Shipwrecks off Mullaitivu Coast -Iris Moana and Mo Ran Bong. They are now sentinels for Sea Tigers.

CBK turns full circle on Trinco
Chalai mystery trawler raises more questions than answers
Dawn was about to break last Monday. A Sri Lanka Navy Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) - P 465 - was in the deep seas off the shores of Mullaitivu. This pivotal coastal village, located midway by sea between Trincomalee and Jaffna, was once home for a major military complex of the Sri Lankan security forces. It is ten years now since it was overrun. Some 1639 soldiers, sailors, policemen and civilians were killed. Over Rs 289 million worth of weaponry was lost. A counter offensive to regain control also ended up in disaster with more than 75 deaths. The events that occurred on July 18, 1997 were then shrouded in secrecy due to a media censorship. Most still remain unknown.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has since turned this sprawling coastal area into a vast military complex. The entire area is declared out of bounds to civilians or visitors. On the sea front, wreckages of two vessels rest on a sand bank, one next to the other, close to the shore.

One is Iris Moana seized by the LTTE on August 28, 1995. This passenger vessel was carrying 121 persons to Jaffna when the incident occurred. They were later released. The other is Mo Ran Bong, a Korean cargo vessel attacked on July 8, 1997. The fourth Officer was killed and 37 crew members were taken hostage. They were later released. Now, the wrecks serve as a sentinel, with gun positions facing the sea. Sea Tiger cadres watch naval movements from here with binoculars.

A few kilometres northwards from Mullaitivu, along the coast lay Chalai, now a major base for Sea Tigers. The stretch of land in between is a no go zone except for fishermen. Armed guerrillas patrol the area to prevent incursions from the sea front.

The two wrecks serve as a sign of identification of the guerrilla base. Similarly Chalai is identified by a large tree along the coast. That towers above others and is clearly visible from the deep seas.

These two points are a reminder to Navy patrols of the dangers they face. Dvora Fast Attack Craft or IPCs that escort vessels veer away upon sighting them. That is to keep a safe distance and thus avoid any confrontation. But when they are about to reach the area, the men on board don their battle gear. They coil their finger around the triggers of guns mounted on their crafts. More importantly their prying eyes hover around the waters off the coastal stretch for possible enemy activity.

On that pre dawn run last Monday, the skipper of the Inshore Patrol Craft - P 465, senior Lieutenant Anton Trevor Perera did exactly that. The IPC was on routine patrol and going past Chalai meant being on full alert. It was still dark but he noticed some unusual activity near the shores. The reflections from the glittering waters gave him only a hazy picture. There was something suspicious.

He waited till sunrise from a distance of half a nautical mile (or 400 metres). Around 7.30 am, what unfolded before his eyes was worrying. He promptly radioed Eastern Naval Area Headquarters at the Dockyard in Trincomalee. He reported that a trawler, much the same as a multi day fishing vessel, was close to the shore. Its canopy was painted white. Two fibre glass dinghies (FGDs) were in close proximity. It looked like an all too familiar scenario encountered by naval patrols, the unloading of military cargo.

The news raised concern at the Eastern Command. Was this a trawler used for a mid sea transfer of military cargo from a cargo ship in the deep seas? Was the overnight unloading incomplete prompting them to finish up in the morning? The Navy's Advanced Offshore Patrol Vessel (AOPV) SLNS Sayura which was in the deep seas off the East coast was alerted. They also radioed another IPC - P 491 - which was on patrol in the vicinity to rush to the waters off Chalai and join IPC - P 465.

As minutes became hours, the Eastern Command was a hive of activity. They had already alerted Navy Headquarters in Colombo. Two more IPCs - P 442 and P 472 - were hurriedly despatched from the Trincomalee harbour. On board P 472 were two members of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). They had been briefed on the Navy's suspicion that the trawler may be unloading military cargo.

The Eastern Command had also requested aerial surveillance of the area. Navy Headquarters forwarded the request to Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) Headquarters in Colombo. By 10.30 a.m., SLAF's Maritime Surveillance Command located in Anuradhapura had arranged for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to take off from Vavuniya. It began scouring the skies over Mullaitivu coast. At the same time the SLAF Beechcraft took off from their base at Ratmalana on an aerial surveillance mission.

IPC - P 472 was moving closer towards the trawler when the two SLMM monitors on board advised them to stop. This was to avoid being fired at. Then the trawler had begun moving northwards for some two nautical miles and later returned to its original location. It was reported by radio to the Eastern Command.

The results of the UAV reconnaissance came to the Eastern Command from the Air Force Headquarters in Colombo. There were boxes on the trawler. One man was seen swimming ashore with a box in hand. Fears rose as these reports tended to confirm suspicions that military cargo was being unloaded. Or so it was believed.

