JVP learning to be 'evolutionary'
By Our Political Editor
Two months into Power and Place, the young revolutionaries of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna are learning, and learning fast, to become 'evolutionaries’.

They have already abandoned their quest for righting the wrongs they saw in the Establishment. They arm-twisted the PA leadership to signing an MoU and a Code of Ethics before the elections, not knowing that the PA knew that these documents are not worth the paper they were written on.

Already, the JVP's firebrand Wimal Weerawansa is a bit subdued. At Kurunegala this week addressing party faithfuls on the subject of whether the nation's mandate should be submerged by the Diyawanna - a clear theme aimed at subjugating Parliament where they don’t have a majority - to the country - where they believe they have a majority, Weerawansa admitted defeat, in a sense.

He told a red-shirt clad youth who fired a question at him during the seminar that despite having an agreement with the PA prior to the polls about defeated candidates not being made MPs or given government jobs, the JVP now had no right to dictate terms to the PA on this subject. To those who believed that the JVP could control the widespread nepotism and abuses indulged in by the two main parties over the years, this was a sad let down. There was no fight on it either, just a wilting under pressure.

This would gladden the hearts of those who fear the JVP for the message was clear. The JVP was joining the Rat Race. It would seem that the PA would steam-roll their way which way they wished, the JVP notwithstanding. But the one solitary issue - almost the last stand of the JVP would be their stance in the new government's negotiations with the LTTE, courtesy Norwegian brokerage.

Thoroughly uncomfortable with what’s going on, the JVP's holy trinity – Somawansa Amarasinghe, Tilvin Silva and Wimal Weerawansa – have shied away from making public statements in recent days. Journalists complain that their mobiles are answered by others, and calls are not returned.

That is, however, not to say that they have given up. As they see President Chandrika Kumaratunga rob them of their platform - a hardline on the LTTE issue - its leaders mustered enough courage to go see her, and convey their reservations at what's happening.

Their secondliners are now being put to the test on tv channels and press interviews. Under the barrage of criticism of being turn-coats, they can only hide behind a copy of the PA-JVP MoU and quote from it when all that is already water under - the Diyawanna.

Nowhere is this phenomenon more manifest than in Norway's efforts to re-start the stalled peace process, as early as possible to appease President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. The JVP which had been the most vociferous over all the elements connected with the peace process now seemed numbed.

At first, they wanted the Norwegians out and the Indians brought in. The former People's Alliance concurred. That is now out. They wanted the Ceasefire Agreement re-negotiated bearing in mind the country's national security interests. They said the CFA was heavily loaded in favour of the LTTE. But that is out now. They wanted the composition of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) re-constituted. They wanted monitors from India and other friendly countries included. That is out too. They said the LTTE was not the sole representative of the Tamil people and should not be treated that way. But the other major arms of the UPFA ignored such protests. Little wonder, they were more angry in private than they were in public. And this explains how they won a major concession from their key partner.

They succeeded in persuading the UPFA leadership to go slow, very slow on the peace process until after the Provincial Council elections on July 10. Whether this is to effect a change of mind, a total about-turn or to review their alliance, is not clear. But the UPFA leadership has heeded their demand. Hey presto, the keenness that was shown to kick-start the peace process and kick out anyone who stood in the way has been lost. It is now tit for tat. If the LTTE wants ISGA, it would be given. But in return, they would have to agree to a federal set- up, decommission arms and adhere to human rights.

And so, eventually the meeting materialised - three hours behind schedule, but then that's not news. As the players took their positions, Kadirgamar sat on a chair like all the others, when President Kumaratunga beckoned him to come and sit with her on the same sofa.

The incident was read more than a Presidential courtesy to one of her Ministers. Kadirgamar had been at odds and ends unsure of what he is to do and what role the President wants him to play, if she wants him to play any role, in the new-look PA peace process with the LTTE.

Only the previous Saturday the two had a long tete-a-tete over egg hoppers and lunu miris at the President's House. Kadirgamar was my right-hand man (or was it left-hand?) she was trying to tell the Norwegians - and Dhanapala. Or was everyone there reading too much into the gesture?

But that tete a tete made at least one thing clear. Even if he is not a front line negotiator for peace and, as he says, opted out on his own, he is very much in the order of battle. He will remain very much part of the inner caucus that will make all the decisions, all the moves, evolve all the negotiating strategies,and decided on what to give and what not. So what difference does it make? The LTTE can be satisfied their delegates will not see him at the negotiating table. But they will not be able to remain happy they have altogether edged out Kadigamar from the peace process. He is there and he will remain. Another strong signal towards this came when Special Envoy Erik Solheim called on President Kumaratunga on Thursday night in what appeared to be an on now off again meeting. It fell on Kadirgamar to sit down at the Janadipathi Mandiraya to draft the press release.

