HSZ issue: who caused the blunder?

The United National Front (UNF) Government this week embarked on emergency damage control over the increasingly contentious issue of the High Security Zones (HSZ) in the Jaffna peninsula - a controversy generated entirely due to a bureaucratic bungle and lack of foresight.

Balasingham’s statement on Tamilnet

Detailed discussion on core issues cannot be undertaken when hundreds of thousands of Tamil people remain unable to return to their homes, says Anton Balasingham, LTTE Chief Negotiator, in an interview with Tamilnet website on December 29.

Here is the text: "The resettlement of displaced Tamil people and the normalisation of conditions in their areas of residence will be the main issues to be taken up at the negotiations in Thailand between the Liberation Tigers and the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE's chief negotiator, Mr. Anton Balasingham, said Sunday.

"Speaking to Tamilnet Sunday, Mr. Balasingham said that the Sri Lanka Army's (SLA) refusal to vacate the homes of hundreds of thousands of people in defiance of the cease-fire agreement and subsequent commitments made by the Colombo government had rendered the Sub-Committee on De-escalation and Normalisation (SDN) defunct.

"The SLA position was thereby also an impediment to the functioning of the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN), he said.

"As such, the issues of resettlement, de-escalation and normalisation would be taken up at the direct talks between the government and the LTTE, Mr. Balasingham told TamilNet.

"The severe existential problems of the Tamil people remain outstanding", Mr. Balasingham said.

"The peace process has proceeded smoothly and much progress has been made," he pointed out. "The agreements reached by both parties on immediate humanitarian issues are however yet to be implemented.

"Detailed discussion on core issues cannot be undertaken when hundreds of thousands of Tamil people remain unable to return to their homes," Mr. Balasingham said, adding "the resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced (people) are the urgent cardinal issue of the day."

"As such, the Sri Lanka Army's hard-line attitude towards the difficulties faced by the Tamil people, which has regrettably been supported by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission is unacceptable," he said further.

"The SLA said last week that it would not permit resettlement of hundreds of thousands of people whose homes now come within its High Security Zones unless the LTTE agreed to the "disarming of (its) cadres and decommission of (its) long range weapons."

"When asked about press reports he had discussed these matters with the head of the SLMM, Maj. Gen. Furuhovde, Mr. Balasingham said he had not spoken to the SLMM. Sri Lanka's state-owned Sunday Observer claimed this week that Mr. Balasingham had on Friday "personally telephoned (Furuhovde) from London and assured him."

"The fourth round of direct talks between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government are to be held in Bangkok from January 6 to 9.

"Queried about press reports that the SLMM is arranging a meeting of the SDN, comprising senior officers of the SLA and LTTE commanders, at Muhamalai before the talks in Thailand, Mr. Balasingham responded negatively, saying, "such a meeting may not materialize".

It was LTTE's "Eastern Commander," Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna, who sounded a warning at the December 14 meeting of the SDN (Sub Committee on De-escalation and Normalisation) that his leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, wanted the HSZ vacated for re-settlement of civilians without delay. He threatened that the LTTE would not take part in future SDN meetings.

With an assurance made that Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, would forward proposals within a week, the leader of the Government delegation Defence Secretary Austin Fernando, deliberated during the next two days with senior Security Forces officials on what they should be. Later, all of them met Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe at "Temple Trees" on December 17. In as much as he was conscious that the issue of re-settling internally displaced persons was essential for normalisation, Premier Wickremesinghe, was equally conscious that such a process in the High Security Zones would have to take into consideration the national security interests. He acknowledged military viewpoints in this regard and agreed to the formulation of a plan that balanced normalisation with de-escalation of high security. The formulation of that concept in the form of a series of proposals was placed in the hands of Maj. Gen. Fonseka. Having set the policy guidelines, Premier Wickremesinghe was off on a working holiday to Singapore. Like him, other UNF

leaders, the Colombo based diplomatic community, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and others, all backing the peace process were aghast at the events that followed in the days thereafter. As the second year in the new millennium, one without war in the battlefields gave way to a third, a war of words had erupted to embroil the UNF Government and the LTTE - the first major battle in the peace process.

This week, senior UNF leaders agreed, it need not have happened. A costly and colossal blunder could have been easily avoided. They conceded that Maj. Gen. Fonseka's five page "De Escalation Plan" with its annexure should not have been forwarded to the LTTE. One high-ranking UNF source associated with the peace process, who spoke on grounds of anonymity, told The Sunday Times "that was an internal document that expressed the Army's viewpoints and concerns. Someone should have 'sanitized' it before it went to the LTTE."

The remarks not only underscored the seriousness of an official lapse but also laid bare a glaring irregularity - the Government's negotiators did not seem to know the psyche or mood of the former enemy with whom they were now negotiating peace. Otherwise, it is inconceivable that an official document from the UNF Government, besides the grammatical errors, would have contained references to "terrorists" after they de-proscribed the LTTE on September 4, last year.

