Situation Report

Territorial waters on the boil

A scene from LTTE ceremonies to mark the third anniversary of the capture of Elephant Pass in the Wanni last week. It also marked the second anniversary of Army’s “Operation Agni Khiela” to which Tiger guerrillas offered stiff resistance.

The saga of Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) proposals for "preventing clashes" between the Sri Lanka Navy and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) at sea continues.

The Head of the SLMM, retired Norwegian Major General Tryggve Teleffsen, has now forwarded to the two Parties what he calls "Adjusted Proposals," more controversial than his original "Initial Discussion Paper". It still seeks recognition for Sea Tigers as a "de facto naval unit."

That is not all. He also enlarges his proposal for an area at sea for "navigation training" and "live firing exercises for them." This time, in a map issued as an annexure to the proposals, he has marked out areas in the western and eastern territorial waters of Sri Lanka to be carved out for this purpose.

In the western territorial waters, the marked out training area extends five nautical miles from the shore, from south of Karativu (near Pooneryn) to near Velankulam, further north of Viduthaltivu. In the east, it also extends five nautical miles from southwards of Mulliyan (east of Elephant Pass) to south of Mullaitivu. This is for training exercises.

An area off the shores of Mullaitivu, extending eight nautical miles from the shore, has been marked out for live firing exercises. This is a function that he has no right to even suggest as a mere Head of a monitoring mission and raises serious questions on the parameters of the mandate given to the SLMM. Moreover that is a violation of Sri Lanka’s Constitution and other laws. If that includes the right to mark out an area of a sovereign nation, either on land or at sea, for use by any party before any formal agreement or understanding is reached with the Government, is it not a clear infringement of Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial integrity?

No self respecting Government would be in a position to consider such a proposal, leave alone publicly acknowledge, that it had been made by the SLMM. In this instance, the UNF Government is expecting support from the Opposition to give effect to whatever peace accord, if and when it is reached. Should not the two sides agree, without any further delay, to assure the public in the form of a joint declaration that they would be committed to pursue the ongoing negotiations any further only within the framework of Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial integrity?

That is within the character of one Sri Lanka. Perhaps that can come as a strong message to all others including the SLMM. Or, as demonstrated since the ceasefire, would the UNF continue to remain supine in its approach? Would it not be incumbent on the Opposition also to be more assertive on this crucial issue than only release joint statements? Even if it comes as embarrassment to UNFers who talk of "peace at any cost," and brand those who raise questions as "saboteurs," it must still be asked in the national interest.

In reality, the areas demarcated for Sea Tigers will become "no go" zones for the Sri Lanka Navy without the presence of the SLMM. This is because of a provision in the Adjusted Proposal which says "If deemed necessary interception or inspection of suspected vessels may take place with the presence of SLMM monitors...” Otherwise, it makes specifically clear that "SLN will neither intercept nor inspect LTTE Sea Tiger vessels conducting training and live firing exercises" in the designated areas.

The proposals also re-iterate that the Navy and Sea Tigers should permit observers from the other party, accompanied by SLMM monitors, on board their vessels when conducting exercises and training. It claims this is for "mutual trust and understanding and as confidence building measures."

Deputy SLMM Head, Hagrup Haukland told The Sunday Times the "adjusted proposals" were formulated taking into consideration "some of the feedback, not all" received from both parties. "They should strictly be considered as working papers until the parties have reached an agreement," he said.

On Friday, Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen discussed his proposals with Defence Secretary Austin Fernando. The Government, one source said, wants to discuss the issue further with Anton Balasingham, LTTE Chief Negotiator, who arrives in Colombo today en route to Wanni.

The SLMM Chief also had a meeting in Wanni yesterday with LTTE Political Wing leader, S.P. Tamilselvan and "Commander" of Sea Tigers, "Col." Soosai. Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen's Initial Discussion Paper on the same subject, revealed exclusively in these columns (Situation Report - April 20) has trigged off a heated national controversy. In the subsequent week (Situation Report - April 27), I reported on far reaching repercussions the proposals had on political, diplomatic and security establishments among other implications.

