Police in Trincomalee were monitoring LTTE transmissions last Sunday when their radio crackled loud and clear.
A caller from a base asked another in Tamil ‘the boss wishes to know what happened?’ The reply came promptly, ‘they could not get to their mouth what fell into their hands’.
Whether the ‘boss’ referred to was LTTE supremo, Velupillai Prabhakaran or some area leader was not clear. But the message was transparent enough. It underscored LTTE’s utter frustration.
The man who was running the military machine against them and his frontliners literally fell from the sky on their laps. And yet, they emerged from the ordeal scot free.
The reference, of course, was to the tryst with destiny of Deputy Minister of Defence, General Anuruddha Ratwatte and his seniormost security officials had that Saturday after their helicopter force landed on a vegetable plot in LTTE dominated territory outside the Vavuniya FDLs.
If they fell hostage into the hands of the LTTE, the consequences would have been unimaginable. On the other hand, if they were forced to lay down their lives in the most unexpected manner, Sri Lanka would have lost the cream of the contemporary leadership fighting the separatist war.
Either way, Saturday, December 7, 1996, threatened to change the course of the 13 year old Eelam War. But one thing stood in the way of that disastrous course - not foolproof contingency planning or a sub-human rescue effort that plucked them out of the jaws of death.
It was just a miracle all the way. Some said the Minister and his team had endless luck, a bounty of it. One Cabinet Minister argued, ‘members of our team have not committed any crimes (aparaada)’ and added that was why colleague, Housing and Construction Minister, Nimal Siripala de Silva, escaped when LTTE exploded a bomb in Jaffna on July 4. In marked contrast, many in the opposition United National Party were aghast with disbelief. Did it really happen or was it stage managed for propaganda?
It all began that Saturday morning. Just after 8 a.m. senior security forces and police officials began arriving at the Police Park at Bambalapitiya. Armed sentries moved to the centre of the road, just opposite the Jade Gardens Chinese Restaurant on Hevelock Road to halt traffic and facilitate entry into the Police Grounds through the baseball court and the adjoining pavilion.
Men from Police Emergency patrol cars moved in to clear the way as Deputy Minister of Defence, Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte, drove in. They were to take off in two Sri Lanka Air Force helicopters that were scheduled to depart at 8.30 a.m.
It was well past take off time when the Chief of Staff of the Sri Lanka Air Force, Air Vice Marshal Anslem Peiris, approached Gen. Ratwatte to explain that his helicopter, a US built Bell 412, would be a bit late to arrive. By then, a Bell 212 piloted by Squadron Leader Sagara Kotakadeniya, had landed. Assisting him as co-pilot was Flying Officer Perera.
Since he felt he would be late for the conference, General Ratwatte, chose to leave in the Bell 212 (not in a Bell 412 as erroneously reported last week). He asked the following to get on board and for the rest who were present to come in the second helicopter.
They were Premaratne Sumathipala, Wanni District MP, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Rohan Daluwatte, Inspector General of Police W.B. Rajaguru and Overall Operations Commander (OOC) Maj. Gen. Asoka Jayawardena.
Also on board were three bodyguards of Gen. Ratwatte, an Army Commando and two from the Ministerial Security Division (MSD). In addition there was also the IGP’s personal bodyguard. The Minister and party took off at 8.55 a.m.
Some 15 minutes later, Flight Lieutenant Liyanagamage landed the Bell 412 at the Police Park. Boarding it were Air Vice Marshal Anslem Peiris, Rear Admiral Cecil Tissera (Chief of Staff, Sri Lanka Navy), Lucky Kodituwakku (Senior DIG - Ranges One), Tilak Iddamalgoda (Senior DIG - Ranges Two), Captain Nishantha Rajapakse (ADC to Army Commander), Captain Gayan Jayasekera (ADC to the Overall Operations Commander), Lt. A.B.C. Dhanapala (Flag Officer to Chief of Staff of the Navy), Sub Inspector Indika Perera (Principal Staff Officer to Senior DIG - Ranges One) and an SLAF Sergeant.
