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Navy
chief gets tough on SLMM issue At around 4 p.m. when he met her, President Kumaratunga handed over a sealed letter and asked that it be forwarded to his Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik. She told the Norwegian envoy the contents - it was a request urging the Premier to remove the Head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Major General (retd.) Tryggve Tellefsen. She asked Mr. Brattskar whether he wished to have a copy. He promptly replied "yes" and was given the one page letter. "This is a very serious matter," he responded after going through it. He said he would forward the letter to his Prime Minister and inform his government. Tea was served. The meeting which had a totally official atmosphere did not last more than ten minutes. Immediately thereafter, Senior Director General in the President's Office and advisor, Mano Tittewala, who was the only other person present, escorted Mr. Brattskar to his car. Upon returning to his office, Mr. Brattskar first cancelled a three day holiday he had planned for the Divali weekend in Nuwara Eliya. He then reached out to the telephone to speak to officials in Oslo, the Norwegian capital, about the meeting. Whilst that went on, the Presidential Secretariat issued a public announcement that President Kumaratunga had called for the removal of Maj. Gen. Tellefsen. The next day she sent a copy of her letter to Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe and to Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force. In the letter to Premier Bondevik, President Kumaratunga said: "On many occasions he (Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen) has acted in such a manner that I have come to have serious doubts about his impartiality and willingness to be objective in discharging his duties under the Ceasefire Agreement." See box story on this page for President Kumaratunga's letter. In addition to making the request from Premier Bondevik, President Kumaratunga also issued a written instructions to Commanders of the Army (Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle), Navy (Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri) and Air Force (Air Marshal Donald Perera) not to take any advice or instructions from Maj. Gen. (retd) Tellefsen. This order has been made in her capacity as their Commander-in-Chief. Soon after Navy Commander Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri accused the SLMM of jeopardising an operation on Thursday night to round up a Tiger guerrilla arms ship, The Sunday Times learnt that the conduct of Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen came up for close scrutiny. President Kumaratunga is said to have examined his past conduct as Head of SLMM with senior officials before deciding to ask for his removal. Among the matters that arose during this scrutiny was the fact that it was Maj. Gen. (retd) Teleffsen who had proposed on April 3, this year, that the Sri Lanka Navy should recognise LTTE's Sea Tigers as "a de facto Naval unit and the LTTE should be excluded from the law concerning limitations on outboard motors (OBMs) horsepower. (Situation Report - April 20). Thereafter, in what he called "Adjusted Proposals" on April 24, this year, Maj. Gen. (retd) Teleffsen sought to confine the Sri Lanka Navy's exercises, particularly live firing to specified areas at sea. He also wanted to carve out separate areas in Sri Lanka's sovereign territorial waters for "training and live firing" after repeating his earlier call to recognise the Sea Tigers as a "de facto naval unit." (Situation Report - May 4) He had in fact marked out in a map the areas in the country's western and eastern seas to be handed out to the LTTE for "training and live firing." The rationale for Maj. Gen. (retd.) Teleffsen's actions was that the UNF Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), had during a round of talks in Tokyo, requested the SLMM to work out measures to prevent clashes at sea. The two proposals he made, one after another, raised such a controversy that matters were not pursued any further. Whilst UNF Government leaders remained totally silent, the proposals angered the security establishment, opposition parties and raised concerns in neighbouring India. The question arose whether it was within the mandate of the SLMM to call for recognition of Sea Tigers or to mark out parts of sovereign territory of Sri Lanka for use by a third party. The propriety of declaring that it should be set apart for exclusive use by an armed group whose declared objective still remains a separate homeland came into question. Such an objective has not been denounced altogether and peace talks had not reached a stage at that time where core issues were discussed. Hence, the recognition of a sea going force or areas for training and live firing was very much part of matters that had to be determined during talks. Another question that arose was whether the UNF or any other party was legally entitled to request the SLMM to formulate any proposals that went counter to the country's constitution and laws. If the issues were altogether forgotten, there was more to come. On March 20, around 4 a.m. 17 crew members (15 Chinese and two Sri Lankans) on board the Chinese fishing trawler "Fu Yuan Ya 225" were brutally