Checkpoint terror
Omanthai arrest of two LTTE cadres bares bomb plan in Colombo

Sunday, September 14 was a relatively easy day for soldiers at the Omanthai Entry-Exit Point. This check-point north of Vavuniya marks the last area of control by Sri Lankan security forces and police before guerrilla dominated areas.

A stretch of "no man's" land extends nearly 200 metres beyond a monitoring post of delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The check-point of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) begins thereafter. That is the gateway to the guerrilla held Wanni and the Jaffna peninsula.

Around 3 p.m. that day, two soldiers of the Sri Lanka National Guard (SLNG) and a female colleague from the Sri Lanka Army Women's Corps (SLAWC) found some time to chat with each other. The flow of passenger traffic had slowed down. They were relieved that in the next two and half hours, they would return to their barracks to attend to personal chores.

One of them cracked a joke and there was laughter all-round. Amidst that banter, one of the National Guard soldiers noticed two young men staring at them. He realised they were nervous. Perhaps the duo thought the soldiers were so pre-occupied they could pass the point without drawing any attention.

But the soldier was sharp enough to alert his three colleagues. Discreetly they brought it to the notice of the Sergeant on duty. All five who watched the movement of the two young men, who wanted to enter the security forces controlled areas from the Entry-Exit point, were convinced that the two were behaving suspiciously. Under normal circumstances, they would have gone into action. But these are days of peace and they are very cautious lest they be accused of harassment and thus attempting to sabotage the peace process. This cautiousness had to the relaxation of controls.
A middle level officer on duty was immediately briefed of what they observed. With the help of a Warrant Officer and Lance Corporal, this officer surprised the two young men. They were body searched. This is what it revealed:

One person was identified as 29 year old Sinnathamby Suresh Kumar from Point Pedro Road, Irapalai. He had his official National Identity Card No: 743390275 V.
He had in his possession three mobile telephones. One mobile phone was programmed to function as a remote controlled device. It could be used to detonate a bomb.

A cyanide capsule and an LTTE "dog tag" or piece of aluminium with his identification number inscribed. In a false lining of his purse were code sheets and letters. He held another National Identity Card (found to be forged) and bearing No: 73564080 V under the name Pillayar Selvathurai. There was Rs 90,000 in cash.

The second person was identified as 23 year old Palai Thambi Meenachisunderam of Ganeshapuram, Mandoor. He had his official National Identity Card No 802793637 V. He had in his possession LTTE code sheets. They were concealed in the flap of his shirt which held the buttons. They had been carefully stitched. He was in possession of Rs 2200 in cash.

The most unexpected moment for the officer, Sergeant and the soldiers came when Meenachisunderam took out a cyanide capsule. It was concealed in his shirt collar. If he bit that, it would have led to his instant death. But the men jumped on him and seized the capsule. The two men were then hand cuffed and searched again.
What did the highly secretive LTTE code sheets contain? Were they instructions to those in one of the many "sleeping cells" in the City and suburbs to execute a particular task? Were they assassinations? Who were the targets? Breaking the codes is no easy task. Government intelligence agencies have tried that over the years.

At first, the help of their counterparts in India, and later Pakistan, were sought. Thereafter even help from western intelligence agencies failed to provide the answer.
This is the first time since the 19 month long ceasefire between the UNF Government and the LTTE that such a detection was made at Omanthai Entry-Exit Point. That Sunday evening, the telephones of senior Army top brass in Wanni and Colombo were busy. Orders went out to hand over the two guerrillas to the Police. That night, Director, Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Sisira Mendis SSP, had detailed a team to rush to Omanthai and take charge of them. They were hurriedly brought to Colombo for interrogation.

There were none more embarrassed than those in the upper echelons of the UNF leadership and their propagandists. The Omanthai detection was clear proof that whilst talking peace, the Tiger guerrillas had set in motion military preparations - a position which the UNF has gone to great lengths to deny than the guerrillas themselves. Desperate efforts were made to stop the media from reporting the event.

As has been the case since the ceasefire, they believed that keeping the news away from the public would mean nothing bad was happening. But that failed. If this was uncomfortable, more bad news sent shock waves reeling down the corridors of power.
CID detectives had to adhere to the UNF policy of not enforcing the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) - an undertaking they had given to the LTTE. Hence the two suspects had to be interrogated under the normal laws of the land and remanded within 24 hours. They are now seeking further recourse to the law to question the men.
But the initial investigations have given them many leads that had to be verified and re-confirmed. One such revelation spoke of plans to target key UNF personalities should the peace talks fail or are disrupted. The detonating mechanism in one of the cell phones was meant to trigger off bombs to be placed in a culvert somewhere near Gregory's Road. The guerrillas are known to lead detectives on bogey trails. Hence, only a thorough investigation will bare fuller details.