The Bell 412 landed at Weli Oya shortly after 10 a.m. Senior security officials on board realised that the Bell 212 that departed earlier had not arrived. Some looked at the horizon to see whether there was any sign of the helicopter. They thought it might have landed at Anuradhapura or Vavuniya to re-fuel and hence the delay.
Around 10.55 a.m., when it was two hours since take off, concern began to grow. Air Vice Marshal Peiris radioed Anuradhapura and Vavuniya to check. There was no word from the former location but the Control Tower at Vavuniya confirmed the Bell 212 had made radio contact with them at that time. They said they heard the Pilot speak of running out of fuel. The journey from the general area of Vavuniya to Weli Oya would not have exceeded ten minutes but there was still no word.
Air Vice Marshal Peiris arranged for an MI 17 helicopter from Anuradhapura to be airborne immediately and fly to Weli Oya tracing the possible flight path of the Bell 212. When it arrived in Weli Oya, there was no word. Air Vice Marshal Peiris flew immediately in the 412 to the SLAF Zonal Headquarters in Anuradhapura.
Two hours had elapsed and there was still no word. Air Vice Marshal Peiris rushed to the SLAF Control Tower. He promptly informed his Commander, Air Marshal Oliver Ranasinghe and the Army Headquarters. The latter were to tell Police Headquarters. Army detachments and Police Stations in the area were alerted.
Former Commandant of the Police Special Task Force (STF), Lionel Karunasena, now DIG Operations based in Anuradhapura and Mahinda Balasuriya, DIG North Central Range were busy at Weli Oya contacting Police Stations in the area.
Unknown to all of them, Squadron Leader Kotakadeniya had headed north west instead of north east from Vavuniya. The Bell 212 had flown over Anuradhapura and Mihintale. But Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Rohan Daluwatte, who is quite familiar with the terrain realised as the flight progressed they were over Oddusuddan, the village midway on the highway between Mankulam and Mullaitivu.
It soon dawned that the flight had veered off course. He asked Squadron Leader Kotakadeniya to do a 180 degree turn and head south. But moments later, the former military base area in Pooneryn, the adjoining lagoon and later even the sea (the Gulf of Mannar) were within sight. Soon the Ministerial party were scrutinising maps to ascertain their location. There was a cloud base and mist making visibility occasional. They were now airborne for two hours or more.
Later Pilot Kotakadeniya set the chopper on a course for landing in Vavuniya but warned the Minister and his entourage that he was low on fuel. There was only some ten minutes of flying time left with the fuel remaining. The Bell 212 has an endurance of two and half hours.
But soon the low fuel warning began to blink on the instrument panel. In such situations when fuel tanks go dry, the pilot has a survival span of just two minutes to bring the helicopter down.
Sqn. Ldr. Kotakadeniya announced that he had only two minutes flying time left and swiftly made a landing on a vegetable plot adjoining three homesteads. Two of the houses were empty. But there was activity in the one closest to the vegetable plot. Parliamentarian Sumathipala and IGP Rajaguru, who spoke Tamil, walked in.
The immediate requirement was to ascertain where they had landed. They learnt they were in Kidachchuri, north east of Pampaimadu (on the Vavuniya-Mannar road). It was six kilometres west from that point to Tavasiyankulam junction and a distance of a further nine miles via Thandikulam to Vavuniya town. However, to the FDLs off Pampaimadu it was less than ten kilometres through the jungle.
On learning they were far out of the FDLs, Pilot Kotakadeniya re-started the engine of the Bell 212, hovered for a while and lifted the Collective. The chopper rose a few feet from the ground but came down seconds later. They inquired from the chief occupant of the house, K. Tiruchelvam, whether he had any kerosene oil. He brought in a bottle but that was hardly sufficient to make an effort to fire the engines for a quick get away. The cockpit radio was not working. The bodyguards spoke into their walkie talkie sets but there was no response.
Quick decisions had to be made. Waiting in that area for long would mean sure death for the LTTE would arrive sooner than later. At least from a distance, they may have seen the chopper land.
The Minister and party decided to leave the area immediately. They wanted to walk in the direction of the FDLs . Helping them to do so was the wrist watch/compass STF Commando, Chief Inspector Anil Priyantha (one of General Ratwatte’s bodyguards) wore. Joining the team were Tiruchelvam, his wife and three children including an infant. Before leaving, wires linking the control panels and the throttle cables were cut thus immobilising the helicopter.