killed in the deep seas off Mullaitivu. In his determination on the incident, Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen ruled that it was the work of "armed elements - not recognised by any of the parties - operating in LTTE or GOSL controlled areas..." He declared that they "represent a serious threat to the peace process." (Situation Report - April 6). As I said last week, it is still not clear who these "armed elements" were. In Colombo's diplomatic community a whisper campaign went on that it may be a reference to some group from India that was out to wreck the peace process. The SLMM may not have intended that but the rumour gained so much currency that Indian diplomats in Colombo informally made inquiries from the Norwegian facilitators what the reference meant. They were assured it was no aspersion on India. It is in this backdrop that Maj. Gen.(retd.) Tellefsen is at the centre of another storm. Last week The Sunday Times revealed exclusively how Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, accused the SLMM of jeopardising an operation on Thursday (October 16) night to round up a Tiger guerrilla arms ship. He said so in a report to President Kumaratunga. This incident also clearly revealed what seems to be an acute weakness, or ineptitude on the part of the mandarins responsible for the nation's defence and security. If the Navy's operation was thwarted on Thursday night, by Friday morning it became clear that the suspect LTTE arms vessel had disappeared. Then came Saturday. These mandarins were still unaware or, if they knew, the Governmental machinery did not go into action. Not until The Sunday Times made the revelations last week. Immediately thereafter, it took Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, to set the machinery in motion. What followed was a hurriedly summoned conference at the Ministry of Defence on a Sunday. Taking part were Defence Minister Tilak Marapana, Defence Secretary Austin Fernando,Navy Commander Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri and Dr. John Gooneratne, Deputy-Director General of the Secretariat Co-ordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP). Vice Admiral Sandagiri The Sunday Times learnt gave an account of what happened. He said the Navy's Commander, Eastern Naval Area, Rear Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, had been directed to track down a suspect Tiger guerrilla arms vessel some 250 nautical miles north east of Mullaitivu. This was around late afternoon on Thursday. (See box story on this page on how the Navy went into action). SLMM monitor in Trincomalee Olli Vasenius had boarded SLNS Prathapa. He had carried a satellite telephone. Whilst at sea he had obtained details of the mission from the Commanding Officer (CO), Lt. Cmdr. J.S. Ruwanpathirana. Later Mr. Vasenius, moved away from him and used the satellite telephone to contact the SLMM head office to give the details of SLNS Prathapa's mission. Later, Mr. Vasenius had returned to tell the CO his head office in Colombo had contacted the LTTE and inquired about their ship movements. The LTTE had not given a reply, he had said. Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen had admitted at the conference that after a call from Mr. Vasenius, it was he who had telephoned the LTTE. It was not to jeopardise the Navy's operation but to ascertain from the LTTE whether any of their vessels were moving in the eastern seas. Why this retired Norwegian military officer was so naïve not to realise that such an inquiry would alert the guerrillas is not clear. But by his own admission, he made unequivocally clear that the LTTE was made aware. The remarks saw an angry Vice Admiral Sandagiri declare he would not in future carry any SLMM monitor on board when the Navy conducts special operations. That was to track down suspected guerrilla arms ships. He said hitherto the Navy had strictly abided by SLMM rulings. The next two days were to see him engaging in verbal duels with the SLMM chief about future operations. More on that later. But later that Sunday, both Minister Marapana and Defence Secretary Fernando flew to Trincomalee with Vice Admiral Sandagiri. At the Navy House they obtained a first hand debrief of what had happened. Speaking to them were Rear Admiral Karannagoda, Lt. Cmdr. Ruwanpathirana, CO SLNS Prathapa and a staff officer dealing with operations at Eastern Naval Area Headquarters. Upon their return to Colombo, Mr Marapana briefed Premier Wickremasinghe. What followed was a statement released by the Government spokesman on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. Referring to a news item "appearing in a Sunday newspaper" the focus of the statement was not on the grave incident. It was on a reference to "instructions given by Secretary of Defence a few months back that resulted in engaging SLMM monitors on board Navy ships while on operations at sea." The statement said "the instructions were given after the incident at sea causing the engagement of a ship in June, this year, where the SLMM alleged that such incident could have been averted if the Navy used the services of the SLMM in interdicting LTTE vessels." No one disputed the reason for assigning SLMM monitors. It was only reported that Defence Secretary Fernando had given the instructions and the Navy had adhered to it. But, perhaps