23rd July 2000

A self-created impasse

Even if the PA gets the same number of votes at the coming parliamentary elections as it had at the presidential election of 1999, the parties in the PA and all the other parties which collaborate with it (namely SLFP, LSSP, CP, SLMC, CWC, EPDP, PLOTE and the alternative group of the UNP), all these parties will be able to get only 115 seats out of the total of 225 parliamentary seats. If the number of votes the PA candidate polled at the presidential election of 99 drops by 10%, the total number of seats that all these parties will be able to win is 103.

What this shows is that under the existing district proportional system the PA will not be able to get a convincing win. Perhaps it might even lose its parliamentary majority. If that happens, even the success scored at the 1999 presidential election might be imperilled. At a presidential election the main contest is between the two main presidential candidates. At such an election the rivalries between local leaders of the same party do not come to the fore. Every supporter of a party votes for the candidate of the party. It will be possible to bring forth organised villainy too without difficulty.

However it is impossible to prevent the emergence of a rabid contest among local leaders of the same party at a parliamentary election. In such complex conditions it is difficult to implement a villainous programme. That is why the government has moved towards thinking that the existing district ratio system should be given up and that it should go for a mixed system if it (the government) wants to survive as the ruling party.

However, it is not possible to move in that direction without amending the constitution. Even if it is possible to get too thirds majority for such an amendment, it will be necessary to have a referendum for its enactment. But if all the opposition parties combine to reject the government at such a referendum, then the government will be placed in a more precarious position than it finds itself today. That is why the government is contemplating a way out which does not require a referendum.

On the other hand the minimum period required for a constitutional amendment and a referendum for the purpose is six months. The term of the present parliament is due to expire on August 24. Therefore, according to law, there is absolutely no possibility of changing the electoral system. However, the government thinks that it could be possible to get a solution to such difficult problem from the courts.

However, it is not possible, even for the courts, to give approval to a constitutional amendment that needs a referendum or to one that does not need a referendum, for a scheme for the purpose of extending the life of parliament, even for a few months. If that happens it will initially throw the entire judicial system into a massive crisis.

On the other hand, even the minority parties cannot agree to a social system of election. Such a system would limit further the representation which they have. That is why the SLMC as well as the CWC will not agree to it. No opposition party at all will like a too sudden and precipitate change. The JVP cannot agree to it. The UNP too cannot agree to it.

Consequently the rules of the contest cannot be changed at this moment without resorting to a very great and villainous action. If such a means is resorted to, the government will lose its legitimacy from that moment.

If the number of seats won by parties which are not prepared to co-operate with the government exceed that won by parties aligned with the PA and those which support it, the situation will inevitably arise that would push the executive presidential system into a major crisis.

The prime minister and the speaker are chosen and appointed by the parliament. If a member of the opposition becomes the speaker, then the opposition will have the ability to bring forward an impeachment against the president. The president cannot dissolve a newly elected parliament until a year passes. On the other hand the parliament, if it so desires, can bring down the presidential system by abstaining from passing the funds for the post of president.

Such a situation will lead to the emergence of a second centre of power. The president was elected by the people. However because that was only a victory she had scored in the past, it is improbable that a new people's power will bow to it.

The excellent analysis made by Dr. N.M. Perera about the possibility and nature of the crisis that might arise as a result of a president coming from one party and the parliament being dominated by another is valid even today. If the leaders of the P.A. had been wise, what they should have done was, not to attempt a ridiculous amendment of the constitution for giving the president the opportunity to stay in office until the end of a term, but to arrive at an agreement on a reform of the constitution and to make provision for the abolition of the presidential system with the inauguration of the new parliament. If that happened the president would have the possibility of entering the parliament either as prime minister or at least as the leader of the opposition. However the set up that has been created now has pushed her to a position in which she voluntarily reaches an impasse. If by any chance the P.A. fails to gain a majority in the next parliament, the MPs who would rise against the executive presidential system with the most violent emotions will be not those of the other parties but those of the P.A. itself.

Inside the glass house

Editorial/ Opinion Contents