In the wake of this, another IPC - P 485 - was despatched from the Northern Command Headquarters at Kankesanthurai in the Jaffna peninsula. By then, Jan Sjolin, Head of the SLMM Naval Monitoring Team in Trincomalee had arrived at the Eastern Command. He was in touch with his two officers on board IPC - P 472. They were still unable to report a cohesive picture to Mr. Sjolin.

Having learnt of other reports reaching the Eastern Command, he spoke on the satellite phone to SLMM monitors based in Kilinochchi. They were asked to proceed to Chalai and clarify the situation. Two members drove to the area only to be turned away by armed Tiger guerrillas. They reported back to Mr. Sjolin that they were denied access. This was brought to the attention of retired Norwegian General Trond Furuhovde, the Head of the SLMM. Needless to say he was distressed since it was the responsibility of the SLMM to enforce the Ceasefire Agreement.

By 2 p.m. on Monday, air surveillance by the UAV had ended. So did the surveillance by the Beechcraft. By then, the SLAF had concluded there was no tangible evidence to suggest the presence of boxes on board the trawler or of any persons swimming ashore with the boxes. Evidently the earlier report of sightings was a misreading of visuals transmitted by a video camera.

If five IPCs were at the scene, none on board also reported any presence of boxes, or any unloading of cargo. With little or no evidence except for the presence of the trawler itself, by Tuesday morning the additional naval craft were withdrawn. One, however, remained to observe the trawler. It was under orders to intercept it only for inspection if the trawler moved into the deep seas. That again was to be carried out in accordance with the Rules of Engagement issued to the Navy after the ceasefire.

Both Navy Headquarters in Colombo and the Eastern Command in Trincomalee were now puzzled by the mystery. That Tuesday the Eastern Command had intercepted a guerrilla radio communication. It revealed that the Sea Tigers were conducting a "passing out parade" for new recruits. Was the presence of the trawler linked to this event? Answers were not available.

It was in this backdrop that the National Security Council chaired by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga discussed the trawler mystery during a meeting on Tuesday. She and others at the NSC viewed a videotape of aerial pictures taken by the UAV. It was decided that the Ministry of Defence should issue a statement setting out the facts as the Government saw it. A press release that night said:

"The Sri Lanka Navy during early hours of 16th August 2004 spotted a trawler moving under suspicious circumstances off Chalai close to Mullaitvu. The Navy craft, which detected this trawler, mounted surveillance on the suspected trawler during which it observed a fibreglass dinghy moving alongside the trawler.

"It also observed several boxes suspected to be containing military hardware being unloaded from the trawler to the dinghy."The Sri Lanka Navy informed the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) of the incident. The SLMM Monitors had tried to proceed to the Chalai area to inspect the trawler and examine the contents of the boxes but they were not allowed to do so by LTTE cadres.

"The Ministry of Defence (MOD) expects to raise this matter with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission." By Tuesday, other reports Navy Headquarters received made them wonder whether the presence of a trawler off the Mullaitivu shores was a diversion. These reports suggested the possibility of a vessel unloading military cargo elsewhere. A flotilla of fast attack craft and gun boats moved out.

On Wednesday there were no reports from them about any sighting. But there was a diversion after two naval sub units, one based in Mutur and the other in Norway Island, reported gunfire from Sampur area. This is from a location where the LTTE has admitted it has a firing range. Both had recorded 16 rounds of tracer bullets being fired into the air. Tracers, as the name implies, are used to identify targets before normal bullets are fired. At that time the Eastern Command had not deployed any naval vessel in the vicinity.

By Thursday night, naval craft on patrol off Vakarai, north of Batticaloa, reported to Eastern Command what they thought was a disturbing find. They said they observed a low flying aircraft close upon midnight. If this was to cause concerns at Navy headquarters, it was short lived. By Friday afternoon it became clear that was Cathay Pacific Airways flight 704 to Colombo. The wide bodied Airbus A-340 aircraft from Hong Kong had just begun its descent. The time was 11.40 pm - the exact time when the naval patrol reported the presence of an unidentified aircraft.

The trawler mystery continues to puzzle the Sri Lanka Navy. Even yesterday it remained off the shores of Mullaitivu. However, the LTTE leadership in Kilinochchi sent an emissary to Colombo to tell the SLMM that the trawler was not involved in any weapons transfer or engaged in any suspicious activity. T. Bavanandan alias Bavan, deputy head of the LTTE Peace Secretariat delivered the message.

However, SLMM head, Gen. (retd.) Furuhovde is to seek a meeting with the head of the LTTE Political Wing, S.P. Tamilselvan. The issue appears to be LTTE's denial to allow ceasefire monitors to visit Chalai in the exercise of their legitimate duties. The SLMM is said to be taking a serious view of this issue since both the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE had jointly tasked the SLMM the responsibility of ensuring the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA).

