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Forces on backfoot as Tigers strike at will Finger pointing over the incident, 16 long months after the ceasefire, would have been at anyone but the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) - contract killers, drug peddlers, deserters, dope merchants, underworld gangs or what have you? But an LTTE spy owned up. Sellathurai Kirupakaran alias Madan, for the first time since the ceasefire, directly challenged state authority when he walked into Dehiwala Police Station and poured bullets into the head of Inspector Sunil Thabrew, chief of the intelligence unit. He had the audacity to admit he received orders from his handler, Thooyavan, spy boss for Vavuniya, to kill him. Thus, a guessing game over the identity of the assailant was short lived. A group of policemen gave chase and caught up with Madan. Creditably their timely intervention prevented the attacker from swallowing a cyanide capsule, a guerrilla trade mark. Even if it gave cause to a morbid joke, that the cops may face interdiction for sabotaging the peace process, their brave act left little work for investigators. If Madan was acting the role of a double agent, he may not be the only one in that role. In fact, the first infamous guerrilla spy Babu was one such operative who infiltrated himself into the highest security cordon, that of late President Ranasinghe Premadasa. In the murky and often shaky world of intelligence men who cover the LTTE, roles have been reversed by state operatives too. Did two cops, also prominent in the same game, use Madan to feed disinformation about Inspector Thabrew with whom they had developed a bitter hatred? Did that lead to the killing? The slain policeman's entries have bared vital clues. If the killing of informants, operatives of state intelligence agencies, members of moderate political groups did not, Madan's brazen act jolted both the United National Front (UNF) Government and the opposition People's Alliance alike. From London, Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe, telephoned Defence Minister Tilak Marapana and Interior Minister John Ameratunga. Hurried conferences led to equally hurried joint operations in the city and suburbs. Security Forces and Police conducted night checks on suspected guerrilla hideouts to round up dozens for screening. Sporadic checks were also mounted on vehicles in busy streets. This frenzy raised fears that checkpoints the UNF had hastily dismantled even before the ceasefire may re-appear. Last Tuesday, during a two hour session of the National Security Council, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, once again reviewed preparedness of the Security Forces and the Police to meet mounting guerrilla threat perceptions. If Inspector Thabrew's killing further highlighted the need, the Navy's sinking of LTTE's weapons ship on June 14, prompted her to intensify action. Just two days after this incident, she held a meeting with Commanders of the Army (Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle), Navy (Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri), Air Force (Air Marshal Donald Perera), their respective field commanders for the north and east. She urged them to disclose their concerns and shortcomings. Most did. It became clear many were badly hit by the lack of essential and basic resources - uniforms, helmets, boots, body armour and even personnel. Last Sunday, President Kumaratunga dropped a bombshell at the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) annual sessions in Nittambuwa when she declared that Security Forces have ammunition left for only ten days - a fact she had learnt from a National Security Council meeting weeks earlier. Even if she claimed the guerrillas were aware of these military shortcomings, the news did not come as a morale booster to most civilians. The revelation was inopportune even for military top brass trying to halt desertions and promote fresh recruitment drives. Evidently, the President, who is Commander-in-Chief has not been briefed that the situation has improved considerably since she was told of the actual shortage. As revealed in these columns (Situation Report - April 20), the Government released funds for the Security Forces to replenish their inventories for at least three months. On that occasion I said "The Government now appears to have reviewed the initial euphoric response to downgrade military preparedness and readiness. This is visibly manifest in their current response to revamp military capability and to release funding for essential procurements, which were not given priority since the ceasefire. In hindsight it is all too obvious that the initial lack of a studied approach to the military aspect of the ceasefire has had a devastating setback. In marked contrast, the LTTE on the other hand has used the opportunity of the ceasefire to revamp, retrain and re-arm their military capability…" Approval to replenish stocks came 14 long months after the ceasefire. Procedures and lead time for procurements take several weeks if not months. But a friendly country deeply concerned about local developments came as a saviour. Ammunition stocks dwindled only because they had to be used, even in a minimal way, to train troops. If this particular episode alone was the callous attitude shown towards security planning since the ceasefire, many events that followed have not inspired any confidence in those directly responsible. In fact even before the Ceasefire Agreement was signed with the LTTE, the UNF had sought to downsize the Security Forces and find placements for their personnel in UN peace keeping forces. This was on the unfounded belief that there would be no serious security threat in the future. That is even before core issues were discussed or a peace accord had been reached. Could anyone have been that gullible? Quite