20th August 2000

Reforms process: it's a matter of trust

Under the banner of a solution to the ethnic problem, the new constitution was in fact a crafty insidious endeavour aimed at continuing in power. The President's father too, in 1956, and in a similar manner, made use of Sinhala grievances with the aim of coming to power. His daughter's attempt has been to retain the power which she might lose, by making use of the minority grievances, the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka is like an illness which cannot be cured without a surgical operation. However, the surgery required is not a simple one. It is surgery that can be done, not by any surgeon but only by one who has expert knowledge. If one, because of the difficulty of finding a surgeon with specialist knowledge, permit a surgeon who does not have the necessary knowledge for the task but wants to do it for cheap publicity, the patient might even die as a result. The illness is very painful. But it is dangerous to get the services of a surgeon who does not have the necessary qualifications, just because of the inability to bear the pain.

This is a complex problem that has to be settled on the basis of agreement among a number of contradicting forces. However, the president did not adopt an approach suitable for the purpose. Her approach was such that it made all the forces work against a common agreement.

While claiming that the new constitution is a solution to the ethnic crisis she also says that its purpose is to defeat Prabhakaran. If its purpose is to defeat Prabhakaran, the Tamil people would see it as a document that gives strength and justification to the war against Prabhakaran. A war waged for the purpose of defeating Prabhakaran might please some Sri Lankans in Sinhala society but not the Tamil people in Tamil society. On the other hand, if the purpose of the new constitution is to defeat Prabhakaran, he, on his part will inevitably be driven to a policy of doing everything in his power to sabotage it.

The programme of getting the new constitution adopted had been linked to the introduction of a new system of election for the parliamentary election alone. When organisations like the JVP and the Sihala Urumaya saw that the new system would prevent any reasonable chance for them to get parliamentary representation, they were compelled to do everything in their power to defeat the entire plan. The UNP too saw the new constitution not as an honest attempt to solve the ethnic problem but as a deceitful strategy by the government to win over some UNP MPs and to win the parliamentary elections easily. In the circumstances, that party did everything it could to defeat the constitution. The government's strategy was disturbed not only by the opposition parties but also by some MPs in the PA too. Those MPs saw it as one aimed at getting rid of ministers disliked by the president on enhancing the power of a small clique trusted by her. Although they did not oppose it openly because of their fear of the post of executive president, they obstructed it stealthily.

The manner in which the president transacted with the entire society was completely immature. The Maha Sangha are a powerful religious institution in Sri Lanka. Although the Catholic Church has its faithful in both Sinhala society and Tamil society, Buddhism is different. In Sri Lanka it is a religion confined exehisively to the Sinhalese. Therefore its commitment is only to the Sinhalese. Consequently it is natural that in the Sangha there are attitudes that give weight to the Sinhalese. Although it might be difficult to get the Sangha to agree to a line of action that would bring a solution to the grievances of the minorities, it might have been possible to avoid the strong opposition of the Sangha if matters were more patiently and respectfully explained to them. However the manner in which the president dealt with the Sangha was different. Instead of following a policy of explaining matters patiently and with due respect, she followed a policy of aggressive attack prompting them to counter attack.

Bringing about a solution to the ethnic crisis is as important as reaching a consensus on the matter among a number of divers ethnic groups or political parties. In such a complex transaction, the leader who takes the initiative must be a personality who must command the respect of them all. Otherwise some other method has to be adopted from the beginning, without any dependence on a leader.

Although Nelson Mandela was a leader of the Blacks he was a leader who was respected not only by the Black community but also by the White community. While the black community believed that he would not betray the rights of the Blacks at any level, a belief had built up amongst the White community too that, although he was a Black, he would do nothing prejudicial to the Whites too. It was due to the respect the main parties had for Mandela that it was possible for him to take the movement for a consensus to a logical conclusion inspite of various obstacles.

It was that kind of strength that President Kumaratunga lacked, at the time that she started the present process, she had already lost whatever respect she had gained in '94. She was not trusted by the Sinhala or the Tamil community. Due to some of the anti-democratic practices adopted by her to hit out at the opposition parties, no opposition party trusted her.

If she had expected to handle such an onerous task she should have conducted herself in such a way as to earn the respect of all the ethnic, religious and social groups as well as all the political parties. Such a condition applies not only to her but also to all leaders who may come to power in the future.

A solution offered for such a crisis must be devoid of ulterior motive for power. A programme that aims at consolidating or maintaining power cannot have the support of rival parties in the struggle for power. On the other hand, nothing which is good can have ulterior motives. If someone who helps a poor family in his neighbourhood does so with the intention of annexing the neighbours only plot of land, that action can only be considered a strategy. The hidden aims of power beneath the process launched for getting the constitution passed, the provisions for retaining the executive presidency until the end of her second term of office, and retaining immunity even after her term of office and even to the end of her life instead abolishing it turned the entire programme of constitutional reform into a ridiculous project for power.

If de Klerk in his transaction with Mandela had tried to reach an agreement in such a manner as to retain his own power, his action too would have become a ridiculous farce. However, the willingness he showed to give up power not only generated respect for that White leader in the Black community but also contributed to a lessening, to some extent, of the feelings of hatred that the Black community had towards the White community. Although the intention of President Kumaratunga might have been to become a Mandela, finally she could not even become a 'de Klerk'.

Inside the glass house

Editorial/ Opinion Contents