The Situation Report

11th October 1998

Censorship resurrecting the dead!

By Iqbal Athas

The media blitzkrieg on the re-capture of Mankulam failed to bury the bravery and valour of the heroes, who paid with their dear lives or inherited battle scars, forever at Kilinochchi and Paranthan – the worst in the 17 year long separatist war.

Even if their supreme sacrifices did not adorn much of the front pages or most of prime time television slots, their final farewells found a place in the minds of the sorrowing public.

That pain and anguish, like nightfall or daylight, enveloped all parts of the country. There were that many funerals in every district with the exception of Jaffna peninsula and some areas in the Wanni.

A week of tears and sorrow that followed the worst debacle in Sri Lanka's military history was made worse by the pains of the heroes who filled hospitals in the City and the far flung suburbs. If they had been lucky enough to dodge death, most of them were not lucky enough to avoid injuries. The scars from the wounds caused by small arms, mortars, artillery or hand grenades will stay forever not only as a reminder of the blood they have shed for their motherland but also the supreme sacrifices their friends and colleagues had made.

Without the glare of little or no media attention, a sizeable section of the public paid their own tribute to these men. This came in the form of patients in hospitals vacating their beds for soldiers. Others queued to donate blood. Some welfare groups distributed chocolates and sweetmeats.

Patients were forced to forego their regular specialist clinics in most leading hospitals. Those who were rostered to undergo surgical operations found the dates allotted to them cancelled. For hours and hours, soldiers were being wheeled in and wheeled out of the operating theatres.

At the Ragama Teaching Hospital, a surgeon fell ill after sheer exhaustion. He had been operating on soldiers from morning till evening.

Families and the next of kin of soldiers from various parts of the country called at Army Headquarters to ascertain the whereabouts of their loved ones. Large numbers were also present outside major hospitals in the City. Many of them from very poor households could not afford even the proletarian luxury of a City boarding house. They spent their anxious nights in the corridors of some unguarded buildings.

When the news of their plight became known, the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC) rushed to offer accommodation and comfort to them. The Sudu Nelum Movement soon joined the effort. If millions were spent on recruitment drives to encourage the nation's youth to join the security forces with promises of a good future, there was not a single state institution involved in the effort.

Nor did the three services have a unit or a group of officers assigned for the task of looking after those anxious parents and relatives. Equally, private sector organisations and political groups were also conspicuous by their absence though several expounded the cause of the soldier with great patriotic zeal from time to time.

That was how the vast mass of Sri Lankans learnt for themselves the grim realities of the worst military debacle. And that too with a censorship, (both local and foreign), that blatantly sought to hide how many died, how many were wounded and how many were missing.

Parliamentary privilege over rode the censorship last Friday. During the debate on the extension of the State of Emergency, many Opposition parliamentarians seized the opportunity to air their views not only on the Kilinochchi debacle but also on the re-capture of Mankulam. Varied views were expressed. Government parliamentarians countered many of them.

Despite this, one important aspect still remains a mystery. If the Government's position has become curioser and curioser, the Opposition, with its own team of retired military and police advisers, has not been able to discern exactly how many died, how many were injured and how many have gone missing in the Kilinochchi debacle.

Since the attack on the Kilinochchi defence complex and the Paranthan defences on September 27, the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence broke the casualty figures in stages. Here is how it was reported:

Op Hq Press Release of September 27: "….9 soldiers were

killed and 29 wounded…"

Op Hq Press Release of September 28: "….A total of 43 soldiers were killed and 110 wounded….."

Op Hq Press Release of September 29: "……Security Forces personnel lost 62 personnel …" A press release issued later in the evening on the same day said: "…investigations have so far revealed the casualty figures of Security Forces have reached a total of over 150 killed and nearly 300 wounded…" Another press release at night on the same day said: "….losses to security forces during the confrontations in Kilinochchi and Paranthan had exceeded over 200 killed in action."

The Op Hq press release of September 30 (Wednesday) did not give any casualty figures for the Kilinochchi debacle but declared that "troops involved in Operation Jaya Sikurui captured the Mankulam town."

The three news releases by the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence, declared officially that security forces losses "exceed over 200 killed in action and 439 wounded."

On September 30 (Wednesday), Mr. Harsha Gunawardene, spokesman in Sri Lanka for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) declared that they had handed over 600 bodies to the Sri Lanka Army. This was after they took charge of the bodies in LTTE dominated Mallavi and transported them in 20 trucks through the Wanni to Poovarasankulam (along the Vavuniya-Mannar road).