clearly they have not learnt from lessons of the past. They have misguidedly taken for granted that the ceasefire meant that the war has ended. General Sir Michael Rose, a retired British Army officer was hired at considerable state expense to prepare a report. His findings appeared in the Situation Report - May 25. It is one fact that the Tiger guerrillas became strong during the ceasefire whilst the Security Forces became relatively weaker. Added to that were wrong judgements and actions that humiliated them and sought to make their image in the public eye very low. There were many glaring instances. Among them: An "intelligence cell" (Safe House) operated by the Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), which successfully infiltrated guerrilla controlled east to mount attacks on key targets, was branded as an insidious unit that planned to assassinate UNF leaders. The Police went out of the way to conduct a raid. A massive propaganda blitz to hide the truth failed. The outcome of the raid led to revelations of high security and sensitive intelligence including the names of operatives many of whom co-incidentally have been executed. It has now become the subject of a Presidential Commission of Inquiry. The office of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) - an exalted position from which a senior, experienced high ranking military officer co-ordinated the workings of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police - was downgraded after Gen. Rohan de S. Daluwatte retired in June, last year. During his tenure, he met service chiefs and the Inspector General of Police (or his senior representative) weekly, assessed intelligence reports and jointly formulated responses to threat perceptions. For the first time in the history of Sri Lanka, or for that matter in the world, a civilian was appointed to act in this post - Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando. He chaired the conferences and heard every week how senior intelligence officials warned of guerrilla preparations. If that tenure saw no substantive action, in the wake of mounting guerrilla threats, just two weeks ago, the position was turned over to Lt. Gen. Balagalle, now the senior-most among serving Commanders. After sinking the LTTE cargo vessel carrying a lethal cargo that included 23 mm anti aircraft guns and surface to surface missiles (Situation Report - June 22), state media were at the forefront of a vicious campaign to accuse the Navy of sabotaging the peace process. The fact that it was an official accusation of treasonable conduct, humiliated officers and men not only in the Navy but also in the other services. This also hurt the next of kin of the many thousands of servicemen who have sacrificed life and limb for the preservation of the security of Sri Lanka. They also see it as an attempt to ridicule them in the public eye. And now the SLMM has endorsed the Navy action and thus proved that the UNF’s sinister charges are wrong. Why were they made? Was it not to silence the Navy? Since the ceasefire, aerial sorties have ceased. Perhaps that has saved some embarrassment for the Air Force, whose operational efficiency has dropped to worrisome levels. Among the main causes is the lack of spares and equipment. For the Police, the brutal murder of Inspector Thabrew has come as a shocking eye opener. If these were some of the debilitating effects on a security establishment, incidents this week have only added to the rising concern. Just two examples would give one an idea: The Army's official website on June 26 (Thursday) had the following report after it has been cleared by an official from the Secretariat Co-ordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP): Armed LTTE gang storm Prison and threaten Prison Officers. "An attempt by nine armed LTTE men and women to forcibly secure the release of an imprisoned LTTE murder suspect from a cell at the Batticaloa Prison on 23 June 2003 around 2.00 p.m. was foiled as all attempts by LTTE cadres to break open the Prison cell failed. "Nine LTTE men and women (07 males and 02 females), brandishing pistols and hand grenades stormed the main gate at Batticaloa Prison and forced open the main door to gain access to the cell where one LTTE murder suspect was being detained on a Court order. "The armed LTTE group, led by LTTE's Batticaloa deputy political leader Senadhiraj who arrived on the vehicle (59-9265) entered the Prison premises by force after they forced open the Main Gate and the Main Door despite objections raised by Prison Officers and Guards on duty. "These LTTE intruders threatened Prison Officers and demanded the surrender of keys to the respective cell where the LTTE murder suspect, Subaraj Sathyarajah was being detained on a Court order after he was found allegedly involved in the murder of an Army Sergeant K. Thevasooriyan of Puttur on 19 May 2003." On the same night, Defence Secretary Austin Fernando ordered the news report be pulled out immediately from the website. Perhaps it was too much for Sri Lankans (and even the outside world) to know that after shooting a Police Inspector inside a Police Station premises, guerrilla gangs had stormed a Prison to secure the release of a murder suspect. The office of the Chief Government Spokesman Gyrika Perusinghe (also Chairman of state run Independent Television Network) issued a denial. A statement
said Interior Minister John Ameratunga had denied this incident
and warned that such unverified reports in the media led to public
unrest. Defence Minister Tilak Marapana went on television to repeat
the same denial. It is not without significance that the LTTE action
in Batticaloa is not dissimilar to many acts of lawlessness perpetrated
in the recent months by UNF legislators, their kith and kin. The Sunday Times
has confirmed that the incident, as reported by the Army, did occur.