due to his inexperience and lack of knowledge in handling matters defence, in giving those instructions Mr. Fernando, had failed to spell out procedures SLMM monitors on board Naval vessels should follow. Hence, the Navy personnel were not authorised to challenge their conduct that not only threatened to jeopardise their operation but also placed their lives in danger. Other than that ‘self explanation’, the Ministry of Defence statement last Sunday confirmed The Sunday Times exclusive account. They went further when the statement said "The Secretary of the Ministry and the Commander of the Navy have explained to the SLMM the grave repercussions of such information falling in to the hands of LTTE, whatever the intentions of the SLMM were. It was agreed by the Head of Mission of the SLMM that any information of this nature will not be dealt with in this manner in the future." In making this assertion, has not the Ministry of Defence under the UNF Government admitted that there were grave repercussions from the actions of the Head of SLMM whatever the intentions may be? In other words the Government concedes that not only had the Head of SLMM blundered. He had also admitted his improper conduct by saying that "any information of this nature will not be dealt with in this manner in the future." Having made that official declaration, what has the UNF leadership done? Here is an instance where Navy personnel committed to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation has been prevented from intercepting a suspected LTTE arms vessel. If they successfully smuggled in weapons, they were going to not only make the guerrillas much stronger but those weapons were going to be used against the security forces. Did not this action deprive the Navy of making a successful detection and thus prevent them from doing their legitimate duty?Therefore did not the SLMM, which is tasked to monitor the ceasefire, violate it themselves? The only message the Ministry of Defence gave apart from telling a nation that they had obtained an assurance "any information of this nature will not be dealt with in this manner" was to add that "the Minister of Defence will hold a meeting with the SLMM and the Navy to discuss further on this issue." Meetings followed on Monday and Tuesday but measures to avoid what the Ministry called “similar incidents whilst ensuring the security of the country” could not be worked out. Vice Admiral Sandagiri who pointed out that all successful detections of LTTE vessels had been made when there were no SLMM monitors insisted he would not take them on board any more on special operations. He said he would only inform them no sooner "contact" (or sighting) of a vessel has been made. However, SLMM monitors were welcome on board routine patrols and other similar tasks, he said. During discussions, Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen is said to have pointed out that he had experience in naval work having served in the Middle East. The retired Norwegian military officer's last posting was Commander of the Multi National Force (MFO) - the peace keeping force that oversaw security arrangements in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel. This had drawn a retort from Vice Admiral Sandagiri that conditions in Sri Lanka were quite different. The discussions failed to work out a compromise prompting Minister Marapana to declare that a decision would be made at the political level. He expects the Navy to follow this. What happens if Navy receives reports of another guerrilla arms vessel in the meanwhile? What Vice Admiral Sandagiri told senior officers during an informal discussion makes it clear. He said "I will take the full responsibility. Follow the Rules of Engagement (ROE) given to you and deal with the suspected vessel. As Navy men national interest is foremost for us. We cannot endanger the lives of our men and our people." If a 20 month long ceasefire has led to a security imbalance - the result of the guerrillas became stronger as against the security forces - and prompted the UNF Government to seek a Defence Co-operation Agreement with neighbouring India, one more thing becomes essential now. Those tasked by Premier Wickremasinghe to ensure the proper functioning of the defence and security establishment of the country should do their own job. If we cannot look after ourselves and our own interests, no amount of outside help will be of any use. Now that India's help is forthcoming, the tendency to take things more easy may lead to complacency. Must one say that action and accountability has always been lacking? Not
available for comment The request was first made to spokesperson Agnes Braggadotir on Tuesday. Upon repeated requests thereafter on Wednesday and Thursday, she said the Head of Mission will not be able to make any comments until matters were resolved on issues by the Defence Ministry, the Navy and the SLMM. Tracking
the Tiger ship In fact security in the area had been tightened for this purpose (Situation Report - October 12). Here is the sequence of events : Thursday, October
16 Information is passed to Navy Headquarters which in turn informs Commander, Eastern Naval Area (COMEAST. "Operation Waruna Kirana" the naval cordon off Mullaitivu is also alerted. COMEAST orders
Fast Gun Boats "SLNS Prathapa and SLNS Edithara to proceed.
