Situation Report

Arms agents gear up to fish in defence void
It will be 50 long days since the take over of the defence portfolio when President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga meets the armed forces commanders on Tuesday (December 23) to discuss their urgent requirements of equipment and other matters.

All three of them - Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle (Army), Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri (Navy) and Air Marshal Donald Perera (Air Force) - are ready with their long lists. In fact, they gave a glimpse of what they need to Defence Secretary, Cyril Herath, at a discussion on Friday.

That their lists have become lengthy since the Ceasefire Agreement of February 22, 2002, is no secret. United National Front (UNF) leaders, who were pursuing peace with Tiger guerrillas, had given low priority to replenishing equipment needs or meeting fresh requirements of the armed forces. In fact the focus was on down sizing the armed forces.

Plans were to divert funds saved from defence expenditure to development activity. If it was in the mistaken belief that peace had already arrived, the futility of the ill conceived effort, is now clear. More so, when it became evident that threat perceptions have changed. The military balance has tilted, and continues to tilt, heavily in favour of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

President Kumaratunga told Sri Lankans the reasons for the take over of defence, interior and mass communication portfolios, in an address to the nation on November 27. "The sovereignty of the State of Sri Lanka, its territorial integrity and the security of the Nation have been placed in grave danger by acts of wilful commission and other acts of careless omission by some members of the Government," she said.

Such acts, no doubt, included meeting the urgent needs of the armed forces. She declared "Another serious act of irresponsibility was the neglect of the Armed Forces and thus rendering them unprepared to execute their duties effectively. The allocation of money ever for the purchase of spare parts was unduly delayed even after repeated instructions from me. At the time the negotiations broke down between the LTTE and the Government, 16 months after the Government came to power, about 60 % of the attack craft of the Navy and Air Force were out of operation due to lack of spare parts for regular maintenance. At the end of 2002, the Army possessed less than one month's requirements of ammunition. In other countries, all these would amount to a serious dereliction of duty by those in authority."

That it would take 50 days since assuming the defence portfolio to only examine the urgent equipment needs of the armed forces is bad enough. At least a part of these requirements were those formulated when the subject of defence was in the hands of the UNF. It is well known that some of these impending transactions were shrouded in mystery. There were allegations of corruption over them.

Even if most other procurements are straight forward deals, the urgency, exacerbated by delays, will deny them being put through a wholly transparent process. The United National Party (UNP) promised in its election manifesto the setting up of a centralised military procurements mechanism. As is always the case, it was forgotten after they were voted to power. President Kumaratunga accused the UNF of "irresponsibility and neglect of the armed forces." She was perhaps right.

But it is 48 days today since she brought under her charge the subject of defence. She has not named a Minister of Defence or a deputy. Nor has she named any defence advisor or formulated any other mechanism to ensure the smoother functioning of the defence sector. The task, since the take over, has been revolving around her and the Defence Secretary, Mr. Herath. That matters have been allowed to drift is becoming increasingly clear in many areas.

In the field of procurement, the danger as a result would be a repetition of what prevailed during the previous seven year regime of the People's Alliance. There was unprecedented corruption. That era spawned millionaires, both in and outside uniform. Would the absence of checks and balances see a repetition? It will not be surprising at all judging by the volume of interest now shown by various Colombo based agents of military goods. Many in uniform dealing with procurements are being bombarded with catalogues and other details extolling the virtues of brand new items.

The situation assumes greater significance since the ruling UNF appears to be shut out from all matters defence. During her November 7 address to the nation, President Kumaratunga, who spoke on why she ceded the defence portfolio to the UNF, said. "The Prime Minister clearly agreed to the condition that all important decisions regarding Defence would be decided in consultation with me. This promise was never once observed for the past two years. At most times I came to know of the decisions on Defence matters, after they were taken, only from the media. A couple of times I was informed of the decisions taken after the decisions were implemented by the Prime Minister or the Minister in charge….."

It seems to be in the reverse now. It is Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe, who is coming to know of decisions taken on defence matters from the media. In fact, he told his confidantes that since the subject of defence was taken over, there had been no formal official briefings for him or to any of his nominees. Nor are some intelligence assessments, previously forwarded, reaching him now. Ironic enough it is from the very same intelligence caucus that he set up.

The fact that the UNF, who constitute an elected Government are being ignored, becomes glaring when it is known that others, relatively less important, have been kept up to date on matters pertaining to defence. Take for example retired military officers, members of the Association of Flag Rank Officers (ARFRO). They were given a full briefing on the Tiger guerrilla build up. It was backed by intelligence assessments. The briefing was held at the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH) on December 4. An ARFRO delegation met President Kumaratunga only thereafter to discuss matters relating to defence and security.