I said last week that the SLMM had provided the Government and the LTTE with a "second draft of proposals" and reported on its contents. This drew a response from the SLMM.

In a press release e-mailed to the media (including The Sunday Times) headlined "ERRONEOUS REFERENCE TO SLMM ADJUSTED WORKING DOCUMENT OF 24 APRIL 2003," Mr Haukland says the "revised version" I referred to is not the "adjusted working document submitted by the SLMM to the Parties" on April 24. (See box story on bottom for the full text of Mr. Haukland's press release).

The fact that I did not refer to the "adjusted document" is abundantly clear from the contents of my report last week. However, I did refer to "a SLMM document." As I said, it contained the same dates as their original Initial Discussion Paper but did not bear Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen's signature.

The document referred to by me, it now transpires, has been prepared by the Government and forwarded to the SLMM. The contents were in the same format as the Initial Discussion Paper. Though sections of the Government insisted it had been accepted by the SLMM heeding their request, with deletions of the controversial provisions, The Sunday Times has now learnt that the claims are wrong. Only parts of the contents have been taken into consideration by the SLMM in the Adjusted Working Document. Hence the controversial proposals have only been re-worded but the contents remain.

A comparison of proposals in the Initial Discussion Paper and the Adjusted Working Document (See box story on bottom) show that the latter contains more controversial and new provisions. The Navy Commander Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri has already rejected almost all the proposals contained in the Initial Discussion Paper as revealed in these columns last week.

The full text of the "SLMM ADJUSTED PROPOSALS FOR MEASURES PREVENTING CLASHES BETWEEN THE SLN AND LTTE AT SEA" appears in a box story on bottom.

Here are some of the significant proposals together with a few observations:
The LTTE Sea Tigers as a de facto naval unit: When the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was signed on the 22nd of Feb 02, the LTTE fighting formations, including the Sea Tigers existed. Consequently, the LTTE Sea Tigers exists as a De Facto Naval Unit. (In the Oxford Advanced Dictionary "De Facto" is defined as follows: Existing as a fact although it may not be legally accepted as existing). SLMM would like to emphasise that the LTTE Sea Tigers has neither legal rights nor any legitimate tasks of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. These obligations belong purely to the GOSL Forces.

It should also be noted that there are no requirements in the CFA to demobilise or disband any of the LTTE military units, including the Sea Tigers. Furthermore, the final composition of the Sri Lanka Armed Forces should be reached in the peace negotiations.

There is a distinct difference in this proposal compared to the Initial Discussion Paper. It does not say that SLN (Sri Lanka Navy) should recognise the LTTE Sea Tigers that has existed (as an illegal entity) and continues to do so. Yet, the wording of this SLMM proposal seeks to legalise the Sea Tigers by a subtle means of obtaining recognition.

The question arises whether such a matter should not come up for discussion if and when core issues are taken up? This is when, among other matters, the all important case of decommissioning guerrilla weapons will become a subject. Exercise and Training Areas: Balance of force is one of the key elements for the existing CFA.

Hence, to maintain their Forces' capabilities both Parties must have the right to carry out training and exercises in designated areas. Such exercises and training should cause minimum disturbance to the normal life i.e. the fishery.

a. SLN must confine their exercises; especially live firing exercises, to specified exercise and training areas.
b. The LTTE Sea Tigers should be allocated exercise and training areas at sea, designed for navigation training and for live firing exercises as well (See Annex A).
c. LTTE vessels sailing outside exercise and training areas will not carry weapons, ammunition or explosives onboard, except for special agreed arrangements.
d. For mutual trust and understanding and as confidence building measures, the SLN and the LTTE Sea Tigers should permit observers from the other Party, accompanied by SLMM monitors, onboard their vessels when conducting exercises and training in the North -eastern/western waters.
e. All naval exercises with more than two vessels will be notified to SLMM, through the RMCs, and all live firing exercises will be notified, regardless of the number of participating vessels.

The notification should at least include type of exercise, duration, Startex and Endex, OiC, Exercise Areas to be used, number and type and name of vessels, number of crew members, armament, number and calibre of rounds to be fired, firing position and target areas, caution areas, markings, communications, POC."