That is not to fault Maj. Gen. Fonseka for his proposals or conceding that Security Forces capabilities are not 100 per cent superior to that of the LTTE. As a soldier, that is his responsibility and he must be commended for making a dispassionate, professional appraisal of the ground situation. But, whose responsibility it was to "sanitize," or in other words re-formulate the proposals in acceptable jargon, for discussion with the LTTE?

Premier Wickremesinghe, who spelt out the policy guidelines, was away in Singapore. Defence Minister Tilak Marapana, was on a visit to India. Minister of Economic Reforms, Science and Technology Milinda Moragoda, was away in Japan. It goes without saying that none of them would have allowed the Army's "De-escalation Plan" to be forwarded to the LTTE in that original format and thus place the peace talks in peril.

How did it happen then? As revealed in The Sunday Times last week, from Maj. Gen. Fonseka, the plan went to Defence Secretary Fernando. He approved it. Thereafter, in the absence of Norwegian Ambassador Jon Westborg, it was handed over to Maj. Gen.(retd.) Trond Furuhovde, head of SLMM for onward transmission to the LTTE. To his credit, Gen. Furuhovde, keen to ensure that the tone and content of the plan did not become an irritant in Government-LTTE relations, double-checked it with Mr. Fernando. The Sunday Times learnt that if he could not persuade to keep back the entire plan for a re-appraisal, whether the annexure "A" (Summary of de-escalation proposals in relation to re-settlement in HSZs) should be held over. The answer was in the affirmative.

He wanted the plan to be forwarded in that very format. The action of the Defence Secretary and what followed is now history. It has not only embarrassed the United National Front acutely but led to ill-founded fears that the Government was on a collision course with the Army. Wild claims were made that the UNF had no control over the Army and they were acting differently. Colombo based diplomats raised questions on the future of the peace process and why the Army was allowed to take a position that seemed counter to Government's goals of peace. A lack of foresight by one official had placed the Government's peace process in danger, drawn accusations against the Army and caused anxiety among those backing the peace process.

The LTTE singled out the Army and charged it was "imposing unacceptable and unrealistic conditions" to disrupt the peace process. They felt insulted by the response. The most worrying impact is on tomorrow's resumed peace talks in the Rose Garden resort at Nakorn Pathom in Thailand.

If the Government wanted to focus on core issues and human rights, as their Chief Negotiator, Prof. G.L. Peiris declared, his LTTE counterpart, Anton Balasingham made clear that would not happen in the next three days of talks.

The Tamilnet website quoted him saying in an interview that "the re-settlement of displaced Tamil people and the normalisation of conditions in their areas of residence will be the main issues to be taken up at the negotiations in Thailand next month between Liberation Tigers and the Sri Lankan Government…" He was also quoted saying "detailed discussion on core issues cannot be undertaken when hundreds of thousands of Tamil people remain unable to return to their homes." See box story for the Tamilnet interview.

Little wonder, Premier Wickremesinghe, who returned from Singapore last Thursday, was angry at the media publicity Maj. Gen. Fonseka's plan had generated. The London based Tamil Guardian newspaper not only published the plan in full but also chided it for the grammatical errors. It was also grist to the mill to those who opposed the Government's peace initiatives and the opposition media. They seized the opportunity to drive the point home that the Government and the Army were on a collision course on the issue of High Security Zones.

Referring to media reports Mr Wickremesinghe told a conference of military and Government officials at "Temple Trees" on Thursday, there was no need to go public on such issues. He was compelled to rebuke Defence Secretary Fernando for his latest remarks at a press conference on January 1 when the controversial Defence Review Committee headed by him launched a website.

Though Mr. Fernando began a news conference on that occasion by saying he would only answer questions relating to that event, he readily went on to reply to questions put to him on a variety of other issues. To one such question, he said that Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, would not be transferred "just because someone requests him to do so." He added "We have not received any letter from any politician or anyone else requesting Gen. Fonseka to be transferred from the North…." He was alluding to a public statement by Hindu Religious Affairs Minister, T. Maheswaran, demanding the withdrawal of Maj. Gen. Fonseka from Jaffna.

Premier Wickremesinghe felt that the prerogative of effecting transfers of the Army's sector commanders belonged to the Commander of the Army. Hence, there was no need for Mr. Fernando to make public declarations on such matters.

Even before the Prime Minister returned to Sri Lanka, the furore over the HSZ issue had drawn his attention. So much so, he asked to see and met Minister Milinda Moragoda in Singapore, when he was en route to Colombo from Tokyo. There he advised him to take damage control measures no sooner he returned to Colombo. That included the task of keeping President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga informed of developments that had taken place.

