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city bombs and Batti clashes Chairing a conference in his office last Friday, he asked the intelligence top brass about the Police find of a suicide jacket, two claymore mines and two hand grenades on the roadside near the Sugathadasa Stadium. He was told that that deadly find bore all the hallmarks of the LTTE. Police and armed forces top brass were all in agreement but there was no answer to the most puzzling question. If the Tiger guerrillas are so smart to smuggle such war like material into the City and execute attacks, why were they placing them on public display for the Police to discover? But several logical and illogical explanations were offered. If in fact they were placed by the guerrillas, it constituted a warning to the authorities, a message that they were still prepared to attack targets. That way the LTTE was trying to create a fear psychosis in the south. According to a high ranking Police officer, a member of the Karuna faction, now hunting for cadres loyal to LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran left them behind in panic. Yet another felt the lethal cargo arrived in a bus from Batticaloa that had arrived at the spot only minutes earlier. It has taken the LTTE leadership a great deal of ingenuity to acquire the reputation as one of the world's deadliest guerrilla groups. So, would they display the military hardware so successfully smuggled through hundreds of miles like tomatoes in a polythene bag or rambuttans in a basket. They are particular about every little detail unlike some in the police or armed forces who sometimes slip up. An example that comes to mind is the plainclothes security for our VIPs or even VVIPs. Why are they referred to as plainclothes security? They are supposed to look like any other private citizen when they offer personal protection. For this purpose, they have to give up their uniforms and dress like ordinary men or even women in some instances. In the days before the onset of the separatist insurgency, the late Dudley Senanayake, who was Prime Minister, was protected by plainclothesmen. But at public functions or other social events they stood out. All of them carried a large brown paper envelope concealing their pistols. That became their name board. Today, they still stick out in collar-less, short sleeve shirts or safari suits though their weapons are well concealed. Perhaps one may argue that though not in uniform these men have to look different from the ordinary people lest others infiltrate. Be that as it may, for the one time Prime Minister, Mr. Wickremanayake the discovery of the suicide jackets and other items was too much to ignore whether it was a forewarning of bad omen or not. Soon after that Friday morning's meeting, he chaired a mini session of the National Security Council - the first in President Kumaratunga's absence since the United People's Freedom Alliance was voted to power. Not wanting to take chances, he initiated measures to immediately enhance security. That included tightening up security precautions at some key State institutions including Sri Lanka Telecom, Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation, Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation and at strategic points in the City. Police were to step up vigilance and seek more help from the armed forces if necessary. That has already led to increased patrols and spot checks. This is mostly by the Police and some by the Army. However, the LTTE leadership in Wanni held an entirely different view. According to reports from Kilinochchi, they perceive these moves as efforts to build a fear psychosis in the South and give them a bad image in the eyes of the international community. They are linking the discovery of the suicide kit and other items near the Sugathadasa Stadium also as part of a campaign by the UPFA, like the reports of a heavy death toll in the Toppigala jungles. An official LTTE statement on the matter is most likely. Such a statement is expected to deny any LTTE involvement with the find by the Grandpass Police. The morning meeting on Friday at the Ministry of Defence was the first official conference Mr. Wickremanayake chaired since being sworn in as Deputy Minister of Defence. Soon after it began, at 8.am he was joined by Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. Defence Secretary Cyril Herath, Public Security, Law and Order Ministry Secretary, Tilak Ranaviraja, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle (Army), Air Force Commander (Air Marshal Donald Perera) and intelligence top brass were on hand. However, no representatives of the Navy were there. If Mr. Wickremanayake has set in motion measures to deal with any possible attacks by the Tiger guerrillas, other UPFA leaders were busy trying to re-activate the stalled peace process. They asked Norway's Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Hans Brattskar to ascertain from the LTTE leadership in Wanni their formal response to President Kumaratunga's policy statement broadcast on Saturday (June 12) night by the state electronic media. UPFA leaders have taken seriously the advice of Norway's Foreign Minister, Jan Peterson, during his visit to Colombo last month. He made clear that Norway, playing the role of a facilitator, would not be influenced by media reports in Sri Lanka or abroad. He had asserted that they would guide themselves only from the accounts they receive directly both from the Government and the LTTE. Hence the move by the UPFA leadership to directly seek the views of the LTTE leadership than rely on their websites or media. Ambassador Brattskar flew into Kilinochchi in a Sri Lanka Air Force helicopter in the company of his embassy staffer, Kjerstie Tromsdal last Wednesday. There LTTE Political Wing leader, S.P. Tamilselvan and "Police Chief," Sinhala speaking B. Nadesan, a new addition to the peace negotiations had a different story to relate. As the Tamilnet website put it, they complained about what was called "malicious and false