There was a debate in sections of the intelligence community whether the Tiger guerrillas had stage managed the Omanthai incident to send a warning to the UNF leaders. They say since the dismantling of check-points in the Greater Colombo area and relaxation of security after the ceasefire, guerrillas have been able to infiltrate in large numbers and establish cells unimpeded. Proof of this came when they gunned down military informants with impunity and made the Police impotent in dealing with them. This was in addition to being able to move in weapons and explosives.
They ask why the guerrillas should risk detection at a check-point when their "strike capability" in the City and suburbs has been greatly enhanced. But veterans in the game argue that the matter could not be lightly dismissed since the guerrillas will not force their cadres into suicide merely to send warnings to the Government. "Even in the past when they operated cells in the City, there have been instances where hit squads arrived to carry out special jobs. This is nothing new," a senior intelligence official familiar with guerrilla activity told The Sunday Times.

According to this official, a serving professional with over a ten year track record, who, for obvious reasons spoke on grounds of anonymity, "what was contained in the code sheets holds the key. Almost all attacks in the past were carried out by those sleeping members of the cells after instructions arrived. Before the ceasefire, such orders were personally brought to the City by cadres who came from the east since access through the north was restricted due to high security."

"But controls even at Omanthai now are so relaxed; guerrilla cadres feel they can confidently pass through. The recent detection was undoubtedly due to the alertness shown by a soldier. But that is not to say others on similar missions have not passed through," the official said. However, all are agreed on one aspect - the existence of hidden guerrilla explosives in the City or other areas. Hence a sophisticated triggering mechanism is all that was being sent for a specific job.

Besides trying to cover up embarrassing events, like the Omanthai detection, the UNF Government appears to have done little or nothing. It would have been better to make public the find and declare that the Government would raise issue with the LTTE. Similarly they could have also declared that the issue would also be raised with the Norwegian facilitators as well as the helpless Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). That would have been good for their credibility.

But UNF leaders, who are so supine, believe that may offend the guerrillas, particularly its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. This is one reason why attempts are made throughout the 19 month long ceasefire to keep away the bad news from the public. One such move that has clearly backfired is the guerrilla build up in the Trincomalee district, exclusively revealed by The Sunday Times (Situation Report - August 3).

The opposition People's Alliance was to raise issue over the matter triggering off a major controversy with the UNF Government. UNF chief peace negotiator and spokesman, Prof. G.L. Peiris flatly denied during a news conference that the guerrillas have opened up new camps in Trincomalee except for the one at Manirsakulam (Kuranku Panchan Kulam).

That was despite an Army report that was received by the Ministry of Defence just two days before the news conference, providing facts to the contrary. Prof. Peiris, was on a visit to London, this week his media promoters said. He was having lunch in the House of Commons canteen with British Minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mike O'Brien. Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe was at his official residence, "Temple Trees" in Colombo, that Wednesday (September 17) receiving a first hand account about the guerrilla build up in Trincomalee.

Giving him the facts, which confirmed the existence of the new camps, were the senior Army, Navy and Air Force officers in charge of the area - Major General Sunil Tennekoon, General Officer Commanding (GOC) Army's 22 Division, Rear Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, Commander Eastern Naval Area and Group Captain Gagan Bulathsinhala, Air Officer Commanding the Sri Lanka Air Force Base in Trincomalee.
Before meeting the three area commanders, Premier Wickremasinghe had a full review of the security situation with the service chiefs - Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle (Army), Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri (Navy) and Air Vice Marshal Laksan Salgado, (Chief of Staff, Sri Lanka Air Force). Air Force Commander Air Marshal Donald Perera is on an official visit abroad. Also taking part in the meeting were Defence Minister, Tilak Marapana and Economic Reforms Minister, Milinda Moragoda.

The Sunday Times learnt that Premier Wickremasinghe's meeting with the service chiefs, which was later expanded to include the eastern area security chiefs, lasted nearly three hours. At the first meeting, a gamut of issues including preparedness of the Navy to meet developing threats in the Trincomalee area - an acknowledgment that such a threat now exists - was discussed. For obvious reasons, one cannot elaborate on the measures discussed or decisions taken.

But there indeed was confirmation and acknowledgement of the Army report, referred to in these columns last week, that there were 12 newly established Tiger guerrilla camps in the Trincomalee area. In addition, it was pointed out, that there were unconfirmed reports of the existence of another five camps. The Army report, from the office of Major General Chula Seneviratne, Director General-General Staff (DGGS), accompanied by a map had in fact been forwarded to Defence Minister, Tilak Marapana, by Army Chief Lt. Gen. Balagalle. As explained in these columns last week, this report, however, was not formulated by him.

