Columns

The recently concluded Local Government (LG) elections have drawn a muted response from both the electorate and political observers, especially when compared to the high-stakes Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 2024 and 2025. Voter turnout was markedly lower, enthusiasm was sparse, and post-election developments have been marred by political maneuvering rather than principled politics. While some see this as a referendum on the new ruling party, the National People’s Power (NPP), others caution against over-interpreting results from what was widely perceived as a low-impact contest. The LG elections reveal much about the current state of Sri Lankan democracy—about what excites the public, what discourages them, and how political actors are navigating a rapidly evolving landscape. 

The LG elections struggled to inspire the same level of voter participation and media attention as last year’s national contests. The Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 2024 and 2025 came on the heels of a deep economic crisis and were imbued with a sense of national urgency. After a few years of mismanagement and public hardship, the people were eager for change—change they believed could only come through a fundamental restructuring of national leadership. That sentiment translated into an unprecedented wave of support for Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the NPP, seen as outsiders with a genuine mandate to reform.

In contrast, LG elections do not promise such sweeping changes. They are often seen as administrative rather than transformative—concerned with garbage collection, road maintenance, and local utilities rather than economic stabilisation, foreign policy, or constitutional reform. As such, many voters likely felt that their participation would not yield a return proportionate to the energy invested. This perception was compounded by a general election fatigue and disillusionment with the political system.

Originally scheduled for March 2022, the LG elections were delayed multiple times by the former UNP-SLPP government under the guise of fiscal constraints and logistical hurdles. In truth, these delays were widely interpreted as politically motivated attempts to postpone an anticipated defeat at the grassroots level.

This erosion of public engagement was visible in the subdued atmosphere before the election. Unlike the energetic campaigns of the national polls, the LG elections were marked by a near-total absence of hype. In many areas, voters seemed unaware of the candidates running. The current LG electoral system, which combines proportional representation and ward-based voting, has also contributed to this alienation, making it harder for voters to form clear connections with individual candidates.

Given the lack of awareness and the depressed turnout, it would be misleading to interpret the results as a definitive mandate for any party. Many appear to have voted along entrenched party lines, while others may have made choices based on parochial concerns, particularly in ethnically distinct regions such as the North and East. It’s worth noting that even among those who did vote, there seems to be limited knowledge of the actual outcomes—who won, who lost, and who will govern. This is symptomatic of a deeper malaise: the disconnect between political structures and the public they are meant to serve.

While the public yawned, political parties sprang into post-election action, trying to negotiate control over councils where no party gained an outright majority. This manoeuvring has raised serious concerns about the health of democratic practice. The current scramble to prevent the NPP from capturing mayoral and chairmanship positions—often through hastily constructed alliances—has more to do with political expediency than with coherent policy visions or ideological alignment.

These ad hoc coalitions are not built on shared goals but on mutual antagonism toward a common rival. As such, they are inherently unstable and likely to produce ineffective local administrations. This, in turn, risks damaging the very parties that engineer such takeovers. Voters who supported these parties expecting clean governance and integrity may find themselves disillusioned once more if these alliances lead to dysfunction.

Among the parties involved, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) appears to be taking a more calculated approach. Rather than entering formal alliances, the SLPP has indicated a willingness to work with others situationally, positioning itself for long-term gain rather than short-term tactical victories. This is a rare note of strategic clarity in an otherwise chaotic post-election environment.

One party facing a particularly delicate situation is the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB). Though considered a credible alternative to the NPP, the SJB has underperformed across the last three election cycles. Now, it is tempted to ally with the very forces—namely the UNP and SLPP—that it previously shunned during the height of the economic crisis. SJB leader Sajith Premadasa notably refused an invitation from then-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to join a government tainted by corruption and ethnic chauvinism. Reversing that principled stance for the sake of gaining control in a few local councils would be difficult to justify to the country.

Moreover, the lingering mistrust between the SJB and UNP runs deep. Any alliance formed without addressing these underlying grievances could collapse spectacularly, with the SJB bearing the brunt of the fallout. A partnership formed out of political convenience rather than mutual respect is unlikely to weather the pressures of governance or public scrutiny.

The overall fallout from the LG elections is disappointing from the standpoint of democratic development. These elections should have been a moment for political renewal at the grassroots—a test of the public’s faith in participatory governance and the competence of emerging leadership. Instead, they have exposed widespread disengagement, strategic cynicism, and the limits of electoral enthusiasm.

However, the results do not signal an outright rejection or endorsement of any particular party or ideology. Rather, they reflect a broader apathy toward local governance and a widespread scepticism about the efficacy of political participation outside national cycles. Voters are not blind to the fact that LG elections offer limited scope for change, especially when fundamental power structures remain unaltered.

In light of these dynamics, a practical way forward might be to de-politicise leadership selection in local bodies without clear majorities. Rather than cobble together unstable alliances, parties could allow the elected members to vote for the most competent and consensus-driven leaders on the day they convene. Such an approach could prioritise effective administration over partisan victory and potentially restore some measure of faith in local governance.

The 2025 Local Government elections serve as a cautionary tale. They show that democracy cannot be sustained by national elections alone. For democracy to thrive, citizens must see value in participating at every level—from choosing a President to selecting a local councilor. Political parties, too, must rise to the challenge of inspiring and informing voters at all levels, not just when the highest offices are at stake.

If Sri Lanka’s political class fails to read the voter sentiment correctly and continues to prioritise tactical victories over long-term vision, the country risks backsliding into the very conditions that led to the crisis of 2022. The road to democratic maturity will not be paved by opportunistic alliances or political stunts, but by sincere efforts to reconnect with voters and deliver results that matter to their everyday lives. (javidyusuf@gmail.com)