The one time sole representative of President Kumaratunga on the peace process will therefore still remain on the band wagon although occasonally eyebrows will continue to be raised. Officials are nervous. One such occasion will come next week, soon after his talks with Indian counterpart K. Natwar Singh. A joint statement that will follow is sure to set out the new Indian Government's position vis a vis the peace talks.

India's High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, the controversial Nirupam Sen, who was featured in a cartoon in the Daily Mirror newspaper hiding behind a pillar and winding a JVP member, drew an uncanny remark from an official in the Colombo Foreign Ministry. Commenting to a colleague inside the teak walled offices, he said the cartoon should have had a headline - "Sen-tral Command". No explanation is required for the title is self- explanatory. Sen himself will be on hand when Kadirgamar talks to External Affairs Minister Singh. The latter had summoned all Indian envoys of the SAARC region for a brain storming session. Will the newly appointed National Security Advisor Jyotindra Nath Dixit also be a participant at these sessions is a question that is being raised at FO circles in Colombo.

Those who were familiar with the goings-on at the Indian High Commission in Colombo in the 1980s when Dixit and Sen were the top two diplomats, and the latter had to exit owing to sharp differences between the two will surely wonder how Dixit's entre into the corridors of power in New Delhi will impact on Sen now directing operations in Colombo.

At the time, Dixit was toeing the New Delhi line of giving a helping hand to the LTTE, while Sen had a line open to the JVP that was taking a virulent anti-Indian, anti-LTTE line. Significantly, the JVP is in power and Sen in place here in Colombo, but what of Dixit?

The 'Sudar Oli' newspaper which is hostile to Sen and his anti-LTTE line had an unusually incisive and well-analysed editorial on Friday on Dixit's re-entry into New Delhi's power axis.

The newspaper discredits Dixit with turning India against the LTTE and the cause of Eelam by working on Rajiv Gandhi to reverse his mother's stance towards Eelam and says that Dixit's new office having the status of a minister of state, would see his influence being felt at the highest levels. It says that Dixit must take a major share of the blame for India's disastrous military intervention when its troops engaged the LTTE, and lost, but that if Dixit has learnt from that bitter lesson, it is worth the experience. On the other hand, they ask, will Dixit be seeking revenge.

For those who think that the advent of Sonia Gandhi's Congress in India is a good sign for Sri Lanka, they better think again. In this newspaper's editorial a fortnight ago we said that Investments Minister Anura Bandaranaike writing to Ms. Gandhi referring to the long-standing personal relationship between his family and the Gandhis was alright, but lest we forget, it was the same Gandhis who unleashed the LTTE on this country, and Rajiv Gandhi who sent his Air Force against our wishes on the now infamous 'parippu drop' to arrest our Forces from vanquishing, militarily, the LTTE at Vadamarachchi in 1987.

As Foreign Minister Kadirgamar races to New Delhi for meetings with the new Indian leaders it might be useful to consider the following. The section relating to Sri Lanka in the Common Minimum Programme (CMP) of the new Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in India, reflects a noticeable tilt towards the Tamil and Muslim minorities.

And Dixit had suggested that India "unofficially" shed its reserve about interacting with the LTTE, and allow its "political establishment" to engage the militant group in an informal effort to persuade it to accept a settlement which met the legitimate aspirations of the Tamils within a united Sri Lanka.

The CMP, adopted unanimously on Thursday this week, says the following about Sri Lanka: 'The UPA government will support peace talks in Sri Lanka that fulfil the legitimate aspirations of Tamils and religious minorities within the territorial integrity and solidarity of Sri Lanka."

This is a clear departure from the earlier stand (adopted during the BJP regime) that India will support a solution acceptable to "all communities" in Sri Lanka. The earlier stand had not singled out the Tamils or mentioned any community or communities. There was also an abandonment of an exclusive interest in the Tamil cause, which India had upheld since the mid 1980s.

In the last days of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, New Delhi had stressed the importance of Sri Lanka's finding a "homegrown" solution, as opposed to a solution brought about by external forces. India had said that any solution would have to be worked out by negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE without the involvement of foreign powers (except as facilitators).