On Wednesday (September 30) night, Ariya Rubasinghe,Director of Information, disclosed to the Island newspaper (October 1), that bodies of 400 soldiers "killed in the battle with the LTTE in Paranthan-Kilinochchi area since Sunday were handed over to the ICRC…"

But, the very next day (Thursday, October 1), Military Spokesman, Brigadier Sunil Tennekoon, declared at the Government's weekly news conference that 400 soldiers were killed and another 400 were injured. Later on Saturday night, (October 3), The Sunday Times asked Brigadier Tennekoon for the latest casualty figures.

The Sunday Times quoted Brigadier Tennekoon in its front page lead story on October 4 on the answer he gave. This is what the report said:

"Last night, official Military spokesman and Military Intelligence Director, Sunil Tennekoon told The Sunday Times 632 soldiers were killed in action and another 432 were wounded."

The ongoing censorship prevents comment on the real death and the injured toll. Brigadier Tennekoon had officially placed the dead at 632 and the wounded at 432. He is not only the Military Spokesman but also Director of Military Intelligence (DMI).

But, five days later, the Op Hq of the Ministry of Defence, which Brigadier Tennekoon heads, put out a news release with a different set of casualty figures. This news release came on Thursday night (October 8), hours before Parliament met to debate the extension of the State of Emergency. There was no doubt that the news release was to forestall figures opposition MPs would give when they raised issues concerning the Kilinochchi debacle.

This is what that news release said:

"Details of battle casualties occurred during the confrontations in Paranthan and Kilinochchi areas are as follows:

A. Killed in Action – 04 Officers and 182 Other Ranks

B. Missing in Action – 18 Officers and 771 Other Ranks

C.Wounded in Action – 25 Officers and 401 Other Ranks

According to information more than 717 LTTE cadres have been killed and about 1100 injured…… "

Now comes the most curious question. Brig. Tennekoon first declares that 632 soldiers were killed and 432 were wounded. And now, in a news release signed on his own behalf by another officer, the Op Hq says 186 (2 officers and 182 other ranks) were killed and 426 (25 officers and 401 other ranks) were wounded.

What happened to the remaining 448 killed and the six who were wounded ? Though comical, one is compelled to ask whether the dead were resurrected ? Similarly how did the six injured suddenly go out of the injured list ? I am compelled to refrain from making further comment or elaborate on the facts in view of the ongoing censorship. But, it is relevant to ask whether this is not a clear case of how the censorship is being used as a cover to manipulate figures and subvert the truth ?

It is these new, reduced figures of the Op Hq that the Deputy Minister of Defence, General Anuruddha Ratwatte, gave Parliament when he moved a motion on Friday to extend the ongoing State of Emergency countrywide. More on that later.

I said in these columns last week that the ICRC handed over 600 bodies to the Army. The Army Censor approved that figure and also the fact that the ICRC subsequently handed over 74 more, thus bringing the total to 674.

On Friday, ICRC's Harsha Gunawardene disclosed that more bodies have been handed over on two separate occasions. But the Army Censor has deleted all references made to these hand overs as well as the number of bodies involved. I cannot therefore reveal the exact figures of casualties, wounded and missing, taking into account the new hand overs.

However, like Brigadier Tennekoon, (no insult intended on the good Brigadier), if I am permitted to play with the figures officially released (and others allowed by the Army Censor), my random calculations raise some queries. Say if one adds 632 (Brigadier Tennekoon's originally declared death toll), with 674 bodies handed over by the ICRC (not to mention the other counts not approved by the Censor) and 789 Missing In Action (Op Hq news release), it adds upto a record 2095. It is here that the Op Hq of the Ministry of Defence has not made matters clear and thus heightened public doubt.

If there has been a discrepancy in the numbers, why has it not been explained ? How did a publicly declared high toll become less and at whose behest ? By manipulating figures, does one believe the public can be convinced that a debacle did not occur or the war is nearing an end ? Is this the only reason for prolonging the censorship and ensuring a news blackout ? Will these manipulations, if they are believed, lull the nation and even the security forces into a state of complacency ? These and many, many more questions beg answers.

The confusion over the casualty figures was further confounded when the Leader of the Opposition, Ranil Wickremasinghe, rose to open Friday's debate in Parliament. He declared that 1500 were killed in action, 2000 more were wounded and a further 100 were missing in action – all round figures indeed. He also tabled a three page note listing out military casualties for ongoing "Operation Jaya Sikurui" (Victory Assured) where, among other things, "Equipment lost in Kilinochchi" was listed.

Of course, Mr. Wickremasinghe had returned to Sri Lanka only on Wednesday and had to bank on UNP's new Defence Adviser, retired Major General Lakshman Algama for most of the updates. The former Sri Lanka Army Chief of Staff was busy early this week collecting casualty figures and documenting losses of military hardware.