All these factors relating to exercise and training areas impinge on the sovereign duty of the Government to safeguard the nation's maritime rights. In addition to that, the propriety of the SLMM, again subtly seeks to obtain not only recognition for Sea Tigers but also to confer on them the rights and privileges of exercising some control in Sri Lanka's sovereign waters - a right which the armed forces of the Government of Sri Lanka is vested with under the Constitution.

It must be strongly emphasised that all these proposals of the SLMM are rightly matters of concern to the core issues of the maintenance of military forces. To consider these issues piecemeal now is to pre-empt a future discussion on core issues.

Furthermore, the recognition of the SLMM proposals paves the way for a fully fledged, de facto separate state. This is a further advancement of structures already established and consolidated since the ceasefire - like a police service, judiciary, a taxation system, administrative service, land forces and a civilian militia among others.
Even at the expense of being accused as a saboteur, would it be wrong to ask whether someone would now suggest that these structures, much strengthened after the ceasefire, also be recognised as a de facto state?

Therefore, for the UNF Government to remain stoically silent when these proposals are being made by the SLMM raises serious questions. Strangely, there has been no official response so far although the issue concerns the sovereign rights of the people.
These developments come at a time when two other crucial matters remain unresolved. They relate to the LTTE demand for troop withdrawals from Jaffna peninsula, more particularly the headquarters of the 51 Division and the headquarters of 512 Brigade, from the town area. They are now located in two hotels and some 80 houses.

The Government move to shift them to state land next to the Police Station, adjoining the damaged, old Dutch Fort area, has been rejected by the LTTE. Now a fresh controversy is brewing. With no other suitable location available near the town area, the choice before the Government is to shift them to the Security Forces Headquarters complex in Palaly - a move strongly opposed by the Army hierarchy. Pressure is also mounting on the Government to make substantive withdrawals from other areas in the High Security Zone (HSZ).

Amidst Tiger guerrilla military preparations, evident at ceremonies last week to mark the third anniversary of their capture of Elephant Pass military base, another matter has been engaging the attention of the Government.

It is a close scrutiny on military preparedness. The move to release funds to procure at least three months requirements of urgently needed items or other priority purchases, for the first time since the ceasefire, has created an all too familiar scenario - arms dealers and their agents scurrying for deals. It is reminiscent of the collapse of peace talks in 1995 and preparations for war thereafter.

One instance will give an idea. A controversial Mirihana (Nugegoda) businessman with strong political connections approached the State agency of a friendly country over a multi million dollar deal for trainer aircraft. He had assured an official there he could take a representative of the agency to a UNF politician at any time of the day or night and make sure the deal is put through.

Whether he is using the name of this influential politician or not is unclear but the commission, if he was allowed to work the deal, is said to run into over thirty million rupees.

The businessman, who is said to have been involved in earlier transactions as a middle-man had boasted he had donated five million rupees to the ruling party for their election campaign and wields great clout. The agency concerned has rejected the overture on the grounds that the deal was government to government.
So it is crisis management time for the UNF Government on all fronts.

SLMM’s Adjusted proposals
Here is the full text of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission's latest "ADJUSTED PROPOSALS FOR MEASURES PREVENTING CLASHES BETWEEN THE SLN AND LTTE AT SEA".

The four page document is signed by SLMM Head, retired Norweigian Major General Tryggve Tellefsen.

See Situation Report for a detailed account on how it compares with previous proposals on the same subject.

1. Introduction
Some of the most serious incidents related to the CFA have occurred at sea, endangering the ceasefire and the Peace Process.

To prevent future clashes at sea that could threaten the stability of the Cease Fire, the Sixth Round of Peace Talks has decided that effective arrangements for the operation of their naval units should be worked out and implemented.
Based on SLMM Initial Discussion Paper forwarded to the Parties and on the feedback/comments from the Parties, SLMM proposals are specified in Paragraph 2-11 below.

2. The Sri Lanka Navy
From SLMM point of view it is of the outmost importance that the mechanisms and arrangements specified in this document must not interfere with SL Navy's obligations and legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.