propaganda in the state controlled media regarding the situation in the Batticaloa district." An incident in Pondukalchenai near Toppigala in the Batticaloa district just after midnight signalling the dawn of Monday this week triggered off all the anger in Kilinochchi. The fact that state electronic media and the vernacular press were giving prominence to a rising death toll that reached a record 150 was the cause of it. In addition to it were reports that the LTTE intelligence wing leader, Pottu Amman (Shivasankaran), the man wanted for the murder of one time Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, had been killed. Pottu Amman was in Batticaloa for weeks but had returned to the Wanni more than a week before this incident. In fact he had joked to colleagues on learning of these reports that he was one guerrilla who had been killed a number of times but was still alive. Since Karuna faction broke off from the LTTE, some media reports of their feuding and resultant deaths lacked accuracy. If the state run media is being blamed for the "latest killings," sections of the private media reported early last month that LTTE Trincomalee military wing leader Pathuman had been shot dead. He is still in Wanni. Proof he was among the living came when the guerrilla leadership allowed Pathuman to talk to Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim when he visited Kilinochchi last month. The Sunday Times learnt from authoritative sources that remaining elements loyal to renegade leader Karuna had carried out the attack in Pondukalchenai on an LTTE intelligence base. According to a guerrilla source in the Wanni, only eight of their cadres were killed. The first indication of an incident came when armed forces intercepted a radio conversation about some firing. But one base had immediately ordered the other to maintain complete radio silence. Later that day cadres loyal to Wanni had launched manhunt in the area for the attackers. At least two of them, one report said, had been rounded up. A search is said to be under way to identify the civilians who helped. Some of this had been near security forces positions. They had even heard gunfire. In another incident members of the Karuna faction had reportedly thrown a grenade killing an elderly person and his daughter. But for the LTTE leadership in Wanni the reports in the state controlled media were an acute embarrassment. Firstly such reports were perceived as an official account of the Government and led to suspicions that it was being cleverly orchestrated by the UPFA leadership. Though reports related to the incident were factually inaccurate, they still focused attention on a reality - the fact that the LTTE is not yet in full military control of the Batticaloa district. These reports, the LTTE feared, created the feeling that the Karuna faction still wielded strong clout in the area. Hence the LTTE not only denied the reports but also came out with a smokescreen - the firing was the result of training exercises that were under way. Mr Brattskar who returned from the Wanni briefed the head of the Peace Secretariat, Jayantha Dhanapala on the outcome of his talks on Thursday. The main issue had become the protest over state media reports. That very day, Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, Vidar Helgesen met with President Kumaratunga in London. On the same day, special envoy Erik Solheim also met LTTE chief negotiator, Anton Balasingham in London. Later, Mr. Helgesen boarded a flight to New Delhi that Thursday. Also leaving for New Delhi from Colombo that day was Ambassador Brattskar. The two Norwegian facilitators on Friday met India's new National Security Advisor Jyotindra Nath Dixit to brief him on the latest developments in the peace process. The Norwegian Government, a diplomatic source said, was keen to keep the new Congress led United Progressive Alliance kept abreast of all important developments. This source said Norwegian facilitator efforts will resume in Colombo by early July. However, no forward movement in the shuttle diplomacy between Colombo and Kilinochchi is expected till after the Provincial Council elections on July 10. By then another important factor will become clearer - whether the UPFA will be in a position to muster a clear majority in Parliament. If they don't, then the LTTE will be faced with the prospect of negotiating with a minority Government. Even if such a Government vows to seek Parliament's support for any interim solution until issues related to a final settlement are discussed, once again the US $ 4.5 billion dollar question would still remain unanswered. All
set for Courageous voyage Last month President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga gave approval for the Navy to acquire a 1967 vintage US Coast Guard (USCG) cutter named "Courageous." This 210 feet long search and rescue vessel is being offered by the US Government free of charge but it is costing the Government US dollars 6.9 million (approximately Rs 690 million) to repair the vessel and train the crew before sailing it from Baltimore (US) to Colombo. The voyage will have to be through both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. A further commitment of US dollars 4 million (Rs 400 million) or more will have to be incurred by the Sri Lanka Navy to install a weapons system on board. Last Monday a team of 12 officers and sailors of the Navy left for United States. They are led by Captain S.S. Ranasinghe, who has been designated as the Commanding Officer for the coast guard vessel which is yet to be re-named by the Navy. The Navy team is now conducting sea trials together with the US Coast Guard in the seas off Portland, Oregon in the North West coast. A vessel similar to the one being acquired by the Navy is being used for this purpose. This week, two other senior officers of the Navy, Commodores Jayantha Perera and Thisara Samarasinghe left for Washington ahead of Vice Admiral Sandagiri's visit. The Navy chief will also be joined by Capt. Ranasinghe in Washington. On