Leave alone the casualty figures, the list tabled by Mr. Wickremasinghe appeared to be a hurriedly prepared one. Listed in "Equipment lost in Kilinochchi" were artillery guns and Chinese built T 55 battle tanks which were destroyed in the confrontation. The ambiguity in the statement prompted some sections of the print and electronic media to say they had been captured by the LTTE.

UNP Parliamentarians had agreed that Wednesday to adhere to one set of statistics. Unless it was part of a cleverly studied tactical move, the disclosure of casualty figures and losses clearly demonstrated that fuller details of the worst disaster in Sri Lanka's military history had not reached the UNP hierarchy. If their demand for a Parliamentary Select Committee to probe the incident is heeded by the Government, there will be more light thrown on the debacle and the correct numbers will become public.

General Anuruddha Ratwatte who is personally directing the military machine against Tiger guerrillas repeated the same casualty figures contained in Thursday's news release issued by the Op Hq of the Ministry of Defence.

Commenting on the LTTE's death toll (in Kilinochchi and Paranthan) of 717 dead and 1,100 injured, Gen. Ratwatte, made an interesting observation. He declared that the LTTE dead at Paranthan-Kilinochchi constituted 35 per cent of its strength and the injured, a further 20 per cent.

From the arithmetic he has worked out, the LTTE strength would be exactly 2049 members. With 717 dead, that leaves behind a strength of 1332. Leaving aside the injured which works out to 409, the LTTE will therefore be left with only a mere 923.

If Gen. Ratwatte is correct, it is the 2049 LTTErs who had stalled the march of a conventional Army of more than 20,000 from capturing a 74 kilometre long (A9 Kandy-Jaffna) highway for over 17 long months. It is a band of just 2049 LTTErs who had compelled him not to release 30,000 policemen for the conduct Provincial Council elections.

And now, after the Kilinochchi debacle, it is a mere 923 Tiger guerrillas who are obstructing the successful conclusion of "Operation Jaya Sikurui." And to finish them, a handful in military terms, the Government not only voted Rs 45 billion as defence expenditure for 1998 but is seeking Parliamentary approval for a further Rs 12.2 billion bringing the total cost of the war to Rs 57.2 billion this year.

The only previous occasion when Gen. Ratwatte has gone on public record about the LTTE strength is in an interview he gave journalist Prabath Sahabandu and published on Page 12 of The Sunday Island of November 2, 1997 under the headline "SAVE YOUR CHILDREN FROM THE LTTE."

Asked what his assessment of the LTTE strength was, General Ratwatte replied:

"I think the LTTE cadres have been reduced to about 2,500. All of them are not hard core terrorists. Most of them are young girls and boys between 13 and 17 years. The LTTE has lost its fighting spirit and their morale has hit the lowest depth….."

There seems a paradox in General Ratwatte's assertions. If he gave a lower number of soldier casualties to Parliament than officially announced earlier over the Kilinochchi debacle, the LTTE numbers, he declared seem to be not diminishing that rapidly. Over a period of nearly an year, they have come down from a mere 2,500 to 2049. Hence, only a mere 451 have died in the past ten months. Has the Op Hq lied when it gave higher LTTE casualty figures when reporting on incidents since November, last year ? Or otherwise, what is the truth.

In the same interview, this is what Gen. Ratwatte said about defence expenditure:

"The same amount has been spent this year (i.e. 1997). We purchased other things needed for the military. But I expect that the success of Operation Jaya Sikurui and other operations we will not have a need to utilise all this money. I think we will be able to save some and channel that for development activities especially programmes aimed at employment generation."

As we come to the end of a century, the scourge of terrorism has become the biggest concern for the international community.

And Sri Lanka sure has some very valuable advice to offer nations on how to successfully suppress a separatist insurrection and combat terrorism. Some of the highlights - Fix deadlines and keep on extending them. Impose a censorship, bar the media from battle areas and control casualty figures. Speak of successes after successes and have them repeated in the media. There will be a few scribes who will try to make things difficult. Brand them terrorist acolytes, harass and intimidate them. Make public promises of a quick end to the war. That is how battles can be won and debacles can be turned into victories. As for winning the war or winning peace, who cares?

Get out of your bunker mentality and change tactics

Top Indian General advises Lankan Army

India's top most military man who led the campaign against Tiger guerrillas in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1989, Lieutenant General Amarjit Singh Kalkat, feels the Sri Lanka Army should get rid of what he calls "their bunker mentality" and change tactics to match "the mobility and agility" of the LTTE.

The only recipient of the Sarvottam Yudh Seva Medal (SYSM), India's highest award for leadership in conflict and war, 63 year old Lt. Gen. Kalkat of the 8th Gurkhas, fought in the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan. He founded the Indian Army's Training Command, led the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka and was General Officer Commanding in Chief of India's Southern Army Command.