Upon learning that President Kumaratunga was out of Colombo, Mr. Moragoda had a meeting with her international affairs advisor and former Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. There he briefed the latter on how Maj. Gen. Fonseka's "De-escalation Plan" came to be formulated. The Sunday Times learnt Mr. Moragoda was frank enough to admit it was a mistake on the part of the Government to have sent the full text of that plan to the LTTE. He was of the view the proposals contained in that plan should have been re-formulated and sent for detailed discussion since there were many options available. He is learnt to have expressed the view that the UNF felt issues related to the HSZ could be resolved.

On Friday evening, Premier Wickremesinghe together with Ministers Tilak Marapana and Milinda Moragoda, held a near 90-minute meeting with President Kumaratunga at Janadipathi Mandiraya. There they briefed her on the issues coming up at tomorrow's peace talks.

Following up on Premier Wickremesinghe's Singapore meeting, Mr. Moragoda flew with the Commanders of the Army (Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle) and Air Force (Air Marshal Donald Perera) to Jaffna last Tuesday to make an on the spot study of the HSZs. This is with a view to presenting the UNF's position on the matter at tomorrow's talks.

He is likely to announce that the Army would make immediate withdrawals from the Jaffna town area from two hotels and some 80 houses. This, however, also entails the resolving of some knotty issues like the acquisition of land (in the Jaffna peninsula) to re-locate the Army and providing accommodation for them.

The possibility of obtaining pre-fabricated construction units under an Indian credit line for this purpose is also being examined. In addition, the Government is also to release an estimated 700 houses that lay immediately outside the HSZ for immediate re-settlement of civilians. After a top-level conference at the SF Headquarters in Palaly, Mr. Moragoda and the military team also paid a call on the Bishop of Jaffna, Rev. Thomas Savundranayagam. He is learnt to have told them that the HSZ affected the re-settlement of displaced families now living under very difficult conditions. The Commander of the Navy, Daya Sandagiri, was conspicuous by his absence in Mr. Moragoda's team to Jaffna last week, particularly in view of the concerns the Navy has expressed over Maj. Gen. Fonseka's offer to hand over two areas in the HSZ to Tiger guerrillas subject to conditions - one west of Keerimalai and the other at Kovilkandy.

The Navy, The Sunday Times learns, has expressed reservations about the offer of the area west of Keerimalai and has said Maj. Gen. Fonseka, as Security Forces Commander, had not consulted his Naval counterpart in the Jaffna peninsula to obtain his views before incorporating them in the "De-escalation Plan."

Vice Admiral Sandagiri held a meeting last Tuesday with President Kumaratunga to brief her on his New Year's eve visit to New Delhi for a meeting with his Indian counterparts. The Sunday Times learnt Indian Naval authorities showed Vice Admiral Sandagiri photographs and other evidence of the vessel "MV Koimar," that was located transporting ammunition and fuel for the LTTE in the deep seas off the north eastern Coast of Sri Lanka last month. Sri Lanka Navy sources said an arrangement to ensure closer co-operation between Sri Lankan and Indian Navy patrols in the deep seas have now been formulated but declined to divulge details for reasons of secrecy.

Navy patrols in the north-eastern seas intensified since the mystery ship was located have reported another find on December 29, last year. According to a report reaching Navy Headquarters, a Navy patrol had observed the flight of an unidentified light aircraft on that day between 11 p.m. and midnight one mile off the shore between Chalai and Mullaitivu.

It had been observed on two occasions though it is not clear whether they were two light aircraft or a single one making a return journey. The Navy has forwarded its report to Air Force Headquarters. The tussle over the HSZ also caused panic in Government circles on Thursday when news arrived that the LTTE team from the Wanni, wanting to travel to Thailand, were apprehensive to arrive in Colombo due to security considerations. Fears had been heightened after Maj. Gen. Fonseka's proposals and the resultant worry that the Army was hostile. Norway's Ambassador to Colombo, Jon Westborg, who was in touch with the LTTE and Government leaders, ensured some security guarantees sought by the LTTE. Thereafter, a delegation comprising Tamil Selvam, the Political Wing Leader and Karuna, "Eastern Commander," arrived in Colombo on Friday night by a Sri Lanka Air Force helicopter. They later boarded a Bangkok bound flight.

The New Year's eve drama over the HSZ between the UNF Government and the LTTE reminds one of the seven years of separatist war during the People's Alliance Government. Then, many blamed the incompetence of generals and politicians, at least one of them who claimed to be both, for accountability and accused then Government of inaction over their incompetence. And now, under the United Front Government, that has waged a peace offensive, it is a case of the ineptitude of incompetent bureaucrats. Like the incompetent generals and blundering politicians during a war, inefficient and incompetent bureaucrats can cause great harm to a peace process. That is if UNF continues to ignore accountability that by itself has already caused considerable embarrassment not to mention the colossal damage.

 


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