For the SLMM the issue over the CFA comes at a time when internecine warfare between the LTTE and rival groups continues. On Monday, Balan Nadaraja Aiyar, a journalist, author and spokesman for the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) was brutally gunned down in broad daylight at W. A. Silva Mawatha, Wellawatte. As in most similar attacks by pistol gangs, known to be from the LTTE, the assailants went scot free. Does this not make clear that killer groups can operate with impunity within the City of Colombo. Their safe houses where weapons are stored remain secure for more attacks.

Needless to say this development angered President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. On Tuesday, she sounded a warning to the LTTE in an interview she gave Ravi Prasad, the Colombo Correspondent for United Press International (UPI), a US news agency and the burgeoning Singapore based Channel News Asia TV network. She said she would order troops to march into the guerrilla held areas if the internecine war between the guerrillas were to endanger the country's stability. She added that the Government had offered to bring law and order under control even in the LTTE-controlled areas, but the guerrillas had refused. The offer was made soon after the split within the LTTE.

Despite the warning, the killings continue. On Friday, three senior LTTE cadres Bawa (former Political Wing leader for Ampara district) and Yoga (head of the finance, development and rehabilitation wing for Vakarai) were shot dead reportedly by members of the Karuna faction. Venuka (LTTE Women's Political Wing leader for Batticaloa) is said to be in a critical condition at the Batticaloa hospitial. The incident occurred in security forces controlled Batticaloa north. On Friday night, in what appeared to be a retaliatory attack, Police Sergeant 26175 Jayaratne of the Kalmunai Police was shot dead. He had proceeded to a bakery to place orders for bread, part of his functions as the officer who ran the mess.

Yesterday morning, Captain Wijeratne and soldier Tennekoon of the 7th battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry, travelling in a motorcycle along Mankerni - Vakarai road were attacked. Gunmen, said to be Tiger guerrillas, opened fire and hurled a grenade at them. Both sustained injuries.

With their equipment and many urgent needs denied, ordering security forces to march into guerrilla strong holds will be no easy task. More so when the LTTE has tremendously strengthened their military machine and continue to do so during 31 months of ceasefire.

Even before the guerrillas became much stronger, under the People's Alliance Government of President Kumaratunga, the re-capture of Kilinochchi, now the main power centre of the LTTE, became difficult. "Operation Jaya Sikurui" (Victory Assured) was launched on May 13, 1997 to gain control of a stretch of over 40 kilometres between Vavuniya (Omanthai) and Elephant Pass (Paranthan) that was not under Government control. This was after carrying out "crisis purchases" of various types of military equipment - an exercise that made millionaires of those in uniform and outside it.

Two divisions of the Army backed by the Navy, Air Force and the Police were deployed. The offensive included the capture of Kilinochchi but had to be abandoned on December 4, 1998. A total of 2180 soldiers were killed in this failed military campaign, the worst in post independent Sri Lanka. This is in addition to those killed in the Navy, Air Force as well as the Police during the 18 long months.

Ordering unprepared, ill equipped troops into guerrilla-controlled areas would only invite disaster and place their lives at tremendous risk. Instead it would have been wiser for those in charge of the country's defence establishment to resort to a simpler thing. That is to devise ways and means to ensure security in the City of Colombo and the suburbs. The fact that pistol groups have established safe houses or cells from which they operate with impunity is no secret. If proof is required, the spate of killings in the recent weeks and months is testimony. There have neither been arrests nor raids on such safe houses where weapons are known to be stored. This is one urgent exercise in which the troops could easily assist the Police.

However, the latter will not be able to initiate action on their own unless politicians give them a directive. Here lies the dichotomy - how to weigh the safety and security of peace loving citizens in the City vis-à-vis the risk of offending the LTTE and thus impairing the peace process. In this backdrop, President Kumaratunga dropped a bombshell at last Tuesday's meeting of the National Security Council.

Barring some LTTE activity at Sampur, an area that overlooks the entrance to Trincomalee harbour, she declared reports about LTTE camps in that district (like Manirasakulam) were not true. She said there were no such camps and such reports were being spread by those who wanted to see a resumption of war.

That no doubt is in marked contrast to LTTE's own response. They have said such camps in Trincomalee district had existed all along, even before the ceasefire. They never maintained such camps did not exist. Moreover, SLMM, that studied Government complaints, The Sunday Times learnt, was of the view that some camps had remained even before the ceasefire.

President Kumaratunga's shock disclosure to the NSC will no doubt warm the hearts of former Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe and his then Defence Minister, Tilak Marapana. They were in for a shock on the morning of November 4, 2003 when the defence portfolio was taken over from the latter (together with Interior and Mass Communications portfolios). This was on the grounds that national security was "deteriorating." The threat to Trincomalee was a main reason. And such a threat had been fully endorsed even by a high powered team from the United States Pacific Command that reviewed defence and security matters in Sri Lanka.

If such threats to Trincomalee are not true and such LTTE camps do not exist, was the take over of the defence portfolio therefore a mistake? Like neighbouring India where the matter raised serious concerns at the highest levels of then BJP Government, Sri Lankans too would want to know the answer.

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