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The Seven Sisters of South Asia: Where are they going? Excerpts from
the Tenth Lal Bahadur Shastri Memorial Lecture, 2003 delivered by
Lakshman Kadirgamar P.C. M.P. at the National Museum Auditorium
Janpath, New Delhi, India yesterday.
You will notice
that the title of this lecture is not "SAARC: where is it going?"
With conscious intent I pose the question "the Seven Sisters
of South Asia: where are they going?" The nuance is deliberate.
It reflects my view that SAARC - the South Asia Association for
Regional Cooperation - comprising Seven States is a grouping of
legal entities. States are devoid of hearts and feelings. They are
permanently locked into a pattern of elaborate political and diplomatic
manoeuvre which may or may not, at any given point of time or on
any particular issue, reflect accurately, or at all, the interests
and aspirations of the people at large whom they are supposed to
represent. SAARC is State-led, government-driven. The metaphor
of the sisters, on the other hand, conjures up an image of kith
and kin, a shared home in our vast sub-continent, and in the language
of the Colombo Declaration at the 10th SAARC Summit in 1998, "heirs
to a profound common civilizational continuum of great antiquity
which constitutes a historical basis for sustaining harmonious relations
among the people of the region". The sisters are mothers. Their
children - the people of South Asia - are thus, by definition, first
cousins. Sisters may suffer estrangement from time to time; more
often than not they make up, and family life is resumed. Blood is
thicker than water. During my seven
years as the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, I had the privilege
of a ringside seat at three Summits and Retreats. I had the special
privilege of chairing the Council of Ministers for three and a half
years - perhaps the longest tenure of that chair in the history
of SAARC - at a time when SAARC was in the doldrums; its very survival
at stake. Sri Lanka struggled to keep SAARC afloat. It was a lonely
period. I learnt much about SAARC in those years which I intend
to share with you today and with all those commentators on the affairs
of SAARC from whose writings I have drawn liberally. It seems clear
that although regional cooperation was the ostensible raison d'
etre of SAARC the masked agenda of each State, in relation to the
others, was the advancement, certainly the protection, of its own
national interests in South Asia. In this context SAARC was considered
relevant and necessary by its constituent members. It is their opinion
that counts. Thus, as I see it, SAARC was primarily intended to
be a political instrument designed for managing, through its various
regional mechanisms, a dialogue among its members, and by implementing
various joint programmes of action in areas of common, social, educational,
economic, cultural and humanitarian interest to create a degree
of stability in inter-State relations that would minimise, by encouraging
the habit of constantly working together on a variety of subjects,
the risk of disagreements and misunderstandings erupting into conflicts. If the question
is asked whether it is wrong (although in terms of realpolitik nothing
could be said to be wrong) for the SAARC States to look to their
regional organisation to fulfil and protect their individual national
interests, my answer would be certainly not because surely it must
be one of the principal aims of regional cooperation to ensure stability
in the region and one cannot achieve stability if the interplay
of national interests results in a state of chronic disequilibrium. In my view
the questions that should be posed, at this stage in the history
of SAARC, are whether SAARC has retained its original political
relevance and usefulness to its constituent members as a mechanism
for regional cooperation as well as a forum for bilateral consultation;
whether the regional, social and economic cooperation programmes
in which SAARC is engaged are effective; and whether it has acquired
additional political relevance and usefulness in the wider international
context. These are all mainly questions of fact, and evidence is
available on the basis of which answers could be formulated. On the question of political relevance, given the various national motives that impelled the SAARC States to get together in the first place, there is clear evidence that the States have used the SAARC forum to maintain continuity in their bilateral relations. It would be
timely, at this stage of the lecture, for me to branch off into
some personal reminiscences. They will reinforce my contention that
SAARC today retains its political relevance and usefulness. I also
raise questions as to whether good personal interactions between
SAARC leaders, especially of India and Pakistan, could actually
move SAARC forward and improve bilateral relations between its members.
I will give you some glimpses of the personal chemistry between
SAARC leaders and the mechanics of decision making, at the Summit,
drawn from my experience of two Summits. At the 1997
Male Summit Prime Minister Gujral of India and Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif of Pakistan met, I believe, for the first time or after many
years. When they embraced each other and broke out immediately into
animated Punjabi there was a palpable mood of elation not only among
all of us in the SAARC family but among the hardened international
journalists and cameramen who had assembled to cover the Summit.
