Situation Report

27th June 1997


Mortar ship mystery still baffles Defence officials

By Iqbal Athas


The fate of the ship bringing in 32,400 mm mortar bombs - 81 mm calibre - manufactured in Harare, Zimbabwe, to Colombo, exclusively revealed in these columns last week, continues to puzzle the country’s defence establishment.

Senior security and defence officials are still busy piecing together an indomitable jigsaw. As some pieces fall into place, other missing pieces are not only baffling but have also deepened the mystery. With the help of some western nations and Interpol, they are still busy trying to ascertain where things went wrong.

Defence officials in Colombo learnt this week that the Zimbabwe Defence Industries (in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe) had in fact executed an order for the supply of mortar ammunition to Sri Lanka.

The military cargo has been transported overland across the borders of Zimbabwe and loaded on a vessel on May 24 from the neighbouring Mozambican Port of Beira. Thereafter the vessel reportedly went to some unknown South African port (or ports) and later to Madagascar to load more cargo. It is from here that the whereabouts of the vessel remains a mystery for the past 25 days - enough time to sail to Colombo and return to Madagascar.

This mystery has become all the more intriguing for now the authorities are yet unable to establish the exact name of the vessel bringing in the cargo.

A purported fax from the LTTE to a western diplomatic mission in Colombo (reproduced in these columns last week) triggered off the drama of the missing ship.

This fax message identified the ship as “Stillus Victoria” which was sailing under the Liberian flag.

The fax which the western diplomatic mission received on July 14 said: “We, the Tamil Tigers, inform you by the present that on 11 July 1997 we have hijacked a vessel carrying arms, sailing under the Liberian flag. The name of the vessel “Stillus Victoria.” On the deck of the vessel there were 12 containers containing 32,400 mortar bombs 81 mm, destined for Colombo Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence.

“We know that the manufacturer and the supplier of the mortar bombs is Zimbabwe Defence Industry from Harare, Zimbabwe. We also know that the deal was executed by Col. Dube D.G. of Zimbabwe Defence Industry.

“The cargo was confiscated by us and the vessel’s crew was released by us unharmed.

“We make known and warn that we will take action against all persons participating in the supply of military equipment used against the legitimate rights of Tamil people and we will severely punish those concerned.” - LTTE.

In an interview with Chandana Keerthi Bandara of the BBC’s Sinhala service Sandeshaya last Monday night (July 21), LTTE’s spokesman in London, Anton Raja, denied that the Tigers had sent a fax to the western diplomatic mission in Colombo. “We know nothing about it,” he declared.

If Anton Raja was categorical with the BBC, the LTTE’s “International Secretariat” in London, which puts out press releases daily, chose not to speak about the matter. As I said last week, the fax in question was not on a LTTE letter-head. Hence Mr. Raja’s denial is understandable.

On the other hand, assuming that the LTTE did send out the fax, could Mr. Raja have admitted it ? That would amount to conceding that they have carried out an act of piracy in international waters - a claim that would have earned the wrath of the international community. There are many instances over the years when the LTTE had “officially” denied its involvement although the actions had in fact been carried out by its own cadres.

Take for example the May (14) , 1985 massacre of over 138 Sinhala civilians near Sri Maha Bodhi, Anuradhapura. Then the April (17) 1987 massacre of 127 civilians, all of them Sinhala, at Kithulutuwa (in the Trincomalee district) and four days later, the Pettah bomb blast killing over 110 persons.

More recent instances are the assassination of then Indian Premier, Rajiv Gandhi on May (21) 1991 and the bomb explosion at the Central Bank in January (31) 1996.

Although the purported LTTE fax message claimed that the vessel was “Stillus Victoria” sailing under the Liberian flag, I said in these columns last week “according to sources at Army Headquarters, the name of the vessel is “Stillus Limmasul” and is registered in Greece.” Thereafter another name surfaced - “Pillus Limmasol.”

It is this name that the Navy Commander, Rear Admiral Cecil Tissera, used when he sent out a warning to Navy bases countrywide on June 18 . If this was the first official confirmation of the fact that Sri Lankan authorities were looking for a “vessel carrying arms/ammo” that has gone missing, there was another significant factor.

The Navy chief warned of the likelihood of the vessel coming towards the east coast and emphasised the need to maintain surveillance and vigilance. Although the vessel bringing in the military cargo was destined to Colombo, the Sri Lanka Navy, was not going to take chances if by some unforeseen circumstance it had fallen into wrong hands. Hence the warning about surveillance in the east coast.

Defence officials in Colombo have been checking with Lloyds of London but found that none of the names of vessels that have surfaced so far - Stillus Victoria, Stillus Limmasul, Pillus Limmasul - are in their registers. That is not to say such ships do not exist. One possibility is that a new owner may have given a new name. In such an event, the previous name of the ship is required to trace its registration.

Another possibility is the likelihood of the LTTE seizing the military cargo. It is a known fact that the LTTE which runs its own fleet of cargo vessels (under Yarl Shipping Corporation) keeps changing the names as they traverse through international shipping lanes. This is particularly to avoid its ships smuggling arms and ammunition being detected.

