The no-frills version about peace

This time, Ranil Wickremesinghe himself is issuing his apologia along with his speech on the new "open ended ceasefire agreement'' signed with the LTTE. Speaking from Vavuniya, Wickremesinghe sounded warnings about "going with our eyes open,'' and said "all abductions extortion etc., should cease with this agreement.'' Wickremesinghe's discretion, definitely was the better part of his valour.

Last time's peace fascism had Mangala Samaraweera and the Sudu Nelum advocates talking more on behalf of the LTTE, than on behalf of the government. Nobody is in the mood for that kind of peace-fascism anymore — the kind of fascism that says, if you sound a note of caution about peace talks, you will be cremated and your ashes scattered all along the Wanni.

Of course the fact that there is no fascism about the UN P's peace initiative doesn't mean that Ranil Wickremesinghe has any ready insurance-policy in his possession. If the peace process yields nothing, Wickremesinghe will have to contend with an angry South, and perhaps an angrier bunch of soldiers and servicemen.

This is a nation talking peace, kicking and screaming. Even the caucus totally opposed to the peace process cannot be vehement, because of several reasons. One is that it is impossible to rise against this "peace wave.'' The perception has dug-in, that the country can no longer go on fighting without at least a respite. 

Ironically, the PA government, which was very hawkish and was going for Prabhakaran's jugular, contributed most to this perception. The PA mismanaged the economy — not necessarily because of the war, but because it had nothing on its mind except the war. This soured the economic climate. Then, there was plain mismanagement, unrelated to the war, about which some incisive economists have already commented.

Wickremesinghe's salvation is that he wants to end the war — not to paint himself as the grand redeemer. The PA was visibly doing the grand about the peace effort. Kumarantunga and her immediate kitchen confidante Mangala Samaraweera talked about providing a "lasting solution to the problems of the Tamil people.''

The most despised dove of the Sinhala anti-negotiation/anti-talks caucus is Ranil Wickremesinghe. Ironically, he also doesn't seem to believe in "solving the problems of the Tamil people.''

Ask Nalin de Silva or Gunadasa Amerasekera, and they will tell you that "the Tamil people do not have any grievances that are peculiar to them.'' Ranil Wickremesinghe — though he wouldn't be caught dead saying so — definitely seems to think on the same lines.

He does not do the grand therefore about "addressing the grievances of the Tamil people'', and eliminating Tamil oppression for all time. 

Instead, he wants to appease the LTTE. In practical terms, the UNP has got it figured out. The conflict is about the LTTE. Therefore, appease the LTTE and not be effusive about the "rights of the Tamil people.'' As far as the grievances of the Tamil people are concerned, Nalin de Silva and Ranil Wickremesinghe seems to be coterminous, and in closet agreement.

Ranil's solution therefore is to offer an interim council – or whatever it takes to keep the LTTE happy. Wickremesinghe figures that if the LTTE is happy, the Tamil people will be happy – and this is not meant to be sarcasm either.

Therefore, with a different peace-tack, Ranil Wickremesinghe sees a chance in nixing the pattern of failed peace initiatives. He sees something in giving the Tigers what they want — which, paradox of paradoxes, may be much less than what the Tamil people are supposed to want (… such as a separate state, or a federal system of administration or conjoint provinces or Utopia.)

Wickremesinghe figures that all preceding peace initiatives failed, because the negotiators missed the bus. They did the statesman's thing – talked about lasting constitutional arrangements — and missed the woods for the trees.

If this conflict — this war — flows from the barrel of a gun — then, Wickremesinghe figures that the only way to stop it is by silencing the LTTE's gun. That's by making the LTTE happy before making the Tamil people happy with constitutional overhauls, and idealistic packages. He doesn't seem to fight shy of granting the LTTE an interim arrangement. He thinks the boys need to be boys. He doesn't mind them running around as if they owned the place as long as the Sri Lankan government, actually, and constitutionally, owns the place. De jure solutions are for PA kinds of doves, he thinks. It's this peace tack — this approach that demystifies the Tamil problem and reduces it to terms of LTTE vs US — that he thinks, will save the face for him and the UNP. All that can be said is that he is probably a lot closer to pulling it off than the PA was ever close to pulling off its own peace initiative in 1994. Or the UNP was, before him.