A number of significant decisions came out of Male. One was, on
the proposal of Pakistan, to establish a Group of Eminent Persons
to undertake a comprehensive appraisal of SAARC and identify measures
to revitalize and enhance the effectiveness of the Association;
the second was that, in the interests of promoting overall development,
all SAARC projects need not necessarily involve all seven States;
the third was, on the proposal of India, that SAARC should move
to a Free Trade Area in 2001; the fourth, on the proposal of Sri
Lanka, concerned the process of informal political consultations. With regard
to the first, it is well known that the Group did produce a comprehensive
and stimulating, even controversial, report which merits close study
and implementation, whenever possible. With regard
to the second, there was a brief history behind it. The four SAARC
States in the North Eastern part of the sub-continent, led by India,
had come to an agreement (the Growth Quadrangle) to collaborate
on certain projects relevant to their area. Sri Lanka objected not
to the concept, which was eminently sound and covered by the Charter,
but to the procedure, bypassing Article Vll of the Charter, which
provides that "Standing Committee may set up Action Committees
comprising Member States concerned with implementation of projects
involving more than two but not all Member States." Pakistan
also lodged an objection; I do not recall on what ground. There
was no question of Pakistan, Maldives and Sri Lanka being able to
participate in such a geographically distant project but there was
no reason why the others could not benefit from a project that was
relevant to them. Sri Lanka felt that if the prescribed procedure
was bypassed there could be a danger of projects involving only
some members of SAARC leading to the beginning of the disintegration
of the Association. Intensive consultations took place at Male and
the agreed formula for solving the problem was expressed in the
following words of the Male Declaration "With the objective
of enhancing regional solidarity and promoting overall development
within SAARC, the Heads of State or Government encouraged, under
the provisions of Articles Vll and X of the Charter, the development
of specific projects relevant to the needs of three or more Member
States". Article X deals with the principle of unanimity in
decision making and the non-engagement of contentious bilateral
issues. The third and
fourth Male decisions had an element of drama. At the Retreat, where
only Heads and Foreign Ministers are present, Prime Minister Gujral
said, quite suddenly: "Excellencies, my country has been creating
difficulties for all of you with regard to trade and economic cooperation.
Therefore, I propose that we move to a Free Trade Area by 2001".
There was a moment of stunned disbelief. This was unexpected. After
all, the South Asia Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) had
come into force only in 1995 and was proceeding slowly in liberalizing
intra-regional trade. President Kumaratunga looked at me with a
quizzical expression. I said in a whisper: "Madam, accept it".
She addressed Prime Minister Gujral as follows:" Excellency,
Sri Lanka supports and welcomes your generous proposal." Seconds
later Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also accepted it. President Gayoom
spoke, as often, with caution. He was concerned, and rightly so,
that the smaller countries would not be able to keep the pace. It
was unanimously agreed that their needs must be respected. The Declaration
having noted with satisfaction the entry into force of SAPTA in
1995, "recognised the importance of achieving a Free Trade
Area by the year 2001 and reiterated that steps towards trade liberalization
must take into account the special needs of the Least Developed
Countries and that benefits must accrue equitably". The fourth
decision came equally, unexpectedly. President Kumaratunga had long
entertained the idea that SAARC had reached a sufficient degree
of maturity to warrant engagement in informal political consultations
on some of the grave problems that afflict the region without endangering
the Charter principle that "bilateral and contentious issues
shall be excluded from the deliberations" - meaning, of course,
the formal deliberations. When President Kumaratunga made this proposal
Prime Minister Gujral was visibly taken aback. He began to explain
that there were many implications involved and that the matter required
study. Then, prudently, he called for a coffee break. When we came
back he said, looking directly at President Kumaratunga: "How
can I say no to Your Excellency". Thus, the words of the Male
Declaration on this point read as follows: "The Heads
of State or Government recalled their commitment to the promotion
of mutual trust and understanding and, recognising that the aims
of promoting peace, stability and amity and accelerated socio-economic
cooperation may best be achieved by fostering good neighbourly relations,
relieving tensions and building confidence, agreed that a process
of informal political consultations would prove useful in this regard".
