Taraki's Column

12th April 1998

Can there be two armies on par?

By Taraki

The recent meeting between the Jaffna Bishop and Dr. Balasingham (with Thamil Chelvan, Sutha and Vithuran of the LTTE's political wing) in the Wanni has once again given rise to speculation about third party mediation to solve the conflict.

What Dr. Balasingham told the Bishop has corroborated the suspicions entertained by sections of the press that western mediation might be in the offing. However, reports of the meeting in the press failed to highlight the most important observation that Dr. Balasingham made during the conversation.

He told the Bishop that peace is possible only when the LTTE and the army are on par militarily.

He said that the LTTE has enough modern weapons to face the army in the Wanni.

Though they have been talking of 'two armies' in the island since the Elephant Pass battle in 1991, this is the first time the Tigers have confidently asserted the formulation that they should achieve equal military power if peace is to be achieved in the country.

A western government made an attempt in late 1996 to prepare the ground for an unofficial dialogue between the government and the LTTE.

This effort fell through because the Tigers insisted that the government should pull out the army to the positions it held in the Jaffna peninsula before Operation Riviresa was launched if they were to come to the negotiating table.

It was obvious that the government was not going to meet this condition come what come may.

And also it was a time when it appeared a foregone conclusion, despite the Mullaitivu debacle, that the army was going to open the highway to Jaffna through the Wanni and effectively marginalise the Tigers.

So the LTTE's condition for taking part in a dialogue with the Sri Lankan government looked a sure recipe for suicide to those who were more than confident that it was a only matter of time for the army to trifurcate the Wanni and expedite the process of the organisation's disintegration as a semi-conventional force. But it was argued in these columns at that time that the Tigers were doing so because they seemed to have sufficient grounds to believe that they could take the upper hand in the Eelam War in due course and hence did not want to forego that by engaging in talks with the government. Dr. Balasingham has made it plain that the LTTE's military project is well on course. In other words, he is saying the converse of what the government today firmly believes is the best course of action to deal with the LTTE - bash them relentlessly on all sides, weaken them and then (if they are still around as a bunch of troublesome guerillas) bring them to the negotiating table.

The government's wisdom is very conventional, borne out by the manner in which similar conflicts in other parts of the world have eventually been resolved or are being kept under check.

And all the western governments and sections of the Indian establishment who tacitly or openly back the PA's war effort firmly beleive that weakening the LTTE is the best way for opening the doors for negotiating peace.

What they do not understand is that the weaker the LTTE is the more its suicidal determination to fight. This mind set is rooted in some aspects of Tamil culture and nationalism on which it is not necessary to expand on here. (Basically, it relates to the now well recognised formulation that different culture respond to war in different ways and the realisation that the Clausewitzian approach to war is universal is a myth.) Can the LTTE ever get on par with the army in terms of military power? And does it have any credible and tangible ground to think so? We know that the government thinks that it has the upperhand in the war because it has captured Jaffna, Operation Jaya Sikurui, according to the claims made by Gen.Ratwatte, is slowly but surely weakening the LTTE's base in the Wanni, Western governments (US, Canada, France etc.,) have turned against the Tigers and so on. The Tigers, on the other hand, think that their ability to inflict damage on the army is steadily on the increase. They show statistics of army losses going up in terms of manpower and hardware.

They also feel that the army has painted itself into a corner by exposing the troops to multiple fronts where they (the Tigers) retain the initiative.

The army has to run Jaffna, face hit and run attacks often and contend with the politically and militarily, destabilising effect of the LTTE's large base areas in Vadamaradchi and Punguduthivu. (The situation is such that the President has instructed Jaffna security forces commander Maj. Gen. Lionel Balagalle to send her a monthly report on the military and administrative situation in the peninsula.)

Then the army has to protect Paranthan from the Tigers who are entrenched in Kilinochchi, fight Jaya Sikurui and reckon with the LTTE's expanded territorial control and other problems in the east. Then it has to protect Colombo etc., And particularly, in a number of photographs of their current positions in the heart of Kilinochchi town sent out last week from the Wanni, the Tigers make the point that their military growth has been such that for the first time in their military history they have been able to overrun part of a large extended military base complex and hold on to it effectively.

The LTTE has also launched a major military expansion program in the Wanni.

The Bishop seems to have observed the extensive recruitment campaign in progress there now. Although it may still sound silly to those who decline to weigh the pros and cons in this war from a strictly technical standpoint, I would venture the suggestion that it might do well for the PA to take a second look at Dr. Balasingham's observation before it makes further demands on the army to promote its political agendas.

The Fifth Column

Editorial/Opinion Contents