The glory of "Operation Riviresa" has been dissipated. Medals have been awarded and promotions given for valour with at least one for "finesse". The gore of war, however, continues increasingly frustrating the Sri Lankan public, who, elated by the success of this operation and government's news management or propaganda hype, expected a speedy conclusion to the war. "Jaffna has been taken" was in the lips of everyone; satiating their hunger even though the bread prices soared. However, contrary to public expectations, bombing of the Central Bank has now brought the war to their doorstep. Further contributing to the growing public sense of anxiety and insecurity is the closure of roads, traffic jams and now the indefinite closure of schools.
The slightest incident or rumour is related to the war, like the security forces rehearsals for the 21 gun salute on February 4, Independence Day, and the sound of an explosion in Negombo last Thursday now attributed to a sonic boom by Air Commodore Donald Perera, Director of Operations of the Sri Lanka Air Force. According to him, it has been caused by the Israel built Kfir (Lion Cub) fighter and ground attack aircraft, now undergoing trials over the skies of the SLAF's main base in Katunayake.
What concerns the public most is that the success of "Operation Riviresa" has not stymied the LTTE. This indeed is a moot question.
Undoubtedly, ousting the LTTE political and military infrastructure from Jaffna has been a significant blow to LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and his guerrilla entity. It has dislocated the separate state structure Prabhakaran was building to demonstrate, particularly internationally, of the existence of a separate Eelam. It is noteworthy that building such a structure displays the tangibility of a nation state - a claim which even the Irish Republican Army (IRA) cannot boast of.
The loss of Valikamam has challenged the invincibility of the LTTE and raised doubts in the minds of the Tamil community in the north, east and others of the community in empathy with the LTTE cause, of the promise of victory of the LTTE. Collectively these have hurt Prabhakaran's ego and the psyche of the LTTE.
However, the government has been unable to reap the full benefit of this. The LTTE is cunning in having the population evacuated to seek refuge in other parts of the peninsula questions the validity of the government claim that "Operation Riviresa" was to liberate the people from the "dictatorial clutches" of the LTTE. That those who sought refuge were coerced or terrorised to do so is no secret but unfortunately for the government, the total clamp on media visits to the north denied this message being publicised by independent media, both locally and abroad.
On the contrary, the LTTE propaganda machine through its international links made capital of the distortion that the population was fleeing the security forces and the government.
This is not the first time that the LTTE has scored a propaganda victory due to the slowness of the government to respond through the various mechanisms available to it. For the past several years, this has been so. The government does not seem to have realised the importance of the role of the media to reach out to Sri Lankans and the world outside. A rapid, credible response by the independent media, local and foreign, is important to counter the LTTE propaganda.
Contrary to the claim that the LTTE has been resoundingly defeated during the re-capture of Valikamam, it is now in hindsight clear that the Tigers did not offer more than a token resistance in the defence of Jaffna. It appears that almost at the start of "Operation Riviresa" that the LTTE had made the decision not to engage in a conventional defensive operation but to revert to irregular methods of warfare and fall back on their Wanni base. Quite apart from military strategies, the LTTE had also appreciated the value of the civilian factor as the intrinsic element to make the operation worthwhile in its political dimensions. The corollary to this is the fact that the move-out of the civilian populace would underscore the claim that the population is in support and is part and parcel with the LTTE in its war for Eelam. In other words, that the public of Valikamam have chosen to be with the LTTE rather than to be under government control.
The inability of the government to implement either military or political measures, to either contain or otherwise induce the public from evacuating Valikamam has devalued the military success of the operation. Any claims that the absence of civilians reduced lateral human casualties is perhaps true, but, when in the overall context a part of the operation was aimed to "liberate the oppressed people of Jaffna", that the City was abandoned by the civilians, whether coerced or otherwise, makes the victory somewhat hollow.
Security forces and the government are now posed with the problem of having to maintain security in a large piece of real estate in Valikamam with no population to re-establish an administrative infrastructure.
The commitment to maintain a large part of the security establishment in the peninsula naturally affects the capability of the security forces to deploy adequate resources to contain widespread LTTE activity in other theatres. The government seems to be caught up in a catch 22 situation. Exploiting this, the LTTE whilst reverting to guerrilla type attacks in the contested theatres of operations, has also opted to step up its traditional terrorist methods against economic targets and the innocent public in the city of Colombo and in the frontier borders.
The aim of terrorism is multi faceted. It strives to wear out the military, to sabotage the economy and production capability, to destabilise the society and psychologically to wear the nation to yield to terrorist demand. To respond to these threats is to succumb to terrorist design. In this context, the closure of schools, the closure of roads and the creation of territorial safe zones around the houses and offices of selected VVIPs only contribute to the fear psychosis which has been instigated by LTTE terror.
Undoubtedly VVIPs have to be protected but not at the total exclusion of the rest of the polity. No doubt schools have to be made secure as do other areas of commercial, economic and social importance but the umbrella of security should be subtle, efficient and effective.
To respond in hysteria is to contribute to the strategy of the enemy. This will be to the delight of Prabhakaran who having already scared Shane Warne, the Australian Cricket Board and the West Indies to by-pass Sri Lanka in spite of the offer of Head of State level security must be gleefully watching the hysteria of fear psychosis gripping the city.