3. The LTTE Sea Tigers as a de facto naval unit
When the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) was signed on the 22nd of February 02, the LTTE fighting formations, including the Sea Tigers, existed. Consequently, the LTTE Sea Tigers exists as a De Facto Naval Unit. (In the Oxford Advanced Dictionary "De Facto" is defined as follows: Existing as a fact although it may not be legally accepted as existing). SLMM would like to emphasise that the LTTE Sea Tigers has neither legal rights nor any legitimate tasks of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. These obligations belong purely to the GOSL Forces.

It should also be noted that there are no requirements in the CFA to demobilise or disband any of the LTTE military units, including the LTTE Sea Tigers.
Furthermore, the final composition of The Sri Lanka Armed Forces should be reached in the peace negotiations.

4. Compliance with laws and regulations
The Parties’ naval units at all levels must comply fully with the CFA and with the International Laws at Sea, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of the 10th of Dec 1982.

5. Establishment of Regional Maritime Committees (RMC)
The feedback from LTTE states clearly that LTTE does not favour any RMC. Any incident at sea should be handled in the same way as on land by the existing organisations. The GOSL, however, proposes one Central Maritime Committee and two regional committees.

Based on SLMM experience and the requirement of immediate reaction to any incident, SLMM proposes that Regional Maritime Committees (RMC) should be established (one in Trincomalee and one in Jaffna). These committees will function as a tool to handle incidents and violations at sea. The RMC should consist of two (2) naval representatives from each Party and should be headed by SLMM. These Maritime Committees must play a proactive role, and should be authorised to carry out enquiries and make decisions and rulings in accordance with the CFA.

6. Offensive naval operations
Neither SLN nor LTTE Sea Tigers will conduct offensive or aggressive operations and movements at sea.

7. Identification, communications and information

a. Identification
The Parties' vessels will be marked in accordance with the United Nations Convention on The Law of the Sea of 1982.
b. Communications
To prevent misunderstanding and to exchange crucial information when needed, both Parties' vessels, when at sea, are to monitor channel 16 in accordance with the international laws at Sea.
c. Briefing on the CFA, Laws at Sea, ROE and other agreed regulations
All crews on all vessels belonging to SLN or LTTE Sea Tigers must be thoroughly informed and briefed on the CFA, ROE, specific agreed regulations between the Parties, and Rules and Regulations governing the Sea and good Seamanship.
8. Inspections
The SL Navy's obligations and legitimate tasks of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka are un-debateable. Hence, any vessels challenged or intercepted by the SLN, will obey instructions and orders given by the SLN, including (but not limited to):
a. An intercepted vessel must accept peaceful and legal inspection by SLN.
b. SLN inspections of LTTE vessels should in general terms be monitored by SLMM.
c. If deemed necessary interception and inspection of suspected vessels may also take place, with the presence of SLMM monitors, in the designated LTTE Sea Tigers Exercise Areas.
However, SLN will neither intercept nor inspect LTTE Sea Tiger vessels conducting training and live firing exercises in theallocated Training and Exercise areas.
d. SLN has the right to intercept and inspect LTTE Sea Tiger vessels operating outside the designated Training and Exercise areas. Such inspections, however, should be monitored by SLMM.
e. Denying inspections, destruction of evidence as well as committing suicide to avoid inspections will be considered as grave violations of the CFA.

9. Exercise and Training Areas
Balance of force is one of the key elements for the existing CFA. Hence, to maintain their Forces' capabilities both Parties must have the right to carry out training and exercises in designated areas. Such exercises and training should cause minimum disturbance to the normal life i.e. the fishery.

a. SLN must confine their exercises; specially live firing exercises, to specified exercise and training areas.
b. The LTTE Sea Tigers should be allocated exercise and training areas at sea, designed for navigation training and for live firing exercises as well
c. LTTE vessels sailing outside exercise and training areas will not carry weapons, ammunition or explosives onboard, except for special agreed arrangements.
d. For mutual trust and understanding and as confidence building measures, the SLN and the LTTE Sea Tigers should permit observers from the other Party, accompanied by SLMM monitors, onboard their vessels when conducting exercises and training in the North - eastern/western waters.
e. All naval exercises with more than two vessels will be notified to SLMM through the RMCs, and all live firing exercises will be notified, regardless of the number of participating vessels.
The notification should at least include type of exercise, duration, Startex and Endex, OiC, Exercise Areas to be used, number and type and name of vessels, number crew members, armament, number and calibre of rounds to be fired, firing position and target areas, caution areas, markings, communications, POC.

