Situation Report

Air Force report shows it all
The construction of a new airstrip in the Wanni and the acquisition of air capability by Tiger guerrillas have prompted the UPFA Government to raise issue with a number of countries.

As exclusively revealed in these columns President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumarartunga wrote to Norwegian Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik. In that letter she pointed out that the development of an airstrip and acquisition of aircraft were not in keeping with the Ceasefire Agreement. She made clear the Government fully reserved the right to defend Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial integrity. She also expressed serious concern that there was now a direct threat to Sri Lanka's air space and sought Norway's help to dismantle the air capability and the airstrip.

Soon after this letter to Norwegian Premier Bondevik, Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar wrote to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, the Foreign Ministers of Russia, China, France, Japan and some other member countries of the European Union. In that Mr. Kadirgamar expressed the same concerns President Kumaratunga conveyed to Premier Bondevik.

Like President Kumaratunga's letter to Mr. Bondevik, Foreign Minister Kadirgamar's to others was also accompanied by an aide memoire as well as colour pictures of the airstrip and the aircraft. One of the aircraft was identified by the United States authorities as a Czech built Zlin Z-143.

The aide memoire was based on a report submitted to the Government by the Sri Lanka Air Force. It is titled: "REPORT ON THE SUSPECTED DEVELOPMENTS OF THE AIR CAPABILITY OF THE LTTE AND AN OVERVIEW OF IMMEDIATE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES THAT NEED TO BE IMPLEMENTED TO COUNTER POTENTIAL THREATS." This "top secret" document was accompanied by a photograph of the paved runway (with markings) and pictures obtained by the Israeli built Searcher unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

This document was formulated by the Air Force before a report arrived from the United States Embassy in Colombo confirming that authorities in that country had identified one of the aircraft. The report details the background, the present threats, the limitations imposed on the Air Force, existing defence capability and the shortcomings that are existent.

The Sunday Times has obtained a copy of this report. The first four pages relate to the background and confirm beyond any doubt two important factors - that the construction of a new runway and the acquisition of air capability by the Tiger guerrillas came during the period of the ceasefire. As is clear from this "top secret" report by the Air Force, in the early 1990s an airstrip was constructed by Tiger guerrillas South East of the Iranamadu tank.

The Air Force which monitored the construction later bombed it and rendered it unusable. The construction of the second airstrip came after the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement on February 22, 2002. In other words, construction work for the new airstrip began during the tenure of the previous United National Front (UNF) Government. This is made very clear by the first four pages of the report which The Sunday Times (Situation Report) reproduces today. That makes clear the nucleus of a fully-fledged "air force," for the LTTE in the form of a new runway took shape during the ceasefire period. In view of the sensitive nature of the contents of the remaining pages, publication of those are withheld.

Here is what the Sri Lanka Air Force said:
"INTRODUCTION
"In the course of the long drawn conflict between the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka, on more than one occasion the LTTE has been successful in 'springing surprises' on the security forces allowing them to gain an often dramatic though temporary advantage in the military balance. An example that can be quoted from the SLAF's own experience is the 'missile crisis of 1995' where the Air Force was confronted with a weapon system which could not be countered, and the LTTE maintained an edge for a period of time until suitable counter-measures were acquired.

"In all of these situations, however, the resilience, adaptability and raw 'grit' of the Security Forces soon allowed the advantage to be wrested back, but this was always at a price, both in terms of lives, equipment and money.

"In the light of these past experiences, the SLAF has been vigilant about developments in the LTTE's war making potential since the singing of the MoU in 2002, in order to take suitable precautions against future 'surprises'.

"On the 12th January 2005, a routine reconnaissance mission by an SLAF Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) yielded unexpected intelligence on probable LTTE air assets at a runway in enemy controlled territory. This discovery can be thought to have given the SLAF an opportunity to take precautionary measures against a new threat the LTTE may wield in the future, and thereby thwart any attempt by them to gain an advantage.

