Focus on Rights

When are conversions improper?
Seldom does an issue have a more emotive effect upon an individual than when it involves religion. Nor are those debates more charged than when they involve the question of conversions. Established churches, both in the Christian and Roman Catholic faith, are as inimical in their reactions towards conversions, (by what are pejoratively referred to as the new sects or 'born-again" converts), as the Buddhists and the Hindus in this country.

Up to now, however, there has been no physical violence involved in the process. Recent attacks on churches in Sri Lanka are now lending a far more worrying dimension to the whole. Ironically, the attackers are not demonstrably distinguishing between the established and the new churches in various parts of the country.
In this whole debate, the difficulty remains in distinguishing between a genuine conversion (being essentially a matter of private faith) or preaching to this effect and conversions brought about by financial or other allurements.

This is the primary reason why international human rights tribunals interpreting the law of nations, have been extremely cautious when alleged improper conversions are in issue.

The case is no better illustrated than when in 1993, a Jehovah's Witness appealed to the European Court of Human Rights based in Strasbourg against a conviction, sentence and imprisonment under the Greek criminal law statutes on proselytism. A Greek citizen, who was an orthodox Christian, had complained that the Jehovah's Witness has tried to convert her by coming to her home and talking to her about his faith.

Ruling the conviction as bad, the European Court found that it had not been established that improper means had been used during the discussions on religious belief between the Witness and the Christian. A pressing social need demanding the former's conviction had not been justified. The conviction was not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and there was thus a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Civil and Political Rights which enshrines the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

The reasoning of the Court was very clear. On the one hand, it condemned improper proselytism, such as "offering material or social advantages with a view to gaining new members for a Church or exerting improper pressure on people in distress or need…..or the use of violence or brainwashing." Thus, Greek criminal law statutes on proselytism were upheld to be in line with the Convention. On the other hand, the Court stated unequivocally that bearing Christian witness was an essential mission and a responsibility of every Christian and every church. As such, these were actions that cannot be prohibited.

The line between the two, clear in theory, may not, however, be that black and white in practice. This is a dilemma that is manifested very well in Sri Lanka in debates involving recent judicial reasoning of the Supreme Court in challenges made to three bills relating to the incorporation of particular religious institutions.

In the most recent determination of the Supreme Court, (SC Determination No 19/2003, SCM 25.07.2003), the Court, comprising Justices Shirani Bandaranayake, H.S. Yapa and Nihal Jayasinghe found a private members' Bill seeking to incorporate a Roman Catholic order, inconsistent with not only Article 10, (freedom of thought conscience and religion) of the Constitution but also Article 9, (giving Buddhism the foremost place in the country).

Notably, the Court declared that while what is guaranteed under the Constitution is the manifestation, observance and practice of one's own religion, the propagation and spreading of Christianity would not be permissible as it would impair the very existence of Buddhism and the Buddha Sasana.

This Determination follows previous judicial reasoning, as for example, when a Bench comprising Chief Justice S.N. Silva, Shirani Bandaranayake and Ameer Ismail, (SC Determination 2/2001, SCM 25.5.2001), held that a bill seeking to set up a prayer centre which included among its objects, assisting people to enable them to set up in self-employment or to obtain job opportunities, was inconsistent with Article 10 of the Constitution.

The Court, stating that particular sensitivity attaches to issues of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, took the view that the linking of what could be seen as commercial and economic activities with the observance and practice of a religion would be contrary to constitutional norms.

It is a moot question, however, as to whether the debates that have followed the delivering of these Determinations have addressed the actual issues involved in this regard. In the first instance, the basic tenet is that religious institutions ought not to combine economic and commercial activities with the practice of a religion.

In that context, it would be interesting to examine the multifarious other statutes in existence, (including indeed many statutes setting up institutions linked to the Buddhist faith) in order to see how many of them combine those clauses found to be obnoxious by Court recently. Many of these clauses, while sinister from one perspective, have also a somewhat innocuous tinge, being ordinarily included in order to help members in practical ways. Despite the fact that none of these statutes could be challenged now for unconstitutionality, such an examination would be useful in more ways than one.

Article 14(1)(e) meanwhile assures to every citizen the freedom, either by himself or in association with others and either in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. The constitutional emphasis on "teaching" in Article 14(1)(e) appears to give protection to a wider range of activities than merely worshipping and observing.

Teaching in that sense, could very well involve "spreading a statement, belief or practice from person to person, place to place or to disseminate or diffuse (the same)", that is effectively the dictionary meaning of the term propagation. The precise manner in which the concepts of teaching, propagation and bearing witness are interpreted, is therefore crucial. And, while forcible conversions can only be deplored in the strongest possible terms, restricting some religions to a narrow compass while allowing another unlimited freedom, could be hugely counter productive in the domestic context of any country.

It is therefore important that the vexed question of forcible conversions be put in its proper perspective as a concern to all religions and religious institutions in Sri Lanka. In the alternative, it is perhaps appropriate to remember that due to more than three decades of racial tensions, we are now left with a de facto separate state in one part of the country. One shudders to think of the havoc that would be wreaked if religious tensions, (or worse), are also stirred into this explosive mixture. One is also left wondering at the sheer perfidy of those who appear, in fact, to want this to happen.

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