This concept
was unthinkable some years ago. SAARC has moved a long way from
the explicit words of the Charter. Each of the Male decisions was
a significant milestone on the road to effective regional cooperation.
An effete organisation does not make such decisions. Then came the Colombo Summit - the 10th. Nepal whose turn it was to host the Summit after Maldives, gave way to Sri Lanka in order that Sri Lanka would have the honour of hosting the Summit in the Golden Jubilee Year of its independence. This was the Summit that almost never took place. The drama on that occasion was quite deadly. The nuclear tests in May and June1998 by India and Pakistan shook the region. Indeed, they shook the world. Those who had no faith in SAARC expected a severe disruption of SAARC activities. That did not happen as a result of the tests. The prophets of doom predicted the end of SAARC. That did not happen either. When the tests
occurred the Summit, already scheduled for July, was certainly placed
in dire jeopardy. Preliminary soundings indicated that the other
four States, leaving out India and Pakistan who were not initially
consulted, had grave doubts as to whether the Summit could be held
as scheduled in the poisoned atmosphere that prevailed after the
nuclear tests. They were thinking
of a postponement. President Kumaratunga, sensing that a fateful
moment in the history of SAARC had arrived, decided that we must
do everything possible to save the Summit. A postponement might
have led to a situation where attitudes could harden between India
and Pakistan to such an extent that the very existence of SAARC
might become imperilled. I must confess Sri Lanka feared that SAARC
might actually die, and that it would die in our hands. We decided
to propose to the others that the Summit should focus on economic
matters for the first time. The idea was to move the focus away
from confrontation between India and Pakistan by providing a timely
forum for the SAARC States to reflect on the lessons to be learnt
from the financial difficulties which had then recently engulfed
the neighbouring region, South East Asia, indicating that while
globalisation has many credits, such as enhanced market access and
exposure to innovative technologies, it also carries the danger
that the contagion of adverse developments elsewhere in the global
economic system can spread all too rapidly to other regions. South
Asia, furthermore, should realise that a collective approach would
be useful in coping with the downside of globalisation. The approach
of SAARC towards these problems could be twofold. Firstly, it could
develop its potential economic stre-ngth through SAPTA and SAFTA;
and secondly, as a parallel measure to the first, SAARC members
could henceforth, to the maximum extent possible, act in concert
in multilateral discussions on trade and financial issues. I was charged
by President Kumaratunga with the task of visiting the SAARC capitals
with this message in an effort to save the Summit. I visited them
in alphabetical order as I always did when embarking on a round
of formal consultations. In Bangladesh, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina
seemed, initially, to be in favour of a postponement, perhaps because
she appeared to be interested in conducting some shuttle diplomacy
between India and Pakistan (that is only a surmise), but she soon
came round and agreed that the Summit on the economic theme should
be held as planned. I was unable to visit Bhutan for personal reasons.
In India Prime Minister Vajpayee wholeheartedly welcomed both the
holding of the Summit and the choice of theme and pledged India's
fullest support. A similar reaction came from Prime Minister Koirala
of Nepal. And then on to Pakistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif began
by insisting at some length that security concerns should take precedence
over economic cooperation and that there was no point in discussing
the latter while avoiding the former. I said: "Prime Minister,
if you press that line India will not come to the Summit. That means
the Summit will not only have to be postponed but it may never be
held. SAARC will die in the hands of Sri Lanka". His response
was swift and unexpected: "No, no, Minister, don't say that.
I cannot let that happen. Please tell President Kumaratunga that
I will come and I will give her my full support. In our opening
statement I will set out our position relating to India, but at
the Retreat I will help her." My last call, by prior arrangement,
was on President Gayoom. As the incumbent Chairman he wished to
hear the views of the other Heads before he made up his own mind.
He was hesitant about the wisdom of holding a Summit, lest it fell
apart, in such a tense atmosphere, but on hearing the reactions
of the other Heads he agreed to go along with them. After the nuclear
tests when the very future of SAARC could have been at stake, and
while offers were being made by various countries to host a meeting
between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif, both leaders
made it clear, and publicly, that, if they were to meet at all,
it would be at the forthcoming Colombo Summit and nowhere else.