BACKGROUND TO THE 12TH OF JANUARY SIGHTING
"While the LTTE has in the past challenged the Army and Navy on land and sea and also the Air Force from the ground they have not attempted to challenge the SLAF in the skies. There was no doubt that acquiring an 'air' capability was high on the LTTE's list of priorities and the first step towards achieving this was observed in the early 1990s when an airstrip was constructed by them to the Southeast of Iranamadu tank. At this time construction was constantly monitored and the SLAF took offensive action against it to render it unusable.

Subsequent to the signing of the MoU in 2002, it was revealed that the LTTE had renewed efforts towards acquiring an air capability. On 25th November 2003, an SLAF UAV acquired video footage of a considerable clearing in the jungle east of Iranamadu. On the 16th of February 2004 SLAF reconnaissance assets observed construction work on a runway at this cleared site recommence. A UAV mission on the 30th of September 2004 confirmed that the airstrip had been paved and threshold and centreline markings added.

"During this period, the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) of the SLA brought to the notice of the SLAF that there was information to suggest the availability of 02 aircraft and a UAV in the Wanni, and also information that procurement of a number of small aircraft was scheduled by the LTTE.

"In the light of these observations and inputs, the LTTE's endeavours to acquire an air capability were continuously monitored by the SLAF leading to the discovery of 12th January 2005.

OBSERVATIONS MADE ON 12TH JANUARY 2005
"During AM hours on the 12th of January 2005, a UAV mission over the Iranamadu airstrip observed an aircraft parked at the southern (05) end of the runway. (Annex "A" and Annex "B").

"On the same day a night reconnaissance was carried out using infra-red imaging and another aircraft was observed, parked near a small structure which is suspected to be a makeshift hangar. It was also seen on the images that attempts had been made to conceal the second aircraft. (Annex "A" and Annex "C")

"On the 13th of January 2005 another UAV mission revealed the first aircraft still parked at the original location while the second aircraft appeared to have been camouflaged to avoid detection.
ASSESSMENT OF LTTE AIR CAPABILITY ON PRESENT DATA
"It can be concluded that the construction of an airfield is a first step towards commencing air activities by the LTTE. Given that, the airfield can be estimated to be about 3600 feet in length with a paved surface which would be sufficient to land quite an array of aircraft types. Medium lift aircraft and even aircraft such as C-130, which are capable of short takeoff and landing would be able to operate from there.

"Possession of an airfield could render the following on the LTTE:
(a) It can serve to operate medium sized aircraft flying into and out of Wanni comfortably. Some heavy aircraft (such as C-130) could also be accommodated. This could serve as a useful way for the transport of valuable items or war material and personnel.

(b) It can be used to launch ultralight, light or medium aircraft for offensive operations.

(d) It can be utilized to recover a hijacked aircraft into LTTE controlled territory.

"Several explanations can be considered to describe the sudden appearance of air assets on the runway, and they being retained there. These are enumerated below:

a. The aircraft may have been brought to the field for protection after the damage inflicted on LTTE controlled areas by the tsunami of 26th December 2005.

b. It may be a deceptive measure intended to create an impression of strength in the aftermath of the losses sustained by the LTTE in the recent natural disaster.

c. A deliberate attempt to make a "show of strength" for the benefit of the Tamil population to gain support for the LTTE in general and the developing air potential in particular.

d. A preparatory phase prior to employing these assets in carrying out offensive air operations against Government assets. This can be either through use of these aircraft to drop or fire ordinance at a target or to use the aircraft as a flying "bomb" after being laden with explosives in a suicide attack against a VP (Vulnerable Point) or VA (Vulnerable Area).

e. A preparatory phase prior to commencement of transport operations for cadres and material.

"Upon interpretation of the images (Annex A and B) the first aircraft can be thought to be a:

a. Single engined or twin engined light aircraft.

b. Simply a mock-up of an aircraft employed as a decoy.