It is in this climate of suspicion and uncertainty that Premier Wickremasinghe has been negotiating with President Kumaratunga, through their respective teams, on who should talk peace with the LTTE. Such talks between UNP Chairman Malick Samarawickrema and Presidential Advisor Mano Tittawela will now extend to the New Year. So will any future summit between President Kumaratunga and Premier Wickremasinghe.

This clearly means that the uncertainties that arose after November 4 will remain to herald the New Year and continue thereafter. Premier Wickremesinghe is insistent it is all or nothing - the portfolios of defence, interior and mass communication should be returned. President Kumaratunga's position is that defence can never be returned.

The Interior Ministry sans Police and the Mass Communication Ministry may be given back subject to some mutual accord. But such accord, if at all possible, seems a long way off, certainly not until the early part of 2004. In that period where defence related issues will be headed seems the crucial question. The fact that many matters in this area have been allowed to drift has also sent wrong signals both to the outside world and to the LTTE.

Take for example the recent four day official visit to India by Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle, Chief of Defence Staff and Commander of the Army. Both in India and upon his return, he has revealed to the media and elsewhere many of the subjects he had discussed at the highest levels in India. That included matters relating to the upcoming Defence Co-operation Agreement with India, linking together regiments of the Sri Lanka Army with those of the Army in India, obtaining Indian Air Force helicopters on hire for troop transport, repairs to the runway of the Palaly airbase, arrangements to exchange intelligence between the two countries, joint patrols by Indian Navy, Coast Guard and the Sri Lanka Navy in the Indian ocean, enhanced training facilities for Sri Lankan military in India and the setting up of a monument (or a War Memorial) in Colombo in memory of 1555 members Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) who died in Sri Lanka.
Setting them out is not to fault Lt. Gen. Balagalle by any means.

He is the highest ranking military official in Sri Lanka. He made the pronouncements with the best of intentions. But are they timely? They come in the backdrop of a big vacuum in the defence sector. Ideally, the statement should have been the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence or even the Presidential Secretariat. They should have made a formal, official statement about the outcome of the visit. That is if one was necessary. Naturally, a Foreign Ministry (under UNF) input would also bocome necessary. That could have easily set out the facts bearing in mind all aspects including implications on national policy.

There is no doubt thoseat the highest levels. in India would have been embarrassed by the premature announcement. They were being made before any finality is reached between Colombo and New Delhi. Such finality would necessarily be after consultations at the highest levels of the Government. That would be at Defence Secretary level and later between Ministers. It would no doubt be a time consuming process.

India has Defence Co-operation agreement with more than 20 countries. They have all been concluded after a lengthy process. This includes consultations, on the Indian side, amongst the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Thereafter, the Cabinet Sub Committee on Defence and the Cabinet itself would examine and approve such an agreement.

In the case of the proposed Indo- Sri Lanka Defence Cooperation Agreement, besides this process, the Centre in New Delhi is also likely to consult the Tamil Nadu State government. In addition consultations are also likely with India's Main Opposition political parties before finality is reached.

Nowhere were the reports taken more seriously than in LTTE controlled Wanni. The Tiger guerrillas, who have decided on making an all out effort to woo India, saw greater meaning. The Sunday Times learnt that guerrilla leaders are trying to ascertain whether closer military co-operation with India meant President Kumaratunga was making preparations, with Indian help, to ready the military to go to war. This was whilst delaying her talks with UNF over issues relating to co-habitation. Although this is not true, the absence of any cohesive command and control in the sphere of defence, has led to such a situation clearly underscores the uncertainty and confusion that prevails.

This is particularly in the backdrop of briefings President Kumaratunga received on different occasions about Tiger guerrilla military build-ups in the North-East from the respective military commanders of the area. This followed the takeover of the defence portfolio. Barely a week later, Lt. Gen. Balagalle flew with the Navy, Air Force Commanders and senior officers to Batticoloa. They received an on the spot assessment of the prevailing security situation from field commanders there.

There were also ripples in Colombo's diplomatic community and offices of International Organisations. Many raised queries on whether enhanced defence co-operation would mean the slow death of the peace process. Some in foreign organisations dealing with strategic and international studies also raised questions during telephone calls made to me from their head offices. They were conducting their own studies, some at the behest of those providing funding or the host country on the new developments in Sri Lanka.

It is time both President Kumaratunga and Premier Wickremasinghe realise that it would be extremely dangerous to allow this void in the defence sector to continue. It is not only the two main political parties and their allies who stand to lose.
As democratic political parties and their elected representatives continue to abdicate their roles, the void is being filled by the Generals, both serving and retired. In the past, it was the politicians who wanted to be the Generals and run the war effort. They committed colossal blunders. Losses in terms of men and material were enormous. The country learnt a bigger lesson.

