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| Peace talks bogged down in preconditions
The United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) Government's efforts to hurriedly resume direct peace talks with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have proved futile. It was only last week that assertions the Tiger guerrillas were ready for talks "at any time convenient to the Government," that too "without pre conditions," turned out to be a fallacy. Now there is more. Three weeks into office, the UPFA took the first step of inviting Norway to resume their facilitator role. They were eager. An accord on an agenda, a venue and dates for talks, ahead of the meeting of four major aid donors in Brussels on June 2, would have sent the right signal. The United States, Japan, the European Union and Norway are set to review aid to re-construct war torn north-east. Their decisions hinge on the resumption of peace talks which remain suspended since April 2003. Now, the Brussels meeting is sure to end with donors calling for the two sides to return to the negotiation table than pledge any aid. A second visit this month by Norway's Special Envoy Erik Solheim to Colombo and the Wanni has further laid bare the truth that pre conditions did exist. But this time, the LTTE has amplified those pre conditions prompting in its wake what has turned out to be pre conditions from the UPFA Government. LTTE Political Wing leader, S.P. Tamilselvan, told Mr Solheim last Wednesday in Kilinochchi that "institutionalizing the ISGA (Interim Self Governing Authority) should take place first so that we can demonstrate to the people that their urgent humanitarian needs would be effectively met with by the ISGA and will help to build confidence among the people who are the real stakeholders in the peace process." Those words are from the official LTTE Peace Secretariat website. It added “……Tamil thinking is loud and clear in that the overwhelming mandate on the implementation of the ISGA proposals is a verdict that cannot be ignored." He was alluding to the LTTE claim that voters at the April 2 Parliamentary elections who returned Tamil National Alliance (TNA) candidates had "overwhelmingly endor-sed" ISGA as the sole basis for any future peace talks. Earlier, when the LTTE placed the ISGA proposals before the previous United National Front (UNF) Government, (in November 2003), the position was different. It offered to discuss these proposals. There is a paradigm shift. Now, the LTTE wants the ISGA proposals institutionalized. According to the Oxford Dictionary, institutionalize means to "establish (something typically a practice or activity) as a convention or norm in an organisation or culture…" In other words the LTTE wants an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) in place before any discussions could take place on a final settlement. This means two-thirds of Sri Lanka's landmass and four-fifths of the sea coast will come under LTTE control for five years if the proposals are granted in its present form. The eight-page documents containing the proposals are outside Sri Lanka's Constitution and laws. The arrangements demanded are without any Government control. Yet the LTTE wants funds from the Government, including those accruing from the North-East. The use of these funds will be subject to audit by an Auditor General to be appointed by them. During their 90 minute meeting, the official LTTE Peace Secretariat website also said Mr Solheim (who was there together with Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar) "conveyed to Mr. Tamilselvan the thinking" of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga on re commencement of peace talks. It added "the President is of the view that the discussions on ISGA proposals should take place parallel to the discussions on core issues." Days ahead of Mr. Solheim's arrival in Colombo last Tuesday, the UPFA Government had made available to the LTTE (through the Norwegian facilitators) a document that set out what seems to be their pre condition vis-à-vis the LTTE's own. This document, a copy of which The Sunday Times has seen, made clear "…..any agreed Interim Authority will bear the contours of a final solution to the ethnic conflict taking into account the Oslo statement and the Tokyo Declaration…" This placed the Norwegian facilitators in a dilemma over the issue of a formal statement incorporating an agenda, venue and dates for peace talks. On the one hand, the LTTE was insisting that its ISGA proposals should "be institutionalized." On the other, the UPFA Government was emphatic that any "agreed Interim Authority will bear the contours of a final solution." This solution, it points out, should be on the basis of the Oslo statement and the Tokyo Declaration. The Oslo statement came on December 5, 2002 at the end of the third round of peace talks. A statement issued by the Royal Norwegian Government, among other matters, declared: "Responding to a proposal by the leadership of the LTTE, the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of interim-self determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. The parties acknowledged that the solution has to be acceptable to all communities." The Sunday Times leant that reference was made to clause 18 of the Tokyo Declaration on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka issued on June 10, 2003. This clause which deals with Linkage between Donor Support and Progress in the Peace Process states: "Assistance by the donor community must be closely linked to substantial and parallel progress in the peace process towards fulfilment of the objectives agreed upon by the parties in Oslo. The Conference encourages the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE to enter into discussions as early as possible on a provisional administrative structure to manage the reconstruction and development aspects of the transition process. The process would need the expeditious development of a roadmap with clear milestones indicating the path towards a mutually acceptable final political solution. With this in view, the international community intends to review and monitor the progress of the peace process closely, with particular reference to objectives and milestones including:
The positions taken by the LTTE and the UPFA Government, quite clearly, prevented the Norwegian facilitators from making a breakthrough. Hence they were unable to issue a formal statement. However, a meeting for Mr. Solheim with President Kumaratunga, originally scheduled to take place before his visit to Wanni, only took place thereafter. That was on Thursday evening. A statement issued later that night sounded less optimistic in its tone than a more assuring previous one that spoke of talks at a time convenient to the Government without any pre conditions. It said: "The Norwegian delegation comprising Special Envoy Erik Solheim and Ambassador Hans Brattskar called on President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga on Thursday at President's House. They briefed the President on their discussions in Kilinochchi with the LTTE's Political Wing Head S.P. Tamilselvan who had re-iterated the LTTE's commitment to the Ceasefire Agreement and to the resumption of negotiations. "The President whilst confirming the Government's readiness to enter into negotiations with the LTTE had an exchange of views on the agenda for the talks. It was agreed that the Norwegian delegation would continue consultations in this regard. "Associated with the President in the discussions were Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat Jayantha Dhanapala and Foreign Secretary, S. Palihakkara". As re-iterated in the latest UPFA statement, the Norwegian delegation will no doubt continue consultations but the question is when. Sections of the Colombo based diplomatic community believe mounting protests from UPFA's main partner, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) over the ISGA proposals and the July 10 Provincial Council elections may have forced the Government to "go slow" on the peace process for the time being. Hence, any further Norwegian shuttle diplomacy between Colombo and Kilinochchi is not likely at least until after mid July. That again would be to only resume their task to narrow down the widening gulf in the positions taken up by the LTTE and the Government. Moreover, the LTTE too will be pre-occupied next month with a high profile delegation visiting European capitals for meetings with the Tamil diaspora. Mr. Solheim left Colombo on Friday evening to New Delhi to brief the newly elected United Progressive Alliance Government of Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh on the latest developments. He will also brief the Norweigian Ambassador to India, Jon Westborg. Mr. Solheim’s visit co-incides with an official visit to New Delhi beginning tomorrow by Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar. He arrived in the Indian capital yesterday. Mr. Kadirgamar is to hold official talks with his new counterpart, Kanwar Natwar Singh. Some important issues including the peace process will figure during discussions. It is also likely to pave the way for an early visit to New Delhi by President Kumaratunga. In addition, Prime Minister, Mahinda Rajapakse, is also due to visit India later this month. Later, Mr. Solheim was due in London en route to Brussels for the aid donor meeting. There he will brief LTTE Chief Negotiator, Anton Balasingham, on the recent developments. Despite a lack of steady progress in efforts to resume direct talks, the UPFA Government is going out of the way to ensure the Ceasefire Agreement remains intact. This is particularly in the wake of the LTTE pointing the finger at the Sri Lanka Army for a string of incidents in the Batticaloa district. They have accused that the Army was backing the Karuna faction that was gunning down cadres loyal to the Wanni leadership. However, the Army has denied these charges and is blaming the LTTE for the killings of theirs and Police intelligence cadres in the district. Last Monday, Defence Secretary Cyril Herath, directed Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle, to immediately assign Chief of Staff, Major General Shantha Kottegoda to take control of the situation. A directive Lt. Gen. Balagalle issued with copies to the Army, Navy, Air Force, Police, Special Task Force on May 24 said: "In the recent past increased number of security related incidents were reported from the Eastern Province particularly in the Batticaloa and Ampara Districts. There have been many incidents where members of the Armed Forces, Police, civilians and LTTE cadres were killed in these areas. Killing of LTTE cadres appear to be as a result of the ongoing clashes between LTTE Wanni cadres and the Karuna faction. "Chief of Staff of the Army has been appointed Overall Operational Commander (East) and will be stationed in the SF HQ (E) TAOR with immediate effect. OOC (East) in consultation with