"While the second aircraft can be thought to be:
a. Single engined light aircraft. This can be inferred with a greater degree of certainty since the Infra-red images obtained indicate a "hot spot" in the nose of the aircraft which could in all probability be the "heat signature" of an engine in the nose.

"The fact that the LTTE possesses at least one light aircraft and a runway from which to operate it however seems irrefutable.

"The SLAF has attempted to co-relate the images obtained of the second aircraft with catalogues of aircraft available for purchase in the commercial market in order to obtain at least an approximate estimate of its capabilities. While the quality of the images has prevented a positive identification being made its general characteristics seem to classify it as a medium range, light aircraft. Such an aircraft can be thought to possess the capability to fly for about 350 nautical miles at an average speed of approximately 150 mph (240 kmph).

ESTIMATE OF THE THREAT POSED BY LTTE AIR ASSETS
"As has been discussed earlier on in this report, the purpose of this runway may be simply for logistic support. While this capability too is an alarming one, which needs to be addressed, by far, the greater threat would be if the intended purpose of these assets is offensive.

"If offensive action, earlier as a launch platform for ordinance or as a suicidal "flying bomb" is contemplated, potential targets could range through a considerable spectrum. Some of the targets thought to be of key significance are listed below:

a. City and suburbs of Colombo, with its large number of important military and government establishments, points of great economic importance, and concentrated population.

b. Ports of Colombo and Trincomalee.

c. Katunayake International Airport.

d. Hydro-power stations and dams in the central hills.

e. Air bases and minor airfields to destroy SLAF infrastructure and/or air assets.

f. Main Army and Naval installations and troop deployments.

g. Nodes in the telecommunication network.

h. Historical and religious sites of national importance."

As explained earlier, I will not go into other sensitive aspects referred to in this "top secret" report. There is no doubt at all that the Government has taken this Air Force report very seriously.

That is why it embarked on emergency measures and apprised some of the world's most powerful countries of this disturbing situation. As can be seen from these developments, there is no confusion whatsoever at the highest levels of the Government over the issue of the LTTE constructing a new airstrip and acquiring air capability.

That is why British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw shared the UPFA Government's serious concerns over LTTE's acquisition of a new airstrip and air capability. Even before Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar met with Mr. Straw in London early this month, he had received a copy of his (Mr. Kadirgamar’s) letter. Hence, he was up-to-date when the matter came up for discussion. This is why Mr. Straw expressed the British Government's concern over this matter.

From the Government's own aide memoire which is based on the "top secret" report by the Air Force, two matters are distinctly clear and unambiguous. First is the fact that the construction of the new airstrip came soon after the ceasefire, during the tenure of the previous United National Front (UNF) Government. In fact the first runway has been made redundant by Air Force bombing. Second is the fact that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) acquired light aircraft thereafter. And the identity of one such aircraft has been confirmed by an arm of the United States Government.

In reporting exclusively the existence of the runway and the acquisition of aircraft by the LTTE, The Sunday Times (Situation Report) during the past several weeks, references were made to how such disclosures angered the hierarchy of then UNF Government. It was pointed out how the writer was intimidated. With reference to the airstrip, The Sunday Times (Situation Report) said "Recent investigations have revealed that construction of the runway began during the tenure of the previous United National Front (UNF) Government. Metal for the construction of the airstrip had been moved from suppliers in the Anuradhapura district ostensibly on the grounds that it was to be used for the building of the badly damaged Alpha Nine (A-9) highway."

The many references made periodically to the UNF have embarrassed and even irked some of its leadership. So much so, sections of them have begun to blame The Sunday Times for misleading the Government into raising issue with several powerful countries in the world. There were even idle claims that the government was now in a dilemma. Their complaint - a Tiger guerrilla "air force" had existed long years before. In a bid to prove their point, they quote another report by a Military Analyst (not related to the Situation Report) in The Sunday Times of July 30, 1995 headlined "THE LTTE AIR FORCE." This was to make out that a Tiger guerrilla "air force" had been existence even in 1995 and had been revealed even in The Sunday Times.