Immediately thereafter, Army in Batticaloa also provided additional
strength to the Police Post at the Batticaloa Prisons to avert any
untoward incidents. "…. a group of LTTE cadres (7 x males and 2 x females) led by LTTE Deputy Political leader in Batticaloa named Senadiraj had come to Batticaloa Prison in a vehicle (Van bearing number 59 - 9265) and force opened the main door and entered the Prison. The LTTE group armed with pistols and hand grenades and all were attired in civil clothes. They had asked for the keys of the cell where Sathyaraj the main LTTE suspect who had been remanded in connection of killing Army Sergeant Navasooriyan at Puthoor on 19 May 2003. "It is learnt that during the incident the Prison guard who was in charge of the keys of particular cell had managed to hide/escape with the keys and due to that the LTTE group had to abandon their mission of rescuing the prisoner. Later the LTTE leader Senadiraj had threatened all the guards present that if the incident was reported to any security authority the guards would be killed. Later the group had escaped in the same vehicle and Superintendent of the Prison had neither informed the incident to the Police nor to the Army due to fear. Headquarters 233 Brigade and Batticaloa Police have taken action to strengthen the guard around the Prison and increased the security in the area. This incident has been informed to the SLMM." For reasons explained in the above message, The Sunday Times learnt, Prison Headquarters in Colombo received no report from the Prisons in Batticaloa soon after the incident. However, on Friday they were in the full picture of the events that occurred. In a letter dated June 25 to the District Head of Mission of the SLMM, the Officiating Brigade Commander of 233 Brigade in Batticaloa, Major M.P. Perera has said: "The autocratic acts of this nature by the LTTE would cause a serious breach of the MoU. Furthermore, actions of this nature may have far reaching repercussions on the prison authorities, since even prison guards may have second thoughts of working under compulsion in such an environment if the situation does not improve." The complaint to the SLMM also has an interesting reference to the incident where mouths of female prison guards were sealed with sticking plaster. This is what it says: "Soon after entering the prison the LTTE group had prevented female prison guards from shouting by applying plasters and threatened the other guards present and asked for the keys of the cell where Sathyaraj the main LTTE suspect who had been remanded in connection of killing of Army sergeant Navasooriyan at Puthoor on 19 May 2003." Another incident that occurred on Thursday is better explained by the Army's own report: Armed LTTE men construct new camp "A section of civilians informed the troops in the general area south of Manirasakulam, about 15 km. southwest of Trincomalee on 26 June 2003 that some armed LTTE cadres were building a new camp in Manirasaklulam. "A senior Army Officer in the area visited the location and witnessed the presence of about 65-70 LTTE men and women armed with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), Medium Machine Guns (MMG), Light Machine Guns (LMG) and T-56 weapons. "The officer approached the leader of the LTTE team at the scene and explained that carrying weapons and constructing LTTE camps in government controlled areas amounts to a gross violation of the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). "However,
the LTTE cadres resisted and argued with the Officer but the Officer
showed restraint and returned saying that he would take up the matter
with relevant authorities. "However, the bomb did not cause any damage since it did not fall near the troops waiting close by. "Upon his return, the Officer took up the matter with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) in Trincomalee. "A team of representatives of the SLMM visited the location and a determination on the matter is still awaited." Until yesterday, no SLMM determination has been issued. On Friday, Air Force aircraft obtained aerial photographs of the new guerrilla camp. Security Forces in the area also took precautionary measures to deal with any situation that may arise from this new threat. These developments come at a time when the LTTE has opted out of the peace talks. They are awaiting specific proposals from the Government for an "interim administrative structure." Their chief negotiator, Anton Balasingham, has said if the proposals are found acceptable, the LTTE would return to the negotiating table. Coupled together with the latest guerrilla actions and increasing threats, the situation is no doubt cause for grave concern and uncertainty. Notwithstanding all these developments, the Government has formulated new draft laws, for a second time in succession, to wrest control of the country's defence establishment from the President - a new move that will be both a thorn in future cohabitation and a fore-runner to a new constitutional crisis. See box story on this page for details. The full text of the new draft laws appear on Page 16. With all this confusion the public continue to remain in the dark. A nation waits in suspense. The