If the Generals, who have to get their military machine in order and bring their men to a higher level of preparedness, play the role of politicians, there is even a greater danger of bigger blunders. As the nation readies to usher in a new year, this is the strong message for President Kumaratunga and Premier Wickremasinghe. They cannot allow the defence of a nation to drift whilst they quarrel.

Court of Inquiry confirms Commission probe
The UNF wants to call for a Parliamentary Select Committee to examine the findings and recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into the Army's Safe House at Athurugiriya and the Army's own Court of Inquiry that preceded it.

This is the Front's response to the Commission's findings being made public by the President's Office two weeks ago. The Commission has made scathing indictments against ASP Kulasiri Udugampola and a group of Army officers over the raid which it says was a "total betrayal and absolute treachery to the nation." The highest ranking Army officer on whom indictments have been made is Maj. Gen. Ivan Dassanayake.
Among other matters, the UNF wants the Select Committee to ascertain whether the recommendations made by the Court of Inquiry or the Commission "infringe and or interfere with the rights and privileges of Parliament and or any of its members." Another is to ascertain whether any findings or recommendations relate to "any matter under adjudication by any Court of Law."

Even the Court of Inquiry which was held before the Presidential Commission had concluded that the Army's Safe House was engaged in legitimate counter terrorist activity. This finding also put paid to widespread claims by sections of the media that the Safe House was illegal and did not engage in attacking Tiger guerrilla targets in the East. In their opinion/recommendations, The Sunday Times learns, the Court of Inquiry declared:

"The DMI (Directorate of Military Intelligence) has been carrying out covert offensive operations from beginning of 2001 in the Eastern Province. For these operations, weapons, explosives and other military equipment have been drawn with proper authority adopting the laid down military procedure."

Dealing with "OTHER MATTERS," the Court of Inquiry has said that:
"A paper article appeared in "Lankadeepa" newspaper on 10th Nov. 2001 of an alleged plan to assassinate a rival politician of the then Government using a Thermobaric weapon. The said article was published the day after the test firing of this particular weapon at the Panaluwa Range. During the inquiry, it transpired that a group of civilians had been present with a Warrant Officer of the Sri Lanka Army Service Corps (SLASC) at the pistol firing range adjacent to the main range when the Thermobaric weapon was tested.

"The DMI stated another incident where an unauthorised person had visited the safe house on 01 January 2002 at Athurugiriya and also that some persons had been inquiring the address of its location about two weeks prior to the raid by the Police. This incident was confirmed by Captain Nilam in his statement that a MI (Military Intelligence) person whose name unknown to him had visited on 01st Dec. 2001.
"The court recommends both the above incidents be investigated for breach of security and leakage of secret information.

"The court perused the paper article published highlighting an alleged assassination plan of a VVIP using Thermobaric weapons. The Court after investigating into this aspect, finds that the movement of weapons and the men had been carried out only for operational purposes to Batticaloa area with the authority and concurrence of the DMI (Director, Military Intelligence). The day to day movement of the particular weapons and men were identified from the date weapons were acquired by the MI team before arriving at the above conclusion."

The Court of Inquiry was appointed on a directive from then Defence Minister, Tilak Marapana. The Army Commander is learnt to have formulated the composition of the Committee in consultation with then Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando. It comprised Maj. Gen. Ivan Dassanayake, Brigadier M.R.W. de Zoysa, Col. K.A.N.S.K.A. Dharmaratne and Col. J. Pathiratne.

A copy of the Court of Inquiry report had been sent to Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe on July 2, last year. Later, on his instructions then Defence Secretary Mr. Fernando wrote on July 19 informing the Army Commander that the Premier had wanted him to take action on some aspects brought out in the Court of Inquiry report. These related to several minor lapses. This led to the appointment of another Court of Inquiry. The latter confirmed the involvement of some Army officers in the leakage of information.

Although the Commission report said only 23 operatives and informants had died since news about the Safe House became public, official military records place the figure at over 44 persons. There were also 31 attempted killings and 17 abductions.
Contrary to claims by some UNF politicians that the killings of operatives and informants was not related to the Safe House fiasco, investigations by The Sunday Times revealed it indeed was linked to it.

The first informant to be killed by Tiger guerrillas soon after news of the Police raid on the Safe House spread was V. Vidyarthan. He was abducted by guerrilla intelligence cadres on January 16 and was killed four days later. He was one of the informants assisting Captain Nilam who was heading the LRRP team. It was revealed that during four days of detention. Vidyarthan had been tortured during debriefing sessions. Consequently the guerrillas had obtained information including identities of civilians who were helping the LRRP team operating in guerrilla dominated areas in the East. That was how the guerrillas began their killing spree.

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