The current stand, as elucidated in the CMP, however, makes no mention of India's preferences as regards the manner in which a solution may be sought, that is, if it should be necessarily "homegrown". This might well have been an oversight or a deliberate miss for the sake of brevity in a broad policy document. But the gap is noticeable all the same. It could mean that India might not tout the old line and might seek a role for itself in the peace process in the coming months and years.

However, it looks as if the Congress party had been pushed into taking this stance by the compulsions of coalition politics. This can be gleaned from a comparison of the Congress party's own foreign policy and strategic agenda and the relevant paragraphs in the CMP.

The Congress agenda, drawn up by the present Minister, K.Natwar Singh and Dixit, made no mention of Sri Lanka. The island was subsumed under the category "proximate neighbours" and the policy pronouncement in regard to this omnibus category merely said that India would allocate "the highest priority" to maintaining and expanding relations with them. Therefore, left to itself, the Congress may have pursued the stand-offish policy of the BJP-led government. But it is now in a coalition with the DMK, the MDMK and the PMK, the latter two being especially strong supporters of the Sri Lankan Tamil cause as espoused by the LTTE.

It is not as if the DMK, MDMK and the PMK had not been in the central government before. All three were in the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA). But at that time, they were junior partners with very few MPs. Not so now. Most Tamil Nadu MPs are from the DMK now. The MDMK and PMK also have a stronger presence. Of these, the MDMK is outside the government. But this will only increase its clout because it has power without responsibility. It can take a hardline stand on the Sri Lankan Tamil issue and goad the UPA regime into taking a pro-Tamil line.

The Congress would not be able to brush aside the Tamil Nadu parties easily also because these parties are needed to face the Tamil Nadu state legislature elections two years down the line. And these elections will be historically important for the Tamil Nadu Congress. If the UPA holds till then, and wins the elections in Tamil Nadu, Congress may be part of a coalition government in the state, and in power after a gap of 38 years.

The mention of "religious minorities" in the CMP is also significant because this is the first time that the religious minorities are being mentioned in an Indian policy statement on Sri Lanka. Previously, the various groups in Sri Lanka were identified merely as "communities" and the expression "all communities" was meant to include the Muslims too. But the CMP goes a step further, and short of mentioning the Muslims, talks of "religious minorities".

This is probably due to the avowedly secular and pro-minority character of the UPA and not to the influence of the Dravidian parties of Tamil Nadu which tend to brush aside the Muslim case and uphold only the Tamil case in Sri Lanka. The Dravidian (another name for Tamil parties) parties do not recognize the fact that Sri Lankan Tamils and Sri Lankan Muslims are not the same even though both are Tamil-speaking. The expectation is that all Tamil speakers are "Tamils" and should uphold the "Tamil" cause. But in the last few years, the government of India (the BJP government included) has been holding that Sri Lankan Muslims are a distinct political entity and have a case to be addressed vis-à-vis the majority Tamils in the troubled North Eastern Province. The case for promoting the Muslim cause has acquired further strength in New Delhi now, given the fact that one of the key factors propelling the UPA into power was a pro-minority or to be more specific, a pro-Muslim plank.

The CMP of the UPA regime and also the Congress party's foreign policy agenda indicate a hardening of the attitude towards the United States and this could affect New Delhi's view of American involvement in Sri Lanka.

Referring to the Vajpayee government's policy vis-à-vis the US, the Congress agenda said: " Sadly, a great country like India has been reduced to having a subordinate relationship with the USA, where the USA takes India for granted. This is the result of the BJP/NDA government's willingness to adjust to US priorities and policies without giving due attention to India's own vital foreign policy and national security interests."

Though generally accommodative of the involvement of the US-led "international community" in the Sri Lankan process, India has been none too happy about the increasing internationalization of the Sri Lankan conflict. As India sees it, increasing international involvement may mean having too many cooks who will spoil the broth. It may also mean the entry of forces and interests which can jeopardize India's national, geopolitical and security interests. Hence the formulation that any solution to the Sri Lankan conflict should be "homegrown" and brought about by direct negotiations between the concerned domestic parties.

However, it is likely that India will make itself an exception to the "homegrown" rule, given the fact that the UPA regime is beholden to the non-Congress Tamil Nadu parties for being in power. The Tamil Nadu parties demonstrated their power over the regime when the DMK insisted on getting a large number of portfolios and several plum ministries in the government, the PMK got its chosen men into the cabinet, and the NDMK refused to join the government despite heavy pressure.

The DMK will not be pushy on the Sri Lankan Tamil issue, having lost power on that issue earlier, but it cannot be seen to be taking an anti-Sri Lankan Tamil stand when the MDMK and the PMK make a push for such a stand in the event of a major crisis in Sri Lanka affecting the fortunes of the Tamils there. The DMK needs the MDMK in Tamil Nadu politics.

