Gains in one aspect of the situation are offset by stalemate, if not setbacks, in the others

Sri Lanka enters the second New Year after the government established control in the Jaffna peninsula next week. Yet the government has not come to grips with the political rehabilitation of the peninsula.

The military continues to be in control of both the security aspects as well as in the exercise of the civil administration. In this situation, the government cannot claim total legitimacy of the re-occupation. This situation stems from many reasons both political in nature as well as in its security dimension.

Basically the political rehabilitation of the peninsula implies that grassroots political activity should be manifest. The dilemma of the government is how this should take place.

Whilst the government recognizes that a political content to the rehabilitation programme is essential, it is unfortunately unable to recognise its views with those of the non-militant Tamil political groups. Exacerbating this situation is the different stance taken by the TULF and the CWC and made worse by the intransigence of the LTTE.

In reality the LTTE cannot be marginalised on any political programme. To do so when the credibility of the moderate Tamil parties are not convincing would mean to bring about further confusion into the existing hiatus. It is reminiscent of the contradictions and conclusions that prevailed when the IPKF promoted Varatharaja Perumal's EPRLF into political focus in the late 1980s.

Further confusing the issue is the difference in the political structure that should be put into place to enable the political re-structuring of the north and the east. Whereas some of the moderate political groups, particularly Douglas Devananda's EPDP, are demanding an interim administration for the north and the east, the government is tied up with a North-East Co-ordinating Committee chaired by Ports and Shipping Minister, M.H.M. Ashraff. This situation by itself generates its own political inertia.

In fairness to the government, it is rightly concerned about the security of the Tamil political parties if they are permitted to activate political programmes in the north. It is quite clear that the LTTE will not permit any democratic political activity which will erode his own position and that of the LTTE. Therefore to permit the non-LTTE political parties free movement will be another security problem to the government. Any setback in implementing a political programme will only highlight the LTTE factor as an essential reality. Thus the government cannot risk a political set back.

Therefore the government is faced with a Catch 22 situation from which to get over would mean that the LTTE factor must be weakened so as not to constitute a viable threat to the political rehabilitation and implementation of the norms of civil administration in the peninsula.

This is not to suggest that the government should be hell bent on a military solution but rather recognise the fact that the LTTE should be made politically impotent to influence the polity of the peninsula. To do so, the LTTE must necessarily be further militarily weakened.

Whilst that is the situation in the north, the incidents in the eastern province in the past six months clearly indicate that the LTTE is gaining ground militarily at the expense of the security forces. The extension of LTTE action into Yala portends a dangerous scenario.

The restoration of government control in the eastern province depends on its ability to divert resources from the northern province. To do so in the present state of politico-military imbalance would create a further Catch 22 situation within an existing Catch 22 dilemma.

This is the two-pronged problem basically confronting the government.

As another New Year dawns, Sri Lanka continues to be in the unfortunate situation when it cannot see a light at the end of the politico-military barrel.

Gains in one aspect of the situation are offset by stalemate, if not setbacks, in the others. The year 1997 presents the government a problem of reconciling its military strategy with that of a political one. This will be the deciding issue in 1997.