The Computer and Information Technology Council of Sri Lanka (CINTEC), which has undertaken many pioneering ventures in the past to facilitate and encourage the growth of the IT industry and to encourage and promote its use in Sri Lanka, will conduct a Seminar on Computer Crime on August 23 from 9 a. m. to 5 p.m. at the Hotel Ceylon Inter-Continental. Proposed Legislation on Computer Crime will be discussed at the seminar.
In 1994 the CINTEC Working Committee on Law and Computers initiated a project to examine the Penal Code and to make proposals for substantive Criminal law provisions to deal with Computer Crime, if such crimes were not dealt with under the existing laws. The project was made available for public scrutiny at a seminar held on October 12, 1996.
The suggestions made at this seminar were considered by the Committee on Law and Computers, and a final draft proposal for legislation was prepared. This will be presented for discussion at the forthcoming seminar.
The Seminar is being organized by the CINTEC IT Law Centre, which is managed by the Working Committee on Law and Computers.
The Commissioner of Elections is proposing the computerisation of election registers with national identity card numbers to prevent impersonation after a study showed that at least 6000 people had been illegally registered in different places.
Commissioner Dayananda Dissanaike made this disclosure when an MEP delegation met him as part of the party's campaign for legislation to make national identity cards essential for all voters at the next general elections.
The MEP delegation headed by party leader Dinesh Gunawardene sought the support of the polls chief for their proposal and the Commissioner said it was "practical and useful".
Allegations of widespread impersonation at the local elections in March this year had prompted the MEP to press for NIC's at the next polls.
The party has collected tens of thousands of signatures for a petition in this regard and Mr. Gunawardene is scheduled to meet other party leaders soon to gain more support for the proposal.
Veteran Diplomat Ali Mohammed Al Hamdhan is taking over as the charged' Affaires at atfaires of the Saudi Embassy in Colombo.
He is keen on promoting business ties with Sri Lanka. Mr. Hamdhan who had served in Algiers, Ankara and in Moscow told The Sunday Times a large number of businessmen in Saudi Arabia were interested in establishing trade ties with Sri Lanka.
He succeeds Abdulla Al Zahrani.
Former Additional Solicitor General of India and Vice President of the Karnataka State Commission of Jurists A.N.Jayaram is an unexpectedly easy conversationalist. He carries with him none of the pomposity of office, and is devastatingly frank on issues that trouble him.
Jayaram is in Sri Lanka as a representative of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) to observe the ongoing High Court trial of UNP parliamentarian Dr Jayalath Jayawardana who is facing a charge of drawing unlawful payments of salary while in public service. The ICJ is an international non governmental organisation having consultative status with the United Nations, and is comprised of some of the most eminent jurists of the world.
Jayaram is prompt to answer a query as to what exactly is hoped to be achieved by this kind of observer mission
"Our role is not coercive but rather persuasive. In any situation where there appears to be a violation of human rights, the ICJ would send observers to the spot, to prepare an independent report. Based on this, certain suggestions are made to the government concerned, and it is hoped that some action would be taken."
But what if no response is forthcoming? Then the ICJ would set about publicising the report, and the erring state is apt to court a fair measure of international disapproval.
Jayaram emphasizes that he comes as "an observer and not as an inspector"
"We do not go to countries to make judgments on their human rights situations, only to create awareness that in the best of systems, mistakes may well be made." he adds
The silver haired Indian lawyer cum law teacher is ideally fitted to his role. Counting more than thirty five years of experience as a constitutional lawyer and two decades as an academic, Jayaram has seen the Indian legal landscape change dramatically in his time.
"Many changes have been for the positive, some for the negative. At the end of it all, we can however say that justice has indeed been brought that much closer to the people, that a great deal of good has been achieved, despite the heartbreak and the agony that those striving for change had to go through at that time." he comments.
The point that he makes is strongly stated.That the Indian legal system developed as it did by the willingness of many to risk the storm,and to brave the odds.Credit for the vibrant creature that the law has now become in that country has to be shared by those persons of diverse faiths.