route to Colombo, Vice Admiral Sandagiri and his entourage are to stop in London for a meeting with the Secretary General of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). At the request of the IMO, the Government has already placed the security of the country's four main ports - Colombo, Trincomalee, Galle and Kankesanthurai - in the hands of the Navy. After the Navy took over this responsibility, Vice Admiral Sandagiri, who is to be appointed Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) from July 1 in addition to his present office, issued certificates in accordance with ISPDS (International Shipping and Ports Development Security code). In doing so, he has certified that the security in the four main ports in the country is adequate for normal functioning. During his visit to Washington, Vice Admiral Sandagiri is also expected to meet with US Navy and senior Department of Defence officials. In September 2002, a United States Pacific Command team that made an assessment of the armed forces of Sri Lanka declared that the Sri Lanka Navy plays a key role in the country's defence. Their bulky report noted: "Our assessment team and senior officers from each Sri Lanka service component agree that the LTTE's center of gravity is its re-supply of arms by sea. Stopping this flow must be among the highest priorities. Whilst the Sri Lanka Navy has pushed the arms transfer points from coastal waters to mid-ocean channels, the armed forces of Sri Lanka must possess long-range surveillance aircraft and maritime interdiction vessels capable of stopping the transfers." The report adds: "The vessels need a deck gun with greater stand-off range and accuracy than the LTTE suicide boats, and the fast attack craft unit must change their tactics to reduce their target signature. Finally, the Government of Sri Lanka and the armed forces of Sri Lanka must develop rules of engagement that support the action of local commanders who board suspicious ships to confiscate smuggled arms and ammunition." The focus of the PACOM assessment team was to study the armed forces' operational and tactical levels, to determine their capabilities, needs and requirements. Some of the other salient points made: During almost 20 years of conflict, the armed forces have been unable to defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), despite greatly outnumbering them. The political and military shortfalls that contributed to this situation will take time and investment to correct. However, the assessment team believes that the situation in Sri Lanka is one of the most promising in South Asia, due to the armed forces' extensive combat experience, morale and small unit proficiency and eagerness at most levels to improve their capabilities. Many Sri Lankan military personnel see the US attacks on terrorist organisations after 11 September 2001 as the key in getting the LTTE to sign a ceasefire agreement in February 2002. They emphasised the need for continued international pressure and support for upcoming peace talks. · The LTTE is taking advantage of the ceasefire to strengthen its position politically and militarily through strong recruiting, public relations efforts, establishment of political cells in Government controlled areas, training programmes and weapon re-supply. Due to a variety of challenges, particularly economic shortfalls and operational inefficiencies, the armed forces have made only limited improvements. This situation threatens to place the Government of Sri Lanka in a precarious position at the negotiating table or on the battlefield if the hostilities resume. A variety of factors have limited the development of proper doctrine, force structure, training programmes and tactics. Due to the lack of a rational security strategy, and thus a national military strategy, the country has not effectively focused all of its instruments of national power against the threats posed by the LTTE. During the military's rapid expansion, the armed forces did not develop the long range planning and integrated systems needed to effectively prepare and employ forces and to support the larger structure. This is explained in part by the country's limited resources and engagement in a deadly battle. However, it is also due to the influence of partisan politics and a lack of initiative at higher levels. Officers at all levels were able to identify and propose solutions for current shortcomings. However, it appears that much of the possible internal reform is squelched in a system where promotions are based almost entirely on longevity. One of the top recommendations of the assessment team and many Sri Lankan officers is to establish a merit-based promotion system and service limits for senior personnel. The US Pacific Command assembled a 24 man military assessment team from its service components and Special Operations Command. The team consisted of subject matter experts in operations, intelligence, counter-terrorism (CT), fire support, engineering, logistics, communications, maintenance, foreign internal defence, conventional and naval special operations, civil affairs, psychological operations, conventional and special operations aviation, a Special Forces Operational Detachment B. If the assessment report was completed and delivered during the tenure of the former United National Front (UNF) Government, no action whatsoever appears to have been taken to act on the recommendations or to remedy shortcomings highlighted. That no doubt would add to the reasons adduced by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces for taking over the defence portfolio from the UNF on November 4, last year. But a tragic comedy has followed. If her bold assertions that national security interests were in peril, eight months later, with little or no change, things seem to be in a worse state. The security and defence establishments are in worst disarray. One need not read through classified information to see this reality. The writing is on the wall. |
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