To immense global relief they did meet in Colombo in July 1998,
just two months after the tests I remember thinking at that time
that when dealing with a family squabble what better place is there
for a meeting than the home of one of the other sisters. The invaluable
role that SAARC plays in providing a forum for bilateral discussions,
especially between India and Pakistan, without any loss of face,
at a time when their relations are at a low ebb, was vividly illustrated
by the choice of the 10th Summit at Colombo for their first meeting
after the tests. This event clearly underlined the political relevance
and usefulness of SAARC. When the formal
proceedings began Pakistan fired its promised salvo. India's statement
was restrained. In the back rooms of the Conference, however, the
Indian and Pakistani delegations of officials seem to have gone
for each other hammer and tongs because the text of the draft Declaration
which the Standing Committee of Foreign Secretaries sent up to the
Council of Ministers was full of what in conference jargon is called
square brackets, that is, brackets within which alternative formulations
are placed when no agreed text is possible. When this mangled
text came to the Council late on the evening of the second day my
assessment of the situation as Chairman was that it would be a waste
of time for the Council to attempt to remove the square brackets
when their officials had deliberately placed them there. Accordingly,
I suggested to the Council that we should send up the text, as it
was, to the Heads next morning at their Retreat for them to deal
with the square brackets. This was a highly unusual procedure -
bordering on discourtesy to the Heads - but extreme situations call
for innovative remedies. The Council agreed and the meeting was
terminated in half an hour. Unknown to my colleagues I was, of course,
gambling on the assurance that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had given
me at Islamabad a few weeks earlier - "at the Retreat I will
help her." Next morning
at the Retreat all went well. President Kumaratunga handled the
meeting with considerable aplomb. Every possible eventuality had
been rehearsed. An impressive programme of work emerged including
a number of new initiatives to be taken in the areas of poverty
eradication, education and literacy through distance learning organised
by a forum of Vice Chancellors of Open Universities, tourism, communications,
science and technology, the environment, youth, children, women
and the girl child, health, disabled persons, information, terrorism
and drug trafficking, the establishment of a SAARC cultural centre
and so on. Special mention should be made of the decision to start
work on a Social Charter for the region. It seemed to me quite remarkable
- and it says something for the resilience of SAARC - that barely
two months after the nuclear tests, probably the worst flash point
in Indo-Pakistan relations, their leaders could participate with
their peers in the formulation of such comprehensive programme of
regional activities. As the Retreat drew to a close President Kumaratunga said: "Excellencies, we are now left with the square brackets in the draft text that was sent to us by the Council. What do we do with them ?" Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif immediately said :"Excellencies, as far as I am concerned we can remove them if Prime Minister Vajpayee agrees". Mr. Vajpayee was reading a document, head down, spectacles on his nose. He looked up, somewhat startled, I think, but he recovered swiftly. He said: "I also agree". With those two simple statements the forest of square brackets fell down and the way was cleared for the officials to produce a clean text. Prime Minister Nawaz leant across to me and said "Minister, if we can't settle a small problem like this how are we ever going to solve Kashmir?" Prime Minister Sharif had certainly delivered on his promise to me. If only an accumulation of small problems solved could lead to the solution of the big one what a happy state of affairs that would be for India and Pakistan, for the region, for the world. But that is only wishful thinking. The conclusion I draw from these personal experiences is that good chemistry between the leaders, especially of India and Pakistan, and even the smaller States, do have a temporary effect on improving relations, but no more. The road from New Delhi to Islamabad is strewn with the boulders of history. Powerful compulsions and influences, domestic and foreign, unpredictable events, seem to render futile the well meant attempts of a few individuals, from time to time, to move those boulders. 1999 began with
a brave bus journey to Lahore which lifted the spirits of the entire
sub-continent only to end with the battle in the snows of Kargill
which brought the work of SAARC to a near halt for two years. In terms of finding a solution to one of the most complex problems of all time, one cannot reasonably expect a regional organisation to achieve in seventeen years what the United Nations has failed to achieve in fifty seven; to think otherwise is to condemn SAARC for failing to accomplish a recognised impossibility.
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