It was their combined efforts that awakened the conscience of the nation and stirred the Indian Supreme Court to go beyond the mere letter of the law, to work actual and practical justice.
One example would suffice.In 1979, an Indian newspaper article caused a furore in the country.It concerned a forgotton people,the remand prisoners of Bihar.An enterprising journalist had managed to ferret out the news that there were large numbers of prisoners who had been in jail for almost nine years,without their trial even having commenced.The conditions within the prisons were described as being shocking.
The article might have remained just an article,except for the fact that revolutionary changes had been taking place in the Supreme Court of India.The apex court had embarked on a novel manner of bringing justice closer to the teeming masses of their country.A particular clause of the Indian Constitution gave every person the right not to be deprived of life or liberty except according to procedure established by law.Taken by itself,this clause could have been interpreted very conservatively,but the court had chosen to do exactly the opposite,holding that where a person has been deprived of his liberty it must be on reasonable,fair and just grounds.Made bold by this activism of the Court,a lawyer appealed to a bench headed by Justice Bhagwati on the basis of the newspaper article, claiming a writ of habeas corpus for seven named persons and for the many others who were imprisoned without their trials having started.The Court called upon the Government to answer.Within two months,some shocking facts were revealed.Prison authorities stated that there were about 30.000 such prisoners,and out of these about 300-400 had been in jail for a period longer than the maximum to which they would have been sentenced if they had been convicted. The Supreme Court was appalled.Using harsh language,the Court directed that those prisoners who had overstayed their term be released forthwith,and called upon the State to submit compliance reports on the action taken.
"Eighteen years later,those words of rebuke are still given heed.The Attorney General's Department examines the lists of prisoners and sees that the SC judgement is complied with.We do not oppose bail except in the case of those accused of offences against women,drug trafficking and murder." says Jayaram.
There was in fact no stopping the Supreme Court.Constitutional protection was said to cover the rights of stone quarry workers in Faridabad who were working in abominable conditions,children in Assam who had been accused and not tried for over two years and exploited workers engaged in the construction of the Asad stadium in New Delhi.Rights were declared to bail except in the most serious of cases, the right to a speedy trial, protection from torture inside prison, so on and so forth.Mere letters to the Court on reported injustices were examined,and not only victims but any genuinely interested individual or social action group could intervene on their behalf.Commissions were set up to investigate whether the orders of the Court were actually being carried out.
"Now the tide has become so strong that there have been calls for some restraint.Recently,the Law Minister brought forward a proposal in which it was suggested that there should be a deposit of money before any public interest petition is filed.Opposition to this has been great.It is unlikely that it would ever be pushed through." Jayaram remarks.He is of the opinion that it is unneccasary to curb this kind of action through laws.
"It is up to the particular judge to throw out mischievous petitions.The discretion should rest with him." he says.
The receptive personality of the judges, in fact played a tremendous role in the whole process.
"The manner in which the Indian legal system developed was a result of efforts made by not only judges and lawyers but also academics,social activists and journalists.All interacted in a very healthy manner, and the Court welcomed comments and criticisms" explains Jayaram.
"The boundaries within which criticism of the Court is permitted were clearly laid down.The Indian judiciary draws the line only at comments that attack the integrity and rectitude of the judge." he says.
He adds a refreshing postcript.
"At that time, and even now,young lawyers are in the forefront of pushing for change.As they challenge the system, they do so with a sense of responsibility and respect for the judges, not in a negative spirit. It is in this manner that a country and its laws stand up to the test,and if neccesary improve."
Q. What are the factors which determine the present military offensive in Sri Lanka and how do you think it will proceed in the future?
A. In one word I will describe it as a stalemate. The situation as one sees it now is that the Sri Lankan Army ultimately launched the operation which was an imperative if they were to hold and sustain Jaffna and operate against the LTTE. So far they have been maintaining the force of almost three divisions in Jaffna Peninsula, by sea and air. No army in the world can maintain such a large force without a land line of maintenance for sustaining it. It can be done for a short period but not even a superpower can do it continuously for ever, therefore it was imperative for the Sri Lankan Army to clear a land-route. The distance involved an area which is not under the control of the Sri Lanka Army i.e., between Vavuniya and Killinochchi, about 75 kilometers. When the Sri Lankan forces launched the offensive, I believe they used approximately two divisions; one division south to north from Vavuniya moving up northwards along the road and one division from the right flank, this is quite a normal practice so that the division from the right side is used to outflank any opposition that may be facing the main division on the main road. But one finds after about ten kilometers they got bogged down because they faced very severe opposition and the way I see it with the present situation in the medium term the Sri Lankan Army will be able to maintain a line of communication or a road of maintenance upto Killinochchi. It is possible, but more casualties will occur to open this road for a defining period only. That is only a one time move, if the road is open only for a few hours that does not help. It is necessary to have this road as a safe continuous line of communication and maintenance for the entire 75 kilometers, in which case it will have to be controlled at all times and protected.
To do that the Army will have to position and patrol the road permanently. They will then be susceptible to LTTE attacks both from the east and the west. That is from the Wanni jungle and the jungles of the west, sustaining casualties almost on a daily basis. It will end up as a war of attrition. Even in a war of attrition you will find that the amount of force committed as it is now, there will finally be nothing left for carrying out any offensive operations against the LTTE. It will all be in the defence of protecting the road by itself which will not help.
Secondly, it is a good point whether the kind of casualties which the Sri Lankan Army has taken. I believe in the last month and a half they have taken almost about 600 killed, I do not think any Army can sustain this kind of casualty over a continuous period. Even in terms of numbers an Army could, but whether such a rate of casualties is politically acceptable to the government and what kind of repercussions it will have on the population, and on the other political parties the reactions, keeping all that in mind it is not a practical proposition.
Q. What about the LTTE? Have not they too suffered heavy casualties?
A. As far as the LTTE is concerned they too are sustaining casualties. Yet in terms of numbers even the LTTE may be able to make up by recruitments. One hears of cadres recruiting over 2000 recruits annually from the area of the eastern province, Batticaloa district etc. The point is that whilst in terms of numbers and physically both the Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE are capable of continuing sustained fighting against each other, nevertheless for the Sri Lankan government whether it is politically possible for them to continue is a different issue. In the same way the LTTE will be able to carry on the fighting but the ultimate victims are going to be the Tamil people. The casualties are the Tamil people. There is a limit to how many more casualties they can take. The Tamil people have suffered throughout the last two decades of fighting. So it is to no one's advantage and even if the fighting carries on and is carried on by both the LTTE and the Sri Lanka Army - we find that they can continue the fighting but no side gets to achieving victory. It is only to prove a point. I repeat the ultimate victims will be the Tamil population, and to a lesser extent the Sinhalese population, because their soldiers are also dying. No one gains, and most definitely neither the Tamil population nor the Sinhalese population has anything to gain by any continuation of fighting.
Q. How would you define the various advancements made in Jaffna and other areas of the north by Sri Lankan forces. Are these victories military or political?