Alliance with the PMK will also help. Both the MDMK and the PMK are committed to upholding the Sri Lankan Tamil cause. MDMK leader, Vaiko, who is now the kingpin as far as the Sri Lankan Tamil issue in Tamil Nadu goes, is of the view that India should shed its reserve and actively participate in the Sri Lankan peace process to help the Tamils realize their legitimate aspirations. Vaiko is no diehard supporter of an independent Tamil Eelam, but he insists that the Sri Lankan government give internal autonomy to the Tamils as per the demands made by the LTTE whose legitimacy as the sole leader of the liberation movement he accepts unquestioningly.

The question that remains to be answered is what role the new External Affairs Minister and the new National Security Advisor are likely to play in shaping India's policy towards Sri Lanka on the ethnic issue. They are indeed in nodal positions in terms of actual policy formation and can therefore influence policy both in terms of its broad contours and nuances. But they will have to act within the broad parameters set by domestic politics.

As a former Minister of State for External Affairs, Natwar Singh was closely involved in the formulation of India's Sri Lanka policy in the Rajiv Gandhi years, when the controversial India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 was signed and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was inducted in Sri Lanka. But his writings since becoming a member of the Opposition and as Foreign Policy Advisor to Sonia Gandhi, do not indicate anything more than a passing interest in Sri Lanka. But Dixit has been a different kettle of fish. He has a book ("Assignment Colombo") to his credit on his tenure as India's High Commissioner in Sri Lanka during the Accord years. He has also been writing frequently on the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka as a regular newspaper columnist. One can glean his personal views on the subject from these written works.

What is clear from his writings is that Dixit is no longer a supporter of a "forward" or "interventionist" Indian policy on Sri Lanka. He believes that neither Colombo nor the LTTE could be fully trusted and that India must follow a cautious policy based primarily on its national interests.

In "Assignment Colombo" (page 349) he says that while Indira Gandhi was justified in supporting Tamil aspirations, she should not have supported Tamil militancy. India could have restricted itself to applying diplomatic and political pressure on the Jayewardene government to be reasonable towards the Tamils.

In the Rajiv Gandhi rea, India had not sensed the "deep chasm" between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority, and had erroneously thought that these two could come to a reasonable settlement, as envisaged by the India-Sri Lanka Accord, Dixit said. These parties had accepted the Accord initially, only for "tactical purposes".

The other crucial point that Dixit makes on page 350 is that the India state or the Indian political system has no will power to intervene abroad to shape inter-country relations, especially in an adversarial situation, even though it may be aspiring to be a regional power. India had to leave Sri Lanka without completing its tasks under the India-Sri Lanka Accord because of a lack of political will in New Delhi as was evident in parliament and the "hasty" withdrawal affected by the VP.Singh government which succeeded Rajiv Gandhi's at the end of the 1980s.

Writing in "Hindustan Times" on March 1, 2000, after the entry of the Norwegian government as the facilitator in the Sri Lanka peace process, Dixit welcomed the drafting of Norway as the facilitator. He said that India should play only an indirect role. "Given its experience over the last two decades, India should not get directly involved in the latest mediatory exercise. It should, however, do everything possible to strengthen the Norwegian effort and encourage the Tamils and the Sri Lankan government to move away from rigid stances and towards practical compromises."

Writing in the "Indian Express" on April 18, 2002, after LTTE chief V. Prabhakaran's press conference, Dixit concluded that the LTTE leader would not give up the goal of an independent Eelam easily and that he could renege from promises as he had done hitherto. The Sri Lankan government too seemed to be unbending and averse to going the extra mile to strike a compromise. Dixit said that India should therefore view the on-going peace process with "caution and limited optimism."

On what India could do under the circumstances, Dixit suggested two parallel moves: (1) encourage the moderate Tamil political forces to "become a more active and effective factor in the forthcoming negotiations." (2) suggest to Colombo that it should show "unambiguous responsiveness to Tamil aspirations."

In his latest pronouncement on the subject in an interview to Meenakshi Iyer of Hindustan Times on May 2, 2004, Dixit says: " India should be supportive of the Sri Lankan government in resuming the dialogue with the LTTE to resolve the ethnic problem. It should be equally willing to persuade the LTTE and the other Tamils of Sri Lanka to reach a compromise, which while meeting their aspirations, does not erode the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka."