Chief of Defence Staff will take appropriate courses of action to improve the security situation in the Eastern Province. "OOC (East), Major General S.H.S. Kottegoda WWV RWP RSP USP ndc will be in overall command of all Armed Forces, Police and STF personnel deployed in the East." It is now public knowledge that since the defence portfolio was brought under the President seven months ago (when UNF Government was in power), matters relating to the security establishment have been in a disarray. The appointment of Army's number two, veteran infantryman Maj. Gen. Kottegoda, to the new post caused confusion both in the security establishment in the east as well as in the LTTE hierarchy. In the East, where the security establishment came under an Eastern Commander (Maj. Gen. Nanda Mallawaratchchi), the need for an Overall Operational Commander (OOC) when there is a no war situation led to confusion and cast serious doubts. For obvious reasons one cannot elaborate here the repercussions the appointment had. In the LTTE, strange enough, it led initially to serious fears. Questions were raised by the Wanni leadership whether any covert operations were being planned against their cadres. This was on the assumption that Maj. Gen. Kottegoda had been friendly with ousted Batticaloa-Ampara leader Karuna having served as a member of the Government delegation to the peace talks during the UNF regime. In fact the two had struck a good rapport during talks in Thailand. However, Maj. Gen. Kottegoda was able to dispel most doubts after he undertook a tour of several security forces establishments in the Batticaloa district. Speaking to senior officers including those from the Police, he made clear his task was to ensure that all measures to prevent a break down of the Ceasefire Agreement was in place. He said those in the district had a responsibility to adhere to the CFA and it was the task of the senior officers to make sure it was enforced. After these meetings, Maj. Gen. Kottegoda was reporting to Defence Secretary Herath of the developments. He had gone to the east armed with full powers to deal with any officers or men found negligent, attempting to scuttle the ceasefire or violate directives. Most of the incidents in the Batticaloa district have come in the backdrop of efforts by the LTTE Wanni leadership to regain full control of the area. Since they defeated Karuna and his faction, some of the camps are yet to be re-established and normal activity restored. If the LTTE is busy re-establishing its control of the Batticaloa Ampara districts, what of the Sri Lankan security forces? Here again, it is clear that priorities have got mixed up. In the recent past when clashes between the Wanni leadership and the Karuna faction were at their height, troops had to be rushed from elsewhere to bolster security arrangements in the Batticaloa district. This included troops who were undergoing further training at Minneriya. It is no secret that troop strength in the area is woefully inadequate to meet the rising needs. Many a field commander has brought this to the attention of those who matter. On some occasions the inadequacy has been reflected at National Security Council meetings. What does the Ministry of Defence do in this backdrop where many a countrywide recruitment drive has failed to enlist required numbers? The answer is to send Sri Lankan troops on peace keeping missions abroad. Already national television networks are full of advertisements asking the country's youth to join to go on peace keeping missions overseas. Like
the previous UNF Government, this is being done wholly on the assumption
that peace has already arrived and troops are now redundant.
Changes in military hierarchy soon Although no replacement has been formally named, it is certain to be Major General Shantha Kottegoda, the present Chief of Staff. He is currently serving additionally as Overall Operations Commander (East). It is not immediately clear whether Lt. Gen. Balagalle will continue as Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). In this capacity, he is head of the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH), the combined arm of security forces and Police vested to co-ordinate all operational activity. If he does not, the post is expected to go to Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy, who will then be the senior-most serving Commander. Before making a formal appointment, The Sunday Times learns President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, who is also Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief is having informal interviews with those next in line for the highest post in the Army. Last Friday she is learnt to have met with Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Sarath Fonseka. He is also the Commandant of the Volunteer Force. During an informal conversation President Kumaratunga is learnt to have ascertained from Maj. Gen. Fonseka several matters and emphasised the need to work as a team with anyone named as the new Commander. President Kumaratunga is expected to meet Maj. Gen. Kottegoda tomorrow. He is now the second in command and is widely regarded as one of the best infantrymen in the Army. She is also expected to meet the number four in line of command, Maj. Gen. Chula Seneviratne, currently the Director General - General Staff (DGGS). |
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© 2001 Wijeya Newspapers Ltd. All rights reserved. |
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