The visit of the gallant combined India-Pakistan cricket team for the goodwill match gave lie to the Australian claims and laid bare that the security situation in the city should not be a disincentive.
The sum total of these events and the security hype that prevails in regard to VVIP protection without a high level of security assurance to the public has not given confidence to the public and has created a fertile atmosphere for the spread of rumour and dissension.
This paradoxical situation only contributes to public consternation and confusion.
As often reported in these columns, the eastern province is critical to LTTE aims and objectives. Eelam without the east is meaningless. Though the LTTE has withdrawn from Valikamam which it claims it will re-capture, in my view the LTTE would be quite content to keep the security forces tied down and over extended in the peninsula whilst it focuses on the eastern province.
A destabilisation of the eastern province which has approximately an even population of Sinhala, Muslim and Tamil will ethnically imbalance the population in the region to give a preponderance to the Tamil community. This will not only suit the LTTE politically but will also considerably increase its ability to operate militarily more freely.
It is the presence of the other two communities in the eastern province that has not enabled the LTTE to establish dominance in this province for the past 17 years as against the base it has established in Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi and other Wanni areas.
The increased Sea Tiger activity off shore of the eastern province and north to Manal Kadu, Point Pedro area also reveals the intentions of the LTTE to dominate the lines of communication between the north, Mullaitivu and the eastern province.
All in all, considering the totality of the new problems, the Government has to cope within the aftermath of the re-occupation of Jaffna city, the uneasiness in the minds of the public is understandable. To cope with a new situation, the Government has to balance is strategies or venture into a build up of resources which is going to be expensive and which the Government can only undertake at the expense of economic and political progress in the rest of the country.
It is over three months since the Valikamam sector of the Jaffna peninsula was re-captured by the security forces. Since then, repeated attempts have been made by the LTTE to breach the forward defended localities (FDL) there. Fears of an LTTE infiltration into Valikamam have been heightened by an incident last month when six Tiger guerrillas were killed.
Within moments of the incident, LTTE radio networks have been humming with details of the incident fuelling fears that LTTE communication systems existed in the Valikamam sector. Security forces have been busy in the past few days trying to seal off some gaps within the FDLs, particularly near Puthur and Kondavil areas besides a string of other neighbouring areas. This was after reports that a small group of Tiger infiltrators were spotted within the FDLs in close proximity to Manipay. Adding to that it reported to be LTTE activity in areas outside the FDLs west of Valikamam. There was growing evidence that preparations were under way for a major assault. Giving further credence to this possibility, according to Senior Defence Ministry officials, is a speech by Anton Balasingham, LTTE's ideologue and advisor to the LTTE leader, at a meeting in Kilinochchi early last month. According to intelligence reports reaching the Ministry, Dr. Balasingham warned displaced persons from Valikamam, now living in Kilinochchi, not to return to their homesteads.
He claimed at a public rally last month that the Sri Lankan security forces will not be able to protect the displaced persons once they return to Valikamam. He had also declared that the LTTE would launch attacks on economic and other important targets in the south. Senior intelligence officials early last month expressed the view that his remarks should be taken seriously. Still the LTTE got away by exploding a lethal bomb outside the Central Bank on January 31.
Notwithstanding Dr. Balasingham's appeal publicised in the LTTE press, there has been a trickle of displaced persons from Thenmaratchchi to Valikamam in the past three months. But an unexpected incident last month caused some concern. Some confusion, perhaps arising out of wrong identification, led to a sentry opening fire on a group of returnees killing one of them on the spot.
The LTTE exploited this in its propaganda which has now been stepped up with the brutal massacre of 30 civilians, men, women and children, reportedly by an armed group in uniform, in the village of Kiliveddi in Mutur, last Sunday. The incident had occurred only just a couple of hours after two soldiers from the Guard Battalion, riding on push cycles, were killed. In conclusion, whilst "Operation Riviresa", has had its political upside it also appears to have its strategic downside in spite of the unquestionable military success of the operation. Perhaps a quotation from Karl Von Clausewitz from his magnum opus on war is appropriate:
"War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfill our will," he states and continues elsewhere to say:
"If our opponent is made to comply with our will, we must place him in a situation which is most oppressive to him than the sacrifices we demand, but the disadvantages of this position must naturally not be of a transitory nature, otherwise the enemy instead of yielding will hold out in the prospect of a change for the better. Every change in this position which is produced by a continuation of the war should be changed for the worst."
In quoting Clausewitz, I do not assume to be a strategist. It is only my avid interest in matters of defence that made me read this ponderous work on war. I have only attempted to express commonsense whilst leaving the intricacies of tactics and strategy to the professionals for whom I have the highest regard. I do not pretend to be an arm chair General imposing my dictates on professionals. It is they who are facing the brunt of this war. It is they and their families who are closest to the suffering, horror and the anguish of war.
At least for now it would appear that we have won a battle and certainly given our morale a boost but the question now is how much closer it has brought us to winning the war.
Considering that war is an extension of politics (Clausewitz again), that question had best be answered by the political establishment.
Perhaps it will console us that the good General Anuruddha Ratwatte, Deputy Minister for Defence, who last year said the war would be over in three months and has kept shifting the target dates, in which he will control the situation now says that the "north east war would be ended before the Sinhala and Tamil New Year."
Hopefully, at last, a ray of light at the end of a smoking barrel and not another deadline!!!