mystery vessel and the photograph Readers have raised several questions. Among them: Was this the same cargo vessel that was sunk by the Navy? Was this a photograph taken before the Navy encounter at dawn on June 14? The answer is "NO."This exclusive photograph obtained by The Sunday Times was taken when the cargo vessel towing the heavily laden boat appeared on the high seas off Mullaitivu on May 10. As reported in these columns last week, "Naval craft were able to track them at a point over 150 miles east of Mullaitivu and even photograph it." Highly placed Sri Lanka Navy sources say this cargo vessel and the boat are still at large. The vessel engaged by the Navy and sunk, unlike the vessel shown in the photograph, bore a large crane. The Navy was unable to obtain photographs of this vessel since the only craft equipped with an Israeli built MSIS camera, SLNS Nandimitra, gave chase to the loaded boat that broke away from being towed by the cargo vessels. MSIS pictures of the boat were blurred since they were taken in the dark. The Fast Gun Boats that chased and attacked the cargo vessel had no camera on board. New defence
law and the political battle The creation of a smaller National Security Council to "give proper advice and directions" to a powerful, new Defence Council in respect of matters relating to "national defence" is the highlight of the nine page new draft law. This Council is to comprise the Minister of Defence (Chairman), Deputy Minister of Defence, Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, service chiefs and heads of intelligence services. The President is not included as a member although the draft law says "the President shall, if present preside at every meeting of the Defence Council." The President shall be the head of the National Security Council and shall ordinarily preside at meetings. This Council comprises only the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, a Minister or more than one, if any; agreed by the President and Prime Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence. Unlike the existing National Security Council, it leaves out the Defence Secretary, Service Chiefs and Heads of Intelligence Services. UNF officials argue the draft laws are designed to give "more powers to Parliament." In essence they seek to take away some of the powers currently exercised by the President. Hence, the move is almost certain to become both a thorny issue over cohabitation and a more contentious issue over the Constitution. In terms of the Constitution, the President is vested with the executive power of the people including the defence of Sri Lanka. In other words defence is being described as an aspect of executive power that cannot be exercised by Parliament. Hence it is argued that matters relating to national defence, which the new law seeks confer to on a Defence Council, are in conflict with the Constitution. So are a number of other provisions. The draft law, among other things, describes the powers and functions of the Defence Council as:
Like the previous set of draft laws, exclusively reported in The Sunday Times (Situation Report - October 27, 2002), the new laws also stem from the recommendations of a UNF Government appointed controversial three member Committee on Defence Reforms or DRC. However, the earlier draft law was titled "An Act to provide for the establishment of a Joint Chief of Staff Committee with the objective of providing effective strategic direction for the armed forces; to provide for the operation of the armed forces under an unified control and to provide for matters connected with or incidental thereto." This draft law, approved by the Cabinet, also sought to strip some of the powers and responsibilities of the President, who is Commander-in-Chief, and was based on DRC's recommendations on Higher Defence Control. The draft came even before service chiefs could forward their own observations on higher defence control. (Situation Report - October 27, 2002) The three member Committee on Defence Reforms has generated controversy since it was established last year. It is headed by Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando and comprises Treasury Secretary, Charitha Ratwatte and a former Army Commander Lt. Gen. Denis Perera. After its first
report on Higher Defence Control was brought out, a fourth - retired
Major General Asoka Jayawardena was co-opted. The latter was the
only retired officer who was associated with the separatist war
against Tiger guerrillas, a cause that gave rise to the expansion
of the Security Forces and now necessitating reforms. |
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