10. Rules of engagement
The SL Navy's obligations and legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka require proper Rules of Engagement (ROE) tailored to the implementation of the CFA and the measures spelled out in this document.

a. SLMM has studied carefully The SLN Rules of Engagement (ROE) of 6th Mar 02 (Re-dated to 17th April 03) attached to this document From SLMM's point of view these ROE are well tailored to the CFA - situation. However, the ROE have to include the SLN conduct and actions inside the LTTE designated training areas.
b. To prevent any misunderstanding the LTTE Sea Tigers must know the SLN ROE
c. If an incident at sea should occur, the Parties should refrain from escalating the situation by reinforcing the maritime presence at the scene.
d. SLMM naval monitors are available at a very short notice. Hence, if an incident at sea should occur, SLMM should be notified, and naval monitors sent to the scene immediately. (The Parties are responsible for the provision of security and transport).

11. Modalities for Sea Movements
The modalities for transport of LTTE cadres at sea have already been worked out and these operations will continue. However, there is a need to work out modalities for other movements at sea, such as:
Transport of LTTE Area Commanders; and
Transport of legal supplies and commodities.

12. Finalisation

a. SLMM requests the Parties to examine this document and forward their comment to SLMM HQ not later than 30th April 03.
b. Between the 30th of April and the 4th of May SLMM intends to have separate discussions with the Parties on the matter.
c. SLMM suggests that a Finalisation meeting between senior naval and political representatives from both Parties, the Facilitator and SLMM should take place at Omantai crossing point on the 7th of May 03.
d. The Parties should inform the Facilitator and SLMM immediately if they agree to the above mentioned training.

Respectfully yours,
Tryggve Tellefsen
Major General
Head of SLMM
Attachments:
Annex A: LTTE Sea Tigers exercise and training areas
Annex B: SLN ROEs of 6th Mar 02 (re-dated to 17th April 03)
Annex C: Transport of LTTE Area Commanders in GOSL controlled areas.

Comparison at a glance
Here is a comparison of the proposals contained in the Initial Discussion Paper and Adjusted Working Document.

They show that despite widespread protests, the SLMM has not diluted its proposals but expanded on them.

Initial Discussion Paper
Recognition of the LTTE Sea Tigers
In the spirit of the CFA the GOSL, and especially the SLN, should recognize the LTTE Sea Tigers as a de facto naval unit and the LTTE should be excluded from the law concerning limitations on outboard motors (OBM's) horsepower.

Adjusted Working
Document
The LTTE Sea Tigers as a de facto naval unit
When the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) was signed on the 22nd of Feb 02, the LTTE fighting formations, including the Sea Tigers, existed. Consequently, the LTTE Sea Tigers exists as a De Facto Naval Unit. (In the Oxford Advanced Dictionary "De Facto" is defined as follows: Existing as a fact although it may not be legally accepted as existing). SLMM would like to emphasise that the LTTE Sea Tigers has neither legal rights nor any legitimate tasks of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. These obligations belong purely to the GOSL Forces.

Initial Discussion Paper:
Exercise and training areas
SLN and LTTE Sea Tigers should have specific marked exercise and training areas at sea, designed for navigation training and for live firing exercise as well. LTTE vessels when at sea outside exercise areas should not carry weapons or explosives onboard.