Pilot Kotakadeniya, the Army Commando bodyguard and Tiruchelvam, walked much ahead of the Minister and party. Gen. Ratwatte who has a slight limp after injuries he sustained in a traffic accident years ago walked briskly with his walking stick. To his credit, he was calm, composed and confident. Walking past a large patch of water, he remarked to the others, ‘shall we take a swim before we continue?’
Every now and then, the IGP’s personal bodyguard Chief Inspector Asoka Manage (another STF Commando) kept speaking into his walkie talkie. There was no response.
The trek through the jungle continued. Then the quietness of the jungle was disturbed by three loud explosions, one after another. It became clear that the Tiger guerrillas had not only arrived but had also blasted the Bell 212. There was quietness for a while and then the Minister and party heard the roar of engines at a distance. Tiger cadres were on the move in vehicles. There was no doubt they were on the look-out for those who had landed by the helicopter.
After trekking for almost an hour, the walkie talkie in Chief Inspector Manage’s hand came to life. He could hear radio traffic on the Police communications network. He spoke out and was disappointed that there was no response. Needless to say a moment of glee turned to one of gloom for the group as they continued to walk.
Once again CI Manage spoke out. There was a pleasant surprise this time. A female voice responded and gave her call sign ‘VICTOR’. She was one of the radio operators at the Police Communications Centre in Vavuniya. That call was to be the beginning of a dramatic rescue effort. CI Manage’s call had also been picked up at the Kebettigollawa Police Station by radio operator, Constable M.H.R. de Silva.
Soon a chain link over the radio was established with the SLAF base in Trincomalee. ‘VICTOR’ was busy relaying CI Manage’s messages, some of them orders from the Deputy Defence Minister, calling upon troops to break out from the FDLs and for the SLAF to have their helicopters airborne.
Whilst this was going on, other search and rescue measures were being launched at different centres. Most important was the one from the Operations Room at Army Headquarters in Colombo where President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the Commander-in-Chief, was behind several initiatives. Ensuring they were executed was Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Srilal Weerasuriya, the senior most Army officer present at that time.
Others included measures by the Task Force Two headquarters in Vavuniya, the District Police Headquarters in Vavuniya, Air Vice Marshal Anslem Peiris in Anuradhapura, Air Marshal Oliver Ranasinghe in Katunayake, the IGP’s Command Room at the Police Comcentre in Mirihana. More on those later.
By the time the escaping group reached one end of a stream, they saw helicopters flying over the other end. They waved their hands but the choppers were flying at a high altitude. Frustration began to grow when they saw two helicopters flying some distance, taking a turn and come over the same area. They reached out to ‘VICTOR’ again and urged that the helicopters be asked to fly low in that area. Within moments they were just doing that. But the pilots were still not spotting the group.
IGP Rajaguru waded across the stream, pulled out his tunic and began to wave at the two helicopters whilst holding his cap on one hand. He was spotted. One helicopter landed in a clearing nearby. The Minister and his party boarded the helicopter. As it lifted off, the pilot was asked to radio the other helicopter to land further ahead and pick up Pilot Kotakadeniya, Tiruchelvam and the commando body guard. This they did.
General Ratwatte and party landed at the Vavuniya airfield to the delight of the troops there and was driven to his private chalet. Even before he could take a seat in the drawing room, the two sons of Tiruchelvam had jumped on the sofa and were soon fast asleep.
General Ratwatte had hardly asked for a hurried lunch when his telephone rang. !t was a call from President Kumaratunga who had heard the good news. She wanted her Deputy Minister of Defence to return to Colombo immediately. But Gen. Ratwatte said he wanted to proceed to Weli Oya and conclude the conference. He gave details of his ordeal to the President and revealed that if it came to the worst, he and the entire group had decided to take their lives instead of falling captive to the LTTE.
It was undoubtedly the most tense moment for President Kumaratunga in her two year presidential career. When she heard that the Minister and his team were safe, she could not hide her emotions. More in joy than in seriousness she declared every one of them should be tied to a tree and caned.