In some sections of the media, this report by a Military Analyst has been projected in a montage to create the impression that it has been written by The Sunday Times Defence Correspondent. One need hardly say such a move is not an innocent mistake.

Here again, the report in question by the Military Analyst does not speak of the LTTE acquiring a new airstrip or light aircraft. It deals with the guerrillas acquiring surface to air missiles. It is devoted almost entirely to the fact that the LTTE was acquiring missiles and points out that the guerrillas were trying to use ultra light aircraft. It adds "The Air Tiger Wing of the LTTE established by V. Sornalingam alias Shankar, was also responsible for establishing the Sea Tiger Wing in the mid 1990's.”

Is this not a futile attempt to mislead the public?

No one in their right senses will dispute reports then of a “toothless” “air wing” or “air force” under the LTTE.

Even The Sunday Times (Situation Report) has made many references earlier to an LTTE "air wing" or "air force." There is no dispute about it. But, neither the Government nor the Air Force at that time took such an "air wing" or "air force" seriously since they were much less in character than even an aeronautical society in a high school. It posed no threat. The box story on this page gives a brief chronology of how the LTTE's air capability developed over the years. That makes the position clearer and shows how the threat had developed whilst political leaders turned a blind eye.

But only fools and the dim-witted would deny that the LTTE had constructed a new runway and acquired air capability in the recent past, that too during the ceasefire. The Air Force has borne this out and the Government has acknowledged it. There is no confusion at all.

Even LTTE's chief peace negotiator Anton Balasingham has not denied the existence of such an airstrip. When Norway's Special envoy Erik Solheim raised issue with Mr. Balasingham (after President Kumaratunga's letter to Premier Bondevik), he claimed the airstrip had existed there before. As for the aircraft, he had said he was unaware. Political Wing leader S. P. Thamilselvan had also claimed the runway was there before but made no comment on the aircraft. So, it is also clear that the LTTE has upto now made no denial.

But sections of the UNF leadership and their cohorts have shown greater enthusiasm and eagerness to go beyond the positions taken by the LTTE. In other words they are outdoing the LTTE. Must anything more be said about their acute embarrassment now? Little wonder the LTTE is much stronger after the ceasefire than before.

How the wings grew on the Tigers
Here is a brief chronology of the events leading to LTTE acquiring a new airstrip and air capability.

1993: LTTE clears a vast stretch of land south east of the Iranamadu tank and begins construction of a runway. Work was completed two years later. On March 19, 1995 LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran declares it open. One LTTE cadre operates a hang glider during the opening ceremonies. Air Force later bombs it making it unusable.

1995: LTTE sets up an "air wing" or "air force" in memory of former "Jaffna Commander" Sathasivam Krishnakumar alias Kittu. A former Prabhakaran bodyguard and one time aeronautical engineer in Air Canada, V. Sornalingam alias Shankar is named as its head. Pilots are sent to UK and France for training in ultra light aircraft. Cadres are also taught how to handle surface to air missiles and anti aircraft guns.

1995: April 28 Shooting down of Air Force AVRO aircraft near Palaly.

1995: April 29 Shooting down of second SLAF AVRO aircraft near Palaly

1995: Nov. During "Operation Riviresa", troops in Neerveli find a dummy aircraft in a LTTE hideout. They also find parts of the downed AVROs.

1998: Nov. 27 A microlight aircraft is found showering flowers over Vattapallai Amman Kovil near Mullaitivu.

2000: LTTE declares 2000 as "Year of the Air Tigers"

2003: Nov. An SLAF UAV acquires video footage of a considerable clearing in the jungle east of Iranamadu.

2004: February. SLAF reconnaissance observes construction work on a runway at this cleared site recommence.

2004: Sept. The new runway has been paved, threshold and centreline markings added. It is 1.2 kilomeres long.

2005 January Air Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicles spot Tiger guerrilla light aircraft.

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