Adjusted Working Document:
Exercise and training areas
Balance of force is one of the key elements for the existing CFA. Hence, to maintain their Forces' capabilities both Parties must have the right to carry out training and exercises in designated areas. Such exercises and training should cause minimum disturbance to the normal life i.e. the fishery.

a. SLN must confine their exercises; especially live firing exercises, to specified exercise and training areas.
b. The LTTE Sea Tigers should be allocated exercise and training areas at sea, designed for navigation training and for live firing exercises as well.
c.LTTE vessels sailing outside exercise and training areas will not carry weapons, ammunition or explosives onboard, except for special agreed arrangements.
d.For mutual trust and understanding and as confidence building measures, the SLN and the LTTE Sea Tigers should permit observers from the other Party, accompanied by SLMM monitors, onboard their vessels when conducting exercises and training in the North - eastern/western waters.
e. All naval exercises with more than two vessels will be notified to SLMM through the RMCs, and all live firing exercises will be notified, regardless of the number of participating vessels.

The notification should at least include type of exercise, duration, Startex and Endex, OiC, Exercise Areas to be used, number and type and name of vessels, number crew members, armament, number and calibre or rounds to be fired, firing position and target areas, caution areas, markings, communications, POC.

SLMM on revised version
Hargrup Haukland, Deputy Head of the SLMM states in a news release on April 28:

"SLMM would like to draw attention to the latest article written by Iqbal Athas, "Shock and anger greet SLMM proposals", The Sunday Times, Sunday April 27, 2003, page 11. The document published as "SLMM proposals: The Revised Version" is not the adjusted working document submitted by SLMM to the parties on 24th April 2003. The correct name of the SLMM adjusted working document is "SLMM ADJUSTED PROPOSALS FOR MEASURES PREVENTING CLASHES BETWEEN THE SLN AND LTTE AT SEA", and cannot be compared in style or content with the document published in above mentioned article by Mr. Iqbal Athas.

"SLMM has throughout the peace process made every effort to facilitate the media, having as a policy a very open and close working relationship with both national and international media channels. SLMM has made no attempts to influence what has been reported, and will not do so in the future. On the contrary SLMM has continuously stated that a free and active press is essential to the process, and has continuously encouraged and complimented the media in such ways that has been deemed appropriate.

"Concerning direct quotes and SLMM documents, which are published, there should be no deviations or misrepresentation in the reporting done by the media. Until this time there have been few such occurrences grave enough for SLMM to release separate statements to correct erroneous quotes or misrepresentations of SLMM documents.

The SLMM adjusted working document has been submitted to the parties on Thursday 24 April 2003, and continues to be a working document. It will not be released to the media by SLMM.”

How to witch-hunt a Defence Correspondent
My comments last week about pressure moves to silence me from telling the truth has had a sequel.

The Rupavahini, the national television network, in its news bulletin on Monday night claimed that it had (on April 23 ) only telecast a news report it had received . Hence there was no move on its part to accuse me as sabotaging the peace process or for suppressing me from speaking the truth.

As I said last week, in the news bulletin in question, Rupavahini quoted Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, as identifying me as campaigning together with a Sinhala newspaper against the peace process. According to the report, the confirmation purportedly came from the Managing Director of this newspaper group.

Nimal Welgama, the Managing Director of Upali Newspapers Ltd, (to whom the reference was made) denied he had made any remarks to confirm such claims. He said his reporters had verified the story from their own sources. Alas, there was no mention of this in Monday night's Rupavahini news bulletin.

It is no secret that "briefings" on pre-Cabinet meetings are not open to all the media except for those from State organisations and "friendly" media personnel. It is only the post-Cabinet media briefing that is open both to the foreign and local media.

On April 23, it was the Rupavahini that first broke the story about Premier Wickremesinghe's remarks. It was followed two days later in the ITN. Six days later, this is what The Sunday Leader said:

"Identifying the four as the JVP, arms dealers, defence correspondent of a Sunday newspaper and a Sinhala daily, the Prime Minister said he would be compelled very soon to go before the people and identify whom he described as the "saboteurs".

"And an inkling of what is to come was seen on the Sri Lanka Rupavahini news broadcast the very Wednesday night when the Prime Minister's reference was given coverage."

Then followed a report in the pro-LTTE Colombo based daily Sudar Oli. It was followed the next day by an editorial comment with a scathing attack on the Defence Correspondent. More LTTE channels will undoubtedly follow suit. Must one say anything more? - Iqbal Athas

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