SLMM Monitor Olli Vasenius (a Norwegian national) is on board SLNS
Prathapa. SLNS Suranimala (former Israeli fast missile vessel) heading to Colombo after patrolling eastern seas directed to return to location where suspected vessel is located. Around 6.50
pm Around 7.00
pm Around 7.20
pm October 17 President’s
letter to Norway’s Premier Excellency "The recent incident involving the leakage of information to the LTTE concerning a Navy operation to track down a suspected LTTE ship smuggling arms into Sri Lanka has confirmed my opinion that Major General Tellefsen is not fit to hold the post of Head of the SLMM in the interest of the security of Sri Lanka. "Accordingly, in my capacity as Head of State, Head of the Executive, Head of the Government, Head of the Cabinet and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in whom under the Constitution of Sri Lanka the executive power of the people, including the defence of Sri Lanka is vested, I have to request you to have Major General Tellefsen removed from his post as the Head of the SLMM with immediate effect. "I will be informing the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Service Commanders of this request. It would be appreciated if you could give effect to my request as a matter of priority.” Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga Who
is the boss? (1) Whether powers vested in the Minister of Defence pursuant to the assignment of the subject of defence are subject to overriding control and authority of the President. (2) and Whether
recent gazette notifications issued by the Minister of Defence encroaches
on the powers relating to defence vested in the Executive President. The first relates
to a gazette notification last year enabling Majors General in the
Army who had reached their mandatory three year period of service
in the rank of Majors General to continue in service until 55 years
if they had not reached retirement age by then. Thereafter, a similar
gazette notification two weeks ago extended the same concessions
to those holding equivalent ranks in the Navy and the Air Force. However, the Supereme Court,it is learnt, can ask for further time. Here is the full text of her reference: Reference under Article 129(1) of the Constitution of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 1978 Whereas in terms of Article 3 of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 1978 (hereinafter referred as the 'said Constitution') read with the provisions of Article 4(b) thereof the Executive Power of the Sovereign people including the Defence of Sri Lanka is vested in the President of the Republic elected directly by the people. AND WHEREAS in terms of Article 30(1) read with the provisions of Article 43(2) of the said Constitution, the President of the Republic is the Head of State, Head of the Executive, Government and the Cabinet of Ministers and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces: AND WHEREAS in terms of Article 33(e) of the said Constitution the President of the Republic is vested with the power to declare war and peace: AND WHEREAS under the provisions of Article 61E of the said Constitution, the President of the Republic is empowered to appoint the Heads of Army, Navy and the Air Force. AND WHEREAS the President of the Republic is empowered under the provisions of the Army Act (Cap. 625 L.E.S.L. 1980) and/or Navy Act (Cap. 626 L.E.S.L. 1980) and/or the Air Force Act (Cap. 627 L.E.S.L. 1980) to inter alia issue or withdraw commissions to officers and/or to call out on active service the Regular Reserve. Volunteer Force and the Volunteer Reserve in addition to the Regular Force for the defence of Sri Lanka in time of war, for the prevention of suppression of any rebellion, insurrection or other civil disturbances in Sri Lanka etc., and under Part lll of the Public Security Ordinance (Cap. 51 L.E.S.L. 1980) to call out the Armed forces for the maintenance of Public Order. AND WHEREAS under the provisions of the said Constitution and the Army Act, Navy Act and Air Force Act, President J R Jayawardene had promulgated the following Regulations: 1. Army Pensions and Gratuities Code 1981 published in Gazette Extraordinary No. 562/11 or June 15th, 1989: 