One good sling-shot at a real peace?
It's the motions of making peace that are more peaceful
than the peace itself. Peace is a slowly calibrated affair, in which all
sides make strenuous attempts not to tread on each others toes.
One of the first things about these peace efforts, that are reminiscent
of the earlier peace efforts, is that Prabhakaran himself is not interested
in participating in the talks.
It is the Indians who first learnt that there is no radical departure
from the approach of the LTTE to the previous talks. LTTE ideologue Anton
Balasingham had to consult with Prabhakaran, and he had to shuttle between
an Indian city and the Wanni, if the talks were to be productive. This
is the stated reason India was requested to provide a Southern Indian setting
for the talks.
If Musharaff and Vajpayee talked about Kashmir in Agra (and failed to
resolve anything) it stands to reason that one of the most vexed problems
in the South-Asian region be discussed by the chief protagonists - Prabhakaran,
and now Ranil Wickreme-singhe.
The Norwegians may argue that that's not how they made peace between
the Israelis and Palestinians. But, that's why after a generous distribution
of Nobel Prizes all around, the peace is still on the table.
To make the real peace, there have been several summits with Sharon
and Arafat, the two chief protagonists in attendance. Peace may have not
been made, yet, but at least there is no further yearning to distribute
Nobel Prizes to anyone. The real peace talks began only when the two chief
protagonists met. What went before was only a Nobel photo opportunity.
In Sri Lanka, the dynamics of the conflict are quite clear for anybody
who had done a serious study of the issue. The Manager of the conflict
is Prabhakaran and Prabhakaran alone. If he says the LTTE is the sole representative
of the Tamil people, what he says goes. If he says the LTTE is not the
sole representative of the Tamil people, that goes too.
The Norwegians are the facilitators of the talks. It means that if the
LTTE and the Sri Lankan government says collectively that the Norwegians
should jump, the Norwegians should ask how high - and proceed to jump.
But as it is, the Sri Lankan side seems to be gun-shy of asking the
Norwegians anything. The LTTE has not been too diffident. The LTTE has
already created a minor regional rumpus by asking Indian government to
host the talks. The Sri Lankan side on the other hand, has seen Norway
as more than a facilitator. The Sri Lankan side sees Norway as an agenda-setter
for the talks. The Norwegians have prior experience in these matters, they
know best, is the current Sri Lankan reasoning.
But, if the Sri Lankan government is interested in a lasting and a sustainable
peace, and not in a "peace interregnum'' of cease-fires and more cease-fires,
there is no reason why the Sri Lankan government cannot ask the Norwegians
to comply with some requests that will cut to the bone, and radically alter
the chances for peace.
The only real radical request that the Sri Lankan side can make is to
facilitate the arrival of the only real factor in this conflict to the
negotiating table - Velupillai Prabhakaran. This is the only move that
will galvanize the peace process, and which will make round-four of peace
talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE more meaningful than
the other round table chat sessions that have gone before it.
Whatever talks that are held between any team of LTTE negotiators with
Prabhakaran not in it, should be aimed towards one end _ that of facilitating
the arrival of Prabhakaran at the negotiating table.
Why this hasn't been even considered is the convenient assumption that
Prabhakaran is a cult-figure who operates by proxy. But, this cult status
has largely been accorded to him by the Sri Lankan government, and the
Sri Lankan makers of contemporary legend, such as commentators, authors,
and perhaps the Foreign Ministry.
If Prabhakaran has to be brought to the negotiating table, he has to
be asked. If the LTTE can request the Norwegians to ask the Indian government
the near-impossible of granting a Southern Indian venue for the talks,
there is no reason the Sri Lankan government cannot ask the Norwegians
to prepare the LTTE for a summit?
The charade of talks by proxy has gone on for too long, they have not
yielded anything, and are also viewed with such extreme skepticism by the
Sri Lankan side of the divide, that the attitude is in itself defeatist
from the beginning. This also creates much antipathy towards the Norwegians
for facilitating a prolonged meandering process, which is always read as
being a process that is disadvantageous to the Sri Lankan government.
Therefore, if the Sri Lankan side asks, the Norwegians should jump.
The assumption is that Prabhakaran would not bite. But whether he bites
or not, the Sri Lankans would have already made a radical departure that
would give the message that the Sri Lankan side means business -only business.
Who needs legitimacy more than the LTTE in the international political
arena? The answer is Velupillai Prabhakaran. All things considered, it
will be perhaps an offer that's too tempting for Prabhakaran to refuse.
If the Sri Lankan side asks, Prabhakaran doesn't turn up _ and if the talks
fielding a second eleven fails - the Sri Lankans have a chance of saying,
"we told you so _ this process was bound to be a charade without the supremo
in attendance.'' More than everybody else's, Ranil Wickremesinghe's political
future depends on these talks. More than anyone else _ he needs to make
the talks something of a galvanized process in which he creates a momentum
of his own, that cannot be easily resisted by the most stubborn and unyielding
forces. The only way to do that is to have Anton Balasingham as a decoration
in a Wickremesinghe-Prabhhakaran face-off that that would even confound
the Norwegians and their made to order peace service. |