"India's assistance and help should be basically political. For the present, any military involvement is not advisable. Such involvement should be there only if the LTTE directly or indirectly threatens India's unity and integrity or indulges in terrorism against India."

On how, India could interact with the LTTE when that organization stood banned in India for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, Dixit said: "This (the ban) does not mean that sections of the political establishment of India cannot interact with the LTTE inside Sri Lanka to push them towards a peaceful solution. The proscription is against the LTTE's being active in any manner in India."

This keeps the door open for India to engage the LTTE directly, though by no means officially. And this fits in with the change of the political climate in India since the parliamentary elections in that country. And yet all this must be weighed against Sonia Gandhi’s pathological hate of the LTTE.

Alliance is not facing a very rosy future
By Harinda Ranura Vidanage
The UPFA government machinery is functioning below the expected levels of efficiency since key operational mechanisms are not in place. These include the appointment of heads and board members to a multitude of government departments and institutions. This delay has drastically reduced the working capacity of most ministries.

The appointments made by the President’s House up to now are shrouded in controversy as both SLFP and JVP members claim that President Kumaratunga is on an arbitrary appointment spree with consultations becoming a non existent factor. But it was Mangala Samaraweera who was the first to shoot down a nominee of President Kumaratunga by refusing to appoint Kamal Ratwatte as chairman of the Ports Authority.

The peace process is also a jealously guarded personal subject of the President. Till recently she was working with one of her most trusted advisors and friends based in the United States attached to the Rockefeller Centre. This was the individual who caused Finland's ex- president Mattias Ahtissari to visit Lanka and meet President Kumaratunga during the last UNF regime. The meeting triggered a host of media speculation on the future of the peace process and the possible change of facilitators from the Norwegians to the Finnish.

But these speculations almost became a reality when the same individual returned to the country a few weeks ago and did some serious work with the blessings of President Kumaratunga to bring in the Finns as facilitators. This effort was totally shot down by the LTTE who strongly lobbied for the continuation of the Norwegian group.

The peace process now has taken a U-turn with fresh demands being imposed by the LTTE. The ISGA proposals initially, according to the LTTE, were to be the basis of negotiations but now they have called for the institutionalising of the ISGA to commence negotiations. This could be a calculated move to shut down a window of opportunity available for peace amidst the change of government.

From the government's side the elevation of former Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickramanayake to Parliament at this time of crisis is symbolic. During the PA government efforts at peace making, a group led by the then Prime Minister blocked the path to peace. This opposition led to drastic changes to the draft Constitution of 2000 in the area of devolution of power, eroding its core value on the subject of constitutional devolution.

The euphoria that arose within the JVP ranks consequent to the election victory and its presence in cabinet has been shattered. The JVP is also finding it hard to operate within a bureaucracy well established and functions on its own will. Some call this the "bureaucratic mafia" a truly regressive feature of the governance system of Sri Lanka. The JVP ministers are also affected by the incompetent secretaries who have been appointed, with just a single exception.

Also President Kumaratunga's attitude towards the constituent parties of the Freedom Alliance has also not been to the liking of the JVP. At a politburo meeting the reds have decided to confront the President directly by writing to her and telling her point blank "you should transform into being the leader of the FA while continuing in the capacity of the president of the country"

Meanwhile the Kumari "Lewinsky" Cooray affaire is yet to die down as a special FA team has begun a wider probe into Hakeem's private life. This team includes deputy minister Sripathi Sooriayarachchi, Mahindananda Aluthgamage, Lasantha Alagiyawanne and Mangala Samaraweera coordinating secretary Ruwan Ferdinandez. The grand plan to attack SLMC leader Rauff Hakeem is likely to continue with more issues relating to his private life being used in the near future to blast him out of his political orbit.

Minister Mangala Samaraweera who is also not in the good books of President Kumaratunga is also losing some of his coordinating skills as well. Recently he visited the river Beira site and pledged a total revamping of the whole site to be taken over by his ministry. But the minister forgot to invite his partner Urban Development Minister Dinesh Gunawardena for this trip. This oversight, if at all, had infuriated Mr. Gunawardena making him summon some of the officials of his ministry who joined the Samaraweera team and reportedly giving them a tongue lashing.

As the Sri Lankan political machinery runs on low gear it is vital for the leadership of the government to gear up the process to achieve maximum output. The people were taken up by the promise of dynamism and fast results given them by the Freedom Alliance prior to the general elections. Hence the vote. Work should quicken as a slowing down in spheres all round could disrupt the Freedom Alliance apparatus, thus causing a massive implosion.

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