Before dealing further with this report, it is relevant to mention the developments that followed as a result of The Sunday Times exposure and the controversy it generated thereafter. If the revelations were to rouse the security concerns of neighbouring India and the interests of the international community, it had its repercussions on the LTTE too.

On Friday, guerrilla leaders in the Trincomalee district convened a news conference of local journalists to make an interesting revelation. Taking part were Military Wing leader of the district, Pathuman and Political Wing leader, Thilak. "The Maniraskulam (Kuranku Paanchan Kulam) camp has become controversial because the SLMM made an erroneous determination," said Pathuman. He claimed "not a single camp has been constructed in the Trincomalee district since the CFA" and accused "anti-peace" elements of propagandising a false issue. He claimed that only political offices were being established. Sinniah Gurunathan of The Sunday Times attended this news conference. His report appears on Page 7.

This press conference came just a day after Norwegian peace facilitators - Deputy Minister Vidar Helgessen and Special Envoy Erik Solheim - held talks in Kilinochchi with LTTE Political Wing leader, S.P. Tamilselvan. They were known to have raised issue over complaints of new LTTE camps in the Trincomalee area. Both Pathuman and Thilak said arrangements were being made to allow representatives of the media to visit the areas.

In this backdrop, the UNF Government laid the red carpet for Opposition Leader, Mahinda Rajapakse, to visit Trincomalee. A helicopter was placed at the disposal of him and his entourage. Premier Wickremasinghe directed Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Balagalle and Navy Commander Daya Sandagiri to accompany him. He was given briefings at the Navy’s Eastern Headquar-ters at the Dockyard about the security situation in the area and the preparedness of the security forces.

Now to the four-page report from Maj. Gen. Seneviratne's office. The report noted that since the Ceasefire Agreement, both the security forces and the LTTE were required to provide the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, details of their defence localities. This was within 30 days of the signing of the agreement. Pointing out that the concept of operations in the north and east are different, the report said:

NORTH: Security forces maintained forward defence lines which was a clear cut bunker line and an obstacle belt with a fence. Accordingly, demarcation of cleared and un-cleared areas have been established keeping Forward Defence Line (FDL) as the guideline.

EAST: Security forces maintained independent military bases in tactically important localities in order to control the area whilst conducting military operations in jungles to flush out LTTE. There was no Forward Defence Lines (FDLs) that are a clear indicator on ground. The Army formulated a map demarcating controlled areas dominated by the Army. These areas included townships, villages and agriculture lands cultivated by Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims.

Other excerpts from the report: "Even before signing of the MOU LTTE carried out North-South movement through the jungles in the night discreetly from Trincomalee. There were many occasions Army detected these movements and inflicted casualties to LTTE. This was not an easy task for the LTTE to cross from North to South and vice versa crossing the MSR (Main Supply Route). For these movements LTTE established temporary harbour positions as they had to wait for a few days inside the jungles before they found suitable time for the crossing. These were temporary makeshift positions. Since these makeshift positions were located in dense jungles, the Army carried out search and clear operations and dislodged these temporary camps. Usually the LTTE avoided confrontations with the Army and abandoned these camps….

"…Exploiting the position of troops not operating in the jungles after the Ceasefire Agreement, LTTE converted their temporary makeshift bases into permanent camps. In addition, they established new camps in the Trincomalee area. The details of the makeshift camps prior to the CFA and new camps are as follows: Makeshift Camps -Trincomalee North - 3 Tricomalee South 2 Newly established camps Trincomalee North 4 Trincomalee South 8 Unconfirmed camps Trincomalee South 5

Now to a more important and significant point. In calling upon the Army to formulate a report, the Ministry of Defence had also requested comments on revelations made in The Sunday Times (Situation Report - August 3) about the build up in Trincomalee.
The report revealed for the first time the gradual transformation of the landscape around Trincomalee with guerrillas opening new military camps, re-occupying ones abandoned and setting up satellite camps around bases that existed. It was accompanied by a map marking out the areas where the camps were located.

The Sunday Times learnt the Army was called upon to comment on the revelations, particularly the areas marked out in the map. Does this mean that the Ministry of Defence was blissfully unaware of the developments until they were shown in a map in these columns? Does this also mean those at the Ministry, like in most other instances, do not take cognisance of warnings from senior security officers or from reports forwarded by various state intelligence agencies?

Food for thought for UNF propagandists and guerrilla apologists. The Sunday Times revelations not only generated a controversy but helped none other than Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe, to confirm facts last Wednesday. Who says disclosures of security developments in the media, like threats posed to national security of Sri Lanka, does not help? They should think again.

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