manpower on both sides.
These confrontations have been at a tactical level with the aim of localised domination. The military strategy is dormant, at least for the moment, until resources permit the continuation to a fresh offensive phase. That is on the government side.
The LTTE hemmed into the Wanni has to necessarily be content with the "war of the flea" tactics to wear the government forces and to increase their commitment to the strategic defence of the government controlled areas. The LTTE has little other option for now until itself revamp its resources both human and material. The LTTE is funding difficulties in both these areas.
Though after the Mullaitivu debacle, the LTTE armoury has been considerably replenished and enhanced, the Tigers nevertheless would want the assurance of an adequate war inventory to continue to sustain intensive operations. For this, they must import military hardware which should include anti air weapon to neutralise the air superiority which the government enjoys in total.
However, to procure and smuggle this hardware poses many problems. The increasing concern of western democracies to the LTTE presence, its fund raising and questionable activity have restrained the freedom which it earlier exploited. Whilst this has not as yet prevented the LTTE's fundraising activities, which has been its main source of income and foreign exchange, the LTTE must be concerned of the continued assurance of this source.
The changing attitudes of the western democracies reflect not only on the LTTE financing, but also pinches on the freedom of its subversive operations in those countries in which it hitherto operated with impunity. This means that information of LTTE activities including clandestine procurements and shipments are not only monitored but are also being exchanged between inter-governmental agencies. Sri Lanka becomes privy to such information.
The foiling of the arms smuggling efforts in the "M.V. Rahat" and the "Morning Star" episodes illustrates the ever-growing international intelligence network against global terrorism.
The LTTE, therefore, now no longer enjoy the same sympathy it had earlier which enabled them access to illegal arms markets and the logistics of shipping and transportation. Smuggling in arms has therefore become an increasingly difficult process. To rely on arms captured from the Sri Lanka Army whilst being inadequate for sustained operations against government resources is also not an assured source of supply.
In addition to the LTTE logistics problem to enhance its inventory is the problem of mobilising manpower. The very fact that women and youth of tender age are being thrown into combat suffering heavy casualties indicates the dilemma faced by the LTTE.
In the background of this situation, the battle for population control is the dominating feature in this stalemated situation. The LTTE on one hand wants access to control the Tamil population whereas the government wants to deny this both with a view to starve the LTTE of recruits but also to wrest political influence so as to marginalise or at least neutralise the LTTE as a military-political force.
After the operations Riviresa in the Jaffna peninsula the government had a high expectation of winning over the Tamil population in the "Liberated" area. Indeed the immediate attitudes of people who were able to secure their material living requirements after years of privatisation raised the hopes of the government's expectations.
The momentary happiness of enjoying long deprived physical needs is but a temporary phase. It is not an enduring substitute for freedom and liberty. This requires that the people within the fabric of a social grouping should be able to make their own choices. A full stomach is not the answer.
It is unfortunate that for over an year after the people of Jaffna were thrust into a new found freedom of the LTTE that the government procastinated in giving them the personal liberties to make their own choices.
In other words their political options. In this, it is accepted that the government did have grave security concern whether indigenous political leadership would be permitted a foothold let alone survival. The track record of the LTTE already demonstrates that it will not brook any opposition on, political or even an allied military grouping with a common goal but with differing leadership.
The choice given to the people of the peninsula which is the heartland of the ethos of Eelam was a Hobson's choice - a choice between the LTTE and the government which was and continues to be represented by the military. To the people of Jaffna, the material privations during the LTTE period although with a common political firmament was replaced by access to material comforts but with an unrelated political alliance albeit with a promise of political hope. The dragging process of political solution to the north east problem increasingly frustrates the political developments of the peninsula especially when there is no local democratic political activity to enthuse the community.
The attitude of the non militant Tamil politician is less expressed by a leader of a Tamil political party unnamed. "If we go (to the Jaffna people) we have to tell our people something. We have to do something. For example, people want to come to Colombo but we are not in a position to do anything. Regarding arrests also we cannot help them. These are important things. Rehabilitation is also equally important. We can talk to the people and bring about normalcy. But we must have a mandate".
Here lies the question. Who gives the mandate? Is it the LTTE or is it the government?
This is the "Catch 22" question
The dilemma of the government is certainly understandable for it cannot give the green light for Tamil politicians based in Colombo to operate in the north without assuring their safety. This is nevertheless the dilemma faced in similar situations the world over in facing in civil affairs and political measures in a post military situation. The balance in achieving this objective is what turns defeat into victory.