He spoke to The Sunday Times from his residence in New Delhi. Here are excerpts of the telephone interview approved by the Army Censor.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE LTTE:

The basic difference is that while the Army believes in conventional warfare, based on the defence of fixed positions, the LTTE believes in mobile warfare.

The battle is, therefore, between two mind sets – the defensive Mindset of the Army and the offensive mindset of the LTTE. It appears that the Sri Lanka Army has acquired a bunker mentality which makes it stay put in one place and wait for the enemy to attack.

It would seem that the men in Kilinochchi were either blissfully unaware of the threat to them or felt secure in their entrenched positions, believing that they would be able to beat back any attack. The Tiger guerrillas appear to have assembled 2,000 to 3,000 cadres for the assault. Artillery pieces were moved from afar to places within striking distance of the base.

The attack was by no means sudden. From its scale, one can say that preparations might have gone on in the area for a month. Since artillery had been used, the preparations would have taken even two or three months.

Any Army knows that a base has to dominate 5 to 10 kilometres around it, which means troops should constantly venture out in force in mobile groups and keep engaging the enemy around. Was this done often and consistently enough ?

The enemy should not be allowed to regroup and consolidate. Battles should be fought away from the camp and not inside it. The war in Sri Lanka had gone on for far too long and the Army is taxed too much. Fighting guerrillas is a highly demanding job and no soldier can be vigilant all the time. The Sri Lanka Army is war weary.

There is no military solution to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. There should be a political solution. It is time to talk.

CASUALTIES:

In terms of both the dead and the wounded, casualties would be more than what the Army had given out because the international ratio for dead to wounded is 1 : 2.5 (i.e. one is to two point five). If the dead in the Kilinochchi-Paranthan sector numbered 670 (figure approved by Army Censor), the wounded should be about 1500, though some of the wounded would get back to the frontline within days.

When IPKF was in Sri Lanka, only a third of the men were manning fixed positions. Two thirds were out on the offensive operating in groups of various sizes. I introduced heli-borne commandos for these small but sustained offensives in all directions.

Mobile groups were able to destroy 14 Base, Prabhakaran's Communications and Command Centre in Nethikaikulam, though the Tiger leader got away through a series of underground tunnels.

The destruction of 14 Base enabled me to give the all clear signal to hold elections in the north-east.

I knew it would take some time for the LTTE to re-build the destroyed facilities.

ON WHETHER THE IPKF HAD BETTER INTELLIGENCE THAN THEIR SRI LANKAN COUNTERPARTS;

We could not have better intelligence. It was not our country. The Sri Lankans have a longer acquaintance with the people of the Tamil areas.

But by intercepting radio communications, we did locate the enemy's whereabouts and we went for them.

ON THE CAPTURE OF MANKULAM :

Mankulam is nothing more than a place along the Kandy- Jaffna highway (A-9) but Kilinochchi commanded the gateway to the Jaffna peninsula.

Jaffna becomes very vulnerable now.

WHY THE LTTE ABANDONED MANKULAM WHEN IT HAD BUILT ELABORATE FORTIFICATIONS AND CONCRETE BUNKERS FOR ITS DEFENCE:

I do not think the LTTE cared much for Mankulam. No guerrilla force would want to hold on to territory for the sake of holding it. Prabhakaran obviously considered Kilinochchi more valuable strategically.

ON THE ABILITY OF SRI LANKAN SECURITY FORCES TO DEFEND ELEPHANT PASS, ONLY A SMALL DISTANCE AWAY FROM KILINOCHCHI:

It is possible to defend it if the rear is strong, by which I mean, ,the forces in Jaffna peninsula itself should be free from harassment by the LTTE. There is the importance of keeping the lines of communication with the enemy open even at the height of a conflict. To talk peace or say something, one should know who to contact and what channel to use.

THE RE-CAPTURE OF JAFFNA PENINSULA:

It was a political necessity but holding it is keeping half the Army tied to fixed positions thus denying manpower for offensive operations. Capturing the road from Vavuniya to Kilinochchi is a military and economic necessity, but the task of keeping it open is an onerous one. Even if one per cent of the road is not in Army's control, it is as bad as not having the road at all.

CENSORSHIP ON LOCAL AND FOREIGN MEDIA:

It is counter productive as people begin to discount all Government news and tend to believe in rumour and what the enemy said.

When nothing is hidden from the people they learn to cope with disasters and bad news.

Discovery of an unpleasant truth later on makes them bitter and hostile.

I had this in mind when I, as chief of the IPKF, permitted the international media to report on all its operations.

I learnt this from military history, from Gen. Dwight Eisenhower's campaign in North Africa in World War II.

Fifth Column

Editorial/Opinion Contents