2. Air Force Pensions and Gratuities Code 1981 published in Gazette Extraordinary No. 645/8 of January 16th, 1991: 3. Navy Pensions and Gratuities Code 1981 published in the Gazette Extraordinary No. 654/10 of March 20th 1991; and Copies of the aforesaid Regulations, as amended from time to time and which were in force until 2nd December 2002, are annexed hereto marked XI, X2 and X3. AND WHREAS under aforesaid Regulations that subsisted until 2.12.2002 the senior commissioned officers specified therein (other than the Heads of the said forces) had to retire on the expiry of the period specified in relation to each substantive rank unless promoted to the next higher rank even if the officer concerned was less than 55 years of age, unless the services of such officer was retained by the President if it was essential in the interests of such force to do so. AND WHEREAS the Minister of Defence appointed by the President has purported to frame the following Regulations, namely: 1. Amendment to the Army Pensions and Gratuities Code 1981 as published in the Gazette No. 1265/1 of 2.12.2002: 2. Amendment
to the Air Force Pensions and Gratuities Code 1981 as published
in the Gazette No. 1308/5 of 30.09.2003: 3. Amendments to the Navy
Pensions and Gratuities Code 1981 as published in the Gazette No.
1308/5 of 30.9.2003: AND WHEREAS the intended object of the said purported amendments framed by the Minister of Defence are to enable an officer of the rank of Major General and/or Air Vice Marshal and/or Rear Admiral to continue in service beyond the period stipulated in respect of such rank until he reaches the age of 55 years unless he is required to retire at the end of the period stipulated for the said rank by the President and to make the said Minister of Defence, and not the President, in fact and/or in law the determining authority as to whether an officer retires at the end of the period stipulated in respect of such rank and/or continues in service, thereby in fact and/or in law rendering such amendments an infringement and encroachment on the powers vested in the said President under the Constitution and law in respect thereof. AND WHEREAS doubts have been expressed with regard to the Constitutional validity of the said amendments framed by the Minister of Defence: AND WEHREAS there is likelihood of the Constitutional validity and/or vires of the said Regulations framed by the Minister of Defence, and any action taken thereunder, being challenged in Courts of Law involving protracted and avoidable litigation and the causing of uncertainty and/or disaffection in the ranks of the armed forces: AND WHEREAS in view of what has been herein before stated, it appears to me that the question of law hereinafter set out has arisen or is likely to arise and is of such a nature and of such public importance that is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka thereon: NOW, THEREFORE, in the exercise of the powers conferred upon me under and in terms of Article 129 (1) of the said Constitution I, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, do hereby refer the following questions to the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka for consideration and report thereon within (10) days of the date of this reference, namely:- 1. Whether the powers vested in the Minister of Defence pursuant to the assignment of the subject of Defence of Sri Lanka and the Department of Army, Navy and Air Force under Article 44(2) of the Constitution and published in Gazette No. 1225/19 of 28.02.2002 having regard to the plenary powers relating to the Defence of Sri Lanka being vested in the Executive President of the Republic under the said Constitution of 1978, are subject to the overriding control and authority of the President of the Republic and are subordinate thereto: 2. Whether
all or any of the said amendments Y1, Y2 and Y3 framed by the Minister
of Defence infringes upon and/or encroaches upon the powers relating
to Defence vested in the Executive President of the Republic of
Sri Lanka under the Constitution and/or under law and are ultra
vires the Constitution. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga |
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