Thus the stage is now set for the battle to control the population. Whereas the government is confronted with its own set of problems, the LTTE is faced with the situation of having to maintain a level of militancy which will convince the population of the north and by extension the east that the promise of victory is real - in other words that Eelam is attainable. The operations Riviresa and Sath Jaya successes contest the validity of such claim even with localised LTTE victories like Mullaitivu. In the bid to keep its mission and the promise of Eelam, the LTTE must continue to destabilise the security forces in the occupied areas.
Their operations in the peninsula where they control some territory, especially Valikamam West illustrate the LTTE strategy. The operations elsewhere are to tie the security forces down, increase the governmental expenditure on the forces and in effect on the people and so wear the government down into a political state of collapse. This may be a distant dream but nevertheless an objective.
In this situation, the government is confronted with a battle on many fronts. In the north and the east, a military front with huge political overtones and in the South an equally vibrant war with huge economic overtones.
Tiger guerrillas who surrender to the authorities will no longer be confined to prison custody under a new rehabilitation programme for surrendees.
The Army has launched a propaganda campaign through leaflets and its radio network, the Wanni Sevaya, to attract surrendees with the new programme coming into operation.
It was promulgated by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga.
Here are some of the highlights:
* Any person who surrenders (hereinafter referred to as the surrendee) to any police officer, or any member of the armed forces, or to any public officer or any other person or body of persons authorised by the President by Order, in connection with any offence under the Explosives. Act, the Offensive Weapons Act, the Firearms Ordinance, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, or under Chapter VI, Chapter VII or Chapter VIII of the Penal Code or under any emergency regulation, or through fear of terrorist activities shall be required to give a written statement to the officer or person authorized in that behalf to the effect that he is surrendering voluntarily.
* There shall be approved from time to time by the Secretary to the Ministry of the Minister-in-charge of the subject of Defence, Centres to be known as Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation centers (hereinafter referred to as the Centre) for the purpose of receiving and keeping surrendees.
* The officer or person to whom a person surrenders in terms of paragraph (1), shall within ten (10) days of such surrender take steps to hand over the surrendee to the Commissioner-General of Rehabilitation who shall assign such surrendee to a Centre.
* The officer or any other person to whom a person surrenders shall inform the Secretary to the Ministry or the Minister-in-charge of the subject fo Defence within a period of ten days of the surrender and handing over of the surrendee to the Commissioner-General of Rehabilitation.
On being assigned to a Centre the Commissioner-General of Rehabilitation shall endeavour to provide the surrendee with an appropriate vocational, technical or other training during his stay at the centre. He shall within a period of two months from the date of taking over of such surrendee report to the Secretary to the Ministry of the Minister-in-charge of the subject of Defence indicating the nature of the rehabilitation being carried out in respect of the surrendee.
When the Secretary to the Ministry of the Minister-in-charge of the subject of Defence received the report from the officer or person to whom a person surrendering in terms of paragraph (4), he shall make an order authorizing the Commissioner-General of Rehabilitation to keep such surrendee in a Centre and to rehabilitate him for a period not exceeding twelve months in the first instance. Such period will be computed from the date of handing over of such surrendee by the officer or person as the case may be, to the Commissioner-General of Rehabilitation.
A surrendee assigned to a centre may with the permission of the officer-in-charge of the Centre, be entitled to meet his parents, or relations or guardian as the case may be, once in every two weeks.
The Commissioner-General of Rehabilitation shall prior to the expiration of the period of rehabilitation report to the Secretary to the Ministry of the Minister-in-charge of the subject of Defence on the suitability of releasing the surrendee or whether he need be rehabilitated for a further period.
At the end of the period of twelve months the Secretary to the Ministry of the Minister-in-charge of the subject of Defence, after perusal of the report submitted by the Commissioner-General of Rehabilitation may -
(a) order the release of such person; or
(b) extend the period of rehabilitation for periods of three months at a time, so however that the aggregate period of such extensions shall not exceed twelve months. Such extensions shall be made on the recommendation of the Commissioner-General of Rehabilitation and the Administrative Board appointed by the Secretary to the Ministry of the Minister-in-charge of the subject of Defence in terms of regulation 20(3) (i.e. the processing committee).
At the end of the extended period of rehabilitation the surrendee shall be released.
A surrendee subject to rehabilitation by Order of Court may, if he acts in a manner prejudicial to his rehabilitation programme or the interest of other surrendees at the Centre, on production by Commissioner-General of Rehabilitation before the court which sentenced him, be sentenced to imprisonment in lieu of such towards rehabilitation after such.
Go to the Defence Column
Return to the Editorial/Opinion contents page