That Saturday forenoon she had arrived at the Army Headquarters sports grounds to board a flight to Attanagalla. A chopper for her and one for her security detail were on standby. When she heard the news, she immediately drove to Army Headquarters and was in the Operations Room.
From there she kept following the developments. Army Commander’s Military Assistant, Lt. Col. Vikum Siriwardena, told President Kumaratunga that the Commander’s personal security detail, a team of commandos, were at Army Headquarters and were keen to be air dropped in the general area where the Bell 212 may have gone missing.
She immediately summoned the pilot of her helicopter, Wing Commander Gagan Bulathsinhala, and ordered that he flies with the commandos. Within minutes, Lt. Col. Siriwardena and ten commandos were airborne. By the time they reached Kurunegala, they were ordered to return to Colombo. News had arrived that the Minister and his group were safe.
There was a high degree of confusion from the time the SLAF search began. At first SLAF reported to Army Headquarters that the Bell 212 had ‘crash landed’ in Palamottai. Thereafter came a more distressing report that the helicopter had crashed near a tank in Padaviya and was on fire. One high ranking SLAF officer told a senior Defence Ministry official,, ‘its all over.’ When this news spread to the Operations Room at Army Headquarters, tears were pouring down the cheeks of some senior officers.
It was only thereafter that news arrived that Wing Commander Jayalath Weerakody who was at the SLAF Operations Room in Katunayake was giving instructions to a helicopter pilot to land and pick up the Minister and party. He returned only last week from an year long stint at the National Defence College in India to resume office as Director Operations. At the Army Headquarters tears turned into cheers.
At the Task Force Three headquarters in Vavuniya, Brigade Commander, Brigadier K.B. Egodawala, was on leave. He was in Colombo to join two others - Major General Srilal Weerasuriya and Brigadier Sarath Fonseka - for a visit to Geneva on an ICRC sponsored human rights programme.
The task of launching ground rescue operation fell on Colonel Jayantha Alwis, Commanding Officer of the Fourth Battalion of the Gajaba Regiment which is part of the Air Mobile Brigade. Three companies of the 4GR broke out of Pampaimadu defences whilst one company stayed behind and later boarded two rescue helicopters.
At District Police Headquarters in Vavuniya, SSP Gamini Silva was dressing up to leave station on leave when he heard from ‘Victor’ that General Ratwatte and party had gone missing. With a team of Police officials he also rushed to the Pampaimadu defences.
One of the tasks General Ratwatte undertook before leaving Vavuniya was to summon ‘Victor’, shake her hands and thank her for the wonderful job done. She was none other than Reserve Woman Police Constable Sumana Liyanage. He ordered that she be taken to the regular force and promoted to the rank of Sergeant. There were many others Gen. Ratwatte thanked.
The IGP’s Operations Room in Colombo was in constant radio contact with Police Stations in controlled areas in the north and east. They ordered all other communication traffic to be halted and were monitoring to ascertain any news of the Bell 212. This was whilst most Police stations in the area sent out search parties.
Air Force Commander, Air Marshal Oliver Ranasinghe, has set up a three member SLAF Court of Inquiry. It is headed by Air Commodore J.L.C. Salgado and comprises Wing Commander Gagan Bulathsinhala and Wing Commander Ranjit Yapa. Last Friday they recorded the statements of Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Rohan Daluwatte and IGP W.B. Rajaguru.
There is serious concern in influential sections of the defence establishment that besides the SLAF Court of Inquiry, no investigation has been initiated at the national level to ascertain what went wrong. They say there are a number of questions about the flight of the Generals that arise to an inquiring mind.
The foremost question is what contingency planning exists to cater to these situations. It has been an all too common feature in this war that backup planning has failed in the final crunch. Mankulam, Mandaitivu and Mullaitivu to mention three examples stand sad testimony to the inadequacy and the ineffectiveness of contingency planning.
Even sadder is the fact that inquiries into these debacles are gathering dust in the limbo of defence archives and not made public at least in ‘open issues’. Secrecy in the interests of secrecy is one thing. But openness in the context of public accountability is quite another.
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