Situation Report

20th April 1997

Peace talks: Questions of political prudence

By Iqbal Athas


One hundred days af- ter the break-down of the third attempt to talk peace with the Tigers, this time by the People's Alliance Government, the LTTE characteristically broke the rapport by a treacherous attack on Naval craft in the Trincomalee harbour on April 19 - exactly two years ago yesterday, so violating the agreed cessation of hostilities.

Thus broke out what is now called 'Eelam War Three.' This third phase of the continuing hostilities between the Government and LTTE has seen the bloodiest disasters and casualties to both sides. It has also been a period of unprecedented economic loss to the Government in terms of the loss of military hardware and the destruction caused to non-military targets of strategic sensitivity.

The approximate loss to the armed forces has been over 1600 declared killed in action and over 1307 missing in action, of which many have to be presumed as killed. The equipment losses of weapons, weapons systems, aircraft and ships total well over 100 million US dollars (or five billion rupees) at a conservative estimate.

Apart from losses, the defence budget to meet the cost of the war has swollen from Rs 1294 million in 1993 to Rs 31,797 million in 1996. This in terms of percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) is an increase from 1.19 per cent in 1983 to 3.85 per cent in 1996.

In considering the cost of the war, it should be remembered that a good part of the expenditure is for the purchase of equipment and ammunition and thus a considerable drain on the country's foreign exchange resources.

On the ground situation, Eelam War Three has seen much gain made by the armed forces even though such gains have not comparably weakened the LTTE commensurately. Neither have these gains reflected a commensurate profit to the Government politically in terms of the ethnic conflict.

This is unfortunately the dilemma that prevails today. This also is perhaps the reason for the euphoria seen in the past weeks over the Chandrika-Ranil understanding for a bi-partisan approach towards the ethnsic problem. This is a consolation for at least it recognises one of the most important factors which has inhibited total national support for the war - the confrontational attitude to national issues by the two mainstream political parties.

On the ground, the most significant event has been the pre-occupation of the Jaffna peninsula by the Government. To look at it from the LTTE point of view, it is their being forced to abandon the centres of population in the northern province. This has without question affected the LTTE resources of cadres as well as, to a good extent, losing grip of the control of the population.

Regrettably the Government has been slow to capitalise on that advantage politically. It is only at the beginning of this year, i.e. almost two years after the re-occupation of Jaffna that the Government permitted political activity in the peninsula by Tamil political parties. Even this move has attracted ex-militant political groups into the fray whilst the moderate democratic Tamil parties as well as the mainstream national political groups have not ventured into the political arena as yet.

This by itself poses questions of political prudence as the issue is between the LTTE militancy and ex-militant groups now supportive of the Government. How successful this will be is still to be seen. In fact it now raises further questions in view of the Chandrika-Ranil understanding which implies talking to the LTTE as a distant possibility. This leaves the political leadership of the Tamils wide open.

To maintain high level of security in Jaffna peninsula in particular and in the newly opened Vavuniya-Mannar axis, the armed forces had necessarily to soften their strategies in the eastern province. This has made possible for the LTTE to regain a high profile presence in this province which two years ago was well under control of the armed forces.

In the process of the high intensity of security force operations with a conventional operational focus, the LTTE has been hemmed into the jungles of Vanni with freedom of action in the eastern province. Though tactically limited in this way, the LTTE has not been politically marginalised nor has it been weakened to the extent of military impotency.

While seemingly having adequate inventory of military hardware, it could survive without relying on arms smuggling for some time. In fact its hardware has been considerably improved tactically by the capture of artillery from Mullaitivu.

The support to the LTTE by the overseas Tamil lobby remains virulent and strong. Its inroads to some elements in the western democracies and to other lobby groups should not be under- estimated. The external support remains a singular source of considerable foreign exchange income to the LTTE and a base for mass propaganda and other illicit activities.

If at all the LTTE has begun to feel the pinch, it is in manpower resources. It is losing control of populated areas. This has dried LTTE recruitment and must be a factor of considerable concern to the Tiger initiative. Recruitment in the past two years, particularly after the string of Riviresa military operations led to the capture of the Jaffna peninsula, has been almost entirely from the east barring smaller numbers in the Vanni.

Whilst that is so, there are bold claims in the upper echelons of the defence establishment that the LTTE has been weakened and the separatist war is 75 per cent over. Like most of the propaganda related to the ongoing separatist war, this also appears to be largely for public consumption. Otherwise it contradicts initiatives towards peace overtures.

In balancing the losses and gains of Eelam War Three so far, the military have an edge. But with the existing force levels, whether they would exploit that, remains to be seen. The crunch of the issue may well be in the opening of the Main Supply Route (MSR) from Vavuniya to Kilinochchi and as importantly to maintain it.

This would considerably marginalise the LTTE in the northern province. But their options to destabilise the eastern province remains a strong option. The sensitivity and the strategic importance of the eastern province cannot be over-emphasised.

The northern province is entirely Tamil populated whereas the eastern province has an equal mix of Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims. The further destabilisation of this province will have political ripples in the rest of the country.

Furthermore, the proximity of the eastern province to the highly Indian Tamil populated hill country is an equally sensitive factor strategically. The repercussions of any spill over of the LTTE influence from the eastern province to the hill country portends problems of a higher magnitude politically and militarily.

The PA Government after the break-down of peace talks opted for peace through military victory. The endeavour to do so is economically expensive and an expenditure that will affect other political, economic and development aspects in the country.

The impact of this is all the more to a Government that is now half way in its term and may indeed seek a renewed mandate through an early national election.

Peace on the other hand would be an enormous bonus to the Government on the threshold of its next few years of office. This is undoubtedly a factor that heightened speculation about another round of peace talks in the backdrop of the understanding reached between President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and Opposition Leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe.

Not only the Government and the Opposition but also the British Government (through its High Commission in Colombo) have gone on to deny there had been any contact with the LTTE. However, in reaching the understanding to adopt a bi-partisan approach both President Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and Opposition Leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe, have acknowledgely left the door open for 'discussions' even with the LTTE.

Whether this move had a direct bearing or not, Military Intelligence learnt of an interesting bit of news from the Jaffna peninsula last week. Those were reports through intelligence channels that the LTTE had in fact been making preparations for a cessation of hostilities during the Sinhala-Hindu New Year. It is also not clear whether these preparations, which did not materialise, were the reason why the LTTE had refrained from any offensive action in the past two weeks.

In this scenario, the moot question is which will run out first - LTTE manpower or Government money ?


Go to the Opposite Editorial

Return to the Editorial/Opinion contents page

Go to the Situation Report Archive