A. The capture of Jaffna was symbolic. It was more a political victory, not a military victory. In terms of objective insurgency warfare, in counter insurgency guerrilla warfare, towns and cities and places are not objectives. Because the guerrillas or the militants will leave it and go away. So it was the capturing of an empty house. And when the Army finally leaves, it cannot remain permanently, the guerrillas will come back to it. Therefore this kind of warfare is totally different to conventional warfare where you are going for territory. Where you capture a country or capital, and the people with it. This is a different connotation to insurgency warfare, physical capture has no meaning, trying to gain control of an area with the population intact inside it - that has some connotation. This did not happen with the Sri Lankan forces in the capture of Jaffna. They captured Jaffna in a manner that drove the entire Tamil population out of Jaffna. So therefore, they captured a ghost city. It is no military victory. Political and symbolic yes. Jaffna is symbolically the heart of Tamil Sri Lanka, the cultural centre, the economic centre, the intellectual and educational centre - so it has a certain depth, a political and a moral building connotation. But in terms of military gain it is mixed. As a matter of fact this has disadvantages, as after capturing the city now they are caught with the situation of not being able to leave - like a blanket that won't leave it's bed. Because if the armed forces were to leave Jaffna the LTTE will be back in. Yet, by staying, a city or a town eats up vast numbers of troops, as in the Jaffna peninsula almost 65% or 70% of the Sri Lanka Army is now deployed there. I understand almost three divisions are deployed in Jaffna. It is a situation where now the entire Army is deployed in the northern peninsula. The population is now drifting back slowly. The point is these three divisions can do nothing else, whereas the entire eastern province and central Vavuniya is exposed, and to maintain this force the government is expanding the balance of the Army to open the road line of communication, which they are unable to open. To compound this error the biggest mistake has been to drive the population out of Jaffna. Approximately a quarter million population who had no succour, food, shelter or medicine.
They were left to their own devices. The only people they could fall back upon for help and succour, are the LTTE in that area, and indeed the LTTE have given them succour. So what is the end result? It is only natural to assume then that the sympathies of the Tamil people will be with the LTTE, And you provide it as a recruiting ground of tremendous resource for the future intake of LTTE cadres.
Q. In that sense who are the Sri Lankan armed forces fighting? Are they fighting a fascist guerrilla force or a Tamil Army?
A. Well you can give it any name you want. The fact is the Sri Lanka armed forces is fighting a highly trained, highly motivated, and committed organization, whose standard of fighting is about the best compared to any other insurgency movement in the world. That is a fact. The Sri Lanka Army has expanded very fast and rapidly in the last few years. Therefore their soldiers are not the same kind of trained soldiers that you would see in a normal trained Army, where a soldier would have had five to seven years training and is a battle-hardened soldier. These boys are young boys from College. This makes a significant difference.
Q. Why in your opinion has it been necessary for the Sri Lanka government to impose an unofficial censorship on all military related news? Is it that the armed forces have left too much rubble behind?
A. I do not know. I am not aware of what kind of a censorship has been imposed. There are two approaches to this. If you would recall when the IPKF was in Sri Lanka we permitted the world media free access, because I do firmly believe in not keeping skeletons in the cupboard. I also found that if one shared information honestly with the media and took them into confidence, and told them that such information received and if reported would result in further casualties for my soldiers, and so told them to keep certain information for two days. No one ever violated this promise of their's that they would hold certain information for a couple of days, because it would ensure the safety and security of our troops fighting. Now that is one way of looking at it. The other way around is you have total censorship and deny everything. Once that is done I do believe that the media is free to report as it can imagine or as it hears, and then the government has no right to point a finger at the media to say - you reported falsely - because if the media is denied information then the media is justified in writing whatever they can imagine or conjure up. I have always felt that it is better to be open and share information with the media. However this is a question of policy within governments. I do not know if it is a case of the government trying to hide the level of destruction. I have not been to Sri Lanka since I left and can only go by newspaper reports. I do not think therefore I am in a position to comment on this. But then a very natural conclusion by an outside observer is that if transparency is denied then something must be very wrong. That again is not always so. But it is the normal conclusion, this is why it is far better that even if a mistake is made to be quite open rather than sweep it under the carpet, because it comes out at some time or the other.
Q. How viable do you think the present set of power sharing proposals are?
A. I do not think I could comment on this as I have not studied the entire package sufficiently. Also I would not like to stymie any effort by criticizing it at this juncture.
Q: Should India play an underwriting role in any future commitments to the peace process of Sri Lanka? If not do you see a situation developing where any of the European countries are likely to get involved?