The fact came to light when the Indian Coast Guard (on January 13, 1993) intercepted an LTTE ship with Kittu alias Sathasivam Krishnakumar, the one time “Jaffna Commander” and other members on board. He died in a shoot out that occurred between a Coast Guard vessel and the Honduran registered ship in which he was travelling - the MV Yahat. At the time of detection, the letter “Y” had been erased with paint.

It read MV Ahat. If the LTTE did seize the cargo, how did they do it ? Did they seize the vessel bringing the military cargo at mid sea and transfer the cargo ? Or did they resort to the unlikely but yet possible task of sending in one of their vessels for loading ? These are among the many questions baffling the authorities.

Yet another possibility the authorities are thinking of is the likelihood that the military cargo has been loaded into a Dhow, a type of Arabian sea ship that is known to operate in Indian Ocean waters. They are said to take a long time to sail as against the conventional cargo vessels. The authorities gave thought to this possibility after reports from a western country but are not sure whether this could be altogether credible. In the past no military cargo has arrived in Colombo in Dhows. Moreover, there is no independent confirmation either from the supplier or his agent in Colombo that the cargo was arriving by a Dhow. Besides these factors, containers cannot be loaded to Dhows.

Defence officials in Colombo believe the picture will become more clearer when a high ranking official from the Zimbabwe Defence Industry arrives in Colombo this week. He is said to be bringing in documentation to confirm that the order from the Sri Lanka Government had in fact been executed. He is to help Government officials trace the missing vessel.

Whilst awaiting his arrival to ascertain more details, defence officials are also focusing their attention on initiating measures (through the local bank) to obtain payment from insurance for the loss of cargo.

In financial terms, the non arrival so far of 12 containers loaded with 32,400 mortar bombs is no loss for the Government. While it will be in a position to recover the cost through insurance, the worry is only if the lethal cargo has fallen into wrong hands, the LTTE.

In the latter event, as Navy Commander, Rear Admiral Tissera, has warned, it becomes necessary to exercise greater vigilance over the eastern coastal waters.

The coming weeks will throw more light on what has happened to millions worth of military hardware. If its delay has caused grave anxiety, the circumstances under which it has occurred has caused greater embarrassment to the country’s defence establishment.

This is particularly in view of the ongoing “Operation Jaya Sikurui” which enters its 75th day today or a near three months. It is a known fact that the Government is to muster as many deserters as possible through the extended amnesty for a renewed thrust in the ongoing operation - a measure for which men and material are very important.

Since the LTTE’s second counter attack on June 24, ‘Operation Jayasikurui” has come to a virtual halt except a limited advance by troops on one flank - the 53 Division advancing south westwards from Nedunkerny. Two weeks ago, security in the Weli Oya sector was strengthened following intelligence reports of a possible attack in that area. Since then troops have been taking on selected targets as they inch forward towards Puliyankulam.

This came as Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Rohan De S. Daluwatte, effected some top changes. Brigadier Nihal Marambe, Deputy General Officer Commanding the 55 Division (advancing from Vavuniya towards Kilinochchi) has been posted as the new officiating GOC of the Army’s Three Division. It is headquartered in Batticaloa.

Replacing him as Deputy GOC is Brigadier Gamini Gunasekera who has just returned after a training stint in the United States.

Brigadier Anton Wijendra, who was officiating GOC of the Three Division, will revert to his substantive post as Commandant of the Army Staff College.

Major General Ananda Weerasekera has been posted to Army Headquarters to head a directorate in charge of welfare and related matters. His post as GOC, Task Force 2 has been taken by Brigadier Sarath Fonseka.

Col. Parakrama Pannipitiya has been posted as officiating Brigade Commander (18 Brigade) at Puttalam, a post held by Brigadier Gamini Gunasekera.

The developing security response by the LTTE to the pressure of “Operation Jaya Sikurui” has been to further accelerate the destabilisation of the eastern province whilst maintaining a threat of counter strike against any advance on the operation. This has put the Government into a catch 22 situation wherein thinning out of either theatre of operation to re-inforce the other is fraught with vulnerability to the so weakened theatre without significantly improving its military capability in the other.

To train new cadres to-re inforce the front obviously takes time. Hence the resort to re muster the large number of deserters into active operations. Whether these deserters can be adequately motivated to effectively function in the operational areas or whether the hard pressed troops holding the line will have faith in the dedication of re mustered deserters is, however, another matter.

Be that as it may, the hard fact remains that the north east monsoon is likely to break out come late October or November which gives “Operation Jaya Sikurui” barely three months to complete its original mission to bridge the Main Supply Route from Vavuniya to Kilinochchi.

In the hindsight of the slowness of the advance hitherto and the counter strike capability displayed by the LTTE, it would appear optimistic to expect the advance of the balance 46 kilometres to Kilinochchi to be completed before the monsoon.

This delay will have its repercussions on the political agenda of the Government which is hoping to place a devolution package in Parliament in November. A military success would considerably have boosted the Government’s image to sell the package. As it now stands, the Government has no aces to play to lift the expectations of the people of a completion to the separatist cancer.

No doubt it must be a further concern to the Government that reaping the peace dividend will be further delayed. This will have its effect on the agenda of the People’s Alliance towards the 1999 election year.

As it stands, nothing is clear, neither militarily nor politically. The country appears destined to continue for another year in the political doldrums.


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