A: As a good Samaritan role, no-one should have any objection to anyone playing it, if some good can be achieved. But when you talk of underwriting commitments or an agreement then we are talking of a different ball game. We are talking of a strategic power game. We are talking of a country having the resources, the capability and a readiness and willingness to commit forces to that area. That is a different situation altogether. India at one time was the underwriting party but as you are aware it did not work out because President Premadasa at that time did not think it was necessary and thought he could do without an underwriting government. He had come to an agreement with the LTTE and that's when he asked me to take my forces back. And I brought them back to India. In the end his premise turned out to be faulty and what he said he would be able to achieve or do did not work out because fighting between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan forces broke out I think almost 45 days after we had left. And it has since been a blood-bath except for short breaks in-between. Therefore I do not think India having once been called and then asked to go away will get involved in that context. But it does not mean that whatever happens in Sri Lanka, India does not care. If something is happening there which is affecting India's own vital national interest, certainly it will be cause for concern and India will have to take stock of the situation. But involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict by India, in my personal assessment I would rule out.. I do not see any European country being prepared to shed blood for the cause of Sri Lanka either. That, only India did, because we had with Sri Lanka an association that goes back centuries. It was done for that reason. You are aware of the controversy now where no NATO soldier has shed blood in Europe for any European country. So where is the question of them shedding blood in Sri Lanka? This incident has been a raging controversy in Europe in the last two weeks.
Q: The Indo-Lanka Accord as you are aware has been widely criticized in Sri Lanka. Was this an honourable commitment on the part of India or merely a show of strength?
A: It was honourable to the extent where 1,120 Indians sacrificed their lives and 5000 Indians were wounded. If that is not called an honourable commitment then I have yet to see one which is honourable.
Q: How strong is the support in Tamil Nadu for Tamils in Sri Lanka?
A: I will repeat your question, - How strong is the support in Tamil Nadu for Tamils in Sri Lanka- very strong. However this is for the Tamils in Sri Lanka not the LTTE. Let's be quite clear, the LTTE is different from the Tamils of Sri Lanka. The LTTE have lost most of its credibility as far as India is concerned, even in Tamil Nadu. They will still have certain supporters, sympathizers, relations, but their main support base is gone. Tamil Nadu has forsaken the LTTE. But Tamil Nadu and India will never forsake the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Their well-being will always be a matter of concern for us.
Q: Could the LTTE be trusted again? A: The issue of trust has now become hypothetical. The way the situation is neither the Tamils nor the LTTE trust the Sri Lankan government. And similarly neither does the Sri Lankan government trust the LTTE. Both cases justifiably so. If on that basis one does not talk to the other, then there would be no end in sight. One has to see a situation that since neither trusts the other then whatever package or political arrangement that is brought about has to be such that no party can double-cross or go back against the other for which earlier with regard to the Indo-Lanka Accord, India provided the underwriting. I do not see anyone in future providing underwriting for the Sri Lankan conflict. If so this underwriting will have to be created into parts, into a kind of a political system. A system within a system. An underwriting that would ensure that if the LTTE renege it will be kind of a self-destructive action - that if they destroy the opponents side then they themselves get destroyed, and vice versa. In other words the developing countries domestic doctrine, which means that within the country a political arrangement should be arrived at that if one reneges and harms, the other is then assured of a mutual destruction also, so that both sides stand to lose. That kind of a political infrastructure must be put into position. So that no party can renege. No outsider can now sit as an arbiter with the military power to be prepared to intervene. That is my perception.
Q: So the military option is not the solution to the Sri Lankan ethnic issue?
A: Let me say this that the ethnic issue as a Sri Lankan issue cannot be resolved to a successful conclusion by resorting to force of arms by either side. Neither can Eelam be achieved by a force of arms nor can a majority government impose its will and its domination over the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka by a force of arms. Since both are unachievable they both have to think of achieving a middle level, at least a certain comfort in terms of security and